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1Introduction
After being in Government one realizes that Parliament has a somewhat 
more peripheral role to perform. . . . Parliament is, in fact, not the centre 
of government. The centre of Government is the Cabinet.
—British cabinet minister quoted in Donald D. Searing, 
Westminster’s World (1994), 329 (italics added)
I must have attended nearly ninety Cabinet meetings. They lasted an 
average of ten minutes and all I did was sign documents.
—Former health minister and future prime minister Kan Naoto, quoted 
in Aurelia George Mulgan,  
Japan’s Failed Revolution (2003a), 156
System Failure
On the afternoon of March 11, 2011, an apprehensive nation looked to 
Prime Minister Kan Naoto and his cabinet for leadership and reassur-
ance in the aftermath of a series of cascading disasters. Unleashed by the 
most powerful temblor ever to hit the quake-prone country, the catastro-
phe began with the Eastern Japan Great Earthquake, one of the five stron-
gest in recorded history. Hundreds of aftershocks followed, and millions of 
households and businesses were left without electrical power. The earth-
quake produced an enormous tsunami that propelled a lethal wall of water 
ten kilometers inland. Nearly twenty thousand people died and more 
than three hundred thousand were displaced. Hundreds of thousands 
of homes, buildings, roads, bridges, railway lines, and other elements of 
critical infrastructure were destroyed or damaged. In addition, the earth-
quake and tsunami disabled the cooling systems at the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant, resulting in hydrogen explosions and visible damage 
to three reactors. These natural and man-made disasters produced a vast, 
heart-wrenching humanitarian crisis that was painstakingly reported by 
the domestic and international media. The survivors desperately needed 
shelter, drinking water and food, bathroom facilities, and medical care. 
And, with a late winter storm approaching, no time could be wasted before 
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launching a large-scale, coordinated rescue and recovery effort. Govern-
ment spokespeople called on citizens to remain calm and downplayed 
reports of a nuclear catastrophe.
But the leadership displayed by Kan and his cabinet was ridiculed by 
the mass media. One day after the earthquake, Kan assessed the stricken 
nuclear power plant from a helicopter (evoking criticism that his visit 
delayed crucial venting at the plant) and reportedly asked officials on the 
scene, “What the hell is going on?” (Guardian, November 2, 2011). Then, 
for the next few days Kan and his government’s spokespeople more or less 
read from a script written by the Tokyo Electric Power Company, the utility 
company that operates the plant. The Kan government repeatedly assured 
the nation that the situation was under control, even after the order was 
issued to evacuate tens of thousands of people living within a twelve-mile 
radius of the plant. The Kan government was also criticized for its human-
itarian response. “It’s been a week, and there’s still been no government 
help,” said a resident of one of the hardest hit areas, expressing the exas-
peration of many victims (Los Angeles Times, March 18, 2011). In response, 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano Yukio conceded, “In hindsight, we could 
have moved a little quicker in assessing the situation and coordinating all 
that information and provided it faster” (Bloomberg BusinessWeek, March 
18, 2011).
The fears of a distrustful public were substantiated when dangerous 
levels of radioactivity began to appear in milk and vegetables produced 
in the Fukushima area, and when the media reported that beef cattle 
fed contaminated hay had been shipped around the country. Then, one 
month into the crisis, Japan’s nuclear safety agency retroactively raised 
the event at Fukushima Daiichi from “Level 5” to “Level 7,” putting it on 
par with the Chernobyl catastrophe (Energy News, April 11, 2011). In the 
weeks that followed, opinion surveys showed that most citizens wished to 
do away with nuclear power. Meanwhile, Kan and various cabinet officials 
repeatedly contradicted themselves by calling for “de-nuclearization” and 
then asserting that the country could not do without nuclear energy. On 
August 30, with a sub-20 percent approval rating, Kan and his ministers 
resigned en masse amid criticism of the inept handling of the multiple 
disasters.
The first question raised by these events is this: Why did Prime Minister 
Kan and his cabinet ministers fail to use their powers to galvanize and reas-
sure the nation following the catastrophic sequence of events? Indeed, the 
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Kan cabinet’s inept handling of the March 11 triple disaster is surprising, 
given the fact that the cabinet’s disaster management machinery had been 
bolstered following the Murayama cabinet’s bungled response to the 1995 
Kōbe earthquake that claimed nearly sixty-five hundred lives.1 A similar 
question could be posed concerning the succession of Japanese prime min-
isters and their cabinets who failed to lead Japan out of the “lost decades” 
(ushinawareta jūnen) that followed the bursting of the bubble economy.2 
In fact, the Constitution of Japan vests executive power in the cabinet, and 
even a cursory reading of the historical record reveals that this “supreme 
law of the nation”—which, ironically, was authored in large measure by 
Americans who knew little about parliamentary democracy—aimed to 
establish a parliamentary cabinet system inspired by Britain’s “Westmin-
ster” model (Ward 1956, 1000; Stockwin 1999, 38; McNelly 2000, 65–66). 
Moreover, as we shall see, the executive leaders of the Japanese polity do, 
in fact, possess powers and prerogatives that are similar to those of their 
counterparts in other advanced parliamentary democracies.
It is tempting to blame Kan’s leadership for the flawed response to the 
calamities of March 11, which is exactly what the mass media did. Yet the 
scope and complexity of the disasters were unprecedented and would have 
proved a daunting challenge for any leader. The case can be made, there-
fore, that the flawed response was the result of failure of the cabinet system, 
not shoddy prime ministerial leadership. This draws attention to two addi-
tional puzzles. Why, after more than six and a half decades of parliamen-
tary democracy, has cabinet government failed to set root in Japan? And 
what forces conspired to give Japan’s cabinet system its characteristic form 
and function, unflatteringly described as an “un-Westminster” system 
commanded by prime ministers who are “among the weakest democratic 
leaders in the world” (George Mulgan 2003a, 140; Krauss and Pekkanen 
2010, 280)?
To solve these puzzles, we must trace the development of Japan’s parlia-
mentary cabinet system. In this introductory chapter, I survey the analyti-
cal topography and introduce the conceptual framework that informs this 
study. I draw upon concepts derived from institutionalization theory and 
historical institutionalism to create a unique lens through which to assess 
the process by which Japan’s cabinet system evolved and the factors that 
molded its distinctive form and functions. I contend that Japan’s cabinet 
system was transformed at eight historical junctures. In prewar times, sig-
nificant changes followed the 1868 Meiji Restoration, the advent of party-
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led cabinets in 1898, and their violent demise in 1932. In postwar times, 
the Allied occupation produced a dramatic reconfiguration, while signifi-
cant changes followed the emergence of the “1955 system” that ushered in 
the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) protracted hegemony, the “shocks” 
of the early 1970s, the advent of coalition cabinets in 1993, and the emer-
gence of Twisted Diets following the 2007 House of Councillors elections. 
The substantive chapters of this book trace the evolution of Japan’s cabi-
net system and, in so doing, “deal at length with history, and with time in 
history” (Braudel 1982, 26). Through this discussion, it will become clear 
that the present system is the product of a developmental process that has 
resulted in Japan’s inability to establish a properly functioning system of 
cabinet government.
Organization of the National Executive
The executive branch of the modern democratic polity is organized in 
one of three broad forms—presidential, semi-presidential, and parlia-
mentary. In a presidential system, legislative and executive powers are 
separated, while the symbolic and political functions of the executive 
are fused in a single office. Among the thirty-four advanced industri-
alized polities that make up the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD), the United States, Mexico, the Republic 
of Korea, and Chile are governed under presidential systems. Ministers 
in America’s presidential system go by the title of “secretary” and are 
appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate. But the U.S. 
cabinet has no formal constitutional role; rather, it is an informal, extra-
constitutional advisory organ that is not directly responsible to the leg-
islature. The cabinet is responsible to the president, and, as is the case 
with cabinets in most presidential systems, it is a relatively weak organ. 
Indeed, as the authors of a popular U.S. government textbook observe, 
“unlike in England and many other parliamentary countries, where the 
cabinet is the government, the American cabinet is not a collective body. 
It meets but makes no decisions as a group. . . . The cabinet is made 
up of directors, but it is not a board of directors” (Lowi and Ginsburg 
1998, 242–243). For this reason, meetings of America’s cabinet have 
been described as “vapid non-events in which there has been a delib-
erate non-exchange of information as part of a process of mutual non- 
consultation” (Weisband and Franck, quoted in Cronin 1980, 253). Hence, 
Introduction  5
the U.S. cabinet is not a “formally integrated institution,” but “more a col-
lection of a dozen or so secretaries who sometimes meet together in ses-
sions called by the president, and at his whim” (Cohen 1988, 23).
In a semi-presidential system, executive powers are divided between a 
popularly elected president and a prime minister. The president is endowed 
with considerable constitutional authority, while the prime minister also 
wields substantial power and is subject to the confidence of Parliament 
(Shugart 2005, 324). Semi-presidential systems can be subdivided into 
two types, premier-presidential and president-parliamentary. The French 
Fifth Republic (1956 to the present) is the best known and most widely 
emulated premier-presidential model, but somewhat similar systems also 
can be found in Portugal, Poland, Lithuania, and the Ukraine. The classic 
example of a president-parliamentary system was that of Germany’s Wei-
mar Republic (1918 to 1933), and this type of executive system is found 
in Russia, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Georgia, Armenia, Peru, and 
Mozambique. Among OECD countries, only France, Portugal, and Poland 
are governed under semi-presidential systems.
In a parliamentary system, the executive’s symbolic and political func-
tions are carried out by separate officeholders. The symbolic functions are 
the domain of a “head of state,” in effect a ceremonial figurehead, as is 
the case with the hereditary monarchs in Britain, Sweden, and elsewhere, 
as well as with India’s president.3 The political functions are entrusted to 
a “head of government.” In Britain’s widely emulated “Westminster sys-
tem,” the head of government, known as the “prime minister,” is the leader 
of the majority party or coalition in a popularly elected Parliament. This 
officeholder is selected by the Parliament, not through direct popular elec-
tions. Executive power is concentrated in the prime minister and “cabinet,” 
in essence a committee composed of “ministers” who head up the major 
departments of public administration. With few exceptions, ministers are 
recruited from the ranks of elected members of Parliament. The expecta-
tion that ministers should be elected MPs helps to ensure a “democratic 
character” to the cabinet, whose members are “accountable to the people’s 
elected representatives” (House of Commons 2010, 6). Because a single 
party or coalition controls Parliament as well as the executive, centralized 
and disciplined party control under strong prime ministerial leadership 
becomes the norm. Parliamentary cabinets make decisions as a collectivity, 
and their members are collectively responsible to the legislature. The prime 
minister and the cabinet serve at the pleasure of Parliament, which at any 
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time can remove them by passing a non-confidence resolution or rejecting 
a confidence resolution.
All together, twenty-seven of the thirty-four OECD countries can be 
classified as parliamentary democracies: the United Kingdom, Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Iceland, Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland, Italy, Spain, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, 
Israel, Greece, Turkey, and Japan. Indeed, since 1947 Japan has been gov-
erned under a parliamentary system, although the emergence of “party 
cabinets” in the 1920s and 1930s appeared “to be bringing a relationship 
between the Diet and the executive which resembles that of the British par-
liament to the cabinet” (Quigley 1932, 199). Although Japan’s brief prewar 
drift toward democracy ended in disaster, the postwar polity is founded on 
the institutions of parliamentary democracy.
Japan’s Cabinet System
Japan boasts all of the classic features of a parliamentary democracy. 
The head of state is the emperor, who as “the symbol of the State” per-
forms certain ceremonial duties (Constitution of Japan, Article 1). The 
head of government is the prime minister, who must be an elected mem-
ber of the Diet, as is also the case with a majority of cabinet ministers 
(Articles 67 and 68). The prime minister as well as all cabinet minis-
ters must be “civilian” (Article 66). In the event that the cabinet fails to 
retain the Diet’s confidence, the cabinet must resign en masse unless the 
House of Representatives is dissolved within ten days (Article 66). The 
prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to the Diet in the 
exercise of executive power, which has been interpreted to mean that 
all cabinet decisions should be unanimous (Article 66; Administrative 
Management Bureau 2007, 117; Tanaka 1976, 41). To secure unanim-
ity, the prime minister is empowered to appoint and dismiss ministers 
(Article 68). To facilitate the candid expression of views, no official pub-
lic minutes are kept at cabinet meetings, which only state ministers and 
three designated government officials—two deputy cabinet secretaries 
and the director general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau—are allowed 
to attend.4
The cabinet is responsible for performing a variety of functions. It 
administers the law, supervises the government bureaucracy, manages 
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foreign affairs, concludes treaties (with subsequent approval of the Diet), 
prepares and presents the budget to the Diet, enacts cabinet orders, and 
decides on amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restora-
tion of rights (Constitution of Japan, Articles 72 and 73). All laws and cabi-
net orders must be signed by the relevant ministers and countersigned by 
the prime minister to signify that they have assumed responsibility for the 
faithful implementation of those decisions (Article 74). A cabinet minis-
ter is the supreme authority within each government ministry and agency, 
supervising the agency’s officials, submitting bills and government ordi-
nances to the cabinet for approval, and approving all significant departures 
in agency policy and procedure. The minister is empowered to appoint 
and dismiss agency officials below a certain rank (Park 1986, 1). The prime 
minister and cabinet occupy the apex of the central executive, and are 
tasked with coordinating and securing administrative uniformity among 
the various organs of government and bearing ultimate responsibility for 
all executive activities of the state (Administrative Management Bureau 
2007, 116–117). The powers and perquisites that go along with ministe-
rial appointment exude an irresistible appeal for Japanese MPs, which has 
given rise to the term “minister disease” (daijinbyō) to describe the phe-
nomenon (Kuroda and Miyagawa 1990, 6). The celebrity status accorded 
ministers is attested to by the “tent villages” (tento mura) that the press 
corps sets up outside the Prime Minister’s Official Residence whenever a 
new cabinet is formed.5
The official view of the Japanese government is that “the Cabinet, 
Ministries, Agencies, and public corporations function as one organiza-
tion, at the top of which exists the Cabinet. . . . Consequently, it is natural 
that the agencies and corporations which take care of national adminis-
tration should be systematically organized under the Cabinet” (Adminis-
trative Management Bureau 2007, 116; italics added). While the ministers 
attract the lion’s share of media attention, these busy leaders could not 
perform their multifarious functions without the assistance of a large, 
professional support staff. Indeed, a minister must simultaneously don 
multiple hats—those of government representative, public agency head, 
front-bench party leader, and member of Parliament. The Cabinet Office 
assists with overall administrative coordination and a variety of other 
concerns, including the handling of official documents. The Cabinet Sec-
retariat arranges cabinet meetings, provides safekeeping for official seals, 
and supports the chief cabinet secretary in sundry other ways. The Cabi-
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net Legislation Bureau (Naikaku hōsei kyoku, or CLB)—staffed entirely 
by elite career officials seconded by government ministries—offers legal 
opinions and assists in drafting legislative bills, cabinet orders, and pro-
posed treaties (Asahi Shimbun Globe, June 14, 2010). In addition, the 
Security Council of Japan and other cabinet-related councils and com-
mittees provide for focused policy deliberation. Taken together, these 
organs—and their mutually supportive and interdependent interac-
tions—constitute Japan’s cabinet system.6
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Figure I.1. Japan’s Cabinet System (2nd Abe Cabinet, December 26, 2012)
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The Comparative Perspective
Cross-national comparisons help us understand the extent to which Japan’s 
premiers and cabinet ministers are adequately equipped to shoulder their 
weighty administrative burdens. As noted earlier, Japan’s cabinet serves at 
the pleasure of the Diet, which can topple it with a simple majority vote in 
support of a non-confidence resolution or by rejecting a confidence res-
olution. Similar constitutional conventions are in place in Britain, Can-
ada, and Australia. By way of contrast, a majority of German legislators 
must first elect a successor before the Bundestag can dismiss a chancel-
lor (Kommers 1997, 191; Lancaster 1997, 317). In the Japanese case, non- 
confidence resolutions have succeeded on only four occasions, most 
recently in 1993 when the Miyazawa cabinet was ousted, injecting a brief 
hiatus in the LDP’s legislative hegemony.7 Likewise, Japan is one of many 
advanced countries that require or permit cabinet ministers to be recruited 
from the ranks of elected members of Parliament.8 Except for the occa-
sional non-MP appointed to a ministerial post, Japanese cabinet ministers 
are entitled to hold a seat and to vote in Parliament, as is the case in Brit-
ain, the Commonwealth countries, and elsewhere.9 Such is not the case in 
Holland and Norway, where ministers are obliged to relinquish their par-
liamentary seats, nor in Sweden, where ministers may hold parliamentary 
seats but cannot vote (Andeweg and Bakema 1994, 66; Strom 1994, 43; and 
Larsson 1994, 172).
The Japanese prime minister’s formal powers are comparable to those 
of heads of government in other established parliamentary democracies. 
As noted earlier, Japan’s prime minister is empowered to appoint and 
remove cabinet ministers, which also holds true for the British, Danish, 
Icelandic, Irish, and Swedish heads of government. In contrast, the Dutch, 
Finnish, and Norwegian heads of state lack the power to select or sack cab-
inet ministers unilaterally (Andeweg and Bakema 1994, 59; Nouisiainen 
1994, 98–99). Unlike the British prime minister, Japan’s prime minister is 
not empowered to create departments of state, as this requires Diet leg-
islation. However, as part of the 2001 central government restructuring, 
the Japanese premier is now able to create ministerial portfolios known 
as “minister of state for special missions” (tokumei tantō daijin) (Head-
quarters for the Administrative Reform of the Central Government 2000). 
Nevertheless, while there has been some evidence of “presidentialization” 
of the prime minister’s role or the emergence of a “kantei” (the Japanese 
10  Growing Democracy in Japan
equivalent of the White House) style of diplomacy, few, if any, would argue 
that the actual influence of the Japanese premier even remotely compares 
to that exercised by the British prime minister (Krauss and Nyblade 2005, 
368; Shinoda 2007; Thayer 1996, 71).
Japan’s cabinets are similar in size to those in other parliamentary 
democracies.10 The Cabinet Law specifies that the number of ministers 
of state shall not exceed fourteen, except under special circumstances, in 
which no more than four additional ministers may be appointed. Including 
the prime minister, therefore, the maximum number of ministers in a Japa-
nese cabinet is eighteen. In December 2010, the average membership size of 
the twenty-nine OECD member countries governed under parliamentary 
systems was just under nineteen members (Central Intelligence Agency 
2010). The Israeli and Canadian cabinets were the largest, with thirty-five 
and thirty ministers, respectively, while the smallest were the Icelandic 
(twelve ministers) and Hungarian (eleven ministers) cabinets. Meanwhile, 
the Swiss Federal Council—which is not responsible to the elected assem-
bly, and, therefore, not a parliamentary cabinet—was composed of just 
seven members. As Klimek and his colleagues discovered, there is a high 
significance of negative correlation between a cabinet’s size and its perfor-
mance.11 With a few exceptions, cabinets that number more than around 
twenty members surpass the critical “Coefficient of Inefficiency,” resulting 
in poorer performance as measured by the United Nations Development 
Program’s Human Development Indicator (Klimek et al. 2008).
By law, Japan’s cabinet performs its functions through “cabinet meet-
ings” (kakugi) that are presided over by the prime minister, who sets the 
agenda for discussion, during which each minister is allowed to pose ques-
tions (Cabinet Law, Article 4). Three main types of cabinet meetings have 
come to exist. The bulk of cabinet-related business is conducted in biweekly 
“regular cabinet meetings” (teirei kakugi), while “special cabinet meetings” 
(rinji kakugi) are convened whenever necessary. When an immediate cabi-
net decision is required, officials of the Cabinet Secretariat are dispatched 
to secure signatures (kaō) from each minister in what are referred to as 
“revolving cabinet meetings” (mochimawari kakugi), even though face-to-
face meetings do not occur.12 Cabinet meetings take place in a special room 
in the Prime Minister’s Official Residence, with ministers seated around a 
round wooden table in a predetermined order.13 The prime minister’s seat 
is considered the center of the table, with the chief cabinet secretary on the 
right and the holders of senior posts—generally beginning with the for-
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eign or finance ministers—seated in alternating right-left order around the 
table. This arrangement is somewhat similar to that of the British cabinet, 
whose seating is arranged hierarchically, with the cabinet secretary on the 
prime minister’s immediate right and holders of senior posts on his or her 
left or across the table (Kavanaugh 2000, 247).
If time spent in cabinet meetings is any indication, Japan’s ministers 
are about as busy as their counterparts in other parliamentary democ-
racies. Regular cabinet meetings are generally held each Tuesday and 
Friday at 10:00 a.m., but when the Diet is in session the meetings are 
convened at 9:00 a.m. in a special room in the National Diet Building. 
By way of comparison, the Irish cabinet also meets biweekly, but min-
isters are required to attend an annual retreat lasting two or three days. 
The British cabinet normally meets for about two hours each Thursday 
morning at Whitehall when Parliament is in session, although under 
Tony Blair cabinet meetings were said to last about an hour (ibid., 247). 
Cabinets in Australia, Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Den-
mark also meet once weekly. The Norwegian cabinet generally meets on 
Monday and Thursday, and again briefly in the presence of the monarch 
on Friday. Meanwhile, the Swedish cabinet meets weekly when the Riks-
dag is in session, but ministers who are in Stockholm are expected to 
meet each weekday for “lunch deliberations.” In addition, Swedish min-
isters are expected to attend a weekly lunch deliberation as well as a short 
annual retreat (Larsson 1994, 173–174).
Japanese cabinets endure about as long as their counterparts in other 
countries. According to the government’s official system, the thirty-two 
individuals who held the premiership from May 1946 (first Yoshida cab-
inet) through December 2012 (second Abe cabinet) formed a total of 
ninety-three cabinets, or just under three cabinets per government. The 
average life expectancy of these governments was 760 days, meaning that 
prime ministers rotated about every two years.14 In contrast, a study of 
government duration in nineteen Western countries from 1945 to 1999 
found the Finnish (399 days), Italian (350 days), and Portuguese (327 days) 
cabinets to be the most ephemeral, while the Canadian (945 days), British 
(995 days), and Luxembourgian (1,122 days) cabinets were the longest-
lived (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2004). Viewed in comparative con-
text, therefore, Japan’s governments find themselves in the middle of the 
pack when it comes to life expectancy.
Beginning in the early 1970s, a hierarchy of ministerial portfolios 
12  Growing Democracy in Japan
emerged in Japanese cabinets that bears a close likeness to those found in 
other parliamentary democracies. Because the Japanese prime minister is 
the head of government and something more than primus inter pares in 
cabinet decision-making, it is natural that that portfolio would be accorded 
high esteem. In addition, the holders of the finance, foreign, and interna-
tional trade and industry portfolios are regarded as the crème de la crème 
of departmental ministers (Kato and Laver 1998; Ono 2012). In this regard, 
the ministerial pecking order in Japanese cabinets corresponds with the 
results of an expert survey of twenty-three countries, which found that the 
finance and foreign affairs portfolios ranked no lower than third among all 
portfolios, while the economy/industry portfolio also ranked near the top 
(Laver and Hunt 1992, 133–316).
Of course, a permanent, professional staff is essential to assist minis-
ters in shouldering the onerous executive burden they are called upon to 
bear. In Japan, the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Secretariat, and Cabinet Leg-
islation Bureau provide a large measure of this administrative support. In 
2012, the Cabinet Office boasted a full-time staff of 2,202 national govern-
ment employees, while the respective staffs posted to the Secretariat and 
CLB numbered 338 and 72 employees (Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications 2012b). On the surface, the permanent staff supporting 
Japan’s cabinet—nearly 3,000 employees—would appear to be consider-
ably larger than that employed in the British Cabinet Office, with its staff 
of 1,230 employees (Office for National Statistics 2010). However, if the 
employees posted to Britain’s other cabinet-related agencies are included—
in other words, the Central Office of Information (970 staffers), National 
School of Government (250 staffers), and Office of the Parliamentary 
Counsel (80 staffers)—the difference is not significant.
At least on the surface, therefore, Japan’s premiers and cabinet minis-
ters appear to be amply empowered, sufficiently supported, and similar in 
form and function to their counterparts in other advanced parliamentary 
democracies. In other words, it seems that Japan’s foremost executive lead-
ers possess the requisite formal authority and resources to carry out the 
functions tasked to them by the Constitution and related laws. Why, then, 
did the Kan cabinet fail to provide strong, effective leadership after the 
disasters of March 11? And why did a succession of prime ministers and 
cabinets who occupied the executive helm throughout the “lost decades” 
fail to muster those powers to right the ship? Is this the result of flawed 
leadership or of the failure of the cabinet system?
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Institutionalization
A theoretical guide is necessary to understand the process by which Japan’s 
cabinet system came to be what it is. The question to begin with is this: To 
what extent has cabinet government become institutionalized in the Jap-
anese context? Institutionalization is a ubiquitous process that has been 
observed in a variety of national, subnational, and supranational politi-
cal organizations around the world (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Tolbert and 
Zucker 1996). It employs parsimonious concepts to explain a universal 
process not bound by geography, culture, time, or regime type.
Institutionalization is the process whereby an organization becomes 
well established and, in so doing, acquires value and stability as an end in 
itself (Huntington 1965, 394; Ragsdale and Thies 1997, 1282). An organiza-
tion’s value is enhanced as it develops a distinctive identity, functions, and 
mode of operation. The degree of institutionalization is determined by the 
organization’s progression along four dimensions: complexity, coherence, 
autonomy, and adaptability (Huntington 1965). Complexity is reflected in 
the emergence of an increasingly intricate organizational structure, division 
of labor, and growth of specialized units. Coherence involves the establish-
ment of boundaries that distinguish the organization and its human ele-
ment from all other people and groups. Autonomy, in the case of a political 
organization, is the quality of being relatively free of constraint such that 
the organization has “authoritative control over policy outcomes, acceded 
to by those in other organizations” (Ragsdale and Thies 1997, 1282). Adapt-
ability refers to the ability of an organization to perpetuate its existence 
through leadership succession and modification of its roles, functions, and 
procedures in response to external and internal challenges. Complexity and 
coherence relate to the organization’s internal dynamics, while autonomy 
and adaptability relate to its interactions with the external environment. 
An organization is not fully institutionalized until it has achieved high and 
enduring levels of development in each of these four measures.
There is no agreement concerning institutionalization’s causes. Per-
haps the earliest formulation was Durkheim’s “density theorem,” which 
holds that “the division of labor varies in direct proportion to the volume 
and density of societies, and if it progresses in a continuous manner over 
the course of social development, it is because societies become regularly 
more dense and generally more voluminous” ([1893] 1984, 205; Polsby 
1968, 164). This is implicit in Weber’s thesis that large, highly differentiated 
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bureaucracies, whose power derives from rational-legal authority, emerged 
as a consequence of the development of market economies and centralized 
states (Weber 1946, 204–209). It is also evident in Michels’s study of Ger-
many’s Social Democratic Party, from which he derived his famous “iron 
law” that holds, “who says organization, says oligarchy” (Michels [1911] 
1962). In fact, the expansion of the role of government has been a persis-
tent theme in countries around the world since the nineteenth century, as 
reflected in the rise of the “Administrative State” and the “Welfare State” 
(for example, Ashford 1986). Hence, as a larger portion of the nation’s 
life came under the sway of centrally made decisions, “the agencies of the 
national government institutionalized” (Polsby 1968, 164).
Yet institutionalization is also driven by human choice and ambition. 
This is seen in Parkinson’s observations concerning increases in staff size 
and paperwork generated in Britain’s Colonial Office even as the overseas 
empire was contracting, and, therefore, should have resulted in the oppo-
site. Indeed, Parkinson’s “laws”—officials “multiply subordinates, not rivals” 
and “make work for each other”—derive from the rational self-interested 
actions of bureaucratic actors rather than abstract organizational forces 
(Parkinson 1955). As Ragsdale and Thies observe, individuals affiliated 
with the organization employ their energies and seek to amass “resources 
to establish the organization, bolster its persistence, and make their activi-
ties more routine. The environment creates conditions for the organization 
to be taken for granted as it conducts specialized activities upon which 
other units grow to depend” (1997, 1283; also Zucker 1991, 105). As Sear-
ing found in his study of political roles in Britain’s Westminster system, the 
principal incentives that attracted ministerial aspirants were ambition, sta-
tus, stimulation, and power (1994, 356–357). Ministers—the vast majority 
of whom are, after all, professional politicians—seldom see their careers 
advance when their agencies shrink in budget, staff size, or policy signifi-
cance. Such is also the case with career bureaucrats, who have a vested 
interest in seeing their agencies grow.
Institutionalization theory provides conceptual tools with which to 
explain how Japan’s cabinet system developed. It draws attention to the 
frequently uneven progress of development along the dimensions of insti-
tutionalization and the consequences that follow. For example, the battle 
to privatize Japan’s postal system pitted the Koizumi cabinet against the 
“postal family,” a deeply entrenched subgovernment composed of influ-
ential LDP lawmakers, government officials, and postmasters that epito-
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mized Japan’s rigidly fragmented political structure. To adapt government 
policy to restore economic prosperity, it was necessary for the Koizumi 
cabinet to declare war on a traditional pillar of support for the ruling party 
that gave birth to the cabinet. “When institutions are better at holding the 
line than responding to change,” explains Kesselman, “political constraint 
and overinstitutionalization can occur” (1970, 25; Reed 1991). I explore 
the implications of uneven institutional development in the substantive 
chapters of this book, but for now it is necessary to ask how to identify 
a well-established cabinet system. Specifically, what would such a system 
look like in the Japanese context? On this score, the logical comparison is 
to Britain’s widely emulated Westminster system.
The Westminster Ideal
An established Westminster system is characterized by high and enduring 
levels of development in each of the four measures of institutionalization. 
Because ministerial appointment bestows prestige, power, and perquisites, 
cabinet portfolios are highly coveted and almost exclusively reserved for 
ruling party lawmakers who possess the requisite level of seniority and 
ambition. Because prime ministers believe that “parliamentary apprentice-
ships are prerequisites for understanding ministerial roles and perform-
ing them successfully,” they will distribute few if any portfolios to “lateral 
entrants” or insufficiently senior MPs (Searing 1994, 362; Rose 1971, 401). 
British ministers tend to serve nearly fifteen years in Parliament before 
entering the cabinet, and a similarly lengthy parliamentary apprenticeship 
seems reasonable to expect of Japanese ministerial aspirants (Searing 1994, 
348; Heasman 1962b, 318). Assuming that elections are held every three 
years, novice ministers would be in their fifth terms. It follows that the 
majority of ministers will embark upon political careers by the time they 
reach their mid-forties and will emerge from “occupations of a kind that 
facilitate the pursuit of politics as a serious career,” such as law, media, aca-
demia, parliamentary staffer, and local elective politics (King 1981, 262–
263). Few young people possess the “name brand,” established campaign 
organizations, or riches required to launch and sustain a parliamentary 
career. This puts the offspring or close relatives of MPs in a position of 
comparative advantage. And because “the only significant path to the top 
of the polity passes through the university,” cabinet ministers will tend to 
be well educated (Aberbach et al. 1981, 51).
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Complexity is a defining characteristic of an established Westminster 
system. The British system began as a small, nominal cabinet within the 
Privy Council and evolved into an expansive and specialized network of 
executive organs, multiple levels of ministerial roles, and a “pecking order 
within the Cabinet that is very well recognized by Ministers” (Searing 
1994, 283–284). I would expect those at the top of the ministerial hierar-
chy to possess the basic attributes required of a cabinet minister mentioned 
in the previous paragraph, albeit in more concentrated dosages.15 It is rea-
sonable to assume that the high-status ministers will have been elected to 
at least seven parliamentary terms in the dominant chamber of Parliament, 
amassed more than two decades of service as MPs, and previously held 
ministerial posts. In other words, the highest-status portfolios will not be 
given as gold watches simply to reward many years of faithful service. Also, 
the lion’s share of prestigious portfolios likely will be reserved for men—
alas, “women have been found to hold fewer cabinet positions, and where 
they have been appointed, to be mainly allocated portfolios with ‘femi-
nine’ characteristics and lower levels of prestige” (Krook and O’Brien 2012, 
1). While the British cabinet evolved with little external influence, Japan’s 
modern cabinet system incorporated elements of foreign models. Thus, 
even though the postwar cabinet system did not materialize out of thin 
air, I would expect advancement toward institutionalization to be reflected 
in increasingly differentiated organizational structures and ministerial 
roles (Searing 1994, 344). This does not necessarily mean that cabinets will 
become larger and larger. On the contrary, I would expect that lawmakers 
would, through intuition or trial and error, discover that, as “Parkinson’s 
Law” and empirical assessment have shown, cabinets of more than around 
twenty members perform poorly (Klimek et al. 2008).
An established Westminster-style cabinet is the most powerful exec-
utive organ, and as such it should be able to act with relative autonomy 
vis-à-vis the legislature, government bureaucracy, and other potential 
competitors for executive primacy (Lijphart 1999, 10). The cabinet sets the 
general course for government policy, acts as the ultimate coordinator and 
arbiter of last resort in executive affairs, and oversees the various depart-
ments of government. In the words of a former British cabinet minister, 
the cabinet is at the “centre of the web” (Searing 1994, 366). The cabinet 
sets the agenda for legislative deliberation and sponsors the largest share 
of policies that are enacted into law. In addition, the cabinet oversees the 
government bureaucracy, referees inter-ministerial disputes, and reviews 
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and authorizes all major policy decisions (Kavanaugh 2000, 239). Minis-
ters are the supreme authorities within their departments, over which they 
are individually responsible. At the same time, all ministers are subordi-
nate to the cabinet, which, as a team, possesses powers that are greater 
than the sum of its parts. The prime minister has the power to appoint and 
dismiss ministers and, of necessity, plays a role that exceeds that of first 
among equals. Yet the cabinet’s “consent to major initiatives usually must 
be obtained, and not even the most determined Prime Minister could pre-
vail against the opposition of his or her colleagues for long” (Thomas 1998, 
12). In sum, a Westminster-style cabinet should be firmly entrenched in 
the center of the central state executive.
Finally, a well-established Westminster-style system is the product of 
an evolutionary process that requires “the capacity to respond to the chal-
lenges of time and changing environment; the dropping of old tasks and 
taking on of new ones and the resolution of succession problems” (Domin-
guez and Mitchell 1977, 173). For this reason, I perceive organizational 
age and iterated leadership succession as simple indicators of durabil-
ity. Indeed, a defining feature of the Westminster system is the broadly 
embraced legitimacy and irregularity by which prime ministers and cab-
inet members assume their executive posts, only to be replaced by new 
prime ministers and cabinets. To endure and continue to fulfill their core 
functions, cabinets must adapt to the challenges posed by protracted eco-
nomic downturns, mushrooming government deficits, public health con-
cerns, environmental problems, demographic changes, and natural and 
manmade disasters. In addition, they must deftly respond to interna-
tional structural changes (for example, the end of the Cold War), tension 
in foreign relations, territorial conflicts and challenges to national sover-
eignty, and homegrown as well as international terrorism. Likewise, they 
must effectively respond to structural changes or challenges in the political 
order (such as the advent of coalition governments) and major corruption 
scandals.
In sum, a well-established Westminster system boasts high and endur-
ing levels of development in each of the four dimensions of institution-
alization. The complexity and coherence dimensions relate to the cabinet 
system’s internal orientation, while the autonomy and adaptability dimen-
sions relate to its external orientation. A Westminster system presumes 
the existence of competitive legislative parties whose members are suffi-
ciently disciplined and fearful of punishment at the hands of party lead-
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ers that their votes seldom deviate from government proposals. To carry 
out its functions, the cabinet must exhibit a high degree of cohesiveness, as 
refl ected in well-developed criteria for recruiting members and promot-
ing leaders, collectivity norms, and highly diff erentiated organizational 
structures. It is important to keep in mind that the cabinet is a collective 
body whose members jointly make decisions for which they are “equally 
and jointly responsible,” while allowing “all departmental perspectives and 
competing claims to be fi ltered through the specifi c issue being debated” 
(James 2002, 6; Buckley 2006, 4; also Rhodes et al. 2009, 120–132). As the 
foremost executive organ of government, the cabinet must be endowed 
with suffi  cient powers and resources to operate with relative autonomy in 
conducting executive aff airs and in adapting to environmental challenges. 
In its external orientation, therefore, the cabinet system must be capable 
of eff ecting strategic choice in executive decision-making (Hrebiniak and 
Joyce 1985, 340). By distilling the dimensions of institutionalization into 
two synthetic variables—cohesiveness (coherence + complexity) and strate-
gic choice (autonomy + adaptability)—we can derive a typology of cabinet 
forms.
Four types of parliamentary cabinet systems emerge, corporatist, con-
federate, fi gurehead, and Westminster. Th e corporatist cabinet exerts a high 
degree of strategic choice, although it lacks cohesiveness as a result of inter-
nal divisions or an inability to control the ruling party or coalition. Th e 
confederate cabinet presents a cohesive executive, but its degree of freedom 
in eff ecting strategic choice is constrained by a fragmented or unstable pol-
icy-making environment. Th e lack of cohesion on the part of the corpo-
ratist cabinet and the fragmented or unstable policy-making environment 
that confronts the confederate cabinet eff ectively rule out the possibility 
of cabinet government in either case. On the other hand, as the foremost 
organ of executive decision-making, the Westminster cabinet is endowed 
with suffi  cient powers and prerogatives to enable it to respond fl exibly and 
tactically to virtually any challenge that may arise. In addition, because its 
ministers double as leaders of a centralized and disciplined majority party, 
“it can confi dently count on staying in offi  ce and getting its legislative pro-
posals approved” (Lijphart 1999, 12). In contrast, the fi gurehead cabinet 
clearly is not the most powerful organ of government, even if laws and 
conventions say that this should be so; it functions mainly to rubber-stamp 
decisions made elsewhere. Moreover, because the strategic choice of the 
prime minister and cabinet is constrained—owing to a coalition arrange-
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ment or to a decentralized dominant party—these cabinets cannot count 
on staying in offi  ce or getting their legislative proposals approved. Th ese 
handicaps severely constrain the cabinet’s adaptive capabilities in response 
to external or internal challenges.
I argue that a transitional fi ft h type—a disjoined cabinet—stood at 
Japan’s executive helm from 1993 through 2013. Th is is not a distinct cabi-
net type, but, rather, refl ects the chaotic and unsettled state of Japan’s cabi-
net system since the structural changes and political reforms of 1993 and 
1994. While, on occasion, the disjoined cabinet exhibits forceful, coher-
ent executive leadership (for example, the Koizumi cabinet’s campaign to 
privatize the postal system), just as oft en its actions are inconsistent and 
ineff ective (such as the Kan cabinet’s handling of the Fukushima Daiichi 
crisis). Th e hopes of the citizenry, whose expectations had been elevated 
by the 2001 government restructuring and the changes promised by the 
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Figure I.2. Typology of Parliamentary Cabinet Systems
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Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) when it became the party in power, were 
dashed by the inability of the disjoined cabinets to provide forceful leader-
ship under coalition arrangements and Twisted Diets. While Japan’s cabi-
net system has assumed different forms during different historical periods, 
it has never developed into a fully functional Westminster-style cabi-
net system despite meaningful steps in this direction (Estevez-Abe 2006; 
Krauss 2007; Mochizuki 2007).
Explaining Institutional Change
While institutionalization theory helps to explain how Japan’s cabinet sys-
tem evolved, it cannot explain why it came to assume its characteristic 
form and function. Indeed, since institutionalization is a ubiquitous pro-
cess, we might logically expect all parliamentary systems patterned after 
the Westminster model to exhibit similar organizational forms and per-
formance levels. Yet, despite outward similarities, Japan has never evolved 
a fully functioning Westminster-style cabinet system. I argue that the dis-
tinctive organizational structures, roles, and relationships that together 
form Japan’s cabinet system were forged in a matrix of laws, ordinances, 
political structures, and unwritten codes of conduct. But where do institu-
tions come from? The answer is found in the spurts of institutional inno-
vation that cluster around critical junctures in history when “institutional 
configurations are upended and replaced by fundamentally new ones” as 
well as in the gradual evolution of established institutions (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010, 2).
North’s definition of the term institution—a “humanly devised con-
straint” that structures behavior—provides a foundation upon which to 
build a conceptual framework (1990, 3). Formal institutions are embodied 
in rules, laws, and constitutions (ibid., 4). In the case of Japan’s cabinet sys-
tem, important formal institutions include the Constitution, Cabinet Law, 
National Government Organization Law, and the political party system. 
During the half-century of LDP dominance, intraparty politics and cabinet 
decision-making became so intimately intertwined that it was impossible 
to say where one began and the other ended (Laver and Shepsle 1994b, 7; 
also Calder 1988, 446). A consequence of the failure of the opposition to 
oust the LDP was the systematic exclusion of organized labor and environ-
mental, women’s rights, anti-nuclear, and other interest groups that tended 
to support the opposition (Steinhoff 1989). Of course, this situation could 
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have been remedied had the opposition unseated the LDP, but this did not 
occur from 1955 until 2009. Informal institutions are embodied in behav-
ioral norms, conventions, and unwritten codes of conduct, such as the 
seniority system for ministerial aspirants and the unanimity rule in cabi-
net decision-making (North 1990, 4; Rose 1971, 401, 411). Taken together, 
these formal and informal “rules of the game” constitute what North terms 
the “interdependent web of an institutional matrix” that patterns behavior 
and molds organizational forms (North 1990, 3, 95; italics added).
While the Northian definition explains the static effects of institutions, 
it does not account for their dynamic aspect. Institutions should be viewed 
as political instruments that are “fraught with tensions because they invari-
ably raise resource considerations and invariably have distributional con-
sequences” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 8). In other words, “dynamic 
tensions and pressure for change are built into institutions,” which embody 
“political legacies of historical struggles” that invariably dictate an unequal 
distribution of resources and produce cleavages that later form coalitions 
for change (ibid., 7, 14; Pierson 2000, 258–259). Those interests that are 
disadvantaged by existing arrangements represent potential change agents 
that will constantly be on the lookout for opportunities to redress their 
grievances. As Mahoney and Thelen explain, “where institutions represent 
compromises or relatively durable but still contested settlements based 
on specific coalitional dynamics, they are always vulnerable to shifts” 
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 8). For these reasons, I define an institution 
as a humanly devised constraint that structures behavior and carries power-
distributional consequences.
While much attention focuses on the abrupt bursts of institutional 
innovation that cluster around critical junctures, most institutional change 
is gradual and incremental. A critical juncture is a watershed event, or “key 
choice point,” that leads to the reconfiguration of institutional arrange-
ments or structural patterns (Mahoney 2001, 6–7). It can appear as an 
immediate response to an external shock, such as the Great Depression or 
the Second World War. It can also result from a primarily internal stimulus, 
such as the Iranian Revolution that overthrew the Pahlavi regime in 1979 
or the toppling of long-standing dictatorships in Tunisia and Egypt in the 
“Arab Spring.” But such exogenous shocks occur only rarely, while institu-
tions constantly undergo incremental change. For example, the electoral 
realignment in the United States that began in 1932—when FDR’s Dem-
ocratic Party took control of the executive and legislative branches, and, 
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more or less, maintained its dominance for the next three decades—facili-
tated a succession of incremental changes that fundamentally transformed 
American politics. In this way, the cumulative effects of gradual changes, as 
well as the occasional exogenous shock, create openings for disadvantaged 
interests to seek to improve their situation by pressing for change.
Mahoney and Thelen propose a framework for identifying and explain-
ing the different forms of institutional change. Four types of institutional 
change are identified, displacement (“the removal of existing rules and the 
introduction of new ones”), layering (“the introduction of new rules on top 
of or alongside existing ones”), drift (“the changed impact of existing rules 
due to shifts in the environment”), and conversion (“the changed enact-
ment of existing rules due to their strategic redeployment”) (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010, 15–18). Each type of change can be produced gradually, but 
displacement episodes are also associated with shocks that result in abrupt 
institutional reconfigurations that produce path-dependent legacies. Par-
ticular types of change agents tend to be associated with particular types 
of change: insurrectionaries are associated with displacement, subversives 
with layering, renegades with drift, and opportunists with conversion (ibid., 
22–27).16
Building upon this framework, I argue that Japan’s cabinet system was 
significantly recast at eight historical junctures. Two of these resulted in 
reconfigurations of institutional and structural arrangements. The 1868 
Meiji Restoration and the American-led Allied occupation of Japan (1945–
1952) were exogenous shocks that resulted in the displacement and recast-
ing of a broad array of political institutions and socioeconomic structures. 
The six remaining tipping points were precipitated by the accumulation of 
gradual changes and structural shifts. The changes that followed the estab-
lishment of Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu’s “party cabinet” in 1898 
and the advent of coalition cabinets following the LDP’s brief fall from 
grace in 1993 reflect drift, in the sense that existing rules were changed in 
response to environmental shifts. Similarly, the changes that followed the 
1932 assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi and the “shocks” of 
the early 1970s—precipitated by actions or threats on the part of U.S. pres-
ident Richard M. Nixon and the Organization of the Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC)—resulted in the layering of new rules on top of or 
alongside existing ones. The changes that followed the emergence of the 
“1955 system,” during which the LDP enjoyed parliamentary dominance, 
can be understood as the conversion of existing rules to serve the needs of 
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the perpetually ruling party. A somewhat similar state of affairs has accom-
panied the changes that emerged in the post-2007 era of “Twisted Diets,” 
in which the ruling party in the lower house does not hold a majority in 
the upper house.
In sum, my approach brings together conceptual tools from political 
sociology and historical institutionalism. I believe that analytical eclec-
ticism is necessary to explain how Japan’s cabinet system evolved, why 
it came to assume its characteristic form and functions, and what con-
sequences this holds for Japan’s system of democratic governance and 
its foreign relations. As Katzenstein and Okawara explain, “theory and 
policy are both served better by eclecticism, not parsimony” (2001/2002, 
185). By combining different paradigms, I am knowingly jumping head-
first into what Evans approvingly describes as the “eclectic messy” cen-
ter of comparative politics, where getting it right is the analyst’s primary 
objective (Evans 1996, 2). My central argument is that Japan’s cabinet 
system was forged through an ongoing process of institutionalization fil-
tered through and interacting with a matrix of key institutions that were 
periodically transformed as a result of gradual change and the occasional 
shock.
Table I.1. Institutional Change in Japan’s Cabinet System, 1868 to 2013
Event (Year) Source of Change
Change 
Agent
Institutional 
Change
Cabinet 
Type
Meiji Restoration (1868) Exogenous Insurrectionary Displacement Cabal
Ōkuma’s “Party Cabinet” 
(1898) Endogenous Renegade Drift Quasi-Party
“May 15th Incident”  
(1932) Endogenous Subversive Layering
Techno-
Fascist
Defeat & Occupation 
(1945) Exogenous Insurrectionary Displacement Comprador
Creation of “1955 System” 
(1955) Endogenous Opportunist Conversion Corporatist
Nixon & OPEC “Shocks” 
(1971~) Endogenous Subversive Layering Confederate
Coalition Governments 
(1993) Endogenous Renegade Drift Disjoined-1
“Twisted Diets” (2007) Endogenous Opportunist Conversion Disjoined-2
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The Context of this Study
In recent years, Japan’s cabinet system has begun to attract scholarly atten-
tion. Thayer identifies three “archetypes” in the evolution of Japan’s cabi-
net system—“the imperial cabinet, the predominant party cabinet, and the 
coalition cabinet” (1996, 71). Assessing Japan’s 2001 government restruc-
turing, Shinoda sees little meaningful change with regard to the functions 
of the cabinet, which continues to play an insignificant role, while “actual 
decisions are made at regularly scheduled meetings of the top career offi-
cials of ministries and agencies and then rubber-stamped at subsequent 
cabinet meetings” (2005, 805). George Mulgan argues that “Japan does 
not have cabinet government; it has party-bureaucratic government,” by 
which she means that the cabinet is subordinate to the long-ruling LDP 
and government officialdom (2003a, 129). Krauss and Pekkanen argue that 
the LDP never became the strong, centralized ruling party required in a 
Westminster system. This is because vote mobilization was in the hands of 
the candidate-support organizations (kōenkai) of party backbenchers, the 
distribution of offices was the domain of the bosses of the intraparty fac-
tions, and the party’s Policy Affairs Research Council performed the role 
of veto player in policy-making (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010, 5–6, 279–280; 
also Krauss 1989, 51–52).
While most pundits doubt that cabinet government will arrive on the 
Japanese scene, at least anytime soon, some offer reasons for hope. Shimizu 
maintains that the changes made under the Koizumi government ensure 
the eventual emergence of cabinet government (2005, 404). Estevez-Abe 
shares this view, pointing out that Koizumi’s bold decision to obtain a pop-
ular referendum on his postal privatization bills “cast the die in favor of a 
Westminster system that centralizes power in the hands of the party lead-
ership and prime minister” (2006, 633). She concedes that, historically, 
Japan’s cabinet “simply rubber-stamped decisions made by others,” but 
argues that an “increasingly centralized party structure of the LDP and the 
strengthening of the Cabinet will push Japan in the direction of a British-
style parliamentary democracy” with a “Westminster system” (ibid., 633, 
651). Krauss argues that, as a result of the institutional changes following 
the LDP’s brief hiatus from power in 1993, “Japan has moved somewhat 
closer to the British model” (2007). Of course, these scholars were writing 
before the LDP’s temporary expulsion from the helm in 2009, and much of 
the progress toward enhancing the cabinet’s role taken under the Koizumi 
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cabinet was reversed by the LDP- and DPJ-led governments that followed. 
For these reasons, it is time to take a hard look at the nature, capabilities, 
and limitations of Japan’s parliamentary cabinet system—which is what 
this book is about.
Rival Approaches
Theories purporting to explain who rules the roost in the affairs of Japan’s 
central state executive fall into three broad categories, dominant actor the-
ories, fragmented state theories, and core executive theories. To date, the 
debate among learned observers has primarily focused on which political 
actor dominates executive decision-making. Laver and Shepsle identify six 
general models of executive decision-making—bureaucratic government, 
legislative government, prime ministerial government, party government, 
ministerial government, and cabinet government (1994b, 5–8). Each of 
these models has attracted advocates among students of Japanese execu-
tive decision-making.
Bureaucratic government holds that “the elite bureaucracy . . . makes 
most major decisions, drafts virtually all legislation, controls the national 
budget, and is the source of all major policy innovations in the system” 
(Johnson 1982, 20; also Pempel 1974, Campbell 1977, Inoguchi 1983, 
Amyx 2004, and Vogel 1996). This view is bolstered by the image of a Jap-
anese cabinet minister as a mere “figurehead who [is] manipulated and 
controlled by the career officials” (Park 1986, 8). In addition to being a tra-
ditional elite, Japan’s career civil servants carry out their duties under the 
oversight of, at most, six political appointees per ministry. Because min-
isters rely on bureaucrats for policy expertise, they are prone to become 
the bureaucrats’ “lap dogs” (Takenaka 2008, 51, 81; Iio 2007). Bureaucratic 
influence is ensured by the Supreme Court-like role of the Cabinet Legis-
lation Bureau, which examines all draft bills, treaties, and cabinet orders, 
and whose opinions are regarded as authoritative and difficult to over-
turn. As Samuels argues, “No administrative agency of the Japanese state 
enjoys higher prestige or greater independence than the CLB” (2004, 2). 
Bureaucratic influence is further ensured through the deputy chief cabinet 
secretary for administrative affairs (Naikaku kanbō fukuchōkan), a senior 
ex-bureaucrat who chairs the biweekly meetings of administrative vice 
ministers (jimujikan) from each ministry at which the agenda for cabinet 
meetings is set (Johnson 1995b, 221; Tanaka 2000, 5). Yet the bureaucracy’s 
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relative influence has diminished in recent years as a result of liberaliza-
tion, privatization, scandal, and the fact that fewer ex-officials are opting to 
pursue “second careers” as MPs.
Party government presumes the existence of a strong executive whose 
members are “subject to the discipline of well-organized political parties” 
(Laver and Shepsle 1994b, 7). This model found fruitful application in the 
works of rational choice theorists, who posit that “real bureaucrats . . . 
administer in the shadow of the LDP,” by which they mean that through a 
series of delegations LDP backbenchers strummed the tune to which cabi-
net ministers obligingly danced (quotation is from Ramseyer and Rosen-
bluth 1993, 120; also McCubbins and Noble 1995). Beginning in the early 
1960s, the LDP began requiring that all policy proposals be submitted to 
its Policy Affairs Research Council for “prior approval” before being sent 
on to the cabinet and then to the Diet (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010, 20; 
also George Mulgan 2003a, 140; Holliday and Shinoda 2002, 101). Yet, 
because of the LDP’s essentially decentralized structure, this veto role actu-
ally served to undermine the relative influence of the prime minister (who 
doubled as party president) and central party leadership, and, in so doing, 
impeded the emergence of a Westminster-style cabinet system (Krauss and 
Pekkanen 2010, 279–280).
The four remaining models can be accounted for succinctly. Ministe-
rial government denotes a system in which “individual ministers . . . are 
able to have a significant impact on policy in areas that fall under their 
jurisdiction” (Laver and Shepsle 1994b, 8). This thesis echoes in Campbell’s 
discovery that, in the politics of Japanese budgetary policy, “if collectively 
the Cabinet is not an important . . . actor, individual ministers have often 
assumed prominent parts” (1977, 151). Prime ministerial government pos-
its that “the cabinet is a mainly residual organization” in policy-making, 
ministers are “agents of the . . . prime minister’s will,” and bureaucrats are 
“confined to implementing rather than making policy” (Elgie 1997, 222–
223). While recent reforms and the increasing importance of television 
have enhanced the prime minister’s role, Japan’s premiers continue to be 
regarded as passive leaders who serve mainly as “consensus articulators” 
(Hayao 1993, 202; Angel 1988–1989, 600; Iio 2007). Legislative govern-
ment assumes that the cabinet mechanically implements policies made by 
the legislature (Laver and Shepsle 1994b, 6). The policy gridlock and rapid 
turnover in governments dictated by the post-2007 Twisted Diets provides 
fodder for advocates of this model.
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Finally, cabinet government denotes a parliamentary system with a 
strong executive that provides tactical direction to government policy, 
and whose leaders are chosen by Parliament from among its members and 
bound together by norms of collective responsibility and solidarity. While 
this viewpoint has attracted a few advocates—including an ex-bureaucrat 
who opined that the cabinet is now “the main battle ground for policy-
making” (quoted in Asahi Shimbun Globe, May 31, 2002)—most observers 
believe that the cabinet is “more an aggregation than a real institution, its 
membership turns every year or so . . . and ministers are normally more 
concerned with their individual political affairs than with advancing the 
Cabinet as such” (Campbell 1977, 151).
While they provide insights, these generic models do not account for 
factors specific to the Japanese case. For example, what about the role of the 
“policy tribes” (zoku) in shaping executive decision-making? The influen-
tial MPs who are members of the various tribes exercise considerable sway 
over policy outcomes in agriculture, postal affairs, public works, and so on 
(Muramatsu and Krauss 1984 and 1987; Satō and Matsuzaki 1986; Inoguchi 
and Iwai 1987; Schoppa 1991; Krauss and Pekkanen 2010). While service as 
a cabinet minister often affords entrée to a policy tribe, not all zoku politi-
cians are incumbent ministers. The influence of these policy tribes contrib-
uted to the “political capture” that afflicted policy-making, especially in the 
latter years of the LDP’s hegemonic reign (Samuels 2013, 181). And what 
about the role of the LDP’s intraparty faction bosses in allocating minis-
terial posts? In fact, factional “balance” was a critical concern in the allo-
cation of portfolios under the “1955 system” (Thayer 1969, 31–35; Curtis 
1988, 86–87; Krauss and Pekkanen 2010, 132–134). This diminished the 
prime minister’s leadership role, and on occasion produced cabinets that 
seemed to be under the “remote control” of faction bosses. Finally, how do 
we account for the external pressure (gaiatsu) applied by the United States, 
which, after all, remains the guarantor of Japan’s national security and a 
major destination for its exports? It goes without saying that American 
views strongly influenced Japanese executive decision-making during the 
occupation period (Dower 1999). Much like the proverbial elephant in the 
room, explicit or implicit pressure from the United States is difficult for Jap-
anese policy-makers to ignore, especially when it comes to bilateral trade 
and security issues (Schoppa 1997; Pyle et al. 2010; Woodall 1996, 129–132).
Fragmented state theories come in a variety of forms. The most extreme 
variant, the “stateless nation” thesis, argues that “there is no supreme insti-
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tution with ultimate policy-making jurisdiction. Hence there is no place 
where . . . the buck stops. In Japan, the buck keeps circulating” (van Wolf-
eren 1989, 26, 5). “Hollow state” theory holds that “government is becom-
ing so fragmented that pulling business together at the centre is now an 
almost impossible task” (Holliday and Shinoda 2002, 108). Various case 
studies confirm the fragmented nature of Japanese executive decision-
making, especially during the 1990s. In his research on Japanese budget-
ary politics, Campbell observed signs of fragmentation in the 1960s in the 
form of “subgovernments made up of agencies, specialized LDP politi-
cians, and interest groups—sometimes in alliance, sometimes with much 
internal division” (Campbell and Scheiner 2008, 99; also Campbell 1977 
and 1984). Subsequent studies drew attention to the ways in which a frag-
mented political structure shaped policy outcomes in a variety of arenas, 
including education policy, tax reform, public works, postal services, and 
the response to the banking crisis (for example, Hayao 1993; Schoppa 1993; 
Kato 1994; Woodall 1996; MacLachlan 2004; and Amyx 2004).
Finally, core executive theories focus on the organs and structures that 
“pull together and integrate central government policies, or act as final 
arbiters within the executive of conflicts between different elements of the 
government machine” (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990, 4; also Holliday and 
Shinoda 2002; and Krauss 2007). This approach explicitly recognizes the 
multiplicity of actors that, of necessity, must be involved in executive deci-
sion-making in an advanced parliamentary democracy. In a study compar-
ing the core executives of Britain and Japan, Holliday and Shinoda argue 
that the cabinet is not a “key player” in the core executive of either country. 
They posit that Japan’s core executive is composed of the “Prime Minister, 
the Chief Cabinet Secretary and his three deputies in the Cabinet Secretar-
iat, the key leaders of the LDP, plus top officials in the supporting offices. 
Those offices are the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs” (2002, 98).
While there is merit in each of these explanations, I have come to see 
things in my own way. As I demonstrate in the substantive chapters of 
this book, the relative influence of specific actors has varied over time in 
response to domestic and external crises, institutional change, and tectonic 
shifts in political, economic, and social structures. Moreover, I argue that 
by the early 1990s a fragmented policy-making environment severely lim-
ited the options that prime ministers and cabinets could pursue in attempt-
ing to guide the country out of the gloom and policy lethargy that defined 
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the “lost decades.” While core executive theory draws attention to power 
relations among a number of actors, I believe that its most fruitful applica-
tion is as a conceptual device for assessing shifts over time in that power 
balance.
Summary
By focusing on the evolution of Japan’s cabinet system, the core chapters 
of this book highlight the capabilities and limitations of a crucial compo-
nent of Japanese parliamentary democracy. Throughout this book, I seek 
to solve two central puzzles. First, why has cabinet government failed to 
take root in Japan? This is puzzling because postwar Japan has been gov-
erned under Westminster-style parliamentary institutions and yet has not 
managed to nurture cabinet government. In other words, why has Japan 
failed to produce cabinet government in practice despite having a parlia-
mentary system in form? Focusing on the manner and degree to which the 
cabinet system has become institutionalized reveals much about the capac-
ity of Japan’s political executive—what it can and cannot do, as well as how 
it lives up to and falls short of its intended place in a parliamentary system. 
In this regard, the Westminster ideal provides benchmarks against which 
to assess the degree to which the Japanese cabinet system has progressed 
toward institutionalization.
This calls attention to a second puzzle. Why has Japan’s cabinet system 
assumed its characteristic form and function? Since institutionalization is 
a ubiquitous process, why is the Japanese cabinet system distinctive? The 
question draws attention to the shaping influence of institutions, which 
requires that we “take time seriously” by accounting for the significant 
roles played by context and history in determining institutional change in 
the “longue durée” (Pierson and Skocpol 2002, 685; Braudel 1982, 25–54). 
It also highlights the distributional consequences of institutions and the 
role of critical junctures and tipping points as strategic openings for insti-
tutional reconfiguration.
While the domestic implications should be obvious, understanding 
Japan’s cabinet system is relevant to academics, policy-makers, and busi-
ness leaders in other countries. For one thing, the findings presented in 
this book illuminate the dimly understood inner workings of the cabinet 
system of an important non-Western parliamentary democracy. Perhaps 
this intensive analysis of the Japanese case might offer lessons for reformers 
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in Japan as well as for those who seek to build democratic institutions in 
countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Or, perhaps someday the Japanese 
experience may help to guide the establishment of democratic regimes in 
Cuba, Nigeria, China, and the new regimes born during the Arab Spring. 
At the very least, Japan’s struggles with this fundamental component of 
parliamentary governance should serve as a cautionary tale for those who 
believe that parliamentary institutions in form equate to parliamentary 
government in practice. In fact, growing democracy is not easy, and in this 
regard the Japanese case offers crucial lessons for understanding the chal-
lenges and disappointments that confront today’s developing countries.
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The Anti-Westminsterian Roots 
of Japan’s Parliamentary Cabinet 
System, 1868–1946
The cabinet, in a word, is a board of control chosen by the legislature, 
out of persons it trusts and knows, to rule the nation.
—Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution ([1867] 1925), 14
In England a party cabinet is headed by the leader of the party 
commanding the majority in the House of Commons; but not so under 
the imperial constitution of Japan. To insist on such a principle is to 
encroach on the sovereign power of the emperor.
—Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake, 
quoted in T. Iyenaga, “Parties and the Cabinet System 
in Japan” (1917), 382
Inhospitable Roots
The modern cabinet system that was established in 1885 did not materialize 
out of thin air. In fact, it inherited organizational structures, institutions, 
and experienced administrators from the “Grand Council,” an adminis-
trative system that was originally imported from China during the eighth 
century and was resurrected as part of the Meiji Restoration, an institu-
tional reconfiguration initiated in 1868. The Chinese characters that com-
bine to form the Japanese term for “cabinet”—nai and kaku—translate to 
mean “inner palace.”1 From 1868 until 1898, Japan’s central state executive 
was dominated by a cabal composed of leaders from Satsuma and Chōshū, 
two feudal domains that played the protagonist’s role in bringing about 
the Restoration. When a schism in the Meiji government gave impetus to 
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a “freedom and popular rights movement,” the Sat-Chō cabal responded 
by granting a constitution that vested sovereignty in a divine-right mon-
arch and erected steep barriers to prevent popularly elected representa-
tives from having meaningful influence on national policy. Although the 
Sat-Chō cabal went to great lengths to control all of the major executive 
organs, including the military branches, the “people’s parties” and elected 
members of Parliament managed to claw their way into the inner sanc-
tum of policy-making. So it was that the era of “cabal cabinets” gave way 
to a brief period in which “party cabinets” wielded influence. When party 
government became synonymous with political corruption and pusillani-
mous diplomacy, technocratic government bureaucrats and military offi-
cers joined forces with the leaders of fascist-inspired groups in establishing 
a “new structure” of domestic institutions and a “new order” in East Asia. 
This ushered in an era of “techno-fascist cabinets.”
Japan’s current parliamentary cabinet system inherited important lega-
cies from the authoritarian prewar order. In fact, the organizational gene-
alogy of many of today’s cabinet-related agencies can be traced to organs 
established in prewar times. Just as prewar cabinets never played more than 
a subordinate executive role, postwar cabinets have not played the expected 
role of imparting strategic direction to government policy. For instance, 
the decision made by American occupation authorities to indirectly gov-
ern a defeated Japan through the existing civil bureaucracy perpetuated a 
state of affairs in which the primary purpose of cabinet meetings was to 
ratify decisions made by elite career civil servants. Likewise, the absence 
of a robust collective solidarity norm that undermines contemporary cabi-
nets is the offspring of a system in which prewar ministers were individu-
ally responsible to a divine-right sovereign and were in no way responsible 
to Parliament. Then there is the human bridge embodied in the twenty-six 
prewar cabinet ministers—including five prime ministers—who held port-
folios in postwar cabinets.2 To understand these legacies, it is necessary to 
examine the historical process through which an anti-Westminsterian pre-
war cabinet system evolved.
The Meiji Restoration
On July 8, 1853, Commodore Matthew C. Perry led a squadron of “black 
ships” (kurobune)—so known because two of the four American ves-
sels were smoke-belching steam frigates—into Edo Bay. He brushed off 
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attempts to get him to make his appeal at Deshima in faraway Kyūshū, as 
was required of foreign emissaries. Instead, Perry demanded to present a 
letter from President Millard Fillmore to the Japanese emperor proposing 
to open bilateral trade. Perry’s request was denied, and he departed peace-
fully and vowed to return the following year.
Despite the small size of Perry’s squadron, Japanese officials recognized 
that it packed sufficient firepower to outgun Edo’s meager shore defenses 
(Ravina 2004, 55). This created a quandary for Japan’s supreme political 
leader, the shōgun, who ruled the country from Edo Castle. In fact, well 
before Perry’s uninvited visit, nationalist thinkers had begun questioning 
the legitimacy of a shōgun who ruled while a divine-right emperor merely 
reigned from the Imperial Palace in Kyoto (Pyle 1996b, 51). In an unprec-
edented move, the shōgun’s chief adviser asked for written input from 
the local lords—known as daimyō—on how to respond to the American 
demands (ibid., 62–63). When Perry returned the following February—
this time in command of a seven-ship flotilla—the shōgun’s agents meekly 
acquiesced and signed the Treaty of Peace and Amity (Nichibei Washin 
Jōyaku). By the terms of the treaty, an American “diplomatic agent”—a role 
performed by Townshend Harris—was permitted to reside in Japan. Harris 
negotiated the 1858 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Amity and Commerce, the first of 
a series of “unequal treaties” with the Western powers that imposed a semi-
colonial status by denying tariff autonomy and granting extraterritoriality 
to Westerners in Japan (Gordon 2003, 50).
The arrival of Perry’s ships turned what had been a “chronic low-
grade crisis into an acute, reactionary situation” (ibid., 46). When the 
domestic powder keg finally exploded in 1867, the shōgun was Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu, fifteenth in a family dynasty that had ruled Japan through rel-
ative peace for 264 years. In essence, the Tokugawa shōgunate governed 
through a system of “centralized feudalism,” whereby ruling power was 
based in Edo while some 250-odd daimyō enjoyed substantial autonomy 
in administering their regional domains (Craig 1961, 3). Some of these 
daimyō were blood relatives (shinpan daimyō) or hereditary vassals (fudai 
daimyō) of the Tokugawa. But certain “outside lords” (tozama daimyō) 
were never fully trusted—and for good reason, as we shall see—as they 
had to be forced to submit to Tokugawa domination yet were too power-
ful to be removed.
Thus, the shōgunate ensured that tozama daimyō governed domains 
far from Edo and that they and all daimyō spent alternate years in the 
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shōgunal capital, while their wives and heirs remained there as hostages. 
This “alternate attendance” (sankin kōtai) system consumed up to half the 
time and revenue of the daimyō “in the purely ceremonial functions of 
attending the shōgun’s court and traveling in stately procession between 
Edo and their fiefs” (Vlastos 1990, 6). Some of the tozama daimyō—such 
as Mori of Chōshū, whose castle had to be relocated because the Tokugawa 
substantially reduced the area of domain—continued to harbor animosity 
toward the shōgunate two and a half centuries later (Hackett 1971, 6–7). 
By the time of Perry’s visit, certain powerful tozama daimyō were con-
travening shōgunal prohibitions by engaging in foreign trade, setting up 
Western-style factories, and building strong local militaries (Pyle 1996b, 
70–71). It was difficult for the shōgunate to police and punish such acts of 
insubordination because of the distance of these domains from Edo. With 
Tokugawa influence waning, some tozama daimyō began pressing for the 
creation of a council of lords in Kyoto, in which the Tokugawa shōgun 
would be first among equals, to grant them greater voice in national 
politics.
If the tozama daimyō felt constrained by the shōgunate’s stifling con-
trols, low-ranking samurai were incensed at a social order that placed 
them in perpetual subordination to superiors who “had been corrupted 
by inherited rank beyond the possibility of . . . redemption” (Smith 1988, 
11). They were also outraged that a shōgunal official coerced the emperor 
into consenting to the inequitable Harris Treaty that invited “the threat 
of barbarian domination and debauchment” (ibid., 159). For the most 
part, these “men of spirit” (shishi) were angry young samurai who lived 
on modest incomes, if not in real poverty, and deeply resented the fact 
that they were denied access to important offices of government by a 
rigid hereditary system (ibid., 136, 139–40; Jansen 2002, 338). After Per-
ry’s uncongenial visit, shishi emerged from domains across the country 
and converged upon Kyoto. When Tokugawa forces sought to squelch 
the mounting intrigue in the imperial capital, many of these young hot-
heads fled to Chōshū, where they were joined by a handful of refugee 
allies from the Imperial Court (Beasley 1995, 48). Although there was no 
specific unifying ideology, these firebrands shared a belief that action, not 
mere words, was necessary to destroy an incurably corrupt shōgunate, 
restore ruling power to the emperor, and cast out the Western barbarians. 
In retrospect, the temperament of these shishi is reflected in the violent 
ends they met. Indeed, seven of the ten leading figures in the defeat of the 
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shōgunate and establishment of the new regime were assassinated, com-
mitted suicide, or were executed.3
The Tokugawa rulers attempted to turn back the insurrection through 
various reforms. In 1862, the shōgunate modified the alternate attendance 
system to require daimyō to reside in Edo only one hundred days every 
three years and permitted family hostages to leave. The ban on the construc-
tion of oceangoing vessels was lifted, and, in a move that had not occurred 
in two hundred years, the shōgun traveled to Kyoto to consult with the 
emperor (Pyle 1996b, 66–67; Duus 1998, 76). Meanwhile, the shōgunate 
retained a French mission to advise in military modernization, and con-
sidered adopting a Western-style cabinet system with functional ministries 
(Cullen 2003, 196). This was too late and too little. In 1863, loyalists con-
vinced the emperor to order the shōgun to expel the Western barbarians, 
and a deadline of 25 June was agreed to, even though the shōgunate knew 
that it could not enforce this order (Gordon 2003, 55).
Figure 1.1. Major Outside Domains. Map by Dick Gilbreath, University of Ken-
tucky cartography lab
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When the Edo authorities failed to act, Chōshū hotheads took matters 
into their own hands and fired on Western ships passing through the Strait 
of Shimonoseki, eliciting a retaliatory bombardment by British, Dutch, 
French, and American warships. Around the same time, Satsuma, another 
powerful tozama domain, was shelled by British warships for refusing to 
make reparations for the assassination of an English businessman by sam-
urai retainers of its daimyō. In 1864, extremist samurai from Chōshū and 
elsewhere marched on Kyoto to rescue the emperor, but Tokugawa and 
Satsuma troops drove them out (Gordon 2003, 56). The shōgunate dis-
patched a punitive mission to Chōshū, which saw to it that the leaders of 
the failed coup were executed. In January 1866, officials from Tosa, another 
important tozama domain, brokered a secret alliance between Satsuma and 
Chōshū in the cause of toppling the shōgunate. When the shōgunate dis-
patched a second punitive mission to Chōshū in June, Satsuma and other 
domains refused to supply troops (ibid., 57).
So it was that the curtain came down on two and a half centuries of 
Pax Tokugawa. In November 1867, after coming to believe that he would 
remain first among peers in a governing council of daimyō, Shōgun 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu agreed to “return” power to the emperor and 
withdrew to his castle in Osaka. But leaders from Satsuma and Chōshū 
engineered the issuance on January 3, 1868, of an imperial rescript offi-
cially declaring the shōgunate defunct and “restoring” ruling power to 
the Emperor Meiji, then a fifteen-year-old boy. Yoshinobu responded by 
dispatching a sizable army to Kyoto to deliver a message protesting his 
ouster, but a small defensive force from Chōshū, Satsuma, and Tosa eas-
ily prevailed. After Edo Castle was bloodlessly surrendered to a com-
bined Satsuma-Chōshū army in April 1868, the defeat of the Tokugawa 
shōgunate was complete, save for a few scattered pockets of resistance 
that held out for another year. The Boshin War was a small-scale civil 
war in which an undermanned “imperial” army soundly defeated forces 
loyal to Yoshinobu, who was sent into confinement. The conflict’s final 
battles were fought to suppress Enomoto Takeaki and his followers, 
the last remaining band of rebels, who had commandeered some of 
the shōgunate’s naval vessels and sailed off to Hokkaidō to carry on the 
fight. By the time Enomoto’s forces were finally defeated in July of 1869, 
the emperor had been relocated to Edo, now known as Tokyo or “east-
ern capital.” In the meantime, the powerful outside lords symbolically 
returned control of their domains to the emperor in 1871; soon, virtually 
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all daimyō had followed suit and were appointed governors of their for-
mer fiefs, now known as “prefectures.”
Out of this foment emerged the Meiji Restoration (Meiji ishin), a dra-
matic reconfiguration of institutional and structural arrangements amid a 
“generation of sweeping and breathless change such as history had rarely 
seen” (Smith 1988, 134). Yet, in reality, an oligarchy composed largely of 
young ex-samurai primarily from Satsuma and Chōshū—with support-
ing roles played by similarly spirited men from Tosa and Hizen, another 
powerful tozama domain—replaced the Tokugawa shōgunate as the actual 
rulers of a new regime that continued to govern behind the façade of impe-
rial rule. This marks the genesis of the era of “hanbatsu (domain clique) 
politics”—during which time a “Sat-Chō-To-Hi alliance” (Sat-Chō-To-Hi 
dōmei)—supposedly ruled the roost (Large 2009, 156). However, the real 
power brokers in this arrangement were oligarchs from Chōshū and Sat-
suma, who were at pains to establish institutions that enabled them to main-
tain an iron grip on political power and the distribution of policy benefits. 
From 1871 until 1898, this Sat-Chō cabal controlled all of the key positions 
in government, including the most coveted and powerful ministerial port-
folios. This did not go unnoticed by leaders from Tosa and Hizen, a num-
ber of whom would soon leave their positions in government and become 
renegade agents of change.
Cabinet Forms and Structures
Japan’s first cabinets emerged three and a half years after the Meiji Restora-
tion and were cobbled together out of preexisting organizational structures 
and staffed in large measure by members of the traditional administrative 
elite. Having vanquished the shōgunate and, at least on paper, returned 
ruling power to the emperor, the victorious insurrectionaries had to estab-
lish an administrative system through which to govern the country. To 
reinforce their “Restoration” message, they resurrected a long moribund 
governmental system fashioned after a model imported from T’ang China 
during the eighth century.4 Out of the Grand Council of State, as that 
administrative system was known, emerged what were, in effect, Japan’s 
first proto-cabinets. These proto-cabinets arose spontaneously within the 
group of relatively youthful officials appointed to serve as imperial coun-
cilors (sangi), whose membership bore testimony to Sat-Chō dominance. 
This oligarchic control continued even after the establishment of a modern 
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cabinet system in 1885, and would persist for nearly a decade and a half 
thereafter.
Chinese Roots of Japan’s Cabinet System
China was the natural place for the Emperor Meiji’s distant predecessors 
to look for inspiration in designing administrative structures to facilitate 
centralized control over all of Japan. As Korean priests who appeared at 
the Japanese Court in A.D. 623 reported, “The Land of Great T’ang is an 
admirable country whose laws are complete and fixed. Constant commu-
nications should be kept up with it” (Asakawa 1903, 150, 253). Japan’s rul-
ers dispatched numerous missions across the treacherous seas separating 
Japan from the Asian mainland (ibid., 148–150). Some Japanese emis-
saries remained in China for decades. In 649, the Japanese government 
enlisted several returnees from missions to T’ang China to advise in the 
design of governmental institutions (Varley 1974b, 27).5 Their input led to 
the creation of an administrative system based on a Department of Rites 
(Jingikan) and a Department of State (Dajōkan). The Department of Rites 
oversaw matters involving religious and court rituals, yet enjoyed little 
real power (Varley 1974a, 34). The Department of State—also known as 
the Grand Council—administered secular affairs. In theory, the council 
was under a leadership triumvirate consisting of a grand minister of state 
(dajōdaijin), minister of the left (sadaijin), and minister of the right (udai-
jin). However, in practice the grand minister had no specific duties other 
than to advise the emperor, and the post generally remained vacant. The 
council was divided into eight functional ministries: Central Administra-
tion, Ceremonial, Civil Affairs, People’s Affairs, Military Affairs, Justice, 
Finance, and Imperial Household (Varley 1974a, 34).6
Over time, the Grand Council’s administrative powers dissipated. By 
the mid-ninth century, the Fujiwara family, through its monopolization of 
the positions of regent (sesshō) and chief councilor (kanpaku), was able to 
effectively manipulate a succession of emperors. With the establishment 
of the Kamakura Bakufu (1185–1333)—literally “tent government”—the 
Grand Council was relegated to figurehead status. This marks the begin-
ning of a separation of authority and power that would characterize Japa-
nese political life for centuries. Even as an emperor reigned from his palace 
in Kyoto, a “barbarian-subjugating generalissimo” (seii taishōgun or, sim-
ply, shōgun) ruled from his warrior castle. This state of affairs continued as 
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the Kamakura Bakufu gave way to the Ashikaga shōgunate (1336–1573), 
although virtually any semblance of centralized authority ceased to exist 
during the “warring states period” (sengoku jidai) that extended from the 
mid-1400s until the early 1600s. In 1603, Tokugawa Ieyasu established 
control over the entire country under a dynastic shōgunate that would 
persist until 1867. Centrally, the Tokugawa shōgunate monopolized con-
tact with the Imperial Court and ruled through an elaborate administra-
tive network based in Edo. Locally, the 250-odd daimyō were allowed to 
exercise substantial autonomy over affairs in their fiefs while being kept in 
check through the system of alternate attendance and other controls.
The Emergence of Cabal Cabinets
The Meiji government articulated its basic policies and established a cen-
tral state executive in the Five-Article Oath (Gokajō no seimon), issued on 
April 6, 1868.7 It called for the establishment of an assembly of daimyō to 
decide matters of state through open discussion, unity of social classes in 
carrying out administration, freedom for all in pursuing their respective 
callings, discarding evil practices of the past, and the quest for “knowledge 
throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundation of imperial rule” 
(Lu 1973, 36). This was given concrete expression in the “Document of 
the Form of Government” (Seitaisho), issued on June 11, which called for 
the establishment of an assembly composed of “qualified men” selected by 
“each great city, han [domain], and prefecture.” It set a four-year term for 
government officers, but allowed for “a few additional years” to be added 
to the terms of officials who were “well accepted by the public” and “dif-
ficult to replace” (ibid., 37). It called for the establishment of a three-way 
separation of governing power within the Grand Council (ibid., 36–37). 
The Department of Legislation (Giseikan)—subdivided into an Upper 
Bureau (Jōkyoku) and Lower Bureau (Gekyoku)—was given charge of law-
making, bureaucratic appointments, and the ratification of treaties, while 
the Department of Justice (Keihōkan) handled juridical matters. Executive 
affairs came under the Department of Administration (Gyōseikan), which 
was organized into six subdepartments, subsequently renamed “minis-
tries” (shō), for Religious Shrines and Rituals, Finance, Foreign Relations, 
Military, Judicial, and Civil Affairs.
In July 1871, the most important executive posts—grand minister of 
state, cabinet adviser (Naikaku komon), and imperial councilor (sangi)—
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were placed under a Central Board (Sei-in), which became “the focal point 
of the politics of the time” (Ishii 1980, 101). Sanjō Sanetomi, one of the 
disaffected court nobles who sided with the anti-Tokugawa forces, was 
appointed grand minister, a post he held until 1885. Leaders from Satsuma 
and Chōshū alternated as cabinet adviser, a post sometimes left unfilled, 
while young officials from the four main tozama domains all but monop-
olized the imperial councilor posts. In retrospect, the significance of the 
councilor appointment is evident in the fact that the first four post-1885 
prime ministers had, at some point, served in the post. In fact, twenty-two 
of the twenty-three councilors hailed from one of the four main tozama 
domains. Satsuma claimed the most (nine), followed by Chōshū and Tosa 
(with five each), and Hizen (three).8 In 1873, councilors received the title 
of “state minister” (kyō) and were given charge of administrative and pol-
icy affairs as officials of the cabinet. This is the first time that the term 
“cabinet”—described as “the core governing body in which the councilors 
review legislative and administrative affairs on behalf of the Emperor”—
was invoked in an official proclamation (“Naikaku seido to rekidai nai-
kaku,” accessed March 20, 2013). With this, the imperial councilors became 
a proto-cabinet “which decided all important governmental questions col-
legially” (Ishii 1980, 102).
As part of this reform effort, the government departments were recast 
into ministries (shō) of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Military Affairs, 
Education, Industry, and Imperial Household.9 While court nobles and 
feudal lords were placed in supervisory positions in each ministry, youth-
ful vice ministers—many of whom were young ex-samurai from the main 
tozama domains—wielded power over day-to-day administrative activities 
(Beasley 1989, 641). This state of affairs continued until 1873, when ex-
samurai replaced the nobles and former daimyō as administrative heads 
of the ministries (Silberman 1993, 159). In May 1872, the Ministry of 
Military Affairs was subdivided into an Army Ministry (Rikugunshō) and 
Navy Ministry (Kaigunshō), and in 1873 the Home Ministry (Naimushō) 
was established and given broad powers over local administration, inter-
nal security, public works, and elections. In February 1875, the Legislation 
Bureau (Hōsei kyoku)—the forerunner of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau—
was established within the Grand Council to advise government and to 
review all laws, treaties, and imperial ordinances (Naikaku Hōsei Kyoku 
1985, 2). This was followed in 1881 by the establishment of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Commerce (Nōshōmushō). The only other ministerial 
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agency created during this period was the Colonization Board (Kaita-
kushi), which, during its brief existence from 1869 to 1882, promoted Japa-
nese settlement of Hokkaidō and Sakhalin Island to guard against Russian 
expansion.
From Council to Cabinet
On December 22, 1885, Grand Council Order No. 69 (Dajōkan tasshi Dai-
69-go) established a modern cabinet system based on a prime minister and 
ministers of state. With this, the Grand Council orchestrated itself into 
Figure 1.2. Ministerial Portfolios under the Grand Council and Cabinet System
Grand Council (1871) Cabinet (1885)
Grand Minister Prime Minister
Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs
Finance Finance
Army (1872) Army
Navy (1872) Navy
Justice Justice
Industry
Agriculture & Commerce (1879) Agriculture & Commerce 
Communications
Cabinet Secretary (1879) Cabinet Secretary
Legislation Bureau (1875) Legislation Bureau
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extinction, and, in so doing, provided the legal foundation to transform 
what had been a “hodgepodge of councilors” into “ministers with a cabi-
net” (Samuels 2003, 56). In other words, it transformed proto-cabinets into 
true cabinets. The order abolished the positions of grand minister, left min-
ister, right minister, imperial councilor, and state minister, and established 
the posts of prime minister (sōri daijin) and ministers of state (daijin) for 
foreign affairs, home, finance, army, navy, justice, education, agriculture 
and commerce, and communications.
The cabinet’s primary function was to advise the emperor and to over-
see the affairs of the government ministries. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal 
Sanjō Sanetomi counseled the emperor that “the cabinet should be made a 
supreme council of Ministers with authority to communicate directly with 
Your Majesty . . . [and] should serve as the hands and feet, the ears and eyes 
of Your Majesty” (cited in Beckmann 1957, 75). Guidelines were given in 
a seven-article ordinance entitled “Official Powers of the Cabinet” (Nai-
kaku shokken). It specified the responsibilities of the prime minister, who, 
“as a chief among ministers” (kakudaijin no shuhan to shite), was to report 
to the emperor, receive his instruction, direct the enactment and imple-
mentation of policies, and supervise the various executive organs of gov-
ernment. Ministers were individually responsible for their portfolios, but 
were required to report to the prime minister. As Uyehara explained, “each 
minister is not responsible for the action of the Cabinet as a whole, and 
the Cabinet is not responsible for the action of each minister” (1910, 137). 
However, the establishment of the Privy Council eliminated any possibil-
ity that the cabinet might become the emperor’s foremost advisory organ. 
As Itō explained in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire 
of Japan (1889, 84, 98), the Privy Councilors and state ministers “are the 
Emperor’s most eminent assistants” and “the highest body of the Emperor’s 
constitutional advisers.”
From 1885 through 1898, approximately 550 government officials—
about 1 percent of all government employees—were assigned to staff 
positions in support of the cabinet and its auxiliary organs.10 The most 
important of the auxiliary organs were the Office of the Cabinet Secretariat 
(Naikaku shokikan) and the Legislation Bureau. Their directors, referred to 
as the cabinet’s “chief clerks” (ryō bantō), received imperial appointments 
and participated in cabinet meetings (Naikaku Hōsei Kyoku 1985, 56). 
The main functions of the Secretariat, originally founded in 1879, were to 
promulgate laws and imperial edicts as well as to provide administrative 
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support for the cabinet. The Legislation Bureau was tasked with providing 
guidance and interpretation in the drafting of legislative bills. In addition, 
bureaus were established under the cabinet to administer finance, records, 
the official gazette, pensions, and statistics. In May 1891, the cabinet’s 
responsibilities were strengthened and clarified, and a Political Depart-
ment was set up within the Secretariat to draft cabinet policy as well as to 
oversee interactions with the press and foreign governments.11
The Cabinet’s Cabalistic Roots
Leaders from Satsuma and Chōshū dominated the proto-cabinets and cab-
inets formed between 1871 and 1898, monopolizing the premiership and 
seizing the lion’s share of the coveted foreign, home, and finance portfo-
lios. With the exception of a court noble who served as grand minister 
from 1871 until 1885 (and briefly headed a caretaker cabinet), all of the 
premiers appointed during the period were Sat-Chō leaders.12 The Sat-
Chō cabal ensured that its members grabbed more than half of the for-
eign and finance minister portfolios (respectively, 53 and 56 percent), and 
three-quarters of the home minister portfolios (76 percent). In sum, min-
isters from Satsuma or Chōshū controlled two-thirds (65 percent) of these 
key portfolios. If the military minister portfolios are included, the cabal’s 
dominance is even more obvious. Indeed, Sat-Chō figures occupied three-
quarters of the naval minister portfolios (73 percent) and all of the army 
minister portfolios. In addition, Sat-Chō leaders accounted for 62 percent 
of the imperial councilor (sangi) appointees. By dominating the key posi-
tions in government, the Sat-Chō cabal was able to have its way in dictating 
policy outcomes that ensured a happily inequitable distribution of benefits. 
Not surprisingly, this produced deep-seated resentment of hanbatsu favor-
itism, especially on the part of former government insiders from Tosa and 
Hizen.
Yet the cabalistic roots of Japan’s cabinet system are not unique. In fact, 
rulers around the world have for centuries turned to small groups of advis-
ers for counsel in making decisions of momentous and trivial importance. 
Often, when a small group of advisers acquires the favor of the sovereign, 
it is perceived as a “cabal,” which connotes “secret artifices or machinations 
of a few persons united in a close design,” which invariably connotes secre-
tive, sinister motives and intrigue (Webster’s New International Dictionary). 
British political history is rife with such cabals, the most famous of which 
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arose during the reign of Charles II (1660 to 1685), when a five-member 
group of imperial advisers in the “Committee for Foreign Affairs” of the 
king’s Privy Council came to control the conduct of domestic and foreign 
affairs. This “ministry of the cabal”—or “cabal cabinet”—became “the dom-
inant force in English affairs” from 1667 until 1674 (Abbott 1906, 46–47; 
Lee 1965, 1). By coincidence, the first letter in the last names of its mem-
bers—Sir Thomas Clifford, The Lord Arlington, The Duke of Buckingham, 
The Lord Ashley, and The Earl of Lauderdale—form the word “cabal,” thus 
contributing to the atmosphere of intrigue. Yet while the respective ances-
tries of the Japanese and British cabinets can be traced to cabals, the simi-
larities end there. The Cabal Cabinet that arose during the reign of Charles 
II held together for only half a dozen years, and a parliamentary system 
with a strong, responsible cabinet gradually emerged to take its place. In 
contrast, cabal cabinets were the rule in Japan for nearly three decades, and 
their influence continued to be felt many years later. Thus, England’s Cabal 
Cabinet eventually gave rise to the Westminster system, while the Sat-Chō 
cabal produced an anti-Westminster system.
The Emergence of Parties and a Constitution
The most vexing domestic challenge faced by Japan’s cabal cabinets came 
from ex-samurai angered by the loss of traditional privilege as a result of the 
government’s reforms. These privileges were taken away one by one, begin-
ning with government edicts that permitted commoners to have surnames 
and to travel on horseback. Later on, interclass marriage was allowed, 
and the exclusive right of samurai to bear arms and hold office was taken 
away (Samuels 2003, 50). In 1873, the Grand Council issued the Univer-
sal Conscription Law (Chōheirei) requiring all able-bodied Japanese men 
of twenty years of age to serve three years on active duty, followed by four 
years on reserve status. This was distasteful for the samurai, who believed 
that warriors were born, not made. The crowning blow came in 1876, when 
the government announced cancellation of the annual rice stipends (kura-
mai) that sustained the warrior class. As loyal retainers of the daimyō, ever 
willing to lay down their lives in their masters’ service, the samurai were 
not expected to produce their own sustenance. By this plan, ex-samurai 
were to be paid off with government bonds, the amount of which was a 
multiple of their annual rice stipend. The bonds were redeemable in twenty 
years, after which the ex-samurai could make no claim on the national 
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treasury (Smith 1988, 142). As the course of events would reveal, samurai 
discontent found its most violent expression in those southwestern prov-
inces where traditional values remained strong. Not coincidentally, those 
same provinces were the native domains of disenchanted ex-leaders of the 
Meiji government.
In the midst of these reforms, a group that included about half the 
Sat-Chō oligarchs departed on a twenty-one-month mission to the United 
States and Europe. The mission’s purposes were to obtain revision of the 
unequal treaties, promote goodwill, and observe Western institutions. 
The Iwakura mission (Iwakura shisetsudan), led by court noble Iwakura 
Tomomi, set sail from Yokohama on December 23, 1871.13 While Iwakura 
and his colleagues were schmoozing with foreign leaders, such as Presi-
dent Ulysses S. Grant and Queen Victoria, the oligarchs who remained in 
Tokyo were seething at the insult given by the Korean Court in refusing to 
accept the credentials of the Meiji government’s emissary. In August 1873, 
it was decided that Saigō Takamori, the acting head of the caretaker gov-
ernment, would be dispatched to Korea on the assumption that he would 
be assassinated, which would serve as the perfect pretext for a Japanese 
invasion.14 But, having caught wind of this, the Iwakura mission rushed 
home, arriving on September 13, and Iwakura and Ōkubo Toshimichi 
succeeded in reversing the emperor’s approval of Saigō’s proposed post-
ing to Korea. Saigō resigned his government posts and returned to Sat-
suma. Meanwhile, Itagaki Taisuke, Gotō Shōjirō, Etō Shinpei, and Soejima 
Taneomi also parted ways with the Meiji government and returned to their 
native provinces.
Five years later, Saigō was dead, having committed ritual suicide after 
leading an abortive rebellion against the Meiji government. But the intra-
elite schism created by the “Invade Korea debate” (seikanron) gave birth to 
the “freedom and popular rights movement” (jiyū minken undō). In Jan-
uary 1874, Itagaki and Gotō founded the Aikoku Kōtō (Public Party of 
Patriots) in Tosa, and shortly thereafter Etō founded a branch of this anti-
government protest group in Hizen. This threesome then added their sig-
natures to a petition imploring the emperor to create a popularly elected 
assembly. But Etō was not content to express his discontent merely through 
peaceful protest. In 1874, he led a large mob of discontented ex-samurai 
in attacking government offices in Saga, the capital of the former Hizen 
domain (Gordon 2003, 85–86). Government forces easily suppressed the 
Saga Rebellion (Saga no ran), capturing and executing Etō and a co-leader. 
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As a warning to anyone else who might have been contemplating rebel-
lious action, Etō’s severed head was placed on a pike and put on public dis-
play (Ravina 2004, 192). While the Meiji government suppressed the Saga 
Rebellion and similar uprisings of ex-samurai and peasants, the Sat-Chō 
oligarchs understood that something must be done to defuse a potentially 
revolutionary situation.
To this end, Ōkubo, Itō, and Inoue Kaoru met with Itagaki and Kido 
Kōin in Osaka in January 1875. Kido had resigned as imperial councilor 
in April 1874 to protest what he perceived to be a dangerously provoca-
tive military mission dispatched by the Meiji government to punish Tai-
wanese aborigines for murdering Ryūkyū Islands fishermen (Fraser 1967, 
590–591). The Osaka Conference led to an agreement between the repre-
sentatives of the Meiji government and key leaders of the popular rights 
movement on a fundamental restructuring of government, the basic design 
of which was captured in a simple flow chart drawn by Kido (NDL “Mod-
ern” 1-10). In it, the sovereign emperor is placed above a central executive 
composed of a “cabinet [with a] grand minister and councilors” (naikaku 
dajōdaijin sangi) in between a minister of the left and minister of the right. 
Below are the three branches of government as represented in a legislative 
advisory board (Genrōin), a supreme court (Taishinin), and the govern-
ment ministries (Gyōsei). Although the Genrōin and the proposed cabinet 
structure did not amount to much, this conciliatory gesture bought the 
Sat-Chō oligarchs a breathing space during which to craft a constitution 
and other institutions that would not easily bend to the fickle winds of 
representative democracy. An important consequence of the Osaka Con-
ference was that it induced Itagaki and Kido to return to the Meiji govern-
ment as imperial councilors.
The “1881 political crisis” (Meiji jūyonen no seihen) drove another 
wedge into the oligarchy. It was sparked by a chorus of demands for a rep-
resentative assembly that, by December 1879, had grown sufficiently bois-
terous to prompt Minister of the Right Iwakura Tomomi to command 
each of the seven imperial councilors to present their views on the subject 
of constitutional government. By the end of 1880, six had responded. Itō 
Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Kuroda Kiyotaka, Yamada Akiyoshi, Inoue 
Kaoru, and Ōki Takato submitted opinions suggesting that constitutional 
government should be established, albeit gradually, and in such a way that 
the powers of Parliament were carefully circumscribed (Saikō hōki 2003, 
14). Itō wanted to ensure that the constitution take the form of an “impe-
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rial document” (chokusho), presented as a gift to the people from their 
benevolent divine-right emperor (Furuya 1991, 10). Ōkuma Shigenobu, 
the lone holdout, finally submitted his memorial in March with the pro-
viso that it not be shown to the other councilors. As a Hizen native in a 
group of imperial councilors dominated by a Sat-Chō cabal, Ōkuma was 
convinced that the best way to break the cabal’s stranglehold on political 
power was through establishing a British-style system with a prime min-
ister and cabinet selected by the majority party in Parliament (Lebra 1959, 
482; Saikō hōki 2003, 19).15 When Ōkuma’s views became known, Itō had 
him ousted from his government posts. Not willing to go quietly, Ōkuma 
lent his insider voice to that of the partisan newspapers in attacking Kuroda 
for using his influence as director of the Hokkaidō Colonization Board 
to propose a plan by which government properties in Hokkaidō were to 
be sold to a Satsuma businessman on extremely generous terms. Ōkuma 
argued that creation of a parliamentary system would eliminate hanbatsu 
favoritism, to which Itō countered that it would require at least a decade of 
tutelary governance under transcendental cabinets to prepare the citizenry 
for parliamentary democracy. On October 12, 1881, the day Ōkuma and 
fifteen other officials submitted their resignations, the Meiji government 
announced that it had suspended the plan to sell the Hokkaidō properties 
and, more importantly, that a constitution and national assembly would be 
granted by 1890 (Lebra 1959, 486).
Now that the emperor had promised a constitution, it was necessary to 
determine its content. In an imperial order dated March 3, 1882, His Impe-
rial Highness commanded Itō to investigate the various constitutional sys-
tems of the European countries. A separate document listed thirty-one 
items to be studied, including each country’s constitution, imperial family, 
Parliament, peerage, judiciary, budget, and local administration. Among 
those items, Itō was specifically tasked with studying the organization, 
powers, and appointment of the European cabinets, as well as the nature 
of the relationship between cabinets and Parliament (Saikō hōki 2003, 30). 
The Itō mission departed on March 14 and spent the next fourteen months 
touring Italy, Germany, France, Holland, Belgium, England, and Russia.
Much of the Itō mission’s time was spent imbibing the wisdom of Prus-
sian legal scholars. One of them, Rudolph von Gneist, suggested that if 
the Meiji government were to choose to grant a constitution, budgetary 
power should not be given over to Parliament. In addition, the mission 
received forty-four lectures from scholar Albert Mosse on topics ranging 
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from Prussian constitutional history to the monarch’s powers and citizens’ 
rights (Saikō hōki 2003, 30). Lorenz von Stein emphasized the benefits of 
a system whereby cabinet ministers are appointed by the monarch, rather 
than at the whim of the majority in Parliament. Stein also echoed Gneist’s 
view that parliament’s budgetary powers should be carefully constrained 
(ibid., 32–33). Members of the mission were quick to perceive the ben-
efits of the Prussian system, with its limited parliamentary powers and 
safeguards to ensure effective governance under cabinets whose minis-
ters were individually responsible to a sovereign emperor (Quo 1972, 24). 
As Itō observed in a letter to Iwakura, “the tendency of our country is to 
erroneously believe in the works of British, French, and American liberals 
and radicals as if they were Golden Rules, and thereby lead virtually to the 
overthrow of the State. I have found principle and means of combating this 
trend” (Beckmann 1957, 72, n. 17).
In March 1884, Itō was appointed director general of the Systems 
Investigation Bureau (Seido torishirabe kyoku). Four months later he 
secured issuance of the Peerage Ordinance (Kazoku rei), which created a 
five-rank nobility and a ready-made supply of personnel for an unelected 
upper house of Parliament. Peerage titles were given to imperial family 
members, court nobility, former daimyō, noted scholars, wealthy taxpay-
ers, and, later on, even a few exemplary subjects from Japan’s colonies. A 
strong Sat-Chō presence was ensured by giving titles to important govern-
ment officials and “individuals who made major contributions to the Res-
toration” (ishin no kōrōsha) (Saikō hōki 2003, 34). In November of 1886, 
Itō and his working group began working on a draft constitution, and less 
than five months later they submitted the proposed constitution for review 
by the Privy Council. Naturally, Itō was the Council’s inaugural president. 
Itō presented the completed constitution to the emperor on April 27, 1888 
(ibid., 38).
The Emperor Meiji promulgated the Constitution of the Empire of 
Japan (Dainippon teikoku kenpō) at a grand ceremony on February 11, 
1889. Although the Meiji Constitution created a national assembly—a 
bicameral Imperial Diet (Teikoku kokkai) composed of an elected House of 
Representatives (Shūgiin) and an unelected House of Peers (Kizokuin)—it 
was founded on the premise that the emperor was “sacred and inviolable,” 
and, as head of the empire, combined “in himself the rights of sovereignty.” 
Itō and his fellow founding fathers were at pains to constrain the powers of 
the Imperial Diet. The three hundred-member House of Representatives 
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would be elected by a franchise composed of male citizens over twenty-
five years of age who paid ¥15 in direct national taxes. This meant that 
a mere 1.3 percent of the populace was empowered to elect lower house 
MPs. Moreover, because the Diet’s two houses were independent of one 
another and equal in power, the conservative unelected upper house could 
be expected to restrain any liberalizing initiatives from the popularly 
elected lower house (Gordon 2003, 126). Moreover, parliamentary sessions 
were limited to three months of the year, leaving government bureaucrats 
in charge of the nation’s governance for the remainder of the time (Pempel 
1986, 113). Parliament’s budgetary powers were constrained by a provi-
sion stating that “when the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or 
when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the Govern-
ment shall carry out the Budget of the preceding year” (Meiji Constitution, 
Article 71; Beckmann 1957).
Naturally, Itō and the other architects of the Meiji Constitution “had 
no intention of introducing the system of unified Cabinet control” and 
ensured that the cabinet would not be collectively responsible to the Diet 
(McGovern 1920, 107). In fact, the term “cabinet” (naikaku) does not 
appear in the Meiji Constitution, and its existence is merely implied in the 
lone article in which the “respective ministers of state” are instructed to 
“give their advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it.” It goes on to 
dictate that “all laws, imperial ordinances, and imperial rescripts of what-
ever kind that relate to the affairs of the state, require the countersigna-
ture of a Minister of State” (Article 55). An equal amount of verbiage is 
given to the role of the Privy Councilors (Sūmitsu komon), who “shall, in 
accordance with the provisions for the organization of the Privy Coun-
cil, deliberate upon important matters of State when they have been con-
sulted by the Emperor” (Article 56). In his Commentaries, Itō observed that 
“the appointment and dismissal of [ministers] having been included by the 
Constitution in the sovereign power of the Emperor, it is only a legitimate 
consequence, that the power of deciding as to the responsibility of Min-
isters, is withheld from the Diet” (Itō 1889, 102). He added that “in some 
countries, the Cabinet is regarded as constituting a corporate body, the 
Ministers are not held to take part in the conduct of the government each 
one in an individual capacity, but joint responsibility is the rule. The evil of 
such a system is, that the power of party combination will ultimately over-
rule the supreme power of the Sovereign” (ibid., 104).
The duties of the cabinet and its ministers were set forth in the Cab-
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inet Ordinance (Naikaku kansei kōfu), issued on December 24, 1889. It 
authorized the prime minister to report affairs of state to the emperor and 
to exercise general administrative control over the various administrative 
branches. Nevertheless, each minister was given the right to “submit any 
matter whatsoever for the cabinet’s consideration through the prime min-
ister.” And each minister was individually responsible for giving advice to 
the emperor concerning the affairs of his ministry. This reduced the rela-
tive status of the prime minister to that of first among equals within the 
cabinet. At the same time, not all ministers were created equal, as the mili-
tary ministers were allowed to report directly to the emperor on matters 
concerning the armed forces.
The Sat-Chō Cabal
The social origins of the five men who held the prime ministership between 
1871 and 1898 reflect the forces that propelled the Meiji Restoration. Sanjō 
Sanetomi, who served as grand minister of state in the proto-cabinets that 
prevailed from 1871 until 1885, was one of seven court nobles who fled to 
Chōshū in 1863 when the shōgunate attempted to muzzle dissent in Kyoto 
(Craig 1961, 190; Gordon 2003, 56). From 1885 through 1898, the pre-
miership alternated between Chōshū and Satsuma leaders, each of whom 
emerged from low-ranking samurai households and had been groomed 
as imperial councilors in the Grand Council. Itō Hirobumi and Yamagata 
Aritomo, the Chōshū leaders, were the most important political figures of 
the Meiji era. Itō’s “great talent and natural flair for political life” propelled 
him through virtually every major position in the Meiji government (Hack-
ett 1971, 146). Yet his most significant contribution to the development of 
the cabinet system was in forging the Meiji Constitution, which limited 
popular influence and created a façade of imperial authority, behind which 
the Sat-Chō cabal wielded actual, and nearly absolute, power. Regarded 
as the “father of the modern Japanese army,” Yamagata established mili-
tary branches that were immune to control by civilian governments (Sam-
uels 2003, 65). He once observed that “power is indispensible, so I do my 
best to maintain mine” (Najita 1967, 7; Hackett 1971, 145–146). Kuroda 
Kiyotaka—who carried a reputation for drunken misbehavior and an 
unsubstantiated rumor that he murdered his wife during an intoxicated 
rage—became leader of the Satsuma clique as a result of the deaths of Saigō 
Takamori and Ōkubo Toshimichi (Koyama 1979, 12; Baxter 1994, 158). 
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Likewise, Matsukata Masayoshi became the Satsuma leader by default, 
although he gained fame as a financial wizard who pressed deflationary 
policies during a lengthy stint as finance minister (Bailey 1983, 104).
Including the five prime ministers, a total of sixty-eight individuals 
held ministerial portfolios in the cabal cabinets.16 Not surprisingly, the 
composite profile of this first generation of cabinet ministers bears little 
resemblance to that of ministers associated with a Westminster system. In 
fact, the modal minister in the earliest cabinets was a youthful ex-samurai 
male from Satsuma or Chōshū who had risen through the ranks of the new 
government’s civil or military bureaucracies. In the unlikely event that this 
modal minister had any connection to the Imperial Diet that was estab-
lished in 1890, it was as a member of the nonelected House of Peers.
Young ex-samurai from the main tozama domains were well repre-
sented in the ministerial rosters of the cabal cabinets. In a society steeped 
in a Confucianist respect for seniority, it is surprising that the average min-
ister was less than forty-four years of age upon initial appointment to a 
cabinet post. For example, Itō Hirobumi had just celebrated his thirty-first 
birthday when he was appointed imperial councilor in a proto-cabinet 
headed by thirty-four-year-old Grand Minister Sanjō Sanetomi. Yet the 
fact that 90 percent of ministers emerged from samurai households is to be 
expected, given the fact that, over the course of two and a half centuries of 
Pax Tokugawa, the samurai were transformed from a warrior class into well-
educated urban bureaucrats (Duus 1969, 100). In this regard, ex-samurai 
Table 1.1. The Cabal Cabinets, 1871 to 1898
Cabinet Prime Minister Established Dissolved PM’s Domain
Grand Council Sanjō Sanetomi 7/29/1871 12/22/1885 Kyoto
1st Itō Cabinet Itō Hirobumi 12/22/1885 4/30/1888 Chōshū
Kuroda Cabinet Kuroda Kiyotaka 4/30/1888 10/25/1889 Satsuma
1st Yamagata Cabinet Yamagata Aritomo 12/24/1889 5/6/1891 Chōshū
1st Matsukata Cabinet Matsukata Masayoshi 5/6/1891 8/8/1892 Satsuma
2nd Itō Cabinet Itō Hirobumi 8/8/1892 8/31/1896 Chōshū
2nd Matsukata Cabinet Matsukata Masayoshi 9/18/1896 1/12/1898 Satsuma
3rd Itō Cabinet Itō Hirobumi 1/12/1898 6/30/1898 Chōshū
Source: JCCM Database (Appendix A).
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possessed elite social status and represented the best available administra-
tive talent with which to staff the key posts of the new Meiji government. 
Meanwhile, two-thirds of all ministers appointed to the cabal cabinets origi-
nated in the main tozama domains, with five ministers hailing from Hizen, 
nine from Tosa, fourteen from Chōshū, and seventeen from Satsuma. Over-
all, ministers from Satsuma and Chōshū commanded 54 percent of port-
folios in the cabal cabinets and held the lion’s share of the most prestigious 
portfolios, including prime minister (70 percent), army (100 percent), navy, 
(73 percent), home (76 percent), and finance (56 percent).
Nearly three-quarters of all ministers ascended through the ranks 
of the Meiji government’s civil bureaucracy en route to their ministerial 
appointments, and nearly all of the rest emerged from the officer corps of 
the Imperial Army or Imperial Navy.17 For example, Yamagata rose to the 
rank of field marshal in the Imperial Japanese Army before assuming a 
succession of cabinet-level posts that included war minister and premier. 
Although few held university diplomas (which is not surprising, given the 
paucity of Japanese universities at the time), a number of them studied in 
Europe or the United States. For example, Inoue Kaoru (who served in a 
variety of posts, including minister of foreign affairs, industry, agriculture 
and commerce, justice, and finance) and Yamao Yōzō (industry minister) 
were among five young Chōshū samurai—along with Itō Hirobumi—sent 
to study in England in 1863 in violation of the shōgunate’s ban on over-
seas travel. Others—such as Yamagata and Saigō Tsugumichi—were sent 
to Europe to study military affairs. At least ten incumbent or future min-
isters visited Washington, D.C., and the major Western European capitals 
with the Iwakura mission.18
Throughout the period, only 1 percent of ministers were recruited from 
the ranks of elected MPs. In fact, only three elected MPs held portfolios in 
the cabal cabinets. They were Mutsu Munemitsu, Suematsu Kenchō, and 
Kōmuchi Tomotsune. This tells us that the system of ministerial recruit-
ment functioned as it was designed to do—that is, to ensure that Sat-Chō 
interests prevailed and that popularly elected politicians and the “people’s 
parties” (mintō) had little influence in shaping national policy.
Core Executive Actors
The cabal cabinets never played more than a supporting role in executive 
affairs. In fact, the Sat-Chō oligarchs wielded significant influence, if not 
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outright control, over prime ministers and their cabinets, the government 
bureaucracy, the Privy Council, elder statesmen, military supreme com-
mand, and even the emperor and his “private palace cabinet” (Byas 1942, 
106). The only actors with any meaningful influence over executive affairs 
not under the cabal’s control were the people’s parties and their legions of 
lower house MPs.
From 1868 until the opening of the Diet in 1890, the central state 
bureaucracy and government were one and the same (Silberman 1967, 
84). Because many government bureaucrats emerged from samurai back-
grounds, they brought with them the prestige of a traditionally elite war-
rior class that had been transformed into an administrative class during the 
period of Pax Tokugawa. The leaders of the Sat-Chō cabal controlled the 
bureaucracy by seeing to it that their supporters occupied up to 40 percent 
of upper administrative posts in the central government (Silberman 1993, 
182). Tokyo Imperial University (Tōkyō teikoku daigaku) was established 
in 1886 to train career civil servants, and, over time, alumni of this presti-
gious institution came to dominate the upper echelons of the bureaucracy. 
Beginning in 1887, a Higher Civil Service Examination (Kōtō bunkan shi-
ken) determined appointment to all central government positions with 
the exception of the two highest ranks, which were occupied by imperial 
appointees (Silberman 1970, 349; Koyama 1979, 11). From 1893 on, offi-
cials who passed the examination were given priority in appointments to 
all central bureaucratic postings (Beasley 1989, 668).19
Bureaucrats were in charge of drafting cabinet ordinances (seirei) and 
imperial ordinances (chokurei), neither of which required Diet approval. 
Even after the establishment of the Diet, the bureaucracy issued nine ordi-
nances for every enacted law (hōritsu), providing “an important extralegal 
channel for direct bureaucratic control over wide areas of public policy-
making, a control that carried the important legitimacy provided by the 
imperial seal” (Pempel 1982, 218).20 Government bureaucrats set the 
agenda for cabinet deliberations through the ritualized weekly meetings 
of top career officials from each of the ministries (van Wolferen 2001, 4). 
These meetings, which were initiated in 1886 at Yamagata’s urging, would 
continue for the next 123 years, when they were temporarily suspended.
The Privy Council (Sūmitsuin) was established on April 30, 1888, to 
review the draft constitutions being prepared by Itō Hirobumi and his 
working group. Of the Council’s thirty-one original members, twenty-
one (67 percent) hailed from the four main tozama domains, with the Sat-
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Chō contingent alone accounting for thirteen of them (Saikō hōki 2003, 
44). Three of the four Privy Council presidents who served between 1888 
and 1898—Itō, Yamagata, and Kuroda—were Sat-Chō leaders and for-
mer or future prime ministers.21 In theory, the council was an impartial 
body whose purpose was to protect the constitution, curb the “arrogance 
of the Diet,” and control the “autocracy of the ministers of state” (Cole-
grove 1931a, 594; Harada 1968, 302). In rationalizing the council’s exis-
tence, Itō explained that Japan’s well-being depended on effectuating “new 
enactments” and “far-sighted schemes of statecraft” that necessitated the 
creation of a “special institution made up of men of wide experience and 
of profound erudition” (Itō 1889, 109). In reality, the Privy Council was “a 
‘watchdog’ (bannin) to protect oligarchic power from popular encroach-
ment” and served as the “supreme board of advisers on all questions of 
special importance” (Samuels 2003, 57; Colegrove 1931a, 589; Nitobe 
1931, 193). As “the palladium of the Constitution and of the law,” the Privy 
Council was to Japan’s prewar political system what the Supreme Court is 
to the president and Congress in the United States (Colegrove 1936a, 920; 
Nitobe 1931, 192). Under the Meiji Constitution, the council was autho-
rized to deliberate on “important matters of state,” which meant, in effect, 
that it became a potential veto player in executive and legislative affairs 
(Nitobe 1931, 193; Colegrove 1931a, 598; and Quigley 1932, 92). The coun-
cil frequently requested modifications of treaties, cabinet draft proposals, 
and imperial ordinances, and recommended rejection in the event that the 
desired amendments were not made (Colegrove 1931a, 609).22
By the late 1890s, an extra-constitutional council of elder statesmen, 
known as the genrō, emerged to become, arguably, the “ultimate executive 
power” in the Meiji government (Hackett 1974, 192; Beasley 1995, 133). As 
confidential, self-appointed imperial advisers, the genrō were core mem-
bers of a cabal that collectively made decisions in the name of the emperor. 
The original members of this exclusive fraternity were those Sat-Chō lead-
ers who, through “their brilliancy and experience in statesmanship, guided 
the new Japan through the perplexities of its first years” (Iwasaki 1921, 31). 
During the period of cabal cabinets, the members of the genrō included 
all four Sat-Chō ex-prime ministers—Itō, Kuroda, Yamagata, and Matsu-
kata—as well as Saigō Tsugumichi, a senior figure in the Satsuma clique. 
At one time or another, these five figures held virtually every major posi-
tion in the Meiji government (Silberman 1993, 188). The genrō played an 
important role in shaping long-range policy and in solving leadership cri-
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ses, particularly when it came to recommending prime ministerial candi-
dates (ibid., 189; Colegrove 1936a, 907).
The military supreme command—the army and navy ministers, chiefs 
of staff, field marshals, and fleet admirals—represented a “distinct exec-
utive agency” (Quigley 1932, 89). An 1871 ordinance dictated that only 
active-duty officers holding the rank of major general (shōshō) or above 
could fill the military ministerships. While this requirement was relaxed in 
1886, in practice those appointed to the posts continued to be career mili-
tary officers.23 Simultaneously state ministers and members of the supreme 
command, the army and navy ministers had the authority to bypass the 
cabinet in reporting military matters directly to the emperor (iaku jōsō). 
The military branches could topple cabinets or dictate their composition by 
refusing to appoint a minister. Of the ten men who held military portfolios 
under the cabal cabinets, eight traced their roots to Satsuma or Chōshū.24 
This state of affairs gave rise to the expression “Army of the Chōshū clique, 
Navy of the Satsuma clique” (Riku no Chō-batsu, Kai no Satsu-batsu). In a 
cabinet system in which the prime minister was merely primus inter pares, 
the special powers accorded the supreme command made it an “indepen-
dent—indeed paramount—force in government” (Samuels 2003, 60).
Historically, Japan’s emperors had been figureheads who remained 
aloof from mundane political concerns. But the Emperor Meiji (who 
reigned from 1868 to 1911) was known as a “hands-on ruler making deci-
sions in all affairs of state” (Bix 2000, 8). As the “sacred and inviolable” 
sovereign, the monarch wielded expansive legislative and administra-
tive powers. Under the 1890 Constitution, the emperor was empowered 
to appoint and dismiss government officials and to determine the orga-
nization of the administrative branches and salaries for civil and military 
officials. In performing his duties, the emperor was assisted by a palace 
entourage—a “private palace cabinet”—whose core members included 
the lord keeper of the privy seal, the grand chamberlain, and the imperial 
household minister. This “enclave of privilege and the nucleus of the Japa-
nese elite” acted as the monarch’s closest advisers and as gatekeepers con-
trolling all access to the sovereign (ibid., 178). While the emperor himself 
seldom overtly meddled in political matters, the palace entourage ensured 
“that his purposes were incorporated into decisions of the cabinets” and 
the selection of prime ministers (ibid., 180; Colegrove 1936a, 907). Yet the 
Sat-Chō cabal had means to manipulate the emperor and his private pal-
ace cabinet. Itō drafted both the Imperial Household Law and the peerage 
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ordinance, and he served as imperial household minister from December 
1885 through September 1887. And Yamagata maintained a network of 
loyal followers that extended into virtually every major political and mili-
tary organ, including the Imperial Household Ministry (Samuels 2003, 59).
The only executive actors not under the thumb of the Sat-Chō cabal 
were the people’s parties. After the establishment of the Diet in 1890, the 
parties battled with a succession of governments over issues involving 
the national budget, foreign policy, and so forth. The Sat-Chō oligarchs 
employed a variety of legal and extralegal devices, including Diet disso-
lution (exercised on five occasions), bribery, intimidation, and violence, 
to have their way with the political parties. Moreover, the oligarchs could 
count on the House of Peers to put the brakes on any undesired policy 
departures that might emerge from the party-dominated lower house. Co-
equal in power to the lower house, “the upper house enjoyed the additional 
prestige of comprising the body of men with the highest social status the 
nation could bestow—titles of nobility” (Berger 1974, 460). Yet the people’s 
parties were able to harass, annoy, and otherwise embarrass a succession of 
Sat-Chō governments. Because the oligarchs desperately wanted to avoid 
parliamentary discord that would cast doubt on the image of democratic 
civility they wished to project to the outside world, they were vulnerable to 
blackmail by the political parties (Akita 1967, 78, 176). The leaders of the 
political parties perceived this and seldom missed an opportunity to reject 
or delay objectionable government proposals. In the thirteen Diets con-
vened from November 1890 through June 1898, the lower house rejected 
nearly 40 percent of all government bills.
The Decay of the Cabal
Despite numerous and imposing obstacles, the people’s parties in the Diet’s 
lower house did, in fact, become the nightmare that the architects of the 
Meiji state had so painstakingly endeavored to avoid. In response to popu-
lar pressure, the Sat-Chō cabal crafted a Prussian-inspired Constitution 
intended to appease anti-government protest while denying the despised 
people’s parties influence over the national budget and foreign policy. Nev-
ertheless, the parties were able to exploit a flaw in the Meiji Constitution 
to force a succession of “transcendental” (chōzen) governments, ones that 
were “above politics,” to take heed of their budgetary demands. Even though 
it was not until 1918 that the leader of the largest party in the Diet’s lower 
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house would become prime minister, the days of Sat-Chō dominance were 
numbered. In fact, the seedlings of the cabal’s demise were nurtured within 
those same carefully crafted institutions that had been designed to estab-
lish and perpetuate its rule. Looking ahead, it was clear that the people’s 
parties—the myopic and capricious agents of popular rights—would man-
age to force their way into the inner sanctum of executive decision-making. 
Nevertheless, dire consequences accompanied Japan’s first attempt at par-
liamentary democracy.
The Fleeting Age of Quasi-Party Cabinets, 1898–1932
On June 30, 1898, Ōkuma Shigenobu became prime minister of Japan. This 
was a milestone event, because Ōkuma was the first modern premier who 
did not hail from the former feudal domains of Chōshū or Satsuma (he was 
from Hizen), and, more importantly, he was the leader of a political party. 
For supporters of the long-suffering party movement, the appointment of 
one of its own to the premiership and the awarding of ministerial portfo-
lios to a handful of elected members of Parliament heralded the advent 
of an age of “party cabinets.” Indeed, by the late 1920s party participation 
in cabinets had become the rule. This abruptly changed on May 15, 1932, 
when, after paying their respect to Japan’s war dead at Yasukuni Shrine, 
eleven young Imperial Navy officers made an uninvited visit to the Prime 
Minister’s Official Residence. Wearing their officers’ uniforms, they had 
little difficulty making their way to the premier’s private apartment, where 
they gunned down Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi. During his trial, the 
ringleader of the attack admitted to having no personal grudge against Inu-
kai. Instead, he orchestrated the murderous plot to “overthrow the Premier, 
who was also the president of a political party; in other words to overthrow 
the very center of government” (Byas 1942, 29; italics added). The plotters 
also contemplated bombing the House of Representatives and assassinat-
ing two American diplomats and comedian Charlie Chaplin, who had been 
invited to tea at the Prime Minister’s Residence. In the end, Inukai was the 
only murder victim of the “May 15th Incident” (goichigo jiken).
What happened during the three decades between the founding of 
Ōkuma’s “party cabinet” and the murder of Inukai? Although the age of 
party cabinets—actually, as we shall see, quasi-party cabinets—overlaps 
the reigns of the emperors Meiji (1868–1911) and Shōwa (1926–1989), it 
is associated with the era of “Taishō democracy” (Taishō demokurashii). 
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Unlike the father who preceded and the son who succeeded him, the 
Emperor Taishō (1912–1926) was unable to be a hands-on monarch 
because of brain disease and poor health (Hara 2008a, 213; Hara 2008b, 
227; Bix 2000, 12). A famous, possibly apocryphal story told of the 
Emperor Taishō portrays him using a scroll as a telescope through which 
to peer at bewildered lawmakers at an opening session of the Imperial Diet 
(Hara 2008b, 227). Yet the reign of this infirm monarch occurred in the 
midst of an amazing three-decade period during which political parties 
gained entrée to the “star chamber” of policy-making, party leaders from 
the popularly elected House of Representatives organized cabinets, and 
the franchise was gradually extended to all male citizens over twenty-five 
years of age (Murai 2005, 14). Still, the reign of the Emperor Taishō, who 
unwittingly presided over many of these developments, can be seen as a 
metaphor for the structurally unsound and incomplete experiment with 
democracy that took place between the establishment of Ōkuma’s “party 
cabinet” and Inukai’s assassination.
Drifting into Party Cabinets
Prime Minister Inukai was collateral damage in a holy war to put an end to 
party cabinets. In the minds of the eleven young naval officers and a grow-
ing number of radical nationalists, party politicians such as Inukai were 
traitors to the “rich country, strong military” (fukoku kyōhei) cause, which 
had served as the mantra for Japan’s forced-march program of industri-
alization and the quest for national security through creating a colonial 
empire. Despite the painstaking efforts of the Sat-Chō cabal, political par-
ties had come to occupy—at least in the minds of some, including the young 
naval officers—the “very center of government.” The institutional barriers 
erected by the Sat-Chō cabal included a constitution in which ministers 
of state were individually responsible to a sovereign emperor and bore no 
responsibility to the bicameral Diet. In addition, while lower house MPs 
were elected by a razor-thin franchise of male taxpayers (which expanded 
after the introduction of universal manhood suffrage in 1925), their coun-
terparts in the unelected upper house possessed equal powers and could 
be counted on to veto excessively “liberal” proposals. The Constitution’s 
Prussian-inspired Article 71 was designed to deny the Diet ultimate con-
trol over the nation’s budget by automatically carrying forward the previ-
ous year’s budget in the easily imagined event that the Diet could not agree 
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on a bill. Moreover, the Imperial Army and Navy were not subject to civil-
ian control, and an assortment of constitutional and extra-constitutional 
actors possessed the wherewithal to veto undesired policies proposed by 
party-led cabinets.
Despite the barriers put in their way—not to mention the violence, 
intimidation, and vote-buying by government authorities to thwart their 
rise—the people’s parties (mintō) refused to back down. The Diet’s lower 
house became a battleground in which the parties jousted with a succes-
sion of cabal cabinets over the national budget and issues of domestic and 
foreign policy. Indeed, parties in the Diet quickly perceived that they could 
use Article 71 to block government budget proposals calling for increased 
expenditures to pay for wars and enhanced arsenals (Akita 1967, 76–89; 
Banno 1992, xiii–xiv, 49–50). By 1898, the two leading figures in the Sat-
Chō cabal—Itō Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo—were at odds over how 
to deal with the obstreperous parties. Itō gradually came to favor accom-
modation and, in January 1892, recommended this strategy in a memorial 
to the Emperor Meiji. Itō’s idea was to create a large government-friendly 
party that could control the Diet. But Yamagata regarded that as a first step 
down the slippery slope leading to a British-style parliamentary system 
(Sims 2001, 74). For the next six years, Yamagata’s view held sway among 
the elder statesmen who represented the Sat-Chō cabal’s dominant posi-
tion. But, on June 22, 1898, the two largest people’s parties merged to form 
the Kenseitō (Constitutional Government Party), which controlled an 
overwhelming majority of lower house seats. This made Yamagata’s night-
mare come to pass; the oligarchs were obliged to hand the reins of govern-
ment to the Kenseitō’s leaders, Ōkuma Shigenobu and Itagaki Taisuke.
Although the birth of the first Ōkuma cabinet was heralded as the gen-
esis of an “age of party government,” its effects were far less dramatic than 
the institutional reconfiguration set in motion four and a half decades ear-
lier by Commodore Perry’s uninvited visit. Indeed, by the time of Perry’ s 
visit, the shōgunate was no longer able to police and punish insurrection-
ary acts, especially those committed in the distant domains of powerful 
outside lords. In contrast, the people’s parties operated in an environment 
dominated by a Sat-Chō cabal that possessed a panoply of institutional 
and extra-institutional means of blocking unwanted change. Moreover, 
the Sat-Chō oligarchs enjoyed considerable discretion in enforcing their 
dictates, which had not been the case with an enervated shōgunate. The 
change agents in the drama that unfolded between 1898 and 1932 were 
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former insiders, led by ex-government officials from the former domains 
of Hizen and Tosa and their followers. These renegades formed anti- 
government protest groups that evolved into the people’s parties that 
became a perpetual irritant for Sat-Chō oligarchs. The result was drift from 
transcendental cabinets to cabinets in which parties and elected politicians 
played a visible, if not dominant, role in executive affairs.
The Central State Executive
When the first Ōkuma cabinet was formed, eleven ministers were allocated 
twelve portfolios. In addition to the premiership, these included portfo-
lios for foreign affairs, home, army, navy, justice, education, agriculture 
and commerce, and communications. In addition, the directors general 
of the Cabinet Secretariat and Legislation Bureau continued to participate 
in cabinet meetings, and the occupants of those posts were regarded as de 
facto cabinet ministers (Quigley 1932, 130). By the time the ill-fated Inukai 
cabinet took office, the number of portfolios had expanded to fifteen, dis-
tributed among fourteen ministers. Part of this expansion was owed to the 
decision taken in 1925 to split the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce 
into a Ministry of Agriculture and a Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
In 1920, a Ministry of Railways was founded to oversee a rapidly expanding 
national railway system, which already employed nearly ninety thousand 
personnel and claimed jurisdiction over eighty-two hundred kilometers of 
track. Nine years later, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs was established to 
manage Japan’s expanding empire, which, by the time of Inukai’s assassina-
tion, included control over Taiwan, the southern half of Sakhalin Island, 
and Korea, as well as a “protectorate” over Germany’s holdings in China 
(Jiaozhou Bay in Shandong Province) and in the northern Pacific (the 
Marshall Islands, the Carolines and Marianas, and the Palau Islands).25
The cabinet also got into the business of managing economic plan-
ning and industrial mobilization. In 1918, the Munitions Bureau (Gunju 
kyoku) was established as a cabinet organ and staffed with military officers 
and statisticians who formulated economic plans, gathered statistical data, 
and administered the recently enacted Munitions Industries Mobilization 
Law (Johnson 1982, 117). This is an early indication of the rising influ-
ence of technocrats in Japan’s civil and military bureaucracies. In 1927 the 
Resources Bureau (Shigen kyoku) was established under the cabinet and 
given charge of formulating the “materials mobilization plans” (ibid., 118).
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Cabinets normally met weekly in the Prime Minister’s Official Resi-
dence, except when Parliament was in session, when they met in the cab-
inet chamber of the National Diet Building. The proceedings of cabinet 
meetings were kept secret, although it is known that efforts were made to 
give the appearance of cabinet unity whenever votes were taken (Takeu-
chi 1967, 24). In addition, the Cabinet Secretariat, Legislation Bureau, and 
other agencies supported the activities of the prime ministers and their 
cabinets. At the turn of the century the professional staff posted to cab-
inet-related agencies numbered around 700 government employees; by 
1922 that number had more than doubled to 1,521 staffers. Although the 
number of government employees was cut following the 1923 Great Kantō 
Earthquake, by 1932 some 1,269 staffers were working in cabinet-related 
agencies. Still, the cabinet’s support staff never accounted for more than 1 
percent of government employees.
Party Cabinet Ministers
Between June 1898 and May 1932, twenty-two cabinets were formed under 
sixteen prime ministers. They included nine ex-bureaucrats and seven 
military men, while only the ill-fated Inukai Tsuyoshi could be described 
as a “career politician.” The ex-bureaucrats were Itō Hirobumi, Ōkuma 
Shigenobu, Saionji Kinmochi, Hara Kei (who also worked as a newspa-
per reporter), Takahashi Korekiyo, Kiyoura Keigō, Katō Takaaki, Wakat-
suki Reijirō, and Hamaguchi Osachi. Yamagata Aritomo, Katsura Tarō, 
Terauchi Masatake, Kiyoura Keigo, and Tanaka Giichi were army gener-
als, while Yamamoto Gonbei and Katō Tomosaburō were admirals. Inukai 
was a newspaper reporter before winning a Diet seat in the 1890 election. 
He was serving his seventeenth consecutive lower house term when he 
assumed the premiership, having acquired the moniker of “god of consti-
tutional government” (kensei no kamisama) despite his traitorous willing-
ness to assume portfolios in transcendental cabinets (Shiota 2011, 100).
While the appointment of Ōkuma, a Hizen man, brought an end to the 
Sat-Chō monopoly on the premiership, six of those who held the foremost 
executive post originated in Chōshū or Satsuma. Yamagata, Itō, Katsura, 
Terauchi, and Tanaka traced their roots to Chōshū, while Yamamoto was 
a Satsuma man.26 From June 1898 on, Yamagata and Itō were at odds over 
Itō’s decision to become president of the Seiyūkai (Friends of Constitutional 
Government). Yamagata viewed political parties as divisive elements, and 
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he viewed Itō’s action as tantamount to treason. The Yamagata-Itō rivalry 
lived on in their respective protégés, Katsura Tarō and Saionji Kinmochi, 
who alternated as prime minister from 1901 through 1913.
Including the prime ministers, 156 individuals held ministerial portfo-
lios in the quasi-party cabinets. The modal minister was a fifty-six-year-old 
male (making him nearly nine years older than his cabal cabinet counter-
part) who originated in less urbanized regions of Kyūshū or southwestern 
Honshū. He very well may have served as an upper-level government offi-
cial or as a military officer prior to being appointed to a cabinet post, and 
there was a better than fifty-fifty chance he attended university. Indeed, 
from around the time of the First World War on, a majority of ministe-
rial appointees had received a university education. For two-thirds of 
those who did attend university, Tokyo Imperial University (Tokyo teikoku 
daigaku, or simply Tōdai) was their alma mater. Yet even in this age of 
party cabinets, the modal minister was not an elected MP. In fact, elected 
representatives accounted for only one-quarter of ministers, and repre-
sented half or more of ministers in only seven of the twenty-two cabinets 
formed during this period. As noted earlier, only three of the sixteen prime 
ministers held seats in the Diet’s lower house.
Taken together, the career civil service and imperial armed forces pro-
duced nearly three-quarters of all those who held ministerial portfolios. 
More than half emerged from the central state bureaucracy, and better 
than four in five of these ex-bureaucrats (sixty-four of seventy-eight) had 
ascended to the rank of bureau chief or above. This explains the prom-
inence of Tōdai alumni among the ministerial elite, as the purpose in 
founding the Imperial University was to train upper civil servants. Slightly 
over 20 percent of ministerships were given to retired or active officers in 
the imperial armed forces, with soldiers outnumbering sailors almost two 
to one. Nearly half of these soldier-ministers hailed from Chōshū, which 
wielded enormous sway over that branch of the armed services. Chōshū 
men who held the post of army minister included Kodama Gentarō, Oka 
Ichinosuke, and future premiers Yamagata, Katsura, Tanaka, and Terau-
chi. Despite Satsuma’s strong influence over the navy, only two of its native 
sons—Saigō Tsugumichi and Yamamoto Gonbei—held the navy ministe-
rial portfolio.
Ministers from the predominantly rural and politically conservative 
southwestern areas were disproportionately represented in the party cab-
inets. In particular, the Chūgoku, Kyūshū, and Shikoku regions—which, 
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uncoincidentally, included the former “outside domains” of Chōshū, Sat-
suma, Hizen, and Tosa—accounted for 55 percent of all ministers, despite 
being home to less than 30 percent of the country’s population.27 And, 
by themselves, ministers from Chūgoku (southwestern Honshū) and 
Kyūshū garnered more than half of all portfolios allocated. Although men 
from Chōshū (which had become Yamaguchi Prefecture) and Satsuma 
(Kagoshima Prefecture) had accounted for more than half of all cabal cabi-
net ministers, these two former feudal domains produced only 22 percent 
of ministers in the party cabinets.
While elected MPs assumed a more visible presence in cabinet meet-
ings, the “age of party cabinets” (seitō naikaku jidai) is a misnomer. In fact, 
only one in four ministers appointed during the period held seats in the 
Diet’s lower house, and five cabinets were “transcendental” (chōzen), which 
is to say that they included exactly zero elected MPs. Furthermore, five 
cabinets can be labeled “semi-transcendental,” with elected MPs making 
up less than a quarter of the ministers, while another five could be classi-
fied as “semi-party” cabinets, in which elected MPs accounted for between 
one-quarter and one-half of the ministerial roster. This means that elected 
MPs accounted for half or more ministers in only seven “party cabinets,” 
and it was not until the establishment of the Katō (Takaaki) cabinet on June 
11, 1924, that such cabinets became the rule. This is shown in table 1.2. It is 
worth pointing out that MPs who held portfolios in the six cabinets formed 
between June 1924 and May 1932 had been elected to an average number 
of 6.5 lower house terms. This is the first clear sign that a seniority system 
for cabinet ministers was beginning to take root.
Power Relations in Executive Affairs
As Colegrove observed, the cabinet “never enjoyed the unrivaled direction 
of administration as found in many parliamentary democracies” (1936a, 
903). Indeed, despite all the hype about “party cabinets” and “Taishō 
democracy” (Taishō demokurashii), the government bureaucracy, the Privy 
Council, elder statesmen, the emperor and the palace entourage, and the 
military supreme command continued to dominate the core executive. 
Nonetheless, the people’s parties and elected MPs managed to gain a pre-
carious place at the “high table” of executive decision-making.
The government bureaucracy wielded considerable influence in execu-
tive affairs (Iwasaki 1921, 51). Whereas the approval of both Diet cham-
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bers was required to enact new laws, the bureaucracy was empowered to 
issue imperial ordinances, which did not require Diet approval. In fact, 
for every law passed by the Diet from 1898 until 1932, the bureaucracy 
issued nearly seven ordinances. When Ōkuma established his “party cabi-
net” in 1898, he employed the spoils system to install his followers in upper 
posts in the government officialdom. Of course, this is exactly what the 
Sat-Chō oligarchs had done for their followers, but they were not about 
to allow party leaders to do it. So the oligarchs modified the Civil Ser-
vice Appointment Ordinance (Bunkan nin’yō rei) to require that the high-
est bureaucratic posts be reserved for those who passed the Upper Civil 
Service Examination (Silberman 1970, 349).28 Under the second Ōkuma 
cabinet, parliamentary undersecretary (sanseikan) and deputy parliamen-
tary undersecretary (fuku-sanseikan) posts were established in each minis-
try and staffed with political appointees. Henceforth, each ministry would 
be supervised by only three politically appointed officials—a minister and 
two undersecretaries—while the ministry’s day-to-day operations and all 
of its career and noncareer civil servants were supervised by a hierarchy of 
bureaucratically appointed officials under the direction of an administra-
tive vice minister.29
As “the highest body of the emperor’s constitutional advisers,” the 
Privy Council wielded “an immense and sometimes overpowering influ-
ence” (Itō 1889, 98; Nitobe 1931, 192). Supposedly “impartial, with no 
leanings to this or that party,” in reality the council sided with the Sat-Chō 
oligarchs in decisions concerning major legislative bills, proposed treaties, 
and imperial ordinances (Itō 1889, 98). Under Yamagata’s influence, the 
council’s role expanded to include the appointment of upper civil servants 
and the “reform and organization of Government offices” (Nitobe 1931, 
193; Quigley 1932, 92). Yamagata made the Privy Council into a “citadel 
of reaction” and a “check upon the cabinet, which [had] come more and 
more under the representative branch of government” (Nitobe 1931, 193; 
Colegrove 1931a, 590). As an observer of the time pointed out, “when we 
remember that the average age of Councilors is threescore and ten, we can 
easily understand the resentment of a cabinet of busy, energetic and pro-
gressive younger men at having to run to the Council for approval of their 
every move” (Quigley 1931, 502). The Privy Council vetoed cabinet pro-
posals on several occasions, most famously in the decision taken in 1927 
to reject the Wakatsuki cabinet’s proposed rescue plan for the financially 
troubled Bank of Taiwan (Colegrove 1931b, 885–888).
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Although the influence of the genrō waxed and, mostly, waned over 
time, these elder statesmen continued to represent a potent executive force, 
especially when it came to selecting candidates for a vacant prime min-
istership (Kitazawa 1929, 52–53; Quigley 1931, 503; Murai 2002, 22–23). 
With the exception of Saionji—who was born into a family of Kyoto court 
nobles but became Itō’s protégé—all of the genrō hailed from Satsuma 
or Chōshū. After the Emperor Meiji’s death in 1911, the influence of the 
genrō increased as the mentally and physically feeble Emperor Taishō sat 
upon the Chrysanthemum Throne.30 As premier-to-be Yamamoto Gonbei 
observed to elder statesman Matsukata Masayoshi, the present emperor “is 
not [of the same caliber] as the previous emperor. In my view, it is loyal not 
to obey the [Taishō] emperor’s word if we deem it to be disadvantageous to 
the state” (Bix 2000, 40). So it was that the elder statesmen did not find it 
necessary to consult the emperor in the selection of Takahashi Korekiyo to 
form a cabinet in November 1921 (ibid., 123).
“Upon the fall of a ministry,” an observer of the time noted, “it is cus-
tomary for the Emperor to ask the . . . lord keeper of the privy seal, for 
advice upon the selection of a prime minister. Invariably the [lord keeper 
of the privy seal] proposes that the Genrō be consulted, and invariably the 
Emperor follows the advice of the Genrō” (Colegrove 1936a, 907). In fact, 
beginning around 1927, there is reason to believe that this private palace 
cabinet decided on a candidate for the premiership and then dispatched a 
messenger to secure the rubber-stamped approval of Saionji, the last of the 
genrō (Bix 2000, 174). Yet it is difficult to know exactly how much influ-
ence the emperor and the palace entourage wielded. Although supposedly 
a mere “figurehead dressed in Imperial robes” (Byas 1942, 113), the Meiji 
emperor was known to be a “power wielder,” and the Shōwa emperor acted 
“energetically behind the scenes,” influencing the conduct of prime minis-
ters, hastening the collapse of party cabinets, and shaping policy (Bix 2000, 
39–40, 11–12). Further, “Imperial displeasure” could bring the resignation 
of a ministry (McGovern 1920, 109).
The military branches had the power to topple or transform cabinets 
and appeal directly and independently to the emperor, and they were in 
no way compelled to bow to civilian authority. In 1900, the Yamagata cabi-
net issued an imperial ordinance stipulating that only active-duty military 
officers could hold the army minister or navy minister portfolio (Cole-
grove 1936a, 917). This meant that if one branch of the military refused to 
recommend a replacement for a vacant ministerial portfolio, the cabinet 
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would collapse, and any attempt to form a new government would have to 
pay heed to the wishes of the aggrieved branch. That is exactly what hap-
pened in 1912, when the Saionji cabinet refused to provide funding for two 
new army divisions. In response, the army minister resigned and the army 
refused to nominate an active-duty officer to replace him (Koyama 1979, 
33). Saionji and his ministers had no choice but to throw in the towel, and 
Katsura Tarō, an army general who could be counted on to pursue pro-
army policies, was tapped to form a new cabinet (Gordon 2003, 130). The 
extraordinary power of the military branches meant that Japan was ruled 
under a system of “dual government” (nijū seifu) (Colegrove 1936a, 917).
Despite the numerous barriers erected by the Sat-Chō oligarchy to 
stem their rise—including the creation in 1900 of a system for electing MPs 
through a single nontransferable vote in multimember constituencies—the 
people’s parties were able to influence executive affairs.31 One source of 
influence was a loophole in the Meiji Constitution, by which the budget for 
the previous year automatically carried forward in the event that the Diet 
could not agree on a budget. This inadvertently granted influence to the 
Diet in the event that the government’s proposal called for increased expen-
ditures. In addition, parties employed non-confidence motions to embar-
rass and annoy governments, but these motions carried no force, since 
ministers were individually responsible to the emperor and cabinets were 
not collectively responsible to the Diet. Nevertheless, the establishment of 
the Hara cabinet on June 29, 1918, was seen as a hopeful sign. Dubbed 
the “commoner prime minister” (heimin saishō), Hara distributed ministe-
rial portfolios to eight Seiyūkai MPs. Leaders of the Seiyūkai (Tanaka and 
Wakatsuki) and Minseitō (Hamaguchi and Inukai)—the two largest par-
ties of the day—alternated in the premiership in the four cabinets formed 
between April 1927 and May 1932. In this way, the task of forming a new 
cabinet came to be entrusted to the leader of the largest political party as 
the “normal course of constitutional governance” (Duus 1998, 178–179; 
Murai 2002, 34). Unfortunately, all three of the “commoner” prime minis-
ters—Hara, Hamaguchi, and Inukai—fell victim to assassins’ bullets.
Killing the “Party Cabinet System”
What started out to be a wondrous age of party cabinets ended with the 
bloody May 15th Incident.32 Indeed, it was not until the late 1920s that 
elected MPs consistently accounted for even half of cabinet ministers, and 
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tapping the leader of the largest party in the lower house to be prime min-
ister never became firmly established. More fundamentally, cabinets and 
ministers remained individually responsible to a sovereign emperor, mean-
ing there was no requirement of collective responsibility to the Diet. Despite 
the fact that governments that ran afoul of the elected representatives in the 
lower house tended to collapse, there was no real connection—no electoral 
mandate—between cabinets and lower house elections.33 Even the authors 
of an almanac of the day were forced to concede that “the representative 
system of government in this country has not developed to such a stage as 
to make the cabinet ministers necessarily responsible to the Diet” (Japan 
Times Year Book 1933, 37). In fact, cabinet decisions were subject to poten-
tial, and often actual, veto by the Privy Council or the genrō, while mem-
bers of the Imperial Court influenced executive affairs from the shadow of 
the Chrysanthemum Throne. Meanwhile, a dozen or so transitory cabinet 
ministers were expected to monitor a vast government bureaucracy staffed 
by elite career civil servants who regarded themselves as “servants of the 
emperor.” Most critically, the military branches openly demonstrated that 
they were not subject to civilian control and that they were able and willing 
to topple uncooperative governments.
The Techno-Fascist Cabinets and the Total State, 
1932–1946
On May 26, 1932, a week and a half after Inukai’s assassination, Admiral 
Saitō Makoto formed a “national unity cabinet” (kyokoku itchi naikaku) 
(Shiota 2011, 103). The appointment of Saitō ushered in an era in which 
“reform bureaucrats” and “control officers” were given free rein to engage 
in rational planning that employed all of the country’s resources as well 
as those of its expanding colonial empire. Together with their industri-
alist allies, these technocrats went about their work under the umbrella 
of a “total state” that permitted little interference from the elected MPs 
who had briefly occupied a position of executive influence. Yet this rational 
planning took place in a context punctuated by seemingly irrational acts of 
terror, both at home and abroad. After exiting the premiership, Saitō him-
self was felled by an assassin’s bullet in a bloody putsch that also claimed 
the lives of the finance minister, an imperial adviser, and a member of the 
army’s supreme command. Others, including two future premiers, nar-
rowly escaped assassination, and it required an order from the emperor to 
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bring an end to the attempted coup. Meanwhile, on the Asian mainland, 
the Imperial Army was making foreign policy by the sword and delivering 
faits accompli to the civilian governments in Tokyo. Government leaders 
concluded that declaring war against an objectively mightier United States 
and its allies was somehow worth the risk.
The misguided policies and corruption of the “party cabinets” gave rise 
to subversive individuals and groups determined to rectify Japan’s malfunc-
tioning domestic institutions and an international order that they believed 
denied the country its rightful place in world affairs. They included gov-
ernment officials, military officers, and industrialists who articulated a 
strategy of economic autarchy pursued through rational state planning and 
the efficient mobilization of all of the empire’s resources. These techno-
crats were impressed by the Soviet Union’s experiments with central plan-
ning, and many of them honed their planning skills during postings to 
Japan’s puppet state in Manchuria (Mimura 2011, 14; Barnhart 1987, 270). 
They joined forces with nationalist leaders such as Hiranuma Kiichirō and 
Konoe Fumimaro, who espoused a vision inspired by the models of Fas-
cist Italy and Nazi Germany that incorporated the homegrown ideas of 
Nakano Seigō, Tosaka Jun, Kita Ikki, and others. This produced a poly-
thetic vision that called for a “Shōwa Restoration” and stressed the sanctity 
of the mystical concept of “kokutai,” the traditional national essence based 
on the centrality of a divine-right emperor in the body politic (Tansman 
2009, 11). Thus, by the outset of the 1940s Japan’s central state executive 
was dominated by techno-fascists who “spoke a language close to that of 
European fascist thinkers and promoted a political structure akin to that 
found in Italy and Germany” (ibid.).34
The Techno-Fascists Take Charge
On the home front, the techno-fascists set about destroying the institu-
tional foundations of parliamentary democracy and laissez-faire capital-
ism. They blamed “party cabinets” for the Great Depression, the effects 
of which were especially painful to the rural populace that was directly 
impacted by the collapse of the world silk market in 1930. The techno-
fascists associated party cabinets with a succession of high-profile corrup-
tion scandals involving politicians, industrialists, and government officials 
(Mitchell 1996). They criticized party cabinets for seeking to enhance civil-
ian control of the military, for undermining military capabilities, and for 
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the undisciplined management of the nation’s labor force and its natural 
resources. Following Inukai’s assassination, the practice of tapping the 
leader of the largest party in the Diet’s elective chamber ceased, as the pre-
miership was given over to a succession of admirals and generals, with a 
right-wing ex-diplomat and a pair of fascist ideologues sprinkled in. Natu-
rally, elected MPs were allowed only a token presence among ministers in 
these techno-fascist cabinets. With almost religious fervor, these change 
agents enacted mobilization laws and created “superagencies” to enhance 
state control over economic planning, labor activities, corporate profiteer-
ing, and the use of strategic resources.
On the international front, the techno-fascists took aim at the insti-
tutions of the “Versailles-Washington System,” which were, they believed, 
rigged to favor American and British interests to the detriment of Japa-
nese interests.35 They were outraged that the mission sent to the 1919 
Versailles Conference by “commoner prime minister” Hara Kei and his 
“party cabinet” failed to secure Japan’s main demands. These unfulfilled 
demands included the cession to Japan of German concessions in China 
and the north Pacific, as well as the inclusion of an anti-racial-discrim-
ination clause in the League of Nations charter. In addition, the change 
agents were incensed at the pusillanimous compromises made by diplo-
mats dispatched by Takahashi Korekiyo’s semi-party cabinet to the Wash-
ington Conference on Naval Limitation in 1921–1922. That conference 
produced a Five-Power Treaty that permitted Japan to maintain only 60 
percent as many large warships as were possessed by the United States 
and the United Kingdom, and a Four-Power Treaty in which the Anglo-
American powers, France, and Japan agreed to preserve the status quo in 
the Pacific. Meanwhile, the Nine-Power Treaty affirmed the sanctity of an 
“open door” policy in China that denied Japan the opportunity to create 
a sphere of influence in the same way the Western imperialist countries 
had done. Further, Japan’s assent to the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact meant 
that the country waived the right to employ military force to acquire terri-
tory. A young Konoe Fumimaro expressed the view of many Japanese mal-
contents in arguing that, under the Versailles-Washington System, Japan 
“would be left forever a backward country” (quoted in Hata 1989, 283).
The party cabinets, which had never become firmly established, were 
powerless in the face of the techno-fascist assault. Domestically, the techno-
fascists engineered the New Structure Movement (Shin taisei un’dō), which, 
among other things, led to the dissolution of political parties and interest 
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groups and their recombination under the government’s monolithic “offi-
cial” party. Internationally, the efforts of the techno-fascists culminated in 
the creation of a “New Order in East Asia” superimposed over an expansive 
Japanese empire. As time would tell, Japan’s response to these domestic and 
international challenges led to total war, complete defeat, and institutional 
reconfiguration under a foreign military occupation.
The Techno-Fascist Institutions
New ministerial portfolios and supra-ministerial agencies were created to 
assist in planning and mobilizing all of Japan’s resources, as well as those of 
its expanding empire, in preparation for total war. At the time of its forma-
tion on May 26, 1932, the Saitō cabinet was composed of fourteen minis-
ters holding fifteen portfolios. By the time the Tōjō cabinet assumed office 
just over nine years later, twenty portfolios were distributed among seven-
teen ministers.
Five new ministerial portfolios were created under the techno-fascist 
cabinets. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (Kōseishō) was established 
in January 1938 at the urging of the Imperial Army, which was concerned 
about the poor health of its recruits (Anderson 1993, 50). Prior to this, 
the nation’s health had been the administrative concern of the powerful 
Home Ministry. The Ministry of Greater East Asia (Dai Tō-a Shō) was cre-
ated in November 1942 and given responsibility for administering all of 
Japan’s colonies and occupied territories except Taiwan, Korea, and Kara-
futo (Sakhalin) (Peattie 1984, 124). Three new ministries were established 
on November 1, 1943. The Ministry of Transportation and Communi-
cations (Un’yu teishin shō) was born from the merger of the Ministry of 
Communications and the Ministry of Railways. Meanwhile, the Minis-
try of Munitions (Gunjushō) and Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce 
(Nōshōmushō) were forged through splitting the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry. With the establishment of the Munitions Ministry, the func-
tions of industrial planning, electric power, and airplane manufacture 
were, for the first time, brought together under the administrative control 
of a single ministry (Johnson 1982, 169).
When Hiranuma replaced Konoe as prime minister in January 1939, 
the two swapped seats as Privy Council president and prime minister, but 
Konoe was allowed to stay on in the cabinet as “Hanretsu,” a de facto min-
ister without portfolio. Upon reassuming the premiership in December 
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1940, Konoe established the position of minister of state without port-
folio (muninsho daijin) in his cabinet (Uzawa 1981, 103). This enabled 
Konoe and his successors to bestow “state minister” (kokumu daijin) sta-
tus on directors of important governmental agencies—such as the Cabi-
net Planning Board and the Cabinet Information Bureau—that had not 
been accorded formal ministerial status. Hiranuma Kiichirō and Hoshino 
Naoki became the first ministers without portfolio. Hoshino’s appointment 
was significant in that it brought the president of the Cabinet Planning 
Board into the Konoe cabinet, thus underscoring the board’s importance 
as the cockpit of the “new structure movement” (discussed below). Simi-
larly, Prime Minister Koiso Kuniaki’s appointment of Ogata Taketora as 
minister without portfolio and director of the Cabinet Information Bureau 
signaled the importance of that organ in his government. Ministers with-
out portfolio were appointed in every cabinet formed through the end of 
the Pacific War.
Supra-Ministerial Agencies
Beginning in the mid-1920s, cabinet-level “superagencies” were estab-
lished to enhance state control over planning and mobilization (Samuels 
2003, 144). Although technically under the cabinet’s control, some of these 
superagencies were created at the urging of the Imperial Army and behaved 
accordingly. In addition, cabinets got into the propaganda and censorship 
business with the establishment of high-level deliberative organs to coordi-
nate the views of leading figures in matters pertaining to national security 
and foreign policy.
One of the first of the superagencies was the Resources Bureau (Shi-
gen kyoku), established in 1927 to assess the nature and capabilities of the 
country’s workforce, control labor action and corporate profits, and super-
vise production facilities of all kinds (Barnhart 1987, 25).36 The bureau was 
a civilian agency staffed by elite bureaucrats and special appointees from 
the officer corps of the armed forces (Mimura 2011, 20). In 1935, the Cab-
inet Research Bureau (Naikaku chōsa kyoku) was founded with Yoshida 
Shigeru, a Home Ministry bureaucrat and leading figure among the “new 
bureaucrats,” as its director. Two years later, the army succeeded in gaining 
establishment of the Cabinet Planning Board (Kikaku-in), which produced 
the “materials mobilization” laws of the late 1930s that aimed to improve 
the means and methods of production to enhance efficiency in industries 
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deemed pivotal to the war effort (Uzawa 1981, 94; Johnson 1982, 120). The 
board’s founding director was Taki Masao, a lower house MP and former 
director of the Legislation Bureau. Other noteworthy Planning Board pres-
idents or vice presidents included Aoki Kazuo and Hoshino Naoki (ex-
Finance Ministry bureaucrats), Suzuki Teiichi (an Imperial Army general), 
and Abe Genki (former director of the dreaded Special Higher Police—
the so-called “thought police”—under the Home Ministry) (Johnson 1982, 
138). Not long after Japanese forces invaded China proper in July 1937, the 
Konoe government created the post of cabinet councilor (naikaku sangi) 
and appointed generals, admirals, bureaucrats, and industrialists to advise 
the cabinet in its planning functions (Uzawa 1981, 94; Falk 1961, 513–
514). This was a “return to the old tradition” of the role played by “imperial 
councilors” (sangi) under the Meiji government (Sekiguchi 1938, 7).
In September 1932, military officials and bureaucrats from the Foreign 
Affairs, Education, Home, and Communications Ministries began meet-
ing informally to coordinate the gathering and dissemination of informa-
tion (Awaya 1993, 292–293). These discussions led to the creation four 
years later of the Dōmei Tsūshinsha, the ancestor of today’s Kyodo News 
and Jiji Press agencies. In September of that same year, a Cabinet Infor-
mation Department (Naikaku jōhō bu) was established and given broad 
enforcement powers and functional jurisdiction that included administra-
tive supervision of the National Spirit Mobilization Movement (Kokumin 
seishin sōdōin un’dō). One of the movement’s mottos was “luxury is our 
enemy,” which, among other things, aimed to discourage the wearing of 
Western-style permanent-waved hair-dos by Japanese women (Sodei 2001, 
248). In 1937, state authorities moved to “defer” publication of a number 
of works deemed excessively critical of government policy. Tokyo Impe-
rial University economist Yanaihara Tadao—who was fired for questioning 
Japan’s aggressive policies in Manchuria—was among those whose writings 
were blacklisted (Ienaga 1978, 116). On December 6, 1940, the Cabinet 
Information Bureau (Naikaku jōhō kyoku) was created to keep a watchful 
eye on newspapers, print publications, and radio transmissions. It brought 
together the intelligence-gathering units of the army and navy, as well as 
relevant units of the Foreign, Home, and Communications Ministries.
Two important high-level deliberative councils were established to 
coordinate views concerning matters of foreign, national security, and 
economic policy. The Five Ministers’ Conference (Goshō kaigi), created in 
1933, brought together the prime minister and the army, navy, finance, 
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and foreign affairs ministers. In 1935, the Cabinet Deliberation Council 
(Naikaku shingikai) was established to advise the government of important 
matters of economic administration. Founded under the Okada cabinet, 
the fifteen-member council included “senior statesmen” (jūshin), peers, 
political party leaders, and ex-bureaucrats (Johnson 1982, 123; Colegrove 
1936b, 65).
Techno-Fascist Ministers
Between May 1932 and May 1946, fifteen cabinets were formed under thir-
teen prime ministers. Three of these premiers emerged from high-ranking 
positions in the career civil service, nine were high-ranking military offi-
cers, and one was a hereditary aristocrat. The three ex-government offi-
cials—Hirota Kōki, Shidehara Kijūrō, and Hiranuma Kiichirō—had risen 
to senior posts in the Foreign and Justice Ministries. Saitō Makoto, Okada 
Keisuke, Yonai Mitsumasa, and Suzuki Kantarō were navy admirals, while 
Hayashi Senjurō, Abe Nobuyuki, Tōjō Hideki, Koiso Kuniaki, and Higa-
shikuni Naruhiko were army generals. The most important of the military 
figures, Tōjō, earned the sobriquet “Razor-sharp Tōjō” (Kamisori Tōjō) for 
being “quick and decisive and impatient with those who were not” (Butow 
1969, 7). Konoe Fumimaro, the hereditary aristocrat, was a descendent of 
the aristocratic Fujiwara family and acquired the title of “prince” at the age 
of fourteen.
Including the thirteen prime ministers, 166 individuals held minis-
terial portfolios in the techno-fascist cabinets. The modal minister was 
a fifty-eight-year-old male who had emerged from the upper echelons of 
the civil bureaucracy or was a general or admiral in the military branches. 
In other words, he was a technocrat who “advocated a new activist, goal- 
oriented approach toward government and paved the way for unprece-
dented state control of politics, private industry, and public services based 
on their vision of the ‘managerial state’ ” (Mimura 2011, 9). Technocrats 
eschewed the undisciplined allocation of resources under a laissez-faire 
capitalist order, preferring state planning and a rational mobilization of 
labor, capital, and resources. Chances are the modal minister was an alum-
nus of Tokyo Imperial University. He was not an elected MP, and therefore 
had no meaningful connection to a political party, and very possibly origi-
nated in Japan’s conservative and less-urbanized southwestern regions.
Ministers in the techno-fascist cabinets were a bit older and better edu-
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cated than their predecessors. Novice ministers averaged fifty-six years of 
age, making them three years older than the previous ministerial cohort. 
Ninety-five percent of techno-fascist cabinet ministers were university 
educated, as opposed to only 60 percent of ministers in the party cabinets. 
Tokyo Imperial University was the alma mater to better than half of all 
ministers, while alumni of Kyoto University and Hitotsubashi University 
also began appearing on ministerial rosters. Together these three elite pub-
lic universities educated more than 90 percent of the ex-career civil ser-
vants who held ministerial portfolios. Meanwhile, graduates of prominent 
private institutions, such as Waseda, Chūō, and Keiō universities began 
populating the cabinet elite, accounting for 9 percent of all ministers.
Former government officials and military officers accounted for three-
quarters of the ministers. More than half of those who held portfolios were 
former government officials, the vast majority of whom (81 percent) shifted 
Table 1.3. The Techno-Fascist Cabinets, 1932 to 1946
Cabinet Prime Minister Established Dissolved PM’s Background
Saitō Cabinet Saitō Makoto 5/26/1932 7/8/1934 Navy Admiral
Okada Cabinet Okada Keisuke 7/8/1934 3/9/1936 Navy Admiral
Hirota Cabinet Hirota Kōki 3/9/1936 2/2/1937 Diplomat
Hayashi Cabinet Hayashi Senjurō 2/2/1937 6/4/1937 Army General
1st Konoe Cabinet Konoe Fumimaro 6/4/1937 1/5/1939 Imperial Prince
Hiranuma Cabinet Hiranuma Kiichirō 1/5/1939 8/30/1939 Nationalist Leader
Abe Cabinet Abe Nobuyuki 8/30/1939 1/16/1940 Army General
Yonai Cabinet Yonai Mitsumasa 1/16/1940 7/22/1940 Navy Admiral
2nd Konoe Cabinet Konoe Fumimaro 7/22/1940 7/18/1941 Imperial Prince
3rd Konoe Cabinet " 7/18/1941 10/18/1941 "
Tōjō Cabinet Tōjō Hideki 10/18/1941 7/22/1944 Army General
Koiso Cabinet Koiso Kuniaki 7/22/1944 4/7/1945 Army General
Suzuki (Kantarō)  
Cabinet Suzuki Kantarō 4/7/1945 8/17/1945 Navy Admiral
Higashikuni Cabinet Higashikuni Naruhiko 8/17/1945 10/9/1945 Army General
Shidehara Cabinet Shidehara Kijurō 10/9/1945 5/22/1946 Diplomat
Source: JCCM Database (Appendix A).
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from upper bureaucratic posts into ministerial posts. A large number of 
ex-government officials fit the description of “reform bureaucrats,” and 
many of them were groomed in the Home Ministry. They included Gotō 
Fumio, Yoshida Shigeru (not to be confused with the diplomat and post-
war premier of the same name), Yasui Eiji, and Abe Genki. Aoki Kazuo, 
Hoshino Naoki, and Sakomizu Hisatsune emerged from the Finance Min-
istry, while Kishi Nobusuke and Ishiguro Tadaatsu were officials of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. One-quarter of all ministers were 
products of the armed services, including twenty-one army men and eigh-
teen navy men. Naturally, only generals or admirals were permitted to hold 
the respective army and navy ministers’ portfolios, but this did not dis-
qualify them from holding other “civilian” portfolios.
Elected MPs accounted for only 16 percent of ministers. This contrasts 
starkly with the state of affairs under the last four “party cabinets” (those 
that were formed between April 1927 and May 1932), in which elected 
MPs accounted for half of all ministers. While most techno-fascist cabinets 
boasted a few token MPs, the third Konoe cabinet included none. In other 
cases, the apparent presence of elected lawmakers holding ministerial port-
folios is misleading. For example, the Seiyūkai expelled Tokonami Takejirō, 
Yamazaki Tatsunosuke, Uchida Shin’ya, and Mochizuki Keisuke for their 
willingness to assume ministerial posts in the Okada cabinet. Thus, only 
two of the twenty-two individuals who held portfolios in the Okada cabinet 
actually retained ties to political parties (Kanechika 1979, 80).
Competition in the Core
The techno-fascist cabinets operated in a core executive whose central 
actors included the elder statesmen, Emperor Hirohito and his chief advis-
ers, the Privy Council, “reform bureaucrats,” and “control officers.” “The 
Cabinet, and hence the civil government,” observed former prime minis-
ter Konoe Fumimaro in his memoirs, “were manipulated like puppets by 
the Supreme Command and amounted to little more than weak fixtures” 
(Maxon 1957, 182). Despite the gains they made during the era of quasi-
party cabinets, the relative influence of the political parties and elected 
MPs declined.
Following Inukai’s assassination, the status of political parties plum-
meted from that of “full-fledged members of the ‘political establishment’ ” 
to that of organizations holding only a “feeble but persistent role in the 
The Anti-Westminsterian Roots of Japan’s Parliamentary Cabinet  77
Diet” (Berger 1977, vii; Colegrove 1936b, 58). Beginning in 1940, politi-
cal parties dissolved themselves and were absorbed into the monolithic 
government-sponsored Imperial Rule Assistance Parliamentarians League 
(Yokusan giin dōmei), which was supplanted in April 1942 by the Imperial 
Rule Assistance Political Association (Taisei yokusan seiji kai, or IRAPA). 
As a result of the 1942 general elections, 381 of 466 IRAPA-endorsed can-
didates were elected. One of those who dared to go against the flow was 
future prime minister Hatoyama Ichirō, who was reelected as an inde-
pendent. (Unfortunately for Hatoyama, this did not absolve him from the 
right-wing purge carried out under the U.S. occupation in 1946.) In this 
climate, aspiring cabinet ministers had little choice but to abandon some-
times long-standing partisan allegiances to jump on the IRAPA’s band-
wagon.37 Indeed, from this point on, the primary raison d’être of parties 
was to support unanimously any and all cabinet-sponsored bills (Berger 
1977, 351). In the minds of many Japanese citizens, party cabinets were 
synonymous with corruption, government immobilism, and dangerously 
misguided policies.
Extra-constitutional imperial advisers and the Privy Council contin-
ued to shape executive affairs. As the elder statesmen (genrō) passed away, 
they were replaced by a group of “senior statesmen” (jūshin). Indeed, after 
1924, only one genrō, Saionji Kinmochi, remained. Like the genrō, the 
jūshin were an extra-constitutional and self-appointed group whose major 
function was to recommend candidates for the premiership (Tomita et al. 
1981, 236). The senior statesmen included former prime ministers, the 
Privy Council president, and the lord keeper of the privy seal. Although 
Saionji—the last of the genrō—was consulted in prime ministerial selec-
tions until he passed away in 1940, his influence began to wane in the late 
1920s, and prime ministerial candidates generally were selected through 
jūshin consultations (Bix 2000, 174). Meanwhile, Privy Council approval 
was required for any major departure in legislation, diplomacy, or modi-
fication of the organization or powers of the government (Samuels 2003, 
57). In addition, appointments made by imperial ordinance required the 
council’s stamp of approval (Quigley 1932, 92). Three of the Privy Council’s 
seven presidents who served from 1932 through 1947—Hiranuma, Konoe, 
and Suzuki—went on to become prime ministers (Kanechika 1979; Uzawa 
1981).
As divine-right sovereign and commander in chief of the armed forces, 
the Shōwa emperor was, at least in theory, Japan’s supreme executive officer. 
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Hirohito was twenty-five years old when he assumed the Chrysanthemum 
Throne, yet he had been the de facto monarch since 1921, when he became 
regent to his mentally and physically infirm father. Because of the shroud 
of secrecy surrounding the imperial institution, it is unlikely that we will 
ever know the full extent of the emperor’s involvement in executive affairs 
or that of his closest imperial court advisers. Yet it is known that Hiro-
hito was involved in the appointment of at least three prime ministers—
Saitō, Yonai, and Tōjō—and made his feelings known in other ministerial 
appointments and executive decisions (Bix 2000, 253, 355, 418). Members 
of the private palace cabinet—in particular the lord keeper of the privy seal 
(Naidaijin)—influenced executive affairs (Byas 1942, 106). Beginning with 
the selection of Konoe to succeed Hayashi as premier in June 1937, the lord 
keeper of the privy seal assumed the role of “ever-vigilant attendant” (tsun-
emachi hōhistu) in soliciting the views of the genrō and, later, the jūshin in 
selecting candidates for the premiership (Uzawa 1981, 92).
A new breed of government official—the “reform bureaucrat” (kakushin 
kanryō) or “new bureaucrat” (shinkanryō)—emerged. Many of these tech-
nocrats honed their planning skills in postings to the Cabinet Planning 
Board or as colonial administrators to the puppet state of Manchukuo. 
Their leaders included the aforementioned Kishi Nobusuke and Hoshino 
Naoki, as well as Ayukawa Yoshisuke (Nissan zaibatsu), Matsuoka Yōsuke 
(Foreign Affairs Ministry), and General Tōjō Hideki (Mimura 2011, 3, 14; 
Lu 2002, 123–125). The reform bureaucrats—who began to assume minis-
terial portfolios as early as July 1934 with the formation of the Okada cabi-
net—used the Cabinet Planning Board and other superagencies to impose 
their will in economic planning and to force the Diet to ratify their poli-
cies (Mimura 2011, 20; Shiota 2011, 106). In fact, 98 percent (1,031) of the 
1,048 laws enacted between 1933 and 1946 originated as cabinet-sponsored 
bills, which were initiated and drafted by government bureaucrats. For five 
consecutive years beginning in 1939, the Diet dutifully passed every cab-
inet-sponsored bill submitted to it. In addition, bureaucrats continued to 
incrementally shape policy through the issuance of imperial ordinances, 
which did not require Diet approval. From 1933 through 1946, more than 
ten thousand such ordinances were issued.
Finally, the military branches represented a “state within a state,” and 
the “high command was, in effect, the government of Japan” (Lederer 
1934, 377; Falk 1961, 505). In the words of a Japanese journalist of the 
day, “Our soldiers of the sea, land, and air forces stand outside the pale of 
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contemptible politics. They are responsible directly to the Emperor, in no 
sense obligated to heed the barkings of the Diet or the snobberies of the 
Administration” (Akimoto 1933, 25). The army and navy ministers contin-
ued to enjoy the right of “direct access” to the throne, and only active-duty 
generals and admirals were permitted to hold the military portfolios. This 
meant that the respective service branches, not the prime minister, were 
responsible for appointing their ministers. This gave the armed forces a 
life-and-death hold over any cabinet, and, as noted by a Japanese observer 
of the day, “when military circles, the Army in particular, come to the con-
clusion that a Ministry should go, it goes” (Sekiguchi 1938, 10; also Cole-
grove 1936b, 23).
Yet the Imperial Army was factionalized. In fact, the rise of the reform 
bureaucrats had been paralleled by the emergence of “reform officers” 
(kakushin bakuryō), who believed that military power was a function of 
the industrial capacity of a nation to produce the weapons and supplies 
required by a mechanized army (Crowley 1962, 325–326; Mimura 2011, 
17). Many of them served tours of duty in Manchuria, where they came to 
understand economic planning and the need to cooperate with the gov-
ernment and the zaibatsu, the industrial and financial conglomerates that 
controlled significant parts of the prewar and wartime economy (Johnson 
1982, 124; Mimura 2011, 16, 55). They tended to gravitate to the “Con-
trol faction” (tōsei-ha)—or “Staff Officers’ faction” (bakuryō-ha)—which 
looked to Nazi Germany for inspiration. In contrast, the “Imperial Way 
faction” (kōdō-ha) “religiously espoused the principles of kokutai” and 
emphasized the “spiritual power” of Japanese military culture over mecha-
nization, mass mobilization, and economic planning (Crowley 1962, 310, 
314; Bix 2000, 244).
This factionalism came to its most violent expression in the February 
26, 1936, uprising, in which young officers with ties to the Imperial Way 
faction led fourteen hundred troops in seizing the National Diet Building 
and other government offices.38 They assassinated the finance minister, the 
lord keeper of the privy seal, and the inspector general of military educa-
tion. Prime Minister Okada narrowly escaped the death squad, which mis-
takenly murdered his look-alike brother-in-law instead. The rebels refused 
to stand down until the emperor ordered them to do so three days later 
(Shillony 1973, 184–185). Death sentences were delivered to seventeen 
conspirators, and prison terms to fifty-one others, while eighteen high-
ranking generals—the core leaders of the Imperial Way faction—were 
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forced to resign their posts to atone for the serious breach of military dis-
cipline (Shillony 1973, 51; Crowley 1962, 324–325). This created a power 
vacuum that members of the Control faction filled.
The Consequences of the Failed Gamble
The technocrats and fascists who assumed the executive helm following 
Inukai’s assassination were convinced that Japan’s future was best ensured 
through centralized planning, the rational mobilization of resources, and 
concerted efforts to enhance the unique national essence. To construct 
this total state, the techno-fascists endeavored to stifle dissent and eradi-
cate parliamentary institutions that bred divisiveness, greed, corruption, 
and misguided policies. As a result, the once obstreperous people’s parties 
meekly dissolved themselves and melded into the monolithic Imperial Rule 
Assistance Parliamentarians League. At the same time, new superagencies 
such as the Cabinet Planning Board brought together reform bureaucrats 
and control officers in the cause of central state planning, which further 
marginalized elected politicians (Samuels 2003, 144). The techno-fascist 
cabinets were part of a corporatist state structure dominated by senior 
statesmen, the Privy Council, the emperor and his private palace cabinet, 
and, especially, the career civil service and the military high command. 
These captains of the state forged “mobilization” laws, enforced “thought 
control” to ensure compliance, and turned a blind eye as the Kwantung 
Army unilaterally made foreign policy by the sword.
The decision taken in February 1933 to walk out of the League of 
Nations when that body refused to recognize Japanese control of Manchuria 
symbolized the rejection of an international institutional order that served 
to maintain the dominant—and, in the minds of the techno-fascists, hypo-
critical—position of the Western imperialist powers. In response, Japan set 
up puppet states and otherwise endeavored to impede the unification of 
China, while establishing a zone of control that eventually extended south-
ward until it crashed into French, Dutch, and British colonies. When the 
Americans called for an embargo of fuel and critical raw materials, Japan’s 
supposedly rational techno-fascist political leaders took the risky gamble 
of launching a surprise attack on the United States and establishing an 
empire across a vast expanse of East Asia and the Pacific. Less than four 
years after the raid on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese war machine and most of 
its major cities had been reduced to ashes.
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Findings
The uninvited visit of a small American naval squadron set the stage for 
the Meiji Restoration, a critical juncture in the evolution of Japan’s central 
state executive. As early as 1871, proto-cabinets emerged within the Grand 
Council, which provided a ready-made set of organizational structures, 
institutions, and personnel to staff the central state executive. The Sat-Chō 
oligarchs who dominated the core executive had a strong preference for 
transcendental cabinets and a deep disdain for political parties and popu-
lar democracy. Because cabinets and state ministers were not responsible 
to the Diet, there was no norm of collective responsibility. On the contrary, 
ministers were individually responsible to a sovereign emperor, who was 
under no obligation to heed the advice they proffered. In sum, the Sat-
Chō cabal went to great lengths to design a central state executive that was 
anti-Westminsterian.
At the outset of the 1920s, an American scholar observed that the cabi-
net seemed headed toward becoming responsible to the lower house, at 
least inasmuch as “the incessant and marked dislike of the lower house to 
a particular ministry . . . usually resulted in the long run in its downfall” 
(McGovern 1920, 109). Indeed, by the late 1920s it seemed that this first 
attempt at parliamentary democracy was about to bear fruit. As Prince-
ton-educated diplomat and future MP Kitazawa Naokichi optimistically 
observed, while “the Constitution expressly provides for the individual 
responsibility of Cabinet Ministers . . . the establishment of a quasi-party 
Cabinet system or pure party Cabinet system” had progressed to a point at 
which “the collective responsibility of the Cabinet . . . is almost established” 
(1929, 54).
The techno-fascist cabinets that took charge in the aftermath of the 
May 15th Incident reinforced the structures of the anti-Westminster sys-
tem. Under pressure from a mushrooming ultranationalist movement with 
a fascist coloration, the once-active political parties dissolved themselves 
and melded into the monolithic “official” government party. Naturally, the 
techno-fascist cabinets bore no responsibility to the Diet, collective or oth-
erwise, and ministers remained individually responsible to the divine-right 
emperor. While these cabinets responded with alacrity to the challenges of 
mobilizing for total war and building a “new structure” at home and a “new 
order” in East Asia, the end result was total defeat, unconditional surren-
der, and military occupation.
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So it was that the stage was set for the arrival of an American-led 
military occupation. General Douglas MacArthur became the “indisput-
able overlord of occupied Japan, and his underlings functioned as petty 
viceroys” (Dower 1999, 205). The shock of total defeat, unconditional 
surrender, and occupation by a foreign army created conditions for a dra-
matic institutional reconfiguration. In fact, the reforms enacted under the 
American occupation proved to be every bit as sweeping as those brought 
forth by the Meiji Restoration (ibid., 205). Nevertheless, the “old” was not 
entirely swept away by the “new,” as institutions, structures, leaders, and 
ideas forged under the techno-fascist cabinets carried on and shaped the 
Westminster-style system erected under the American occupation.
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Comprador Cabinets and 
Democracy by the Sword, 
1946–1955
The national government of Great Britain today is controlled by the 
Cabinet, who, indeed, are His Majesty’s servants, but for all normal 
purposes servants whose advice the King must accept, and readily does 
accept.
—Arthur Berriedale Keith, The British Cabinet System, 
1830–1938 (1939), 1
For all practical purposes, General MacArthur’s supergovernment relied 
on the Japanese bureaucracy to carry out its directives, creating in effect 
a two-tiered mandarinate.
—John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat (1999), 27
Democracy Imposed
When the Shidehara cabinet resigned on May 22, 1946, it was expected 
that Hatoyama Ichirō, leader of the largest party in the House of Repre-
sentatives, would become prime minister. But as Hatoyama was preparing 
to make his way to the Imperial Palace to receive his appointment, word 
arrived that he had been purged on orders from General Headquarters, 
which was carrying out the American-led occupation’s policy of removing 
former militarists from public office. Hatoyama turned over the reins of 
party leadership to Yoshida Shigeru, a retired career diplomat, who prom-
ised to vacate the party’s leadership position upon Hatoyama’s eventual 
return to public office. But Yoshida occupied the premiership for the bet-
ter part of the next eight and a half years, during which time he acquired 
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the sobriquet “One-Man Yoshida” (wan man Yoshida) for his autocratic 
leadership style. Even when Hatoyama returned to public life and won a 
seat in the October 1952 general elections, Yoshida refused to step aside. 
So Hatoyama took the helm of a rival party, and for the next two years the 
rivalry between the two men played itself out on Japan’s political stage. 
Finally, on December 10, 1954, when a corruption scandal forced Yoshida 
to resign, Hatoyama’s dream of becoming prime minister came true.
The period from May 1946 through November 1955 witnessed an 
institutional reconfiguration as sweeping as Japan’s 1868 Meiji Restora-
tion. During much of this time Japan was governed by an American-led 
military dictatorship. To assess the extent to which cabinet government 
became established during the period, I examine the background char-
acteristics of the first cohort of postwar prime ministers and cabinet 
ministers. Because they acted as intermediaries between the occupa-
tion authorities and the Japanese body politic, these ministers played a 
role similar to that of the nineteenth-century comprador merchants who 
served as “indispensible go-betweens” between Chinese and foreign-
ers (Hsu 1983, 146).1 The Chinese compradors played a variety of roles, 
including that of on-the-ground managers for foreign firms, middlemen 
in the company’s dealings with the Chinese, and negotiators in talks with 
foreign powers. Some compradors became extremely wealthy and influen-
tial (Hao 1970, 446, 454). Because of his ability to communicate with and 
sometimes manipulate the American military occupiers, Yoshida Shigeru 
was the quintessential comprador prime minister (Pyle 1996b, 21).2 As 
a former U.S. occupation official observed many years later, “to be the 
sole Japanese source of information on MacArthur’s views was a power-
ful weapon in Yoshida’s hands, which he used often and effectively” (Finn 
1992, 212). In addition, diplomats posted to the Central Liaison Office 
played a critical role in intermediating between the Japanese government 
and occupation authorities.
I then assess the major institutional changes wrought under the com-
prador cabinets and seek to determine whether or not cabinets came to 
play their expected role as the foremost executive organ in a parliamentary 
system of governance. Afterward, I evaluate the ability of cabinets to adapt 
to important internal and external challenges. But I begin by surveying the 
efforts of the American occupiers—the foreign mandarinate—who dic-
tated, encouraged, and inspired an array of institutional changes, includ-
ing some revolutionary departures.
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Planning for Occupation
In reality, the “Allied occupation” of Japan was an American operation. It 
began on August 28, 1945, with the deplaning of forty-two hundred para-
troopers of the U.S. 11th Airborne Division at Atsugi Airfield. It ended on 
April 28, 1952, with the formal restoration of sovereignty according to the 
terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. From start to finish, the occu-
pation lasted 2,435 days—more than six years and eight months—and it 
had been under way for nearly nine months when Yoshida formed his first 
cabinet. American planning for the anticipated occupation of a defeated 
Japan had begun in early 1942, even as Japanese forces continued to rack 
up victories on the battlefield. The initial planning was undertaken by a 
small group of diplomats and academic specialists in the State Depart-
ment, but, as the tide of the war turned in favor of the Allied side, the group 
expanded to include officials from the Navy and War Departments. This 
planning group evolved into the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee 
(SWNCC, pronounced “swink”), which began meeting in December 1944.
While SWNCC’s planners plotted policy for postwar Japan, U.S. pres-
ident Harry S. Truman, British prime minister Winston Churchill (later 
replaced by Clement Attlee), and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin met at Pots-
dam, a suburb of Berlin, to decide on the terms of surrender. On July 26, 
1945, Chinese leader Ch’iang Kai-shek joined Truman and Churchill in 
issuing the Potsdam Declaration, which demanded Japan’s unconditional 
surrender and called on its government to “remove all obstacles to the 
revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese 
people.” Failure to do so, the declaration assured, would result in Japan’s 
“prompt and utter destruction.” The declaration drew heavily on a paper 
written a year earlier by George H. Blakeslee and Hugh Borton, a pair of 
State Department officials who were members of SWNCC (McNelly 1959, 
176). Blakeslee, a Harvard-trained professor of history and international 
relations at Clark University, was regarded as one of America’s foremost 
authorities on the foreign relations of East Asia (Janssens 1995, 65).3 Bor-
ton was a historian at Columbia University who spoke Japanese and had 
lived in Tokyo during some tumultuous times in the late 1920s and 1930s 
(Borton 2002, 18, 43, 68).
SWNCC’s Subcommittee on the Far East was tasked with drawing up 
a comprehensive statement of America’s postwar policy for Japan. After 
various iterations and amendments, “SWNCC 228” was finalized on 
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November 27 and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. The 
document was drafted primarily by Borton, who later described the proj-
ect as the “most important single undertaking” of his life (Borton 2002, 
163). SWNCC 228 states that “though the ultimate form of government 
in Japan is to be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese 
people, the retention of the Emperor institution in its present form is not 
considered consistent with [Allied] objectives.” In the event that the Japa-
nese people were to choose to retain the emperor, therefore, certain safe-
guards would be required. According to SWNCC 228, such safeguards 
would include constitutional provisions that (1) cabinet ministers must 
be civilian and chosen with the advice and consent of a democratically 
elected legislature to which the cabinet would be collectively responsible; 
(2) a cabinet must either resign or appeal to the electorate when it loses 
the confidence of the representative legislative body; and (3) the emperor 
would be deprived of all military authority and would act only on the 
advice of the cabinet. The authors of SWNCC 228 advised that it should 
appear that the Japanese themselves had taken the lead in these reforms, 
“as the knowledge that they had been imposed by the Allies would mate-
rially reduce the possibility of their acceptance and support by the Japa-
nese people for the future.”
SWNCC 228 became the party line at the State Department and GHQ. 
On October 4, George Atcheson, a State Department “China hand” dis-
patched to Tokyo to advise MacArthur, telegraphed Washington asking for 
guidance in revising Japan’s constitution. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes 
responded with an outline of specific constitutional safeguards organized 
into two groups, depending on whether or not the imperial institution 
was to be retained (Borton 1966, 206; McNelly 1959, 179–180). Atcheson 
pressed the message in a series of conversations with former premier 
Konoe Fumimaro, at the time a minister without portfolio in the Higashi-
kuni cabinet, who was sounding out occupation officials prior to propos-
ing his own draft constitution (McNelly 1959, 178–179; Masumi 1985, 48). 
Likewise, on December 6, Lieutenant Colonel Milo Rowell, an official in 
GHQ’s Government Section, submitted his “Report of Preliminary Stud-
ies and Recommendations of Constitution.” Among other things, Rowell 
called for the elimination of extra-constitutional bodies having access to 
the emperor and proposed “that the cabinet, being the ministers of state 
and responsible heads of the various executive departments, must be com-
posed of elected representatives; must be answerable to the house and dis-
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solve on vote of no confidence” (NDL “Birth” 3-5). In other words, the 
American planners proposed to create a Westminster-style cabinet system.
Ghostwritten Constitution
On September 18, a little more than two weeks after Japan’s formal surren-
der, Prime Minister Higashikuni Naruhiko told foreign press correspon-
dents that his cabinet had more pressing concerns to worry about than 
writing a new constitution.4 Regardless, the Higashikuni cabinet did not 
survive long enough to take any meaningful action even if it had wanted 
to. Higashikuni’s replacement, Shidehara Kijūrō, met with General MacAr-
thur on October 11 and attempted to convince the Supreme Commander 
that democracy could be achieved without revising the 1890 Meiji Con-
stitution (McNelly 1959, 182; Amakawa 1995, 21). MacArthur strongly 
disagreed, and two days later Shidehara obligingly appointed Matsumoto 
Jōji as minister of state with responsibility for investigating the possibil-
ity of constitutional revision. Matsumoto would chair the Constitutional 
Problems Investigation Committee (Kenpō mondai chōsakai), whose name 
was intentionally chosen to avoid mention of “revision” or “amendment” 
(Dower 1999, 351). Matsumoto spoke openly about the deficiencies of 
“government by the people” (Borton 1955, 402).
The Matsumoto committee was composed of academicians, Privy 
Council officers, and officials of the Legislation Bureau. In addition to 
Matsumoto himself, the academic specialists included Minobe Tatsukichi, 
Nomura Junji, Miyazawa Tsuyoshi, Kiyomiya Shirō, Kawamura Mata-
suke, Gyōbu Tadashi, and Satō Isao. All of the academics had ties to Tokyo 
Imperial University except Kiyomiya (Tōhoku Imperial University) and 
Kawamura (Kyūshū Imperial University). Interestingly, Matsumoto was an 
expert in commercial law, not constitutional law, as might be expected, and 
had served as a high-ranking official in the South Manchuria Railway Com-
pany and as director general of the organizational predecessor of the Legis-
lation Bureau. Minobe was a constitutional law theorist who, in 1935, had 
been fired from his university professorship and driven from his seat in the 
House of Peers for suggesting that the divine-right emperor was merely an 
“organ” of the state. Yet Minobe shared Matsumoto’s view that there was no 
need to rush to revise the Meiji Constitution, especially while the country 
was under a foreign military occupation, or to feel any compulsion to alter 
the status of the “sacred and inviolable” emperor (Dower 1999, 355). Two 
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committee members, Shimizu Tōru and Ishiguro Takeshige, were recruited 
from the Privy Council, an extra-constitutional body with veto power over 
major legislative proposals, treaties, and proposed changes in the struc-
ture or powers of government. The remaining members were Legislation 
Bureau officials Narahashi Wataru, Irie Toshio, and Satō Tatsuo.
The Matsumoto committee met for the first time on October 27 and 
held a total of twenty-two confidential meetings over the course of the next 
three months (Dower 1999, 352). On January 31 the committee completed 
work on a draft document entitled “Outline for a Revised Constitution” 
(kenpō kaisei yōkō). In fact, this “Matsumoto draft” (Matsumoto shian) was 
the more liberal of two drafts the committee was preparing. On that day, 
Nishiyama Ryūzō, a reporter for Mainichi Shimbun, noticed an open door 
to the room in which the committee was holding its secret meeting. Ven-
turing inside, he discovered that committee members had departed for 
lunch but had left binders containing the draft constitution on the table. 
Nishiyama “borrowed” one of the binders, scurried back to his office to 
have it hand-copied, and was able to return it to the meeting room before 
the committee reconvened (ibid., 359). The following day, the Mainichi 
Shimbun published the Matsumoto draft verbatim under the headline 
“Establishing Monarchism” (kunshushugi o kakuritsu). This touched off 
speculation that the newspaper’s scoop was in reality a “trial balloon” sent 
up by Foreign Minister Yoshida Shigeru to gauge reaction to a revised con-
stitution (ibid.). As it turned out, the story behind the newspaper scoop 
remained a mystery for nearly half a century, until Nishiyama confessed to 
his stealthy reporting (Inoue 1991, 12 n. 3).
American occupation officials were flabbergasted to learn that the 
Matsumoto committee proposed to construct a new, “democratic” Japan 
on a foundation of warmed-over imperial sovereignty.5 Brigadier General 
Courtney Whitney, chief of the GHQ’s Government Section (GS), sent a 
translation of the Matsumoto draft to MacArthur. In an accompanying 
memorandum, Whitney commented that “the draft is extremely conser-
vative in character and leaves substantially unchanged the status of the 
Emperor, with all the rights of sovereignty vested in him” (NDL “Birth” 
3-7). The warmed-over nature of the Matsumoto draft leaps out in vari-
ous articles, including those that set forth the powers and responsibilities 
of the cabinet. For example, much of the language in Article 55 had been 
cut and pasted from the Meiji Constitution—specifically, the clauses stat-
ing that “every minister of state shall give his advice to the Emperor and be 
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responsible for it” and that “all Laws, Imperial Ordinances, and Imperial 
Rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of the state, require the 
countersignature of a Minister of State.”
MacArthur was displeased with the Matsumoto committee’s efforts. 
Anticipating a negative response from the Supreme Commander, Whitney 
had taken the liberty of rescheduling a meeting set with Foreign Minister 
Yoshida. In a memo to MacArthur, Whitney explained, “I could foresee the 
reactionary group carrying the ball on constitutional reform were way off 
the beam to what you could agree to.” Whitney reasoned that it was “bet-
ter strategy to orient them [the Shidehara cabinet] before the formal sub-
mission of a draft than to wait and force them to start from scratch once 
an unacceptable draft had been submitted and to which they were com-
mitted.” MacArthur ordered Whitney to produce a document to serve as 
a model for the Japanese side. To assist in its preparation, the Supreme 
Commander provided a memorandum listing three basic points: (1) that 
the “Emperor is at the head of state,” but that his duties and powers will be 
exercised according to the Constitution and the “basic will” of the people; 
(2) “war as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished”; and (3) “the feudal 
system of Japan will cease,” meaning that other than those of the Imperial 
family, the privileges of peerage would no longer exist. At the bottom of 
the memorandum, unnumbered and without commentary, the Supreme 
Commander inserted the cryptic phrase “pattern budget after British sys-
tem” (NDL “Birth” 3-10).
On February 5, 1946, Whitney assembled a group of twenty-five 
American military officers, civilian attachés, researchers, secretaries, and 
interpreters and tasked them with drafting a model constitution for Japan 
(Gibney 1996). He informed the group that a draft should be ready for 
review by MacArthur by February 12 (Dower 1999, 361). The rush job was 
necessary to deliver a fait accompli to the Far Eastern Commission (dis-
cussed below), which would give control of the occupation to America’s 
allies (Buckley 1978, 566). Colonel Charles L. Kades was placed in charge 
of the Constitution Steering Committee, the cockpit of this “constitutional 
convention,” which held its meetings “under the cover of absolute secrecy” 
in the ballroom of the Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Building. A Harvard 
Law graduate, Kades worked as private practice attorney and as assistant 
general counsel to two U.S. government agencies before being called to 
active military duty. The Constitution Steering Committee’s other mem-
bers included Lieutenant Milo E. Rowell, Commander Alfred R. Hussey, 
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and Ruth Ellerman. Rowell was a Stanford-trained lawyer who fought in 
the Philippines before becoming chief of the Judicial Affairs Office at GHQ, 
Hussey was a University of Virginia Law School graduate who worked as 
a lawyer and judge before joining the navy, and Ellerman was the commit-
tee’s scribe (Koseki 1997, 81–82; Moore and Robinson 2002, 96–97).
“Before I arrived,” Kades later confessed, “I knew nothing about Japan 
except that which one would glean from a local American newspaper.” He 
added, “I don’t think any of us had any idea what the British [budget] sys-
tem was” and any resemblance GHQ’s draft articles had to it could only 
have been “purely coincidental” (Gibney 1996). For inspiration, the GS 
team studied the Constitution of the United States and various European 
constitutions, copies of which had been stealthily gathered from various 
Tokyo area libraries so as to not attract attention. In addition, the GS team 
took special account of SWNCC 228, MacArthur’s three basic principles, 
and a document that had been prepared by the Constitution Investigation 
Association, a private Japanese group (NDL “Birth” 3-10 and 2-16).6
Whitney divided his GS team into seven committees, with responsibil-
ities for drafting specific articles on civil rights, local government, finance, 
and the roles and responsibilities of the emperor, legislature, judiciary, and 
executive. Cyrus H. Peake was tapped to chair the executive committee, 
whose members included Jacob I. Miller and First Lieutenant Milton J. 
Esman. As it turned out, members of the committee did not always see eye 
to eye, and a disagreement between Peake and Esman threatened to delay 
completion of the draft. Peake was a professor of Chinese history at Colum-
bia University, where he and Hugh Borton had coedited the Far Eastern 
Quarterly, while Esman had just earned a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton 
University before service in the army led him to a post as a civil affairs offi-
cer in GHQ’s Government Section. The two butted heads on the question 
of whether or not the prime minister should have the authority to dissolve 
the Diet. Peake believed that the prime minister should not be empowered 
to dissolve except when the Diet passed a no-confidence vote or rejected a 
vote of confidence. Esman argued that the prime minister should also be 
empowered to dissolve the Diet when it defeated the government’s “major 
legislation.” He feared that Peake’s proposal, which was supported by the 
Constitution Steering Committee, would reproduce “the very weakest fea-
ture of French experience” by inducing the prime minister to resign “while 
denying him any bargaining power in cases of disagreement with the Diet” 
(NDL “Birth” 3-14). In the end, only Peake affixed his signature to the 
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committee’s draft report, while Esman and Miller expressed their dissent-
ing views in an attached memorandum.7 Both documents were forwarded 
to the Constitution Steering Committee.
On February 10, GHQ’s “constitutional convention” produced a draft 
that was warmly received by MacArthur. Three days later, Whitney—
accompanied by Constitution Steering Committee members Kades, Row-
ell, and Hussey—set off for the rescheduled meeting with Yoshida, who, 
along with Matsumoto, welcomed them at the foreign minister’s official 
residence. When the American entourage arrived, it was apparent that the 
Japanese officials had been poring over the Matsumoto draft, which was, 
Whitley wasted no time in saying, “wholly unacceptable to the Supreme 
Commander as a document of freedom and democracy” (Dower 1999, 
374). He refused to accept the Matsumoto draft and asked Yoshida and 
Matsumoto to examine and discuss the GHQ draft, a copy of which he 
handed them. Whitney and his aides then retired to the garden while 
Matsumoto and Yoshida scrutinized the document. About fifteen min-
utes later, Shirasu Jirō, Yoshida’s aide and an adviser to the Central Liaison 
Office, ventured into the garden and apologized for keeping the Americans 
waiting, to which Whitney replied, “We are out here enjoying the warmth 
of atomic energy” (NDL “Birth” 3-16). As Whitney later recalled, “at that 
moment, with what could not have been better timing, a big B-29 came 
roaring over us” (Whitney 1956, 251).
After returning to the patio where Matsumoto and Yoshida were wait-
ing, Whitney explained that prompt acceptance of the GHQ draft was the 
only hope for the “conservative group, considered by many to be reaction-
ary,” to remain in power (NDL “Birth” Hussey Paper-2). He went on, “The 
Supreme Commander is determined that the people of Japan shall be free 
to choose between this Constitution and any form of Constitution which 
does not embody these principles” (NDL “Birth” 3-16). Three weeks later, 
on February 26, the Shidehara cabinet decided to draft a revised constitu-
tion based on the basic principles laid out in the GHQ draft. Matsumoto 
was given charge of the project.
Cabinet-Related Provisions
A provisional draft constitution was completed on March 2. While the 
draft clearly drew heavily on the handiwork of General Whitney’s “consti-
tutional convention,” the Japanese side was able to obtain modifications. As 
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time would tell, perhaps the most important of these was the Japanese side’s 
insistence on a bicameral Diet instead of the unicameral body called for in 
the GHQ draft (Yoshida 1962, 134; Dower 1999, 378). By requiring that 
both chambers approve all laws and treaties as well as the national budget 
and prime ministerial appointments, Matsumoto and his colleagues were, 
presumably unwittingly, laying the foundation for the Twisted Diets (nejire 
kokkai) that would produce policy stalemate decades later. The repercus-
sions of a Diet in which the ruling party in the lower house did not control 
the upper house are discussed beginning in chapter 4.
On March 6, the Shidehara cabinet announced the “Outline of a Draft 
for a Revised Constitution” (Kenpō kaisei soan), which was subsequently 
rewritten in language that the average Japanese citizen could understand. 
Beginning in early April, Irie Toshio and Satō Tatsuo—the director and 
deputy director of the Legislation Bureau—and Katō Ren of the Central 
Liaison Office took the lead in consulting with GHQ officials to determine 
the extent to which the Americans would permit modifications. In the 
meantime, GHQ brushed aside the demands of the Far Eastern Commis-
sion—theoretically the supreme organ for supervision of occupation pol-
icy—that it be allowed to approve the proposed constitution. On April 22, 
the draft constitution was submitted to the Privy Council for review; a little 
less than two months later, the Council sent it on to the Imperial Diet. As a 
result of discussion in the Diet, about thirty additional modifications were 
incorporated into a final draft constitution (Dower 1999, 392). On October 
7, the Diet approved the Constitution of Japan, which was promulgated on 
November 3 and went into effect in May 1947.
It is instructive to compare the cabinet-related provisions of the GHQ 
draft with those of the 1947 Constitution. Both documents are subdivided 
into eleven chapters, with the fifth chapter devoted to matters specifically 
related to “The Cabinet.” Chapter 5 in the GHQ draft is subdivided into 
eight articles, while the corresponding chapter in the Constitution is made 
up of eleven articles. Twenty-one articles in the GHQ draft mention the 
“cabinet,” “prime minister,” and “ministers of state,” while twenty-three 
articles in the Constitution do so. These cabinet-related articles appear 
under the same chapter rubrics in each document—“The Emperor” (chap-
ter 1), “The Diet” (4), “The Cabinet” (5), “Judiciary” (6), and “Finance” (7).
Eighteen of the twenty-three cabinet-related articles in the Constitution 
were essentially cut and pasted from the GHQ draft. In fact, fourteen of the 
cabinet-related articles in the Constitution are almost verbatim reproduc-
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tions of material in the GHQ draft. For example, Article 60 of the GHQ draft 
states that “Executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet,” while Article 65 
in the Constitution simply substitutes “is” for “shall be.”8 Article 73 of the 
Constitution lists the same seven “other administrative functions” to be per-
formed by the cabinet in the precise order given in Article 65 of the GHQ 
draft—that is, to administer the law, manage foreign affairs, conclude trea-
ties, administer the civil service, prepare the budget, enact cabinet orders, 
and decide on general amnesty. In addition, two articles in the Constitution 
involve minor revisions to the emperor’s ceremonial powers. Article 6 of 
the Constitution grants the emperor power to “appoint the Chief Judge of 
the Supreme Court as designated by the Cabinet” (this ceremonial power is 
not granted in the GHQ draft), while Article 7 gives the monarch power to 
attest to the “instruments of ratification and other diplomatic documents as 
provided for by law” (the GHQ draft is mute on this matter). In other words, 
it is fair to say that three-quarters of the cabinet-related articles in the Con-
stitution were essentially lifted from the GHQ draft.9
Significant revisions were made to six cabinet-related articles. Article 
53 of the Constitution specifies that the cabinet may call a special session 
of the Diet on petition of at least one-quarter of the members of either 
House chamber, as opposed to Article 48 of the GHQ draft, which requires 
the petition of not less than 20 percent of MPs. Likewise, Article 54 per-
mits the cabinet to convene a session of the House of Councillors in times 
of “national emergency,” which, of course, would not have been necessary 
with the unicameral Diet envisioned in the GHQ draft. Article 67 stipulates 
that the designee of the lower house for the prime minister’s post will be 
the decision of the Diet in the event that the two houses cannot agree on a 
prime minister and a joint committee is unable to resolve the matter. Even 
though the primacy of the lower house decision is made clear, this provi-
sion allows the upper house to impose a ten-day delay on the appointment 
of the lower house’s designee for the prime ministership. Article 69 states 
that, in the event that the lower house passes a no-confidence motion or 
rejects a confidence motion, the cabinet will resign en masse unless the 
lower house is dissolved within ten days.
Three articles deal with the qualifications of the prime minister and 
ministers of state. Article 67 specifies that the prime minister “shall be des-
ignated from among the members of the Diet,” while Article 68 specifies 
that a majority of cabinet ministers must be MPs. In this case, the authors 
of the GHQ draft seem to have assumed that these characteristic features of 
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a Westminster-style parliamentary system could be taken for granted. An 
early version of the GHQ draft contains a passage in which it is stated that 
the prime minister is to be “the leader of the Majority party in the Diet or, 
failing a Majority party, such member of the Diet as is able to command a 
majority therein . . .” (NDL “Birth” 3-14). The MP qualification does not 
appear in either the GS subcommittee’s proposal or the final version of the 
GHQ draft. A passage in Ellerman’s notes states that “The Prime Minister, 
in turn, will select his Cabinet from either the majority party or a coali-
tion of parties” (NDL “Birth” Hussey Papers-2). This seems to indicate that 
Kades and some GS officials assumed that the Diet would select the leader 
of the ruling party to be prime minister, and, therefore, it need not be spec-
ified in the Constitution.
Finally, the famous “civilian clause” in Article 66 was included as a 
result of pressure from America’s allies. Despite the fact that the occupa-
tion was an American production, overall policy was, in theory, placed in 
the hands of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), composed of delegates 
from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands, France, India, and the 
Philippines.10 The FEC began meeting on February 26, 1946, and was 
almost immediately broadsided by the Shidehara cabinet’s publication, on 
March 6, of the “Outline of a Draft for a Revised Constitution.” FEC del-
egates believed that MacArthur had exceeded his authority in pressing 
the cabinet to produce a revised constitution and, in a letter dated March 
20, made this known to Secretary of State Byrnes, who was instructed 
to relay the message to the Supreme Commander. On July 2, 1946, the 
FEC approved a document entitled “Basic Principles for a New Japanese 
Constitution,” which included a provision stating that the prime minister 
and all members of the cabinet “shall be civilians” (NDL “Birth” 4-6). On 
August 19, Prime Minister Yoshida asked for and received MacArthur’s 
permission to remove the provision on the grounds that Article 9, the “no 
war” clause, obviated the need to spell this out.11 At an FEC meeting on 
September 21, the Chinese delegate, Dr. S. H. Tan, raised the possibility 
that the Diet might someday reinterpret Article 9 to permit the mainte-
nance of land, sea, and air forces. The FEC members were not persuaded 
by the assurances of Hugh Borton, who served on the subcommittee 
charged with looking into the matter, that Article 9 provided a safeguard 
against the return of military figures to ministerial posts (NDL “Birth” 
4-11; Stratton 1948, 8).12
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In fact, a preliminary version of the GHQ draft stipulated that “the 
Ministers of State and Ministers without Portfolio . . . shall at all times be 
civilians” (NDL “Birth” 3-14). This qualification had been spelled out in 
SWNCC 228, Borton’s handiwork, which stated that “although the author-
ity and influence of the military in Japan’s governmental structure will pre-
sumably disappear with the abolition of the Japanese armed forces, formal 
action permanently subordinating the military services to the civilian gov-
ernment by requiring that the ministers of state or members of the cabinet 
must, in all cases, be civilians would be advisable” (NDL “Birth” 3-2).
On September 25, the FEC requested a provision calling for all min-
isters of state to be civilians. General Whitney explained this to Yoshida, 
and the civilian clause was dutifully inserted into the constitution sent to 
the House of Peers subcommittee deliberating on the draft. However, there 
was a problem—no Japanese equivalent could be found for the term “civil-
ian.” After considering several options, the Peers invented a word, “bun-
min” (literally, “person of letters”), to distinguish those whose primary tool 
of trade is the writing brush as opposed to the sword, and Article 66 came 
to state that “The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civil-
ians” (Lu 1997, 471).
The Compradors
The comprador cabinet minister was a new breed. Gone were the generals, 
admirals, and ultranationalist leaders who lorded over the techno-fascist 
cabinets. From this point on, each and every prime minister would be the 
leader of the largest party or ruling coalition in the Diet’s lower house, and 
the vast majority of ministers would be elected MPs as well. In other words, 
precisely as the Westminster model prescribes, popularly elected represen-
tatives would almost monopolize ministerial appointments. Neverthe-
less, many comprador ministers would be retired government bureaucrats 
who had been fast-tracked into coveted ministerial posts, and a significant 
number of them were veterans of techno-fascist cabinets or other institu-
tions of the totalitarian prewar order.
Prime Ministers and the Overlord
Yoshida Shigeru, Katayama Tetsu, Ashida Hitoshi, and Hatoyama Ichirō 
held the premiership in the twelve cabinets formed between May 1946 and 
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November 1955. The fifth Yoshida cabinet (which survived for 568 days) 
was the longest-lived of the comprador cabinets, while the first Hatoyama 
cabinet (99 days) was the era’s most short-lived. Yoshida was prime min-
ister in eight cabinet reshufflings over the course of seven years, while 
Katayama and Ashida headed up short-lived coalition cabinets. Hatoyama 
returned to political life to organize three cabinets, the third of which 
was formed after the creation of the Liberal Democratic Party. Neverthe-
less, while these Japanese premiers exercised governing authority from 
the Prime Minister’s Official Residence, for five and a half years General 
Douglas MacArthur wielded sovereign power from his headquarters in the 
Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Building, reveling in his role as American 
overlord.
Yoshida Shigeru was a career diplomat whose most obvious qualifica-
tions for the premiership were his English language skills and the fact that 
he was arrested for opposing the wartime government. The son-in-law of 
prewar “senior statesman” Makino Nobuaki, Yoshida joined the Foreign 
Ministry after graduating from Tokyo Imperial University. His diplomatic 
postings took him to Manchuria, the Paris Peace Conference, Korea, Italy, 
and Great Britain. In February 1945, Yoshida was arrested by the “Thought 
Police” and briefly jailed for suggesting that Japan sue for peace to avoid 
a Communist revolution (Yoshida 1962, 24–30). The American occupi-
ers viewed this as evidence that Yoshida was anti-militarist, and they were 
not troubled by his advanced age. In fact, Yoshida was sixty-seven years 
old at the time of Japan’s surrender and had retired nearly a decade ear-
lier. GHQ’s decision to purge Hatoyama opened the door for Yoshida, who 
insisted on three conditions for assuming the premiership: that he not be 
required to raise campaign funds, that he could freely select cabinet min-
isters, and that he be allowed to quit anytime he wanted (ibid., 75; Itoh 
2003, 105).13 Despite the fact that Yoshida was not an elected MP when he 
became prime minister, he was given a significant leadership post in the 
Liberal Party and quickly became its president. Yoshida was elected to the 
lower house in May 1947, and his cabinet presided over the acceptance of 
the GHQ draft constitution. He was obliged to step down following the 
1947 election, but returned to serve as prime minister from October 1948 
until December 1954.
Katayama Tetsu and Ashida Hitoshi presided over coalition govern-
ments. Katayama was a Tokyo Imperial University-trained attorney who 
became interested in social democracy during the 1920s. He won election 
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to the lower house in 1932, but was forced to vacate his seat in 1940 for 
refusing to vote to sanction fellow MP Saitō Takao, who criticized Japan’s 
“holy war” in China in an address to the Diet. After the war, Katayama 
returned to the Diet and, when his Japan Socialist Party (Nihon shakaitō, or 
JSP) emerged from the 1946 lower house elections with a plurality of seats 
in that chamber, unexpectedly found himself in the position of having to 
put together a governing coalition. The Katayama cabinet was founded on a 
three-way coalition between the JSP, Democratic Party, and People’s Coop-
erative Party. General MacArthur found spiritual implications in Kataya-
ma’s selection, observing that “for the first time in its history, Japan is led by 
a Christian leader—one who throughout his life has been a member of the 
Presbyterian Church. It reflects the complete religious freedom which now 
dominates the Japanese mind and the complete religious freedom which 
exists throughout this land” (NDL “Modern” 5-9-2).14
Ashida Hitoshi, too, was a Tōdai alumnus, whose first career as a dip-
lomat included postings to Russia, France, Turkey, and elsewhere. He 
Table 2.1. The Comprador Cabinets, 1946 to 1955
Cabinet Prime Minister Established Dissolved PM’s Background
1st Yoshida Cabinet Yoshida Shigeru 5/22/1946 5/24/1947 Ambassador to UK
Katayama Cabinet Katayama Tetsu 5/24/1947 3/10/1948 Attorney; Christian
Ashida Cabinet Ashida Hitoshi 3/10/1948 10/15/1948 Diplomat
2nd Yoshida Cabinet Yoshida Shigeru 10/15/1948 2/16/1949 Ambassador to UK
3rd Yoshida Cabinet " 2/16/1949 6/28/1950 "
Reorg’ed 3rd 
Yoshida (1) Cabinet " 6/28/1950 7/4/1951 "
Reorg’ed 3rd 
Yoshida (2) Cabinet " 7/4/1951 12/26/1951 "
Reorg’ed 3rd 
Yoshida (3) Cabinet " 12/26/1951 10/30/1952 "
4th Yoshida Cabinet " 10/30/1952 5/21/1953 "
5th Yoshida Cabinet " 5/21/1953 12/10/1954 "
1st Hatoyama 
Cabinet Hatoyama Ichirō 12/10/1954 3/19/1955 Career Politician
2nd Hatoyama 
Cabinet " 3/19/1955 11/22/1955 "
Source: JCCM Database (Appendix A).
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resigned from the diplomatic corps in 1932 to protest the Japanese occu-
pation of Manchuria and immediately launched a second career in elec-
tive politics (Duus and Hasegawa 2011, 92; Finn 1992, 148). After the war, 
Ashida became president of the Democratic Party and held important port-
folios in the Katayama cabinet. In October 1948, after only seven months 
in office, the Ashida cabinet was brought down by the Shōwa Denkō brib-
ery scandal (discussed below) and Ashida’s implication in unrelated cor-
ruption charges. Ashida’s ouster opened the door to the return of Yoshida, 
who occupied the premiership for the next six years.
Hatoyama Ichirō replaced Yoshida as prime minister in Decem-
ber 1954. The son of a former speaker of the House of Representatives, 
Hatoyama graduated from Tokyo Imperial University and practiced law 
before winning election to the Tokyo City Council in 1911. Four years 
later, he was elected to the first of fifteen lower house terms, and held port-
folios in three prewar cabinets. In 1933, as education minister in the Saitō 
cabinet, Hatoyama fatefully ordered Takigawa Yukitoki to resign his law 
professorship at Kyoto Imperial University for espousing “leftist” views in 
two legal textbooks (Itoh 2003, 62). Hatoyama was one of a relatively small 
number of candidates to emerge victorious from the 1942 general elections 
without the endorsement of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Associa-
tion, the government’s “official” party (ibid., 68). After the war, Hatoyama 
became president of the Japan Liberal Party and, in May 1946, was prepar-
ing to replace Shidehara as prime minister when GHQ designated him an 
“undesirable person.” In addition to his actions as prewar education min-
ister, Hatoyama earned the disapproval of occupation authorities for prais-
ing Hitler and Mussolini in a book he published after touring Europe in 
1937 and 1938 (Yamamuro 1995, 95; Shiota 2011, 176). After his rehabili-
tation, Hatoyama won a lower house seat in the 1952 election, and, when 
Yoshida refused to step aside, became president of the rival Japan Demo-
cratic Party.
Prime ministers came and went, but General Douglas MacArthur 
remained the decisive actor from August 29, 1945, to April 11, 1951 (Finn 
1992, 211). MacArthur was sixty-five years old, a recipient of the Congres-
sional Medal of Honor, and a five-star general at the time of his appoint-
ment as Supreme Commander. The top graduate of his class at West Point, 
MacArthur was appointed Army Chief of Staff at fifty years of age, and, as a 
result of having spent a number of years in the Philippines, was convinced 
that he possessed unique insights into the “oriental mind.” He arrived at 
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Atsugi Air Base on August 30, 1945, two days after U.S. troops alighted 
there, and set up a temporary headquarters in Yokohama. After receiv-
ing Japan’s surrender on the USS Missouri, MacArthur moved his head-
quarters to the Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Building, a stone’s throw 
from the Imperial Palace. By insisting that the emperor call on him rather 
than the other way around, the Supreme Commander ensured his absolute 
authority as the American viceroy. MacArthur would later become com-
mander of United Nations forces during the Korean War, but would run 
afoul of U.S. president Harry S. Truman for making provocative statements 
about taking the war to China. MacArthur left Japan to a hero’s departure 
on April 16, 1945, and was replaced by the less flamboyant General Mat-
thew Ridgway.
Departmental Ministers
One hundred and twenty-four individuals held portfolios in the compra-
dor cabinets. The modal minister was a fifty-nine-year-old lower house 
MP who represented a district outside the densely populated areas around 
Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. There is a nine-in-ten chance that this modal 
minister attended university, most likely Tokyo Imperial University or 
Kyoto Imperial University. By constitutional dictate, this modal minister 
emerged from a “civilian” background, in contrast to the numerous gen-
erals and admirals who populated ministerial rosters in the techno-fascist 
cabinets. There is a good chance that he—alas, even though the 1947 Con-
stitution gave women the right to vote and hold public office, the ministe-
rial elite remained an exclusively male world—was a former high-ranking 
civil servant.
With the exception of the first Yoshida cabinet, whose ministers took 
up their portfolios before the 1947 Constitution went into effect, the vast 
majority of ministers were elected MPs. In contrast to the tiny fraction of 
techno-fascist cabinet ministers recruited from the prewar Diet’s elective 
chamber, nine of every ten comprador cabinet ministers were elected MPs, 
and more than three-quarters of them occupied lower house seats. The 
average comprador minister had been elected to four lower house terms 
and had amassed a decade of parliamentary service, which indicates that a 
seniority system for cabinet ministers had yet to become established. This 
is the logical result of the influx of new faces in the Diet, and also of Yoshi-
da’s effort to fast-track (batteki) ex-bureaucrats and the occasional corpo-
100  Growing Democracy in Japan
rate figure into ministerial posts. For example, in October 1948 Yoshida 
suddenly summoned Izumiyama Sanroku, an ex-Mitsui Bank officer, to 
meet with him. Yoshida smiled and said little, but as Izumiyama was leav-
ing Chief Cabinet Secretary Satō Eisaku whispered, “Yoshida is saying that 
he would like to organize a cabinet around you” (Masumi 1985, 279). The 
next evening Izumiyama learned he would become finance minister in the 
second Yoshida cabinet.15
Ex-bureaucrats accounted for 37 percent of ministers in the compra-
dor cabinets. In fact, former bureaucrats were about the only experienced 
administrators in a setting in which nearly every prewar cabinet minis-
ter and senior military officer was deemed ineligible to hold public office. 
Among the former bureaucrats were Prime Ministers Shidehara, Yoshida, 
and Ashida, while others—such as Okazaki Katsuo (who left the vice min-
ister post at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a succession of cabinet 
posts) and Ōhashi Takeo (an ex-upper official at the Home Ministry who 
went on to direct the “red purge” as justice minister in the fourth Yoshida 
cabinet)—assumed coveted portfolios. At the same time, “career politi-
cians” such as Hatoyama, who approached elective politics as a lifelong 
calling, represented only about one-quarter of cabinet ministers. In fact, 
only about one in five comprador ministers emerged from local elective 
office or from positions as MPs’ staff assistants, the traditional pathways for 
aspiring grassroots politicians.
Organizational Upheaval
The organizational structure of the cabinet system was transformed under 
the comprador cabinets. Twenty-seven new cabinet-level ministries and 
agencies were created, while twenty-two others were abolished. On the 
day it left office, the Shidehara cabinet was composed of fourteen minis-
ters holding a total of fifteen portfolios. By the time the second Hatoyama 
cabinet exited the stage nine and a half years later, twenty portfolios were 
distributed among eighteen ministers. This represents the most dramatic 
period of institutional reconfiguration since the modern cabinet system was 
established in 1885. The most enduring changes involved the dismantling of 
the mighty Home Ministry, whose multifarious functions were transferred 
to a number of new and reconstituted ministries and agencies. Yet, when 
the dust settled on this breathtaking burst of institutional reconfiguration, 
the legacy of the undemocratic prewar order continued to be evident.
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Some changes were temporary or cosmetic. In December 1945, the 
First and Second Demobilization Ministries were established and tasked 
with overseeing the disarmament and repatriation of more than 7 million 
armed forces personnel. Six months later, the two ministries consolidated 
into the Demobilization Agency, which functioned until the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty went into effect on April 28, 1952. In February 1948, a Repa-
rations Agency was created to oversee the payment of retribution to coun-
tries that had suffered under Japanese aggression. Although the agency was 
abolished three years later, it oversaw the first installments of Japan’s “offi-
cial development assistance.” Similarly, in August 1945 the splitting up of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce resulted in the creation of an 
agriculture portfolio (to oversee the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fisheries) and a commerce and industry portfolio (to oversee the Minis-
try of Commerce and Industry, which, in May 1949, became the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry). The Ministry of Communications, 
established in July 1946, almost immediately subdivided into the Minis-
try of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and the Ministry of Electric 
Communications. The Legislation Bureau was abolished in February 1948 
and placed under the Ministry of Justice, but Prime Minister Yoshida res-
urrected the bureau in August 1952, shortly after the restoration of sover-
eignty (Naikaku Hōsei Kyoku 1985, 136–148, 158–162; Samuels 2004, 2).
Not surprisingly, GHQ insisted on the abolition of the Home Minis-
try, which had housed the dreaded “Thought Police” (Tokubetsu kōtō kei-
satsu) and other repressive organs. One of the first actions taken under 
the American occupation was to purge the home minister and the head of 
the national police, and more than two-thirds of the relatively few purged 
civilian bureaucrats were Home Ministry officials (Dower 1999, 81; John-
son 1982, 41–42).16 The administrative bailiwick of the Home Ministry 
had included public works, local administration, elections, censorship of 
dangerous publications, labor relations, business licensing, disease preven-
tion, social welfare, immigration, oversight of temples and shrines, and 
the development of Hokkaidō and Sakhalin. On December 31, 1947, the 
ministry was abolished and its functions were parceled out to a variety of 
new and existing organs, resulting in the creation of new ministerial port-
folios. The ministry’s supervisory powers over elections and local finance 
were given to the National Election Management Committee (Zenkoku 
senkyo kanri iinkai) and the Regional Finance Committee (Chihō zaisei 
iinkai), which later merged to form the Local Autonomy Agency (Jichichō). 
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Responsibility for public works administration was transferred to the Con-
struction Board (Kensetsuin), which shortly thereafter became the Minis-
try of Construction. In July 1954, oversight of the National Police Agency 
was given over to the National Public Safety Commission (Kokka kōan 
iinkai). In addition, some of the Home Ministry’s other functions were 
transferred to the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the newly estab-
lished Labor Ministry.
Meanwhile, new portfolios were created for economic planning, 
administrative management, and national defense. In August 1946, the 
cabinet-level Economic Stabilization Headquarters and Price Stabilization 
Agency were established to bring inflation under control. Two years later, 
these organs folded into the Central Economic Assessment Agency, which 
became the Economic Deliberation Agency and eventually morphed into 
the Economic Planning Agency. Similarly, the Administrative Evaluation 
Department, established in October 1946, eventually became the Adminis-
trative Management Agency (AMA). As it turned out, the AMA’s inaugural 
director general was seventy-six-year-old Saitō Takao, who in March 1940 
had been expelled from the Diet for questioning Japan’s belligerent actions 
in China. In June 1950, a ministerial portfolio was created to supervise 
the Hokkaidō Development Agency (Hokkaidō kaihatsu chō), which was 
charged with overseeing resource development, agricultural production, 
and public works projects on the northernmost of Japan’s main islands. In 
August 1952, a cabinet-level Security Agency (Hōanchō) was created, with 
Prime Minister Yoshida himself holding the portfolio. Two years later, the 
Security Agency changed its name to the Defense Agency (Bōeichō), while 
the National Police Reserve became the Japan Self-Defense Forces (Jieitai).17
Other structural changes followed. In June 1949, the Prime Minister’s 
Agency (Sōrichō) became the Prime Minister’s Office (Sōrifu, or PMO) 
and was placed in charge of the Imperial Household Agency, the National 
Police Agency (under the National Public Safety Commission), and the 
Japan Fair Trade Commission. In addition, the PMO oversaw the Special 
Procurements Agency, established in June 1949 to handle supply requisi-
tions from occupation forces, which increased dramatically following the 
outbreak of the Korean War. The PMO was also given supervisory powers 
over the National Personnel Authority (Jinji-in), created in 1948 as an inde-
pendent organ to administer matters relating to the recruitment, training, 
and post-retirement employment of national government employees. In 
addition, the Cabinet Secretariat was stripped of its information-gathering 
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duties, while the supra-ministerial Cabinet Research Bureau was abolished. 
Finally, in May 1947, the name of the Cabinet Secretariat was changed from 
Naikaku shokikan (which sounds like an office housing clerical staff) to the 
more dignified-sounding Naikaku kanbōchōkan.
The organizational changes required a rethinking of cabinet proce-
dures. For example, while the 1947 Cabinet Law states that “the Cabinet 
shall perform its functions through Cabinet Meetings” (kakugi), it makes 
no mention of how cabinet meetings are to be conducted. An obvious issue 
involved the seating arrangement for cabinet ministers. Beginning in 1948, 
under the second Yoshida cabinet, the chief cabinet secretary (who, tech-
nically, did not become an official minister of state until 1966) was seated 
to the prime minister’s right. Ministers were seated in right-left sequence 
depending on the date their respective ministries were established, while 
the directors of the various cabinet-level agencies were seated in left-right 
sequence according to the Japanese alphabetization of their names.18 In fact, 
although the agency directors were accorded ministerial status, the title of 
“director general” (chōkan) carried less prestige than that of “minister” (dai-
jin). Meanwhile, the director general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau and 
the two vice directors of the Cabinet Secretariat were seated at a separate 
square table to the prime minister’s right (Naikaku seido 1995, 96–97). Nat-
urally, the proceedings of cabinet meetings remained confidential.
Rivals for Executive Primacy
The 1947 Constitution established the institutional framework for a 
Westminster-style parliamentary system. Henceforth, executive power 
was vested in a cabinet that was collectively responsible to a democrati-
cally elected Diet, while the military supreme command, Privy Council, 
elder statesmen, and House of Peers were abolished and the divine-right 
emperor and his private palace cabinet relegated to ceremonial roles. Yet, 
while in theory the cabinet was the paramount executive organ, in real-
ity government bureaucrats and American occupation authorities were the 
dominant actors in the spheres of executive influence.
Diet and Parties
The 1947 Constitution enhanced the ability of the Diet and political par-
ties to influence executive affairs. This is evident in the greater salience 
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of MP-sponsored bills, which accounted for 20 percent of enacted laws 
under the comprador cabinets, as opposed to only 2 percent under the 
techno-fascist cabinets. In addition, political parties that had been out-
lawed or persecuted in prewar times were allowed to participate in policy-
making. This became clear in the April 1947 general elections, from which 
the Japan Socialist Party emerged as the largest party in the lower house. 
Having secured a place at the table, the JSP wasted no time in pressing for 
passage of a law to nationalize the coal industry, which, to the surprise 
of many, was not opposed by MacArthur and GHQ. After considerable 
debate—including fistfights between members of the JSP’s left and right 
wings—a watered-down version of the State Coal Control Bill was enacted 
in December 1947 (Hein 1990, 142). Although the new law subordinated 
the interests of organized labor to those of economic productivity, passage 
of such a law would have been unimaginable in prewar times (Watanabe, 
ed. 1995, 69–70; Shiratori 1981, 144).
No-confidence motions now carried constitutional force—in contrast 
to the symbolic acts of the prewar lower house—as was demonstrated on 
two occasions involving Prime Minister Yoshida. Article 69 of the Con-
stitution specifies that the cabinet must resign or call new elections if the 
lower house approves a no-confidence motion or rejects a confidence 
motion. In December 1948, this parliamentary institution was given a road 
test as a result of the controversy sparked by Yoshida’s decision to involve 
the emperor in dissolving the Diet and calling new elections. Yoshida 
maintained that the emperor was constitutionally empowered to dissolve 
the lower house and proclaim a general election “with the advice and 
approval of the Cabinet” (Article 7). But the opposition argued that disso-
lution must be preceded by passage of a no-confidence motion or rejection 
of a confidence motion (Yoshida 1962, 89). Ultimately, Justin Williams, an 
official in GHQ’s Legislative Division, proposed a compromise whereby the 
opposition would agree to approve a supplementary budget before passing 
the non-confidence motion (Masumi 1985, 177; Finn 1992, 214). Conse-
quently, on December 23, the lower house approved the supplementary 
budget and then voted 227 to 130 in favor of a non-confidence measure 
against the Yoshida cabinet. As it turned out, however, the “conspiracy dis-
solution” (nareai kaisan) gave Yoshida exactly what he desired all along: 
the supplementary budget proposed by his cabinet and a landslide victory 
for his Democratic Liberal Party in the general elections of January 1949.
The second non-confidence motion was precipitated by Yoshida’s 
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reference to Socialist MP Nishimura Eiichi as a “fool” (bakayarō) dur-
ing February 1953 Budget Committee interpellations. Yoshida refused to 
apologize, and the opposition seized upon the indiscretion in voting to 
censure the prime minister. The motion’s passage was ensured by the stra-
tegic absence of Hatoyama Ichirō and his followers, who were convinced 
that Yoshida had played a role in delaying Hatoyama’s depurging (Masumi 
1985, 280; Itoh 2003, 114–115). The opposition then proposed a non- 
confidence motion against the Yoshida cabinet, which was approved on 
March 14 in a 229 to 218 vote. This time, Hatoyama and his followers voted 
along with the majority in approving the motion. This left the Yoshida cab-
inet with the choice of resigning en masse or dissolving the Diet and call-
ing new elections. The cabinet opted to dissolve the Diet, and the April 
1953 general election resulted in a stinging defeat for Yoshida’s Liberal 
Party, which managed to win control of only 43 percent of the lower house 
seats. To hang on to power, Yoshida forged a coalition with the Reformist 
Party (Kaishintō).
Homegrown Mandarinate
The American decision to “indirectly” occupy a defeated Japan unwittingly 
enhanced the influence of an already mighty civil bureaucracy. Indeed, 
GHQ opted to purge relatively few career civil bureaucrats, while declaring 
almost all senior military officials and most prewar cabinet ministers ineli-
gible for public office. In fact, the decision to exempt the majority of civil 
bureaucrats from the purge permitted the American occupiers to govern 
with a much smaller force than would have been the case if Allied officials 
had been required to fill all of the key administrative posts in national and 
local government. MacArthur reckoned that the occupation force would 
have required several hundred thousand additional officials had a “direct” 
occupation been pursued (Dower 1999, 325). Absent that, civil bureaucrats 
represented the best and largest source of experienced administrative tal-
ent from which to staff the central state executive. As pointed out above, 
the majority of civil bureaucrats singled out for removal were Home Minis-
try officials who held positions in its repressive police apparatus. As a con-
sequence, many of the same technocrats who were in charge of economic 
planning in prewar times remained at their desks and continued to guide 
the development of the postwar economy (Johnson 1982, 40–41; Pempel 
1986, 123).
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An ex-bureaucrat himself, Yoshida could appreciate the policy expertise 
and elite status of government officials. With the leadership void created by 
GHQ’s right-wing purge, Yoshida proceeded to “fast-track” high-ranking 
former officials into ministerial posts. Among the distinguished alumni 
of the so-called “Yoshida School” were future prime ministers Satō Eisaku 
and Ikeda Hayato, both of whom had risen to the administrative vice min-
ister post in their respective ministries (Masumi 1985, 279).19 Satō had 
just retired from the Transport Ministry and had yet to be elected to the 
Diet when Yoshida tapped him to serve as chief cabinet secretary. Yoshida 
rewarded Ikeda with the coveted finance minister’s portfolio not long after 
Ikeda resigned his post at the Finance Ministry and just three weeks after 
he had won election to the Diet (Satō et al. 1990, 122). In addition, Yoshida 
fast-tracked Sudō Hideo, an ex-Agriculture Ministry official, into the post 
of secretary general of the Liberal Party and then handed him the agricul-
ture portfolio. Okazaki Katsuo (Foreign Affairs), Ōhashi Takeo (Home), 
Noda Uichi (Foreign Affairs), Yoshitake Eiichi (Labor), and Aichi Kiichi 
(Finance) were among the ex-bureaucrats who benefited from Yoshida’s 
tutelage. As it turned out, Yoshida School alumni went on to play crucial 
roles in executive affairs for the next three decades.
The Central Liaison Office (Shūsen renraku chūō jimukyoku, or CLO) 
played an important role in intermediating between the Japanese govern-
ment and GHQ. Established on August 26, 1945, as an external organ of 
the Foreign Ministry, the CLO was staffed by English-speaking diplomats 
such as Okazaki Katsuo, Shirasu Jirō, and Suzuki Tadakatsu (Takemae 
2002, 113). Okazaki, the CLO’s inaugural director, was a rising star in the 
diplomatic corps, with experience in China and India and in important 
internal posts in the Foreign Ministry. Later on he was fast-tracked into 
the foreign minister’s post and held portfolios in several cabinets. Shirasu, 
it will be recalled, was the recipient of General Whitney’s “atomic energy” 
remark at the meeting with Yoshida and Matsumoto. Described as “Yoshi-
da’s alter ego in dealing with the Americans” and a “slippery character,” 
the Cambridge-educated Shirasu was able to bypass GHQ’s Government 
Section—the fountainhead of the occupation’s most utopian reforms—in 
seeking support for the conservative cause from General C. A. Willoughby, 
MacArthur’s anti-leftist chief of intelligence (Finn 1992, 124; Gayn [1946] 
1973, 21). As head of the local CLO branch in Yokohama, Suzuki had a 
close working relationship with General Robert L. Eichelberger, com-
manding general of the 8th Army, which helped in defusing potential ten-
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sion arising from crimes by U.S. servicemen (Finn 1992, 38). These CLO 
officials served as the main channel for relaying directives from GHQ to 
local authorities while helping to deflect or roll back overly zealous Ameri-
can proposals.
Alien Mandarinate
Japan’s homegrown mandarins understood that they had to dance to the 
tune played by GHQ. For instance, General Whitney’s “atomic energy” 
quip as a B-29 flew overhead helped the Shidehara cabinet perceive the 
wisdom in swiftly accepting the GHQ draft of the constitution and claim-
ing authorship of it.20 In addition, the influence of the foreign mandarinate 
can be seen in the “Dodge Line” and the Shoup mission’s recommenda-
tions, as well as in a purge of rightists and intrusion into prime ministerial 
selection.
The “Dodge Line” refers to the strict economic stabilization measures 
recommended by Detroit banker Joseph Dodge, whom Truman dispatched 
to Tokyo in February 1949 (Calder 1988, 79). Dodge’s “nine-point stabili-
zation plan” included a tax hike to enable balanced budgets, steep cuts in 
the size of the governmental workforce, and a fixed exchange rate (Pem-
pel 1998, 104). Dodge made it clear that the U.S. taxpayer was no longer 
willing to pay “hundreds of millions of dollars” each year to subsidize an 
inefficient Japanese economy (Nishi 2004, 76). He bluntly told senior Japa-
nese officials, “The budget will have to be balanced. Unpopular steps will 
have to be taken. Austerity will have to be the basis for a series of economic 
measures” (quoted in Finn 1992, 222). Despite the risks entailed (for exam-
ple, a steep jump in unemployment, cuts in public works spending, and an 
unpopular tax increase), the Yoshida cabinet dutifully accepted the Dodge 
Line (Masumi 1985, 187).
In May 1949, MacArthur invited Carl S. Shoup, a Columbia University 
economist, to visit Tokyo with a group of American tax experts to study the 
Japanese tax system. Despite the fact that virtually every group in Japanese 
society found something distasteful about the Shoup mission’s proposed 
reforms—which included a progressive and broadly based income tax, tax 
equity, and emphasis on “local autonomy”—MacArthur made it known to 
Yoshida that he wanted to see them enacted “at the earliest possible time” 
(Cohen 1949, 311, 307). “Reflecting this support from the highest authori-
ties,” observes Ishi Hiromitsu, an authority on Japan’s tax system, “the Japa-
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nese government and the Diet acted with vigor in accepting nearly all the 
proposals” (1989, 31; italics added). It should be noted that, despite these 
and other examples of obeisance, there were many instances when the Jap-
anese side cleverly “pretended to obey while secretly disobeying” (menjū 
fukuhai) (Johnson 1982, 43).
The American mandarinate reshuffled Japan’s political leadership 
through a right-wing purge. On January 4, 1946, GHQ issued a directive 
entitled “Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public 
Office.” It ordered the purge from public office of all individuals who were 
(1) “active exponents of militaristic nationalism and aggression”; (2) “influ-
ential members of any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic, or secret 
patriotic society, its agencies or affiliates”; or (3) “influential in the activi-
ties of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assis-
tance Political Society or the Political Association of Great Japan.” This 
right-wing purge was implemented in stages and disqualified large num-
bers of experienced parliamentarians, government officials, and industri-
alists from holding public office. This had the effect of almost decimating 
several political parties, notably the Progressive Party; only fourteen of its 
274 founding members were exempted from the purge (Masumi 1985, 96). 
Of course, the most famous casualty of the purge was Hatoyama, but a 
number of cabinet ministers also got axed. Five members of the Shide-
hara cabinet—Home Minister Horiki Zenjirō, Education Minister Maeda 
Tamon, Agriculture Minister Matsumura Kenzō, Transport Minister 
Tanaka Takeo, and Chief Cabinet Secretary and Minister without Portfo-
lio Tsugita Daisaburō—were deemed unfit for public office. Later on, three 
members of the first Yoshida cabinet—Finance Minister Ishibashi Tanzan, 
Justice Minister Kimura Tokutarō, and Commerce and Industry Minister 
Ishii Mitsujirō—were purged, as was Kawai Yoshinari, who days earlier 
had resigned as Minister of Foreign Affairs. In all, around two hundred 
thousand persons with some sort of connection to the war effort were dis-
qualified from holding public office.
Behind the scenes, GHQ meddled in prime ministerial selection. At 
the time of the Ashida cabinet’s resignation in October 1948, Yoshida’s 
Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) was the largest party in the Diet, control-
ling 152 lower house and 46 upper house seats (Fukui 1984, 481). Even 
though the DLP did not command a majority, its leader should have been 
the logical choice to form a new cabinet. But certain GHQ officials regarded 
Yoshida as “reactionary” and likely to revive undemocratic practices. This 
Comprador Cabinets and Democracy by the Sword  109
led MacArthur and Whitney to approach Miki Takeo (head of the centrist 
National Cooperative Party), who politely suggested that the premiership 
should go to the leader of the largest party (Finn 1992, 211). At the same 
time, GS officials were encouraging the candidacy of DLP secretary general 
Yamazaki Takeshi. Not surprisingly, Yoshida was enraged to learn that the 
secretary general of his own party was involved in GHQ-led “plot politics” 
(ibid., 212). The previous week, Yoshida had met with MacArthur, and, 
although no records of the meeting were kept, he later implied that the 
Supreme Commander supported his candidacy. Yamazaki subsequently 
withdrew and resigned his seat in the Diet (although he was reelected in 
January 1949), and on October 4 the lower house voted to approve Yoshi-
da’s selection as prime minister.
The Challenges of a “New Japan”
The comprador cabinets confronted a host of challenges, beginning with 
the complex problem of rebuilding Japan’s devastated economy and infra-
structure. This offered an opportunity for the cabinet to assume the execu-
tive role envisioned for it in the new Constitution, and to demonstrate that 
party-led cabinets and elected MPs were capable of placing the nation’s 
interests above partisan interests and personal greed. The comprador cabi-
nets also had to cope with an American military dictatorship that displayed 
bipolar, mutually contradictory tendencies. Although the Yoshida govern-
ment was obliged to make certain concessions to secure the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, it was quick to roll back many unpalatable reforms after the 
U.S. occupiers permitted the reversion of sovereignty and returned home.
The Irresistible Temptation
In the public’s mind, the party cabinets of the late 1920s and early 1930s 
were synonymous with corruption, scandal, and misguided policies (Seki-
guchi 1938, 14; Scalapino 1953, 393; Buckley 1978, 564). As a result, many 
postwar Japanese citizens held the view that elected MPs were incapable 
of subordinating their greed and narrow partisan interests in pursuing the 
national interest (Tanaka 1976, 652). For this reason, the success of the 
postwar efforts to establish cabinet government depended on severing the 
perceived link between parliamentary institutions and political corrup-
tion. Of course, the comprador cabinets would have to account for their 
110  Growing Democracy in Japan
policies in a more transparent setting—in other words, in interpellations 
before a democratically elected Diet without the benefit of a government-
censored mass media.
Unfortunately, it did not take long for cabinet ministers to discover 
the rewards of influence peddling. One of the first corruption scandals of 
the postwar era arose in July 1947, when several ministers in the Katayama 
cabinet were accused of hoarding military goods and government materiel 
that had been released to individuals and companies on the eve of Japan’s 
surrender (Mitchell 1996, 96). While the “hoarded goods scandal” was 
minor in comparison to the succession of scandals that followed, it helped 
to establish structural corruption as “one foundation stone of the postwar 
political economy” (Dower 1999, 117).21
The Shōwa Denkō scandal was the first large-scale corruption inci-
dent of the postwar era. At its heart were allegations that members of the 
Ashida cabinet and government bureaucrats had peddled their influence 
in steering government funds to the Showa Denkō Company, a fertilizer 
manufacturer. The scandal erupted on June 23, 1948, when the compa-
ny’s president was charged with bribing an official of the Ministry of Com-
merce and Industry in the hope of securing Reconstruction Finance Bank 
loans. Implicated in the mushrooming scandal were a number of MPs—
including cabinet minister Kurusu Takeo and former vice premier Nishio 
Suehiro—as well as bureaucrats in the Commerce and Industry, Finance, 
and Agriculture Ministries and several leading bankers. Future premier 
Fukuda Takeo, then head of the Finance Ministry’s Budget Bureau, was one 
of the government officials charged in the investigation. Although charges 
were brought against thirty-four individuals, in the end only Kurusu, MP 
Shigemasa Seishi, and Showa Denkō’s president were convicted. While 
Ashida himself was not directly involved, he was arrested on unrelated 
charges of tax evasion and accepting a bribe from a construction company 
(Mitchell 1996, 100–106). On October 15, Ashida (who had been found 
innocent of the bribery charges) and his ministers resigned to take respon-
sibility for the massive scandal.
The most damaging corruption incident of the early postwar era was 
the Shipbuilding scandal. On February 16, 1954, special investigators 
obtained permission to arrest Arita Jirō, deputy secretary general of the 
Liberal Party, on charges that he accepted bribes from shipbuilding com-
panies wishing to acquire Japan Development Bank loans. In addition, 
four other MPs and several Transport Ministry officials were arrested, and 
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investigators began tracing evidence linking Satō Eisaku, secretary general 
of the Liberal Party, to the expanding scandal. On April 21, as prosecutors 
were closing the net on Satō, Yoshida ordered Justice Minister Inukai Tak-
eru to exercise the “right of command” (shikiken) to block the arrest of a 
“prized pupil” of the Yoshida School (Hayashi and Tsuji 1981, 5:271). Inu-
kai complied, and the opposition immediately demanded his resignation, 
which was granted one month later. In the end, more than fifty politicians, 
businessmen, and government officials were implicated in the scandal, 
which prompted talk of a non-confidence motion in the lower house and 
led to the defection of a large number of MPs from Yoshida’s Liberal Party 
(Shiratori 1981, 163–164). The scandal exacerbated factional rifts among 
Liberal Party MPs and led corporate donors to insinuate that campaign 
contributions might stop flowing (Mitchell 1996, xvi, 113; Hayashi and 
Tsuji 1981, 5:272). In the end, the Shipbuilding scandal brought down the 
curtain on Yoshida’s protracted run as prime minister and set the stage for 
the establishment of the Liberal Democratic Party.
A Bipolar Occupation
At the time of Japan’s surrender, some feared that the occupation might 
go on indefinitely and that the Americans would radically recast Japanese 
political, economic, and social institutions to suit their alien tastes. Indeed, 
these fears seemed to be confirmed by the utopian reforms undertaken in 
the occupation’s early stages. Yet, by the time the occupation ended, all of 
the most radical reforms—save for the Constitution’s “no war” clause—had 
been rolled back. Moreover, sovereignty was restored far more swiftly than 
almost anyone had imagined, and on terms that were relatively favorable 
to Japanese interests. In large measure, this U-turn in occupation policy 
came in response to the new realities of the Cold War, in which U.S. policy- 
makers came to believe that a politically stable and economically robust 
Japan was essential to contain “creeping Communism.” But the stubborn 
persistence and cleverness of the Japanese compradors—most notably 
Prime Minister Yoshida—also played a role in the change of direction in 
occupation policy.
Japan’s political leaders performed abysmally in some of their initial 
encounters with the American occupiers. The obtuseness of the Japanese 
leaders was readily apparent in their initial attitude toward constitutional 
revision. It should have been abundantly clear from the Potsdam Declara-
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tion that the Americans and their allies were dead serious about ensuring 
that the Japanese adopted democratic institutions. Yet the Shidehara cabi-
net was clueless. “The [Matsumoto] Committee does not necessarily aim 
at the revision of the constitution,” Shidehara explained; its purpose was to 
“determine whether any amendment may be necessary, and, if so, what are 
the points to be amended” (quoted in Tanaka 1976, 656). Years later, Mat-
sumoto admitted that he and members of his committee “thought we could 
handle the matter as we pleased. We even thought it might be all right to 
leave [the existing constitution] as it was” (quoted in Dower 1999, 351). 
Obviously, this was not “all right” to MacArthur and the Americans, and, 
as a result, Japan ended up with a ghostwritten constitution.
Yoshida and other Japanese leaders deftly played different factions at 
GHQ against one another. It soon became apparent that the views of the 
Government Section (GS) clashed with those of the Counterintelligence 
Section (commonly known as G2). GS was under the command of Gen-
eral Whitney, a conservative Republican and MacArthur’s personal friend. 
Whitney delegated considerable authority to his chief aide, Colonel Charles 
L. Kades, a self-described “thorough New Dealer” who had held posts in 
the Roosevelt administration (Itoh 2003). Meanwhile, G2 was under the 
leadership of General Charles Willoughby, the German-born son of a Prus-
sian baron and his American wife (whose maiden name was Willoughby) 
(Campbell 1998, 1). Willoughby—whom MacArthur referred to as “my pet 
fascist”—doubted that American-inspired reforms could make Japan into 
a democracy, and his skepticism permeated GHQ’s military intelligence 
arm (Gordon 2003, 239). GS was given the reins in formulating the early 
occupation-sponsored reforms. With the onset of the U-turn in occupa-
tion policy, however, the divergent views of GS and G2 came to the surface. 
Reflecting on this many decades later, Hans Baerwald, a linguist attached to 
GS, recalled that when it came to political reforms during the early stages 
of the occupation, GS was “on the side of the angels most of the time,” while 
G2 and Willoughby “epitomized our ideological enemy” (Baerwald 2003). 
Mark Gayn, an American journalist posted to Tokyo, described the state of 
relations between GS and G2 as “warring camps” (Gayn 1981, 42).
As the right-wing purge was in progress, GHQ encouraged the expan-
sion of labor unions and applauded the participation of leftist parties in 
coalition governments. In particular, officials at GS were convinced that 
a unionized labor force would promote democracy and that leftist parties 
would serve to check the likely efforts of conservative interests to revive 
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undemocratic practices and institutions. The Labor Union Law, which 
guaranteed the right of collective bargaining, was enacted in December 
1945, and the share of unionized laborers as a percentage of the nation’s 
workforce skyrocketed, as did the number of labor disputes and strikes. 
Even though MacArthur appeared to adopt an anti-labor stance in order-
ing a halt to a general strike planned for February 1, 1947, his real objec-
tive was to maintain public order while pressuring Yoshida to call elections 
before the new Constitution went into effect. Besides, as noted earlier, 
officials at GS were pleased with the progressive reforms pressed forward 
by the Katayama and Ashida cabinets, each of which boasted socialist 
participation.
In late 1948, occupation policy began to take its U-turn, ushering in 
what came to be known as the “reverse course.” By this time GHQ had 
become weary of the demands of unionized labor and the increasing mili-
tancy of the leftist parties, especially the Japan Communist Party (JCP). 
In May 1950, MacArthur suggested that it would be a good idea if the 
JCP were to be outlawed, although, in this case, the Supreme Command-
er’s suggestion was not acted upon. Then, on June 5, 1950, less than three 
weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War, GHQ ordered the purge 
of twenty-four members of the JCP’s Central Committee. Soon thereaf-
ter, seventeen members of the editorial board of Akahata, the party’s print 
organ, were also purged. This marked the beginning of the “red purge,” 
which ultimately resulted in the removal and exclusion of thousands of pri-
vate- and public-sector workers, many of whom had only vague ties to the 
Communist movement. It was accompanied by the staged rehabilitation of 
the previously purged rightists, many of whom returned to reassume their 
Diet seats and leadership posts in the political parties and government. 
For example, the three ministers who were purged in the last days of the 
first Yoshida cabinet—Ishibashi, Kimura, and Ishii—quickly resumed their 
political careers and went on to hold important party and cabinet posts, 
with Ishibashi eventually becoming prime minister. Of course, Hatoyama 
returned to political life to assume the premiership.
Findings
As Ward observed, “the Allied Occupation of Japan was perhaps the single 
most exhaustively planned operation of massive and externally directed 
change in world history” (1987, 401). A major part of this operation was to 
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get the Japanese to adopt a democratic constitution. Japanese authorities 
were reluctant to revise the Meiji Constitution, so the task fell to a secretive 
“constitutional convention” held in the ballroom of the Dai-Ichi Mutual 
Life Insurance Building. In just six breathless days, GHQ officials produced 
a draft constitution that would, with Japanese and Allied input, evolve 
into the Constitution of Japan that laid the foundation for parliamentary 
democracy with a “British-style cabinet system” at its heart (Dower 1999, 
370).
Yet despite the establishment of a Westminster system in form, cabinet 
government in practice failed to take root. Yoshida’s fast-tracking of high-
ranking ex-bureaucrats demonstrated that parliamentary seniority mat-
tered little in the recruitment of ministers, and helped to account for the 
paucity of “career politicians” among the ministerial elite. Moreover, the 
cabinet failed to assume its expected role as the foremost organ of execu-
tive influence; instead it remained a loose collection of individual minis-
ters acting as advocates for the interests of their respective ministries. As 
Dower points out, “from 1945 to 1952, Japan was essentially ruled by an 
American military dictatorship that, for simple reasons of expediency, gov-
erned . . . through a bureaucratic system that remained essentially intact 
from the war years” (1999, 7). Although the Japanese compradors some-
times got what they wanted by dragging their feet or exploiting factional 
differences within GHQ, at the end of the day they danced to an Ameri-
can tune. Meanwhile, corruption scandals brought down ministers, top-
pled cabinets, and confirmed the popular perception that parliamentary 
democracy and political corruption go hand in hand. Indeed, the inability 
of this first cohort of postwar cabinet ministers to resist the forbidden fruit 
of influence peddling laid the foundation for an enduring system of struc-
tural corruption.
By the time the Hatoyama cabinet was reorganized on November 22, 
1955, the institutional foundations for a Westminster-style parliamentary 
cabinet system had been put in place, if not in practice. Still, the cabinet 
system would be fundamentally shaped by an event that had taken place 
one week earlier, when the two major conservative parties merged to form 
the Liberal Democratic Party. While there was no exogenous shock com-
parable to Commodore Perry’s uninvited visit or the arrival of MacArthur 
and his viceroys, the incremental changes effected under the “1955 system” 
and more than half a century of almost uninterrupted rule by the LDP 
would profoundly affect the evolution of Japan’s cabinet system.
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3
Corporatist Cabinets and the 
Emergence of the “1955 System,” 
1955–1972
The Cabinet is more than an agency of executive coordination. It is, 
above all, a body composed of parliamentary leaders. This circumstance 
has had definite consequences for its structure and place in the British 
political system.
—Hans Daalder, Cabinet Reform in Britain, 1914–1963 (1963), 3
Cabinet officers don’t have any time to make policy. They are new to 
their jobs and have to spend all their time boning up on answers to 
questions in the Diet. By the time they are experienced, they are out of 
office. The result is that policy is made by the bureaucrats.
—Miura Kineji quoted in Nathaniel B. Thayer, 
How the Conservatives Rule Japan (1969), 202–203
Genesis of LDP Rule
On November 15, 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyūminshutō, 
or LDP) was born in a ceremony held on a university campus in Tokyo. 
Speeches were made, “banzais” were shouted under raised arms, and Ogata 
Taketora, Hatoyama Ichirō, Ōno Banboku, and Miki Bukichi emerged as 
the party’s acting presidents. Although talk of a “conservative alliance” 
(hoshū gōdō) was not new, personal and partisan rivalries invariably stood 
in the way. The breakthrough had come six months earlier, the result of 
a telephone conversation between erstwhile enemies Ōno and Miki, the 
respective lieutenants in Ogata’s Liberal and Hatoyama’s Japan Democratic 
parties. This led to meetings of leaders of the rival parties, and, eventually, 
an agreement in principle to combine the main conservative parties into 
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one (Thayer 1969, 13–14). Talk soon gave way to action when, in October, 
the left and right branches of the socialist movement merged to form the 
Japan Socialist Party. Fearful of the fate of business interests under a leftist 
regime, the captains of industry threatened to withhold campaign fund-
ing unless the major conservative parties united. This got the attention 
of Ogata, Hatoyama, and other leaders of the conservative parties, who 
put aside their differences and joined forces. With Hatoyama sitting in the 
prime minister’s chair and the LDP in control of a comfortable majority in 
the Diet’s lower house, the new LDP was a dominant force from the outset.
In this chapter, I trace the evolution of Japan’s cabinet system from 
November 15, 1955, until July 6, 1972. During this period, new cabinet-
related organs and government agencies were created, and a seniority 
system for cabinet ministers became established. Because LDP lawmak-
ers all but monopolized ministerial portfolios, appointment to a cabinet 
post became simply another rung on the perpetually ruling party’s inter-
nal promotional ladder. The LDP was, in essence, a “federation of factions” 
united for purposes of campaign and legislative strategy, rather than a uni-
fied national party (Scalapino and Masumi 1962, 18; Bowen 2003, 60). This 
ensured that Machiavellian machinations would play a role in deciding the 
party’s president, who doubled as prime minister. Yet, under the surface, 
differences in style and outlook pitted rival camps of “ex-bureaucrats” and 
“career politicians,” and the need to maintain balance among intraparty 
factions dictated frequent cabinet changes and, often, the appointment 
of ministers with dubious qualifications. At the same time, the auton-
omy of cabinets in executive affairs was challenged by a hegemonic party 
that demanded the right to preapprove all major policy departures and 
by an activist government bureaucracy. Finally, prime ministers and cabi-
nets confronted a variety of challenges produced by high-speed economic 
growth and dissatisfaction with institutional arrangements put in place 
during the American-led occupation.
The “1955 System”
The creation of the LDP provided an opening for opportunistic leaders 
of the major conservative parties to rectify perceived flaws in the postwar 
institutional settlement, which in large measure had been imposed on a 
defeated nation by American military occupiers. Longtime premier Yoshida 
Shigeru was singled out as the principal domestic collaborator in forging 
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these arrangements, symbolized in the 1947 “Peace Constitution” and the 
United States–Japan Mutual Security Treaty. These arrangements had per-
mitted Japan to devote unfettered attention to economic recovery, but had 
constrained its diplomatic and military capabilities. An “anti-Yoshida alli-
ance”—led by Hatoyama, Miki, Kōno Ichirō, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Kishi 
Nobusuke, and others, many of whom had been subject to the occupation-
imposed purge of militarists and ultranationalists—was repulsed by the 
thought that a lightly armed Japan would have to depend forever on the 
United States for its national security. In December 1954, these conserva-
tive leaders ousted Yoshida and installed Hatoyama as prime minister. In 
so doing, their overarching aim was to bring about the “domestic counter-
part” of Yoshida’s “diplomatic opus” (Masumi 1985, 329).
The term “1955 system” denotes the political party system born from 
the creation of the JSP and the LDP as well as the “business first” economic 
strategy that defined the period (Masumi 1985, 16). Yet the two major par-
ties were far from equipotent. The LDP was the party of preference for 
a solid majority of the electorate, while the JSP—with a weak grassroots 
base and a bad case of ideological division—played the part of permanent 
minority. In practice, therefore, Japan was governed under a “one-and-a-
half-party system,” in which the LDP did all the governing, while the JSP 
and the other parties could only oppose (Scalapino and Masumi 1962, 79).
Even though the first two LDP prime ministers—Hatoyama and Ishi-
bashi Tanzan—were “career politicians,” ex-bureaucrats sat in the prime 
minister’s chair for the greater part of the period. Kishi Nobusuke, Ikeda 
Hayato, and Satō Eisaku were elite ex-bureaucrats who gravitated into 
“second careers” in elective politics. Meanwhile, other former officials 
occupied a disproportionate share of key ministerial posts. These leaders 
presided over an era of economic growth that catapulted Japan to the fore-
front of the industrialized world and, in so doing, enhanced the country’s 
diplomatic stature. In 1961, the Ikeda cabinet launched a plan to double the 
country’s GNP by the end of the decade; the goal was achieved in less than 
seven years, and Japan became the world’s second largest economy. Policies 
to promote export-oriented “strategic industries” such as steel, shipbuild-
ing, machine tools, and automobiles were crafted within the ministries and 
agencies of the central government (Johnson 1982).
Throughout this period, corporatist cabinets exerted a high degree of 
strategic choice in setting the agenda for executive decision-making and 
responding to domestic and international challenges. This was made possi-
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ble by a pro-growth consensus among business and political leaders as well 
as by a rapidly expanding economic pie that raised the standard of living of 
the vast majority of Japanese citizens. It also legitimized a state of affairs in 
which the government bureaucracy took the lead in forging economic pol-
icy, while elite ex-bureaucrats occupied pivotal posts in government and in 
the hegemonic party. “Politicians from the bureaucracy have a firm grip on 
the Liberal Democratic leadership,” explained a contemporary observer. 
“Bureaucratic politicians built up the status of power elite while they were 
in the Government Administration” (Sugimori 1968, 496). This meant that 
the ministerial elite possessed a stronger “bureaucratic” coloration than 
that expected in a Westminster system in which career politicians dom-
inate. For the most part, the bureaucratically dominated governments 
adhered to the principle of balanced budgets prescribed under the Dodge 
Line (discussed in chapter 2). For the time being, therefore, career politi-
cians were relegated to a supporting role in executive affairs, although the 
“shocks” of the 1970s would create conditions for a reversal of fortune.
The Corporatist Cabinet Elite
Between November 1955 and July 1972, twenty-two cabinets were formed 
under five prime ministers. On average, a corporatist cabinet survived a 
mere 276 days. The longest-lived was the third Satō cabinet, which carried 
on for nearly eighteen months, while the shortest-lived was the Ishibashi 
cabinet, which collapsed along with the health of its premier after just 
sixty-four days. Meanwhile, the seven-and-a-half-year tenure of the Satō 
government is the longest in the history of Japan’s cabinet system. Each 
of the prime ministers, who simultaneously served as LDP president, had 
previous ties to the Liberal Party, Japan Democratic Party, or both. Two 
held portfolios in prewar cabinets, and three had been purged under the 
American occupation. One had scarcely known a career other than elec-
tive politics, another had been a journalist, and three had risen to the apex 
of the career civil service before descending into “second careers” as MPs.
The Prime Ministers
As noted earlier, Hatoyama Ichirō (1883–1959) was born into a politi-
cal family, and politics was his lifelong calling. In May 1946, Hatoyama 
had just been elected to an eleventh lower house term and, as leader of 
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the largest party in the Diet’s lower house, was preparing to form a cabi-
net when he was subjected to the U.S. occupation’s purge of militarists. 
He reassumed his lower house seat in October 1952 but maintained an 
icy stance toward Liberal Party president Yoshida Shigeru, whom he sus-
pected of delaying his rehabilitation. In March 1953, in the midst of a 
ruckus created by Yoshida’s reference to a JSP lawmaker as a “fool” dur-
ing Diet deliberations, Hatoyama helped establish the Japan Liberal Party. 
The following November he founded the Japan Democratic Party, and a 
year later became the LDP’s inaugural president. He tried and failed to ger-
rymander the electoral system so that the LDP could acquire the requi-
site two-thirds of seats needed to revise the Constitution (Yamamuro 1995, 
105). Although he could not secure the return of the disputed “Northern 
Territories,” Hatoyama exited the premiership amid strong public approval 
for his role in restoring relations with the Soviet Union and negotiating the 
belated repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war (Ōkochi 1981, 354).
Ishibashi Tanzan (1884–1973) took his Waseda University diploma 
and set out on a journalistic career. He became editor in chief of the Ori-
ental Economic Journal (Tōyō keizai shinpō), in whose pages he articu-
lated liberal economic views and questioned Japan’s colonial expansionism 
(Inoki 1995, 112–113). Ishibashi held several key posts in the first Yoshida 
cabinet but was purged shortly after winning a lower house seat in the 1947 
general elections. He was rehabilitated in 1951 and three years later joined 
Hatoyama and others in founding the Japan Democratic Party. Kishi Nobu-
suke was considered the odds-on favorite to succeed Hatoyama when he 
resigned in 1956, but Ishibashi and rival Ishii Mitsujirō secretly agreed to 
join forces in the event that the LDP’s presidential election required a sec-
ond round of voting. When Kishi failed to obtain a majority on the first 
ballot, Ishii ordered members of his faction to vote for Ishibashi in the run-
off. The result was the Ishibashi cabinet and the solidification of “eight pri-
vate divisions” (hachi-ko shidan) that became the LDP’s intraparty factions 
(habatsu) (Satō and Matsuzaki 1986, 240).1 Ishibashi was a septuagenar-
ian when he assumed the premiership, and his health quickly deteriorated 
owing to the heavy schedule of public speaking engagements.
Kishi Nobusuke’s (1896–1987) birth name was Satō, but he adopted 
the family name of an uncle with whom he went to live. Legend has it 
that the young Kishi was so moved by the ideas of Kita Ikki, “the ideo-
logical father of Japanese fascism,” that he hand-copied An Outline Plan 
for the Reorganization of Japan (Nihon kaizō hōan taikō) (Maruyama 1969, 
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28; Samuels 2003, 142). He chose to enter the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce (MAC) rather than the mighty Home Ministry, as might have 
been expected of the top graduate of Tokyo Imperial University’s Law Fac-
ulty (Kitaoka 1995, 125–126). Kishi rose through the ranks at MAC and its 
successor, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI), and in 1936 was 
posted to the powerful General Affairs Agency in the puppet state of Man-
chukuo, where he directed central economic planning (Samuels 2003, 144–
145). After returning to Tokyo, Kishi became the leader of the technocratic 
“reform bureaucrats” who dominated government officialdom under the 
wartime regime (Mimura 2011, 3). In 1939, Kishi became administrative 
vice minister at MCI, and two years later he resigned to serve as a minister 
in the Tōjō cabinet. After Japan’s surrender, Kishi was arrested as a “Class 
A” war criminal and imprisoned, but he was released in December 1948 
and did not stand trial at the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East. Kishi was rehabilitated in April 1952 and, a year later, was elected to 
the lower house. Shortly before the LDP’s founding, Kishi began receiving 
funds from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to consolidate one-party 
rule in Japan and to press America’s Cold War policies. These surreptitious 
payments, which were made using American businessmen as go-betweens 
and funneled to Kishi and other LDP MPs, continued for at least fifteen 
years (Weiner 2007, 119–120; Schaller 1996, 165).
Ikeda Hayato (1899–1965) was the son of a postmaster and sake 
brewer in Hiroshima Prefecture. It is not known why Ikeda chose to pursue 
his studies at Kyoto Imperial University—as opposed to Tokyo University, 
the institution of choice for aspiring government officials—in preparation 
for a career at the Ministry of Finance (Nakamura 1995, 150). In 1929, he 
contracted a rare skin disease that necessitated a five-year medical leave, 
during which he contemplated suicide (ibid., 150). After returning to the 
ministry, Ikeda ascended to the administrative vice minister post, from 
which he retired in 1948. Ikeda was just the sort of elite government offi-
cial favored by Prime Minister Yoshida, who fast-tracked him into the cov-
eted post of finance minister just one month after his election to the lower 
house. In November 1952, Ikeda was forced to resign the ministership 
after stating that he would not be troubled if a few small businessmen were 
driven to suicide as a result of his policies favoring large-scale heavy indus-
tries; he justified the policy by saying that “any major policy requires some 
unavoidable sacrifice” (ibid., 153). As premier, Ikeda promoted an “Income 
Doubling Plan” (shotoku baizō keikaku) emblematic of Japan’s high-speed 
Table 3.1. The Corporatist Cabinets, 1955 to 1972
Cabinet Prime Minister Established Dissolved PM’s Background
3rd Hatoyama 
Cabinet Hatoyama Ichirō 11/22/1955 12/23/1956 Career Politician
Ishibashi Cabinet Ishibashi Tanzan 12/23/1956 2/25/1957 "
1st Kishi Cabinet Kishi Nobusuke 2/25/1957 7/10/1957 Ex-Bureaucrat
Reorg’ed 1st Kishi 
Cabinet " 7/10/1957 6/12/1958 "
2nd Kishi Cabinet " 6/12/1958 6/18/1959 "
Reorg’ed 2nd Kishi 
Cabinet " 6/18/1959 7/19/1960 "
1st Ikeda Cabinet Ikeda Hayato 7/19/1960 12/8/1960 Ex-Bureaucrat
2nd Ikeda Cabinet " 12/8/1960 7/18/1961 "
Reorg’ed 2nd Ikeda 
(1) Cabinet " 7/18/1961 7/18/1962 "
Reorg’ed 2nd Ikeda 
(2) Cabinet " 7/18/1962 7/18/1963 "
Reorg’ed 2nd Ikeda 
(3) Cabinet " 7/18/1963 12/9/1963 "
3rd Ikeda Cabinet " 12/9/1963 7/18/1964 "
Reorg’ed 3rd Ikeda 
Cabinet " 7/18/1964 11/9/1964 "
1st Satō Cabinet Satō Eisaku 11/9/1964 6/3/1965 Ex-Bureaucrat
Reorg’ed 1st Satō (1) 
Cabinet " 6/3/1965 8/1/1966 "
Reorg’ed 1st Satō (2) 
Cabinet " 8/1/1966 12/3/1966 "
Reorg’ed 1st Satō (3) 
Cabinet " 12/3/1966 2/17/1967 "
2nd Satō Cabinet " 2/17/1967 11/25/1967 "
Reorg’ed 2nd Satō 
(1) Cabinet " 11/25/1967 11/30/1968 "
Reorg’ed 2nd Satō 
(2) Cabinet " 11/30/1968 1/14/1970 "
3rd Satō Cabinet " 1/14/1970 7/5/1971 "
Reorg’ed 3rd Satō 
Cabinet " 7/5/1971 7/7/1972 "
Source: JCCM Database (Appendix A).
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growth era, but was disparagingly referred to as a “transistor salesman” by 
French president Charles de Gaulle. Despite suffering from throat cancer, 
Ikeda delivered a speech to delegates of the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank and attended the opening ceremony of the 1964 Tokyo 
Olympic Games.
Satō Eisaku (1901–1975) followed in the footsteps of his biological 
brother, Kishi Nobusuke, by studying law at Tokyo Imperial University in 
preparation for a civil service career. He was promoted at the Ministry of 
Railways, which subsequently morphed into the Ministry of Transport, 
and in 1947 he became administrative vice minister. The following year 
Satō retired from the government bureaucracy and, like Ikeda, was fast-
tracked into a ministerial post. Satō served as chief cabinet secretary in the 
second Yoshida cabinet and won a seat in the 1949 lower house elections. 
After Sato established himself as the “pillar” (shichū) of the Yoshida cabi-
net, his political career was jeopardized by allegations that he and Ikeda 
had received bribes in the 1954 Shipbuilding scandal (Johnson 1995b, 
189). Thanks to the invocation of executive authority by Justice Minister 
Inukai Takeru, who acted on Yoshida’s orders, Satō was spared prosecu-
tion (Mitchell 1996, 111). In 1964, he outmaneuvered Kōno Ichirō and 
Fujiyama Aiichirō to succeed the terminally ill Ikeda as prime minister 
(Masumi 1985, 137). Satō won the Nobel Peace Prize for his nuclear non-
proliferation policies.
Departmental Ministers
Among the 308 individuals who held portfolios in the corporatist cabinets, 
the modal minister was an LDP MP who had been elected to six lower 
house terms and had spent more than a decade and a half treading the 
Diet’s red-carpeted corridors. Chances are that this modal minister was 
a male university graduate who represented a district located outside the 
most highly urbanized centers. It is likely that he labored in the central 
state bureaucracy, prefectural or municipal politics, or worked as an MP’s 
staff assistant or as a journalist before embarking on a career in national 
elective politics. This is to say that our modal minister claimed allegiance 
to the LDP’s band of “ex-bureaucrats” or the rival contingent of “career 
politicians” (Sugimori 1968, 506).
Under the corporatist cabinets, ministerial portfolios were reserved 
almost exclusively for MPs. In fact, the lone nonparliamentarian was Fuji-
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yama Aiichirō, a successful businessman who held the foreign minister’s 
portfolio in the Kishi cabinet. Novice ministers had accumulated nearly 
fifteen years of parliamentary experience, more than four years longer than 
the previous ministerial cohort. These first-time ministers had been elected 
to 4.45 lower house terms (or 2.61 upper house terms), and the average for 
all ministers, novice and veteran, was the equivalent of 6.3 lower house 
terms. Moreover, seniority exceptions—in other words, ministers who 
had not been elected to the equivalent of at least five lower house terms—
declined from two-thirds of comprador ministers to only one in five cor-
porate cabinet ministers.
Ex-bureaucrats accounted for nearly half of all ministers (46 percent), 
and better than two-thirds of them separated from the civil service at the 
lofty rank of bureau chief or above. Prime Ministers Kishi, Ikeda, Satō, and 
Fukuda are numbered among these elite ex-bureaucrats, but even some 
of those who exited the civil service at a junior rank went on to spin out 
successful second careers as MPs. Ōhira Masayoshi (Finance), Nakasone 
Yasuhiro (Home), and Miyazawa Kiichi (Finance) separated from the civil 
service at junior ranks but went on to become prime ministers, while Ishii 
Mitsujirō and Funada Naka (Home Ministry officials) held important 
party leadership posts. Much has been made of the differences in political 
style between the LDP’s rival contingents of ex-bureaucrats and career pol-
iticians, of whom many were former grassroots politicians (for example, 
prefectural assemblymen) or MPs’ staff assistants (Scalapino and Masumi 
1962, 54–59). Ex-bureaucrats were said to prefer centralized control and 
valued their ministry and school ties, while career politicians were more 
attuned to local interests and preferred decentralized control. Career poli-
ticians constituted a minority among corporatist cabinet ministers (in fact, 
they accounted for only 30 percent of ministers), so, at least for the time 
being, they were obliged to toil in the shadow of the ex-bureaucrats.
The vast majority of ministers were university-educated men who rep-
resented rural districts. Although the 1947 Constitution granted women 
the right to hold elective office, the ministerial elite remained an almost 
exclusively male preserve. In assuming the health and welfare portfolio in 
the first Ikeda cabinet on July 19, 1960, Nakayama Masa did for female 
ministerial aspirants what Jackie Robinson and Wat Misaka did for athletes 
of color in American professional baseball and basketball.2 An alumna of 
Ohio Wesleyan University and wife of an MP, Nakayama was elected to 
the lower house in 1947, the first election in which women were allowed 
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to vote. The only other female minister was Kondō Tsuruyo, who held the 
science and technology portfolio in the second Ikeda cabinet. Over 90 
percent of ministers attended university, and nearly 60 percent of them 
held diplomas from either Tokyo University or Kyoto University, elite 
public universities whose graduates dominated the upper echelons of the 
career civil service. Four out of five of those who held portfolios repre-
sented districts outside the heavily urbanized Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya 
metropolitan areas.3 This attests to the LDP’s strong support among rural 
voters, who ensured that the party’s candidates attained the requisite level 
of seniority to ascend the promotional ladder leading to coveted ministe-
rial portfolios.
Finally, it is important to note the large number of ministers who 
held prewar and wartime leadership positions. Many of these individu-
als had been subject to the occupation-imposed purge of militarists and 
right-wingers. Among them were Prime Ministers Hatoyama, Ishibashi, 
and Kishi, as well as Kōno Ichirō (agriculture and construction minister in 
various cabinets), Makino Ryōzō (justice minister in the Hatoyama cabi-
net), Takasaki Tatsunosuke (MITI minister and director of the agencies for 
economic planning and science and technology in the Hatoyama and Kishi 
cabinets), Ōkubo Tomeijirō (chair of the National Public Safety Commis-
sion and director of the Administrative Management Agency in the Ishi-
bashi and Kishi cabinets), and Narahashi Wataru (transport minister in the 
Kishi cabinet). As noted earlier, Hatoyama and Kishi held portfolios in pre-
war cabinets, which almost guaranteed that they would be purged. These 
leaders represented a human bridge linking the “undemocratic” techno-
fascist cabinets with the “democratic” cabinets established under the 1947 
Constitution. As Dower observes, “everywhere one looks, the corridors of 
power in postwar Japan are crowded with men whose talents had already 
been recognized during the war years, and who found the same talents 
highly prized in the ‘new’ Japan” (1993, 11).
Organizational Changes
A net increase of seven ministerial portfolios accrued under the cor-
poratist cabinets, increasing the total number to twenty-eight portfo-
lios. Since, by law, the maximum number of ministers was nineteen, it 
became necessary to award multiple portfolios. In the third Satō cabinet, 
for example, Nemoto Ryūtarō concurrently held the construction min-
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ister’s portfolio as well as the portfolios for three cabinet-level regional 
development commissions. Still, the ministerial hierarchy associated 
with an established parliamentary cabinet system failed to appear. Based 
on ministers’ parliamentary and social attributes, the most prestigious 
portfolios were economic planning, foreign affairs, administrative man-
agement, labor, and regional development (see Appendix C).4 While the 
lofty ranking accorded the foreign affairs portfolio is to be expected, it 
is difficult to account for the fact that economic planning, administra-
tive management, labor, and regional development ranked higher in the 
pecking order than the international trade and industry, finance, and 
prime minister portfolios.
A number of new ministerial portfolios were created. A cabinet-level 
Science and Technology Agency (Kagakugijutsuchō) was created on May 
19, 1956, with Shōriki Matsutarō, a prewar Police Board (Keishichō) official 
who was briefly jailed as a “Class A” war criminal, as its director general. In 
July 1960, the Local Autonomy Agency (Jichichō), an external bureau of the 
Prime Minister’s Office, became the Ministry of Home Affairs (Jishishō, or 
MOHA), and the title of its top administrator was upgraded from director 
general (chōkan) to minister (daijin). Ishihara Kan’ichirō, a former official 
of the Health and Welfare Ministry and a former governor of Fukushima 
Prefecture, became the inaugural minister of Home Affairs. Ishihara’s suc-
cessors included a pair of former Home Ministry officials, Yoshitake Eiichi 
and Yamazaki Iwao, and Sudō Hideo, an ex-official of MCI who had served 
on the powerful Cabinet Planning Board, one of the “superagencies” of the 
prewar state (Samuels 2003, 144). Many of those who had applauded the 
actions of American occupation authorities in dissolving the prewar Home 
Ministry (Naimushō), which housed the “Thought Police” and other organs 
of state repression, were troubled by the installation of former Naimushō 
officials at the helm of the new MOHA.
Ministerial portfolios were given to the directors general of the Prime 
Minister’s Office and the newly created Environment Agency (Kankyōchō), 
as well as to the chairpersons of the three regional development commis-
sions. In May 1965, Imamatsu Jirō, a former Home Ministry official who 
had been purged under the occupation, became the PMO’s first minister-
level director. The Environment Agency was established in January 1971 as 
part of the government’s response to the environmental protest movement, 
and LDP lawmaker Yamanaka Sadanori was tapped to serve as director 
general (Reich 1984, 385). Meanwhile, the chairpersons of the commis-
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sions to oversee the development of the Capital Region (founded in June 
1957) and the Kinki (July 1964) and Chūbu (July 1966) Regions assumed 
ministerial portfolios. In May 1972, following the reversion of sovereignty, 
the Okinawa Development Agency (Okinawa kaihatsuchō) was established 
with a cabinet-level director general as its head.
Several important cabinet-related auxiliary organs appeared. The 
National Defense Council (Kokubō kaigi) emerged in July 1956, with the 
prime minister as its chair and a membership that included the foreign 
minister, finance minister, and the directors general of defense and eco-
nomic planning. A 1957 reform of the Cabinet Secretariat created three 
new offices—cabinet councilors, deliberation, and research. On May 15, 
1972, the same day that sovereignty over Okinawa was restored, a North-
ern Territories Policy Headquarters (Hoppō taisaku honbu) was estab-
lished within the PMO to coordinate efforts to regain sovereignty over 
the disputed islands. A 1956 overhaul of the Cabinet Secretariat created 
internal offices for general affairs (naikaku sōmukan shitsu), public rela-
tions (naikaku kōdōkan shitsu), and information research (naikaku jōhō 
chōsa shitsu). Although it bore scant likeness to its supposed American 
counterpart, the Cabinet Information Research Office was dubbed “Japan’s 
CIA” (Hayao 1993, 175). Finally, although the chief cabinet secretary had 
attended cabinet meetings and served as the government’s primary spokes-
person since prewar times, it was not until 1966 that the occupant of the 
post was accorded formal ministerial status.
A Bureaucratic Core Executive
Executive decision-making came to be dominated by the perpetually ruling 
party and the government bureaucracy. Although Hatoyama succeeded in 
normalizing relations with the Soviet Union and Kishi revised the Mutual 
Security Treaty, neither exhibited the focused, yet carefully calibrated and 
inclusive leadership style expected in prime ministerial government. Ikeda 
wisely chose to adopt a “low posture” leadership style to lower the politi-
cal temperature following the security treaty crisis, and Satō’s protracted 
tenure was more the result of good fortune (his three most serious rivals 
died soon after he took office) than of forceful prime ministerial leadership 
(Stockwin 2011, 11). Most of those who held ministerial portfolios were 
content to act as transitory figureheads who deferred to the career bureau-
crats in the ministries they supervised (Thayer 1969, 203).
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Mist-Enshrouded Party Government
In its role as ever-ruling party, the LDP exerted considerable influence 
over executive affairs. For one thing, the LDP’s unyielding grasp on parlia-
mentary power meant that its president would invariably double as prime 
minister and that its lawmaker members would virtually monopolize 
appointments to cabinet posts. This blurred the line between ruling party 
and cabinet, and appointment to a cabinet ministership became another 
step in the advancement of LDP MPs. As a result, the background char-
acteristics of cabinet ministers became identical to those of senior LDP 
legislators. While that mirroring is expected, what is peculiar about the 
Japanese case is that LDP MPs all but monopolized ministerial portfolios 
for five and a half decades. Moreover, the internal politics of the ruling 
party—especially the need to maintain “factional balance”—determined 
who became cabinet ministers and how long they held office (Thayer 1969, 
195). This process granted priority to factional affiliation over ability in 
selecting ministers. For example, Prime Minister Ikeda reshuffled his cabi-
net with craftsman-like precision, never allowing more than 365 days to 
pass without a change of ministers. The fact that five of Ikeda’s seven reshuf-
flings took place on July 18–19 and the other two on December 8–9 sug-
gests that his chief aim was to obtain factional accord rather than to ensure 
that the most qualified MPs held ministerial posts (see table 3.1). Also, 
factionally unaffiliated MPs and those from smaller factions were routinely 
passed over in allocating portfolios. If these individuals were lucky enough 
to receive a portfolio at all, it is probable that it was one that offered limited 
prestige or pork-barreling opportunity (Cox et al. 1999, 47). In addition, 
the need to ensure harmony within the ruling party dictated rapid turn-
over of ministers, which made it difficult for elected politicians to acquire 
the policy expertise required to win the respect of senior bureaucrats and 
to effectively monitor the career civil servants in their ministries.
The LDP was in a position to require that all major legislative pro-
posals be preapproved by internal party organs before being submitted for 
Diet deliberation. The Policy Affairs Research Council (Seimuchōsakai, 
or PARC) was the key intraparty organ in the preapproval process. Dur-
ing the era of corporatist cabinets, PARC was composed of around fif-
teen divisions (bukai), corresponding to the ministries and agencies of the 
central government and the Diet’s standing committees (Satō and Matsu-
zaki 1986, 248). Each LDP MP was allowed to join up to three divisions, 
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which attracted MPs with designs on becoming members of a particular 
“tribe” (zoku) of influential policy specialists (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987, 99). 
The most popular divisions were the “three noble houses” (go-sanke) of 
Agriculture (Nōrin), Commerce and Industry (Shōkō), and Construction 
(Kensetsu), whose magnetic appeal was a function of the cornucopia of dis-
tributive benefits (such as agricultural price supports, subsidies, and pub-
lic works contracts) over which they held influence (Woodall 1996, 117). 
As early as 1962, the LDP was able to require that all policy and budget-
ary proposals be reviewed and debated within its internal organs before 
submission to the Diet (McCubbins and Noble 1995, 15; George Mulgan 
2003a, 140). In this way, PARC became a sort of “shadow cabinet” in which 
a complex bargaining process ensured that members of the LDP’s policy 
tribes could affect policy and budget proposals before they were debated in 
the Diet (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987, 20, 27–28).
Because LDP lawmakers virtually monopolized ministerial posts, 
instances of malfeasance involving ministers were perceived as the byprod-
ucts of protracted single-party rule. This was seen in the fallout over the 
Black Mist (kurokiri) scandals that erupted in 1966. The scandal was trig-
gered by the arrest of LDP lower house MP Tanaka Shōji on charges that 
he accepted cash from businessmen in return for silence on faked govern-
ment contracts (Time Magazine, November 4, 1966). Transport minister 
Arafune Seijurō then came under fire for allegedly using his influence to 
ensure that express trains stopped at a tiny railway station in his electoral 
district and for taking a pair of businessmen on a government-financed 
trip to South Korea. The opposition seized upon the scandal to lambast the 
Satō government. The scandal continued to expand, and Defense Agency 
director Kanbayashiyama Eikichi drew criticism for staging a lavish home-
coming parade, replete with a Self-Defense Forces (SDF) band and senior 
SDF officers flown in on an official aircraft, when he visited his Kagoshima 
district. Agriculture Minister Matsuno Raizō came under scrutiny for fun-
neling government loans to the ailing Kyōwa Sugar Refining Company, a 
loyal LDP contributor (Mitchell 1996, 117). Matsuno was also lambasted 
for ordering the installation of a private lavatory in the minister’s office 
because he felt “sorry for the toilet guard, who had to salute him every time 
he entered the public rest room” (Newsweek, October 31, 1966).
The opposition argued that the Black Mist scandals were symptomatic 
of the LDP’s spoils system, which awarded portfolios to party MPs recom-
mended by their faction bosses rather than to qualified candidates. In most 
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cases, prime ministers allocated cabinet posts according to a rank-ordered 
list of candidates proposed by each faction (Kyogoku 1987, 193). When 
the mist began to clear, popular approval of the Satō cabinet plummeted. 
Tanaka was expelled from the LDP as a result of his arrest, and Arafune 
resigned as transport minister, but Kanbayashiyama and Matsuno weath-
ered the storm. The opposition turned up the heat on the Satō government 
by boycotting Diet deliberations, and Satō gave them what they wanted by 
dissolving the Diet and calling new elections for January 29, 1967. Despite 
the negative press and the emergence of the Soka Gakkai-sponsored Clean 
Government (Kōmei) Party, the LDP emerged from the 1967 lower house 
elections with 277 seats, a loss of only six.
The Kasumigaseki Shogunate
Japan’s government bureaucrats were not mere value-neutral policy imple-
menters; indeed, they initiated the majority of policy decisions, drafted 
bills, and explained government positions in Diet interpellations. Policy 
initiatives frequently emerged from “deliberation councils” (shingikai), 
official standing organs composed of civilian experts who advised the rel-
evant ministers. The supposed autonomy of these councils was called into 
question, however, because their meetings were typically held in minis-
try offices, and ministry bureaucrats provided data for their deliberations 
(Johnson 1982, 36, 47). Moreover, in addition to drafting most govern-
ment-sponsored bills (seifu hōan), bureaucrats were able to make policy 
incrementally by issuing cabinet ordinances (seirei), which did not require 
Diet approval. Under the corporatist cabinets, ordinances outnumbered 
enacted laws by a factor of better than two to one (387 to 164). The Cab-
inet Legislation Bureau (renamed from the Legislation Bureau in 1962) 
continued to play a role akin to that of a quasi-constitutional court con-
cerning matters of constitutional interpretation. Although Hatoyama ini-
tially resisted the bureau’s interpretations, he eventually came to see the 
light. As the bureau’s director general of the time recalled, “Prime Minister 
Hatoyama was an amateur when it came to constitutional arguments and 
legal theory” (Samuels 2004, 6).
Although they were physically based in Tokyo’s Kasumigaseki district, 
the government bureaucrats were able to make their influence felt through 
an expansive network of friends in high places. As noted, nearly half of all 
ministerial portfolios were given to ex-bureaucrats, and three of the five 
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prime ministers descended from the highest rank in the career civil ser-
vice into second careers as MPs. In fact, Prime Ministers Kishi, Ikeda, and 
Satō presided over twenty of the twenty-two cabinets formed during the 
era of corporatist cabinets. Furthermore, ex-bureaucrats grabbed a dispro-
portionate share of the most coveted cabinet posts. At various times, Kishi, 
Ōhira Masayoshi, Shiina Etsusaburō, Aichi Kiichi, and Fukuda Takeo held 
the foreign affairs portfolio, while Ikeda, Satō, Fukuda, and Ueki Koshirō 
were among those who held the finance portfolio. The international trade 
and industry portfolio went to Maeo Shigesaburō, Ikeda, Ishii Mitsujirō, 
Shiina, Satō, Ōhira, Miyazawa Kiichi, and Nakasone Yasuhiro. In addition, 
ex-bureaucrats held the portfolios of justice, education, posts and tele-
communications, health and welfare, economic planning, and defense. It 
is worth reiterating that two-thirds of these ex-bureaucrat ministers had 
risen to the rarefied rank of bureau chief or above at the time they parted 
ways with their ministries.
The bureaucracy consolidated its dominance over the executive branch 
in the scrum to replace Kishi as prime minister. In June 1960, when Kishi 
publicly announced his intention to resign, Ōno Banboku, Ishii Mitsujirō, 
and Ikeda Hayato became the main candidates to replace him. Ōno and 
Ishii were career politicians, as were most of their factional followers. Ikeda, 
on the other hand, was the quintessential “Yoshida School” alumnus, and 
many ex-bureaucrats were numbered among his followers. After enduring 
Kishi’s steamroller style of leadership (discussed below), the career poli-
ticians were eager to take the helm. As the date for the presidential elec-
tion drew near, Ōno was confident that he could count on the support of 
170 LDP MPs, but he needed the support of other factions to assemble 
the 256 votes required for a majority. On the eve of the election, rumors 
began circulating that Ishii’s supporters and members of other factions 
were being wooed away by a “last-ditch strategy” conjured up by Kishi to 
ensure Ikeda’s victory (Thayer 1969, 171). Ōno reluctantly ordered his fol-
lowers to vote for Ishii, but Ikeda—backed by the “bureaucratic” Kishi and 
Satō factions—prevailed in a 302 to 194 vote (with five invalid ballots). 
After the election, Ōno cryptically observed, “Arrows broken, ammunition 
spent, the battle ended in a defeat for the party politicians. Simply stated, 
the reason we lost is that we ran out of money” (quoted in ibid., 173). It is 
unclear whether or not “M-Fund” monies—a secret fund of money named 
for General William F. Marquat, one of MacArthur’s inner circle of advis-
ers—funneled from the CIA to Kishi played a role in this triumph (John-
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son 1995a; Schaller 1995). Ikeda’s victory—which was followed by Sato’s 
extended premiership—deepened the rift between the LDP’s rival camps 
of ex-bureaucrats and career politicians.
Some ex-bureaucrats went on to become “muscle man ministers” who 
were able to shape policy (Thayer 1969, 203). For example, Finance Min-
ister Ikeda Hayato was able to remove fiscally conservative officials at the 
ministry who opposed his high-speed growth policies (Johnson 1982, 53). 
Of course, ex-bureaucrats such as Ikeda had an advantage because they 
had firsthand knowledge of the inner workings and subject matter of their 
ministries. Yet, a few career politicians were able to dominate the irremov-
able career bureaucrats. For example, future prime minister Tanaka Kakuei 
was able to win the allegiance of bureaucrats with his impressive memory 
for details (including, as legend has it, the birthdays of all upper officials in 
the ministry) and his penchant for generous gift-giving (Johnson 1986b, 
11). For the most part, though, political meddling in the internal affairs of 
the ministries produced little or no enduring change.5
The Challenges of High-Speed Growth
The corporatist cabinets faced an array of domestic and international chal-
lenges. Conservative leaders such as Hatoyama and Kishi felt compelled 
to rectify the unequal and demeaning Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty 
and to establish a more independent foreign policy by restoring relations 
with the Soviet Union. Domestically, these cabinets faced mounting pub-
lic opposition to the large U.S. military presence on the mainland, pro-
tests against the Vietnam War, and a rising chorus of demands to secure 
the return of Okinawa. As they presided over an economic “miracle” that 
ushered Japan into the ranks of the world’s most advanced countries, these 
executive leaders were forced to deal with the negative byproducts of 
high-speed growth that created trade friction and badly degraded air and 
waterways.
Steamrolling Revision
The rival camps in the “1955 system” were at odds over the Japan-U.S. 
Mutual Security Treaty (Nichibei anzen hoshō jōyaku, or Anpo), which had 
been agreed to by the Yoshida government in September 1951. Progres-
sives opposed the Anpo because it allowed the United States to station its 
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military forces on Japanese soil and to deploy those forces without hav-
ing to receive approval from Tokyo. They feared that this could embroil 
the country in Cold War tensions of America’s making, and they opposed 
the presumed existence of U.S. nuclear weapons at military bases in Japan. 
Meanwhile, the LDP and conservative elements believed that the Anpo 
perpetuated Japan’s security dependence on the United States. While pro-
gressives advocated abrogation of the security treaty, the LDP and its allies 
tended to favor a revised treaty that was more equitable and gave Japan 
greater autonomy in providing for its own defense.
The revision of the Anpo became the Kishi cabinet’s primary mission. 
Kishi was aware that any attempt to revise the treaty would provoke contro-
versy, but he vowed to “brush such opposition aside and complete the task 
even if it meant putting his [political] life on the line” (quoted in Masumi 
1985, 27). On September 11, 1958, Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichirō 
and U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles issued a joint communiqué 
pledging to revise the security treaty, and formal talks began the follow-
ing month. Predictably, the opposition condemned the talks, but some ele-
ments within the LDP also took a dim view of treaty revision. With a party 
presidential election set for late January 1959, Kishi wished to avoid divi-
sion within the ruling party. While Fujiyama and Dulles were in Washing-
ton hammering out the language of their communiqué, the Kishi cabinet 
sponsored a bill to modify the Police Duties Law to enhance the govern-
ment’s powers to curb mass demonstrations (Shiratori 1981, 208). Kishi 
viewed this as essential to maintaining public order in the chaos likely to 
be unleashed when the Diet took up treaty revision. Pacifists, socialists, 
and student groups wanted to reaffirm the Constitution’s “no war” clause to 
rid Japan of American military bases. They viewed Kishi’s obsession with 
treaty revision—which kept U.S. forces in Japan and strengthened the hand 
of Japanese militarists—as the worst of all worlds. Eventually the bill to 
modify the Police Duties Law evoked so much controversy that the Kishi 
cabinet allowed it to be shelved, but not before intraparty faction bosses 
Miki Takeo, Ikeda Hayato, and Nadao Hirokichi resigned their cabinet 
posts in protest. To hang on to the party presidency, Kishi had to make 
a secret pact with other faction bosses to resign as LDP president once a 
revised Anpo was enacted (Masumi 1985, 29; Kensei shiryō hensankai, ed. 
1978, 42).
Despite an expansion of mass protests, Kishi and his cabinet pressed 
ahead with ratification. Anti-revision protests exploded in the spring of 
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1959, and a November 27 demonstration saw two hundred thousand pro-
testors surround the Diet Building. On January 7, 1960, one day after 
bilateral talks produced an agreement, Kishi, Foreign Minister Fujiyama, 
and LDP Executive Council Chair Ishii Mitsujirō flew to Washington to 
sign the revised treaty, which they did on January 19. The Soviet Union 
responded by declaring that none of the islands in the disputed Northern 
Territories would be returned as long as American troops remained on 
Japanese soil. The treaty was submitted to the Diet for deliberation and 
ratification. Out in the streets, demonstrations continued, and in April a 
major clash occurred between police and members of Zengakuren, the rad-
ical All-Japan Federation of Students’ Self-Governing Associations (Nihon 
Gakusei Jichikai Sō Rengō). On May 19, the Kishi government’s decision 
to use the LDP’s lower house majority to force an extension of the Diet ses-
sion led JSP MPs to organize a sit-in to block House Speaker Kiyose Ichirō 
from entering the chamber. Kiyose called in the police, who proceeded to 
forcibly remove JSP MPs from the Diet corridor. Shortly after midnight, 
with JSP and Democratic Socialist Party lawmakers absent, Kiyose called a 
snap vote that resulted in lower house approval of the revised treaty.
Popular protests continued despite the fact that the Kishi government’s 
steamroller tactics (kyōkō saiketsu) ensured the revised treaty’s automatic 
ratification. Petitions were gathered, labor strikes were called, and protes-
tors swarmed around the Diet Building on a daily basis. On June 11, a U.S. 
Marine helicopter had to be sent to rescue White House Press Secretary 
James Haggerty from several thousand protestors who surrounded the car 
in which he was riding. Haggerty had been sent to Tokyo to make final 
arrangements for President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s planned visit, which, 
as it turned out, never took place. Four days later, a university coed was 
killed and hundreds were injured in a clash between students and police 
at a demonstration organized by Zengakuren, and large-scale demonstra-
tions, complete with snake-dancing, continued in front of the Diet Build-
ing and in the streets of Tokyo (Packard 1966, 296). Nevertheless, the 
revised treaty was automatically ratified on June 19 and went into force on 
June 23, the same day the Kishi cabinet announced its intention to resign. 
On July 14, Kishi was stabbed by a member of a right-wing group who was 
incensed at his decision to endorse Ikeda Hayato, reputed to be a moder-
ate, as his successor as LDP president. Although Kishi survived the attack, 
his progressive rival, JSP Chairman Asanuma Inejirō, was stabbed to death 
while delivering a speech on October 12.
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Embracing Environmentalism
The success of Japan’s high-speed growth policies legitimized a “business 
first” strategy that allowed companies to reap huge profits with little or no 
concern for the effects of the pollutants their factories dumped into the 
environment. By the mid-1960s, Japan’s polluted air and waterways had 
become infamous. The willful disregard for the environment was symbol-
ized in the “four great pollution diseases” (yon-dai kōgyō byō): Minamata 
disease, Itai-itai disease, Niigata Minamata disease, and Yokkaichi asthma. 
Yet policy-makers refused to acknowledge scientific evidence linking 
human deaths and disease to decades of unrestrained pollution. Further-
more, the government turned a blind eye when the polluters hired thugs to 
intimidate victims and physicians who initiated legal action.
An environmental protection movement emerged in the mid-1960s 
and coalesced around victims of pollution-related diseases and denizens 
of heavily industrialized urban areas (Reich 1984, 390). Buoyed by court 
rulings in favor of victims of the pollution-related diseases, several thou-
sand citizens’ groups sprouted up (McKean 1981, 17, 20; Mason 1999, 
189). The Socialist, Japan Communist, and newly formed Clean Govern-
ment (Kōmei) parties seized the opportunity to champion the environ-
mental protection cause. Eventually, the anti-pollution movement became 
the dominant issue on the political agenda, making it impossible for the 
ruling LDP to go on with business as usual.
In contrast to the Kishi cabinet’s steamroller approach to treaty revi-
sion, the Satō cabinet nimbly executed an about-face and embraced envi-
ronmental protection. In 1967, the Basic Law on Environmental Pollution 
Control (which included a clause stating that the government would pur-
sue pollution control as long as it was “in harmony with” the overall health 
of the economy) was enacted; two years later, the Diet passed a law to com-
pensate the victims of pollution-related damage (Reich 1984, 383; McKean 
1981, 21; Rosenbluth and Thies 1999, 11). The greatest burst of legislative 
action occurred in the “Pollution Diet” (kōgai kokkai) of 1970, in which the 
Satō cabinet orchestrated passage of fourteen bills related to environmental 
protection. In 1971, the Satō cabinet established a cabinet-level Environ-
ment Agency (Kankyochō) and charged it with producing monthly bulle-
tins and an annual white paper on pollution (Reich 1984, 383–384). As a 
result, Japan came to possess “one of the most complete statutory frame-
works for environmental policy in the world,” transforming itself from 
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environmental laggard to environmental leader almost overnight (ibid., 
384). In so doing, the LDP-dominated Satō cabinet successfully under-
mined efforts to tie the plethora of citizens’ groups into a unified national 
movement (Mason 1999, 189).
Selling Thread to Buy Rope
Securing the return of Okinawa became the Satō government’s diplo-
matic magnum opus, but it extracted a high price. It is said that Satō 
“sold thread to buy rope” (ito o utte nawa o kau) at his 1969 summit 
with U.S. president Richard M. Nixon, which means that the Japanese 
prime minister was forced to accept voluntary restraints on Japanese tex-
tile exports (the character “ito” means thread in Japanese) to obtain the 
return of Okinawa (the character “nawa” means rope) (Funabashi 1999, 
132). While there would seem to be no connection between the return of 
Okinawa and textile exports, circumstances dictated that the two issues 
would be linked.
By the early 1950s, Japanese exports to the United States had become a 
source of contention. While Washington’s official position was that a pros-
perous Japan was important in containing the Communist menace, it did 
not take long for American producers to feel threatened by products car-
rying the “Made in Japan” label. In 1951, the American tuna industry’s 
complaints about unfair competition led the Japanese side to propose and 
implement temporary restraints on exports (McClenahan 1991, 181). Yet 
an economic boom stimulated by American procurements for the Korean 
War led to an increase in Japanese exports to U.S. markets. Japan’s tex-
tile producers made some of the biggest gains, even though their products 
never captured more than 2 percent of the U.S. textile market (Mettler 2010, 
217). American producers pointed with disdain to the Japanese-made “one 
dollar blouses” that were selling in U.S. department stores (ibid., 214). In 
December 1955, the Japanese side agreed to a one-year voluntary limit on 
exports of velveteens, cotton fabrics, and blouses. This did not appease the 
textile-producing states of Alabama, South Carolina, and Georgia, which 
enacted laws requiring businesses to display signs stating that they sold 
Japanese merchandise (ibid., 214–215; McClenahan 1991, 183). On Jan-
uary 16, 1957, Tokyo agreed to a five-year voluntary export restraint of 
cotton textile exports (McClenahan 1991, 183). Not surprisingly, this and 
subsequent concessions were deeply resented by Japan’s textile manufac-
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turers and their bureaucratic and political champions (Watanabe 1981b, 
188; Johnson 1982, 249–252).
The textile issue continued to fester, leading presidential candidate 
Richard M. Nixon to promise textile producers in the southern states that, 
if elected in 1968, he would restrict imports of Japanese synthetic textiles. 
Shortly after becoming president, Nixon made it clear to National Secu-
rity Adviser Henry Kissinger that he intended to keep his word (Kissinger 
1979, 330). Meanwhile, Satō was keen to ensure that American displea-
sure over Japanese textile imports did not sidetrack efforts to secure the 
return of Okinawa, which was his government’s top priority. Satō dis-
patched university professor Wakaizumi Kei to Washington to act as his 
secret emissary. Satō’s decision to pursue back-channel diplomacy was 
motivated by his distrust of Foreign Minister Miki Takeo, a fellow faction 
leader and rival for the LDP presidency, and the justifiable assumption that 
MITI would torpedo any proposal to restrain textile exports. Kissinger 
and Wakaizumi—who referred to each other as “Mr. Jones” and “Mr. 
Yoshida” to maintain secrecy—began meeting in September 1969 (Wakai-
zumi 2002, 112). Wakaizumi signaled that his “friend” (Satō) was willing to 
accept comprehensive export limits on Japanese textiles in exchange for the 
return of Okinawa, with U.S. nuclear weapons removed. Kissinger relayed 
that his “friend” (Nixon) was amenable, but had some concerns regarding 
the nuclear weapons issue. Eventually, Kissinger and Wakaizumi agreed 
that the nuclear issue could be finessed by invoking language in the U.S.-
Japan Mutual Security Treaty that called for prior consultation in emergen-
cies. This allowed the Satō government to maintain its anti-nuclear stance, 
while the U.S. side could claim the right to use nuclear weapons in Oki-
nawa even in advance of an emergency (Kissinger 1979, 334–335).
This back-channel deal nearly fell apart on the evening of Satō’s arrival 
in Washington for his summit with Nixon. On November 17, Wakaizumi 
informed Kissinger that Satō was having second thoughts concerning an 
agreed-upon formula for comprehensive limits on textile exports (Kis-
singer 1979, 333; Watanabe 1981b, 190–191). Wakaizumi agreed to ask 
Satō to “sleep on it,” and the next day the Japanese prime minister agreed to 
the planned scenario. However, Satō requested that the Okinawa commu-
niqué contain no mention of the textile issue, thus revealing his justifiable 
fear that MITI and industry interests would vilify him for selling thread to 
buy rope. Satō wanted the textile deal to emerge seemingly out of the blue 
at separate bilateral talks going on in Geneva. Nixon and Kissinger were 
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amenable, and the joint statement issued on November 21 contained no 
mention of the secret textile accord.
After their formal talks had concluded, Satō, Nixon, and Kissinger met 
privately. Nixon explained that the “nuclear-free” aspect of the Okinawa 
accord had been a tough sell for the American side and that, in return, he 
expected Satō to keep his part of the bargain by restraining Japanese tex-
tile exports (Schaller 1996, 219). The two heads of state shook hands, and 
Nixon walked away believing that Satō was a man of his word. Satō later 
claimed that he had not promised to curb textile exports, but had merely 
agreed to do his best to honor Nixon’s request (Destler et al. 1979, 134–
135; Watanabe 1981b, 191–192). Kissinger later conceded that Satō did not 
actually use the term “comprehensive” with regard to export limits, but 
claimed that Wakaizumi assured him on two occasions that Satō would 
honor his word (Kissinger 1979, 336–337; Wakaizumi 2002, 318). What-
ever the case, the flow of Japanese textile exports continued unabated, and, 
in the minds of Nixon and Kissinger, textiles and Okinawa had become 
inextricably linked.
Tug of War over Okinawa
The United States had exercised military governance over the Ryūkyū 
Islands, including Okinawa, since June of 1945, although the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty designated them as United Nations Trust Territories. The U.S. 
military bases on Okinawa were viewed by the U.S. side as vital in sup-
porting American forces fighting in Vietnam. At the same time, Okinawa 
was symbolically important to the Japanese, who viewed the restoration 
of sovereignty over this “homeland” territory and the Northern Territo-
ries as unresolved issues left over from the Pacific War. In fact, every post-
war Japanese prime minister had made efforts to secure the reversion of 
sovereignty.
In January 1965, during his initial visit to Washington as Japan’s prime 
minister, Satō broached the issue of the return of Okinawa. The Ameri-
cans gave no response, although in a joint declaration Satō and President 
Lyndon B. Johnson reaffirmed Okinawa’s importance for regional secu-
rity. During an August visit to Okinawa, Satō famously declared that “the 
postwar era will not end until the return of Okinawa to the homeland is 
realized” (Okinawa no fukki naku shite Nippon no sengo wa owaranai) 
(Sarantakes 2000, 137). Satō tasked Cabinet Minister Mori Kiyoshi, direc-
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tor general of the Prime Minister’s Office, with examining the Okinawa 
problem. Mori proposed an approach whereby Japan would negotiate for 
the reversion of control over Okinawa’s functional administrative domains 
one at a time, beginning with education (ibid, 140; Watanabe 1981a, 167). 
Satō rejected Mori’s approach and in August 1967 established the Okinawa 
Problems Council (Okinawa mondai tō kondankai) under the chairman-
ship of Kusumi Tadao, a former Imperial Navy officer and a military affairs 
commentator (Sarantakes 2000, 169). Satō’s decision to create this extra-
cabinet council was motivated, at least in part, by a distrust of Foreign 
Minister Miki, who was preparing to challenge him in the upcoming LDP 
presidential election.
Negotiations continued through 1967 and into 1968. On December 16, 
Satō and Johnson issued a joint declaration in Washington affirming that a 
decision concerning Okinawa’s return would be made within three years. 
Meanwhile, back in Tokyo, LDP faction bosses Miki and Maeo Shigesaburō 
were gearing up for the party’s presidential election by criticizing Satō’s 
vague stance concerning the presumed existence of U.S. nuclear weap-
ons on Okinawa (Watanabe 1981a, 169). At a December 11 meeting of 
the lower house budget committee, Satō deftly defanged his intraparty foes 
by declaring that “my responsibility is to achieve and maintain safety in 
Japan under the Three Non-Nuclear Principles [hikaku san-gensoku] of not 
possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear 
weapons, in line with Japan’s Peace Constitution” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 1967). On November 27, 1968, Satō easily won a third term as the 
LDP president. Afterward, U.S. diplomat Richard L. Sneider returned from 
visiting Japan and Okinawa to report to Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian Affairs William Bundy that Satō “has put into office a cabinet, which 
is by far the ablest and most understanding of the vitals of U.S.-Japan rela-
tions,” yet “by publicly committing his regime to solution of the Okinawa 
problem, he has given his rivals within the party and his foes outside the 
party a major test of success” (“Memorandum, Sneider to Bundy” 1968).
On March 3, 1969, Kusumi’s Okinawa Problems Council recom-
mended that a bilateral decision on Okinawa’s return be agreed to by year’s 
end, with reversion taking place no later than 1972 (Watanabe 1981a, 
169). Two days later, at a meeting of the upper house Budget Commit-
tee, Satō affirmed that Okinawa must be returned all at once and with the 
understanding that this would be accompanied by the removal of nuclear 
weapons and a reduced American military presence (ibid., 170). At the 
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November 21 summit, Satō and Nixon agreed to proceed “with a view 
to accomplishing the reversion during 1972” and agreed that it would be 
carried out in a manner consistent with “the particular sentiment of the 
Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese 
Government reflecting such sentiment” (Joint Statement 1969). Satō and 
the LDP were rewarded with a landslide victory in December’s lower house 
elections, and on March 31 the Satō cabinet agreed on basic policy mea-
sures for the return of Okinawa (Okinawa fukki taisaku no kihon hōshin). 
Japan assumed sovereignty over Okinawa on May 15, 1972.
Yet even as Satō and his associates were toasting the Okinawa accord, 
the seemingly insignificant textile dispute threatened to incite trade war. In 
March 1971, the Japan Textile Federation (Nihon sen’i sangyō renmei) pro-
posed a plan to voluntarily limit textile exports to the United States. This 
came as a result of talks with Wilbur Mills, chairman of the U.S. House 
Ways and Means Committee and a leader in the Democratic Party (Time 
Magazine, March 29, 1971; Meyer interview 1996). Nixon was nonplussed 
at the thought that Mills would claim credit for bringing the Japanese to 
heel. With an election approaching, Nixon was eager to retain the backing 
of textile producers, who followed suit by claiming that the Mills-brokered 
proposal was overly generous to Japanese interests (Schaller 1996, 216).
On July 5, Satō reshuffled his cabinet and made the strategic decision 
to appoint Tanaka Kakuei as minister of international trade and indus-
try. In so doing, Satō removed MITI minister Miyazawa Kiichi, a former 
Finance Ministry bureaucrat, who refused to accept comprehensive limits 
on Japanese textile exports (Kikuchi interview 1996). Tanaka was a rising 
star in the political world, with a reputation for getting results through 
sometimes ethically dubious means. Before Tanaka could tackle the textile 
problem, however, shock waves began emanating from the White House.
The Nixon “shocks” were a punch in the gut for the Satō government. 
On July 15, with little advance warning to Tokyo, Nixon announced plans 
to visit the People’s Republic of China. This was viewed as an insult to Satō 
and the Japanese, who had loyally followed the American lead in recog-
nizing the Republic of China on Taiwan as opposed to the Beijing govern-
ment. In August, a second “Nixon shock” was administered in the form of 
the unilateral declaration that the dollar would no longer be convertible 
into gold and that a 10 percent surcharge would be imposed on all exist-
ing U.S. tariffs, a move that was seen as aimed at Japanese imports. Then, 
in September, Ambassador at Large David M. Kennedy delivered what was 
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viewed as an “ultimatum” (saigo tsūchō) by setting a deadline of October 15 
to reach an agreement on the textile issue (Ishii 2009, 443). With Ameri-
can officials threatening to invoke the “Trading with the Enemy Act,” the 
Japanese side agreed to a three-year comprehensive limit on textile exports 
(Destler 1976, 44–45). In his trademark manner, Tanaka sealed the deal 
by arranging for a ¥200 billion payment to Japanese textile producers as 
compensation for the restrictions they were forced to bear (Johnson 1986b, 
9; Kikuchi interview 1996). At the end of the day, Tanaka’s deal gave the 
Americans the comprehensive export limitations they had insisted on all 
along.
Findings
Between 1955 and 1972, corporatist cabinets sponsored the high-speed 
growth policies that gave birth to the “Japanese miracle” that became a 
source of pride for a nation not long removed from the sackcloth and ashes 
of defeat. This economic juggernaut, known to the world as “Japan, Inc.,” 
was buoyed by a strong pro-growth consensus and legitimized by the suc-
cess of the export-oriented, high-speed growth policies. Although the ini-
tial change agents were opportunistic party leaders, most of whom were 
“career politicians,” the corporatist cabinets had a strong bureaucratic 
coloration. Indeed, three of the era’s prime ministers were former high-
ranking government officials, and ex-bureaucrats held a large share of min-
isterial posts. Although most of the key policy initiatives emerged from 
government ministries and agencies, the corporatist cabinets dutifully sub-
mitted government-sponsored bills that were rubber-stamped by the LDP-
dominated Diet. In fact, the LDP was able to require that it preapprove 
all major policy and budgetary proposals before they could be submitted 
for Diet deliberation. As long as the economy grew and the budgetary pie 
expanded, the LDP and its leaders were content to claim credit for policy 
initiatives that emerged from the government ministries. LDP candidates 
were able to shower their supporters with patronage, especially in the form 
of public works projects and subsidies (Scheiner 2006, 2). In addition, the 
party’s stranglehold over ministerial portfolios had the effect of creating 
a ministerial elite whose background characteristics mirrored those of its 
senior MPs. The combination of an activist bureaucracy and a perpetually 
ruling party ensured that cabinet government did not take root.
The corporatist cabinets responded with alacrity to some challenges 
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and in a ham-handed manner to others. For example, Satō’s duplicity in 
the textile dispute was the result of his failure to consult with the domes-
tic government bureaucrats and industry groups whose compliance was 
necessary (Johnson 1982, 285). In the words of Armin Meyer, U.S. ambas-
sador to Japan, “they’re all sovereign bureaucracies and the Prime Minis-
ter cannot overrule them” (Meyer interview 1996). At the same time, Satō 
wanted to avoid distractions that might sidetrack the Okinawa talks, so 
he handed the international trade portfolio to someone he knew would 
buy off the domestic manufacturers. Satō ensured the return of Okinawa 
through back-channel diplomacy and the use of an extracabinet council. 
Meanwhile, Kishi and his ministers were determined to obtain treaty revi-
sion no matter what the cost, even if it meant steamrolling ratification. In 
the end, Kishi got a revised treaty, but at the cost of his government and 
an attempt on his life. Finally, the Satō cabinet deftly reversed course and 
embraced environmental protection by sponsoring a raft of laws and by 
creating a cabinet-level Environment Agency. This helped to ensure that 
the environmental movement did not coalesce into mass protest, as had 
been the case with the treaty revision crisis.
On June 7, 1972, Prime Minister Satō announced his resignation in a 
televised press conference from which all members of the press had been 
expelled. The scene of Satō, an elite ex-bureaucrat with little patience for 
impertinent reporters, speaking to the nation from a room filled with 
empty chairs symbolized the end of the era of corporatist cabinets. Satō’s 
replacement, Tanaka Kakuei, the quintessential career politician, per-
ceived the utility of the mass media and, more importantly, understood 
that political power was enhanced by expanding the number of one’s fol-
lowers and placing them in positions of influence in a range of important 
policy domains. The Nixon and oil “shocks” helped topple the Satō govern-
ment and brought down the curtain on the era of high-speed economic 
growth with its constantly expanding budgetary pie. This ushered in the 
era of confederate cabinets and a fragmented policy-making environment 
dominated by “policy tribes.”
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Confederate Cabinets and the 
Demise of the “1955 System,” 
1972–1993
British government is essentially “ministerial government,” although 
this is counter-balanced by a Cabinet whose collegiate ethos is stronger 
than in most countries.
—Simon James, British Cabinet Government, 2nd ed. (2002), 12
Those legislators who wield influence in particular policy areas, the zoku 
politicians, are treated as lawmakers representing the various ministries 
and agencies. . . . Rather than going through the cabinet minister and 
the official chain of command, bureaucrats brief the ruling party’s zoku 
politicians on a daily basis.
—Iio Jun, Nihon tōchi no Kōzō: Kanryō naikakusei kara giin  
naikakusei e [Japan’s Structure of Governance: From Bureaucratic 
 to Parliamentary Cabinet System] (2007), 6.
Low Unseat the High
On July 7, 1972, at fifty-four years of age, Tanaka Kakuei became the 
youngest prime minister in the postwar era. His rise from humble origins 
to the pinnacle of the political executive conjured up images of a latter-
day Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–1598), the peasant-turned-warlord who 
helped to establish a system of centralized governance that brought an end 
to the Warring States (sengoku jidai—1476–1615) period. Tanaka was pro-
claimed the “commoner premier” (shōmin saishō) because he displayed a 
populist style, liked to sing naniwabushi (traditional Japanese narrative 
songs), and lacked the elitist educational pedigree of his predecessors. He 
established a cabinet of “party men” (tōjin ha) dedicated to “the politics of 
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decision and action” (ketsudan to jikkō no seiji) (Watanabe, ed. 1995, 210; 
Kensei shiryō hensankai, ed. 1978, 45). He assumed the premiership with 
a promise to visit the People’s Republic of China, and fulfilled that promise 
just two months after taking office. He further stoked the public’s imagina-
tion with a grandiose plan to “remodel” the Japanese archipelago through 
a bonanza of expressways, bullet train lines, and island-linking bridges. 
Tanaka’s decision to dissolve the Diet and call new elections in December 
1972 left the Liberal Democratic Party in control of a solid majority of seats 
in the Diet’s lower house. The party’s hegemonic control of the Diet seemed 
ensured with a dynamic, young, and popular party president sitting in the 
prime minister’s chair.
Contrast this with the scene on August 9, 1993, when septuagenarian 
Miyazawa Kiichi was forced to turn over the premiership to Hosokawa 
Morihiro, a young former prefectural governor and the first non-LDP 
prime minister in nearly four decades. Miyazawa, an ex-Finance Minis-
try bureaucrat, had assumed leadership of the LDP in the midst of several 
high-profile scandals. His predecessor had gambled and lost in staking the 
future of his government on the passage of a package of bills to reform 
campaign finance and the system for electing lower house MPs. The reform 
bill proposed by the Miyazawa cabinet was torpedoed by the LDP’s top 
leaders, resulting in plummeting public approval ratings for the cabinet 
and the secession of several party leaders and their followers. On June 18, 
an opposition-sponsored no-confidence vote against the Miyazawa cabinet 
had been approved as a result of the supporting votes cast by these disaf-
fected former LDP MPs. The LDP emerged from the lower house election 
that followed in control of only 44 percent of the seats, paving the way for 
a non-LDP coalition government under the Hosokawa cabinet. With this, 
the curtain came down on nearly four decades of uninterrupted LDP pre-
dominance, bringing with it the demise of the “1955 system.”
In this chapter, I explore the evolution of the cabinet system through 
the last days of the “1955 system.” This was an era of “confederate cabinets,” 
in which an already blurry distinction between ruling party and cabinet 
became even blurrier, and a succession of corruption scandals intensified 
demands for political reform. Measures were taken to enhance the prime 
minister’s leadership powers, and yet these efforts failed to establish top-
down executive leadership. At the same time, prime ministers and their 
cabinets struggled to provide coherent leadership in a context in which 
subgovernments dominated policy-making. Meanwhile, cabinets con-
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fronted an array of challenges that included reducing government debt in 
a slow-growth economy and responding to popular demands to reform a 
structurally corrupt political order. The story begins with the premiers and 
ministers who occupied center stage in the political drama that unfolded 
during the eventful 1970s and 1980s.
The Emergence of Confederate Cabinets
Tanaka’s triumphal rise signaled the advent of an age of confederate cab-
inets. The “Nixon shocks” dictated the demise of the fixed yen-dollar 
exchange rate and produced an unexpected thawing of relations between 
Washington and Beijing, while the “oil shocks” of 1973 and 1979 led to 
higher energy costs and the end of high-speed economic growth. This 
spelled the end to a constantly expanding economic pie and created fis-
sures in the pro-growth consensus among government and business lead-
ers. Influential lawmakers known as policy tribalists (zoku giin) assumed 
a leading role in the fief-like policy subgovernments that characterized a 
fragmented policy-making environment and exacerbated the difficulties 
faced by prime ministers and cabinets in pursuing their policy agendas. In 
contrast to the dramatic reconfigurations that followed the Meiji Restora-
tion and the American occupation, institutional changes taken under the 
confederate cabinets were more akin to tectonic plate shifts. Ministerial 
portfolios came to be almost monopolized by career politicians who had 
ascended the LDP’s promotional ladder and achieved the requisite level 
of seniority. In other words, the most coveted portfolios were no longer 
reserved for the likes of Kishi Nobusuke, Ikeda Hayato, and Satō Eisaku, 
who descended from the most senior posts in their respective ministries 
into second careers in elective politics. Predictably, the ascendency of the 
career politician was accompanied by increasing demands for pork bar-
rel spending, a burgeoning black market for political funds, and structural 
corruption that afflicted the entire body politic, producing a succession 
of corruption scandals that ultimately drove the LDP into the opposition 
pews (Woodall 2014).
Four factors combined to create conditions for the expanded influence 
of the LDP and its tribal politicians. One consequence of the slowed rate 
of economic growth that followed the 1973 oil shock (discussed below) 
was intensified competition among government ministries for a share of 
a government budget that was no longer expanding rapidly. The policy 
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tribalists were called on to champion the positions of the various minis-
tries in slicing up a static budgetary pie. In addition, changes in technology 
blurred distinctions among policy domains. For example, the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Posts and Telecom-
munications—which, respectively, controlled the computer industry and 
electronic communications—fought sectionalist turf wars backed by trib-
alist champions to decide which would control telecommunications policy 
(Johnson 1986a). Third, the LDP’s seemingly eternal parliamentary mas-
tery—coupled with a well-established seniority system and an expansive 
system of policy-specific party committees and subcommittees—enabled 
ambitious MPs to specialize in particular policy areas. The expertise they 
acquired allowed them to more effectively monitor the career bureaucrats 
in the ministries. Finally, the LDP’s factions continued to determine who 
occupied which ministerial post and for how long, with particular factions 
gaining disproportionate expertise in specific policy areas.1 The downside 
of this was that, as the policy tribes developed their own strong ties to spe-
cial interests and government bureaucrats, it became increasingly difficult 
for government and central party leaders to control their actions. In this 
sense, the rise of the policy tribes reflected “overinstitutionalization” in the 
political system (Kesselman 1970, 23).
The Rise of the Career Politician
Between July 1973 and August 1993, twenty-five cabinets were organized 
under ten different prime ministers, and a total of 307 individuals held 
portfolios. The longest-lived of the confederate cabinets was the Miki cabi-
net, which held on for twenty-one months, while the most fleeting was the 
Reorganized second Tanaka cabinet, which collapsed after only twenty-
eight days. This period witnessed an influx of career politicians into minis-
terial posts. The rise of once-marginalized MPs vis-à-vis traditionally elite 
bureaucrats can be likened to the phenomenon of “low unseating the high” 
(gekokujō), when vassals ousted their lords during the Warring States era 
that began in the fifteenth century (Conlan 2010).
The Prime Ministers
The majority of prime ministers were political careerists. Tanaka was the 
first career politician to hold the premiership since Ishibashi Tanzan more 
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than a decade and a half earlier. Miki Takeo, Suzuki Zenkō, Takeshita 
Noboru, Uno Sōsuke, and Kaifu Toshiki also approached national elective 
politics as a primary career. Although Nakasone Yasuhiro briefly labored 
as a Home Ministry bureaucrat, most of his professional life was spent as 
a lower house MP, so he, too, deserves to be numbered among the career 
politicians. Even the three retired government bureaucrats Fukuda Takeo, 
Ōhira Masayoshi, and Miyazawa were a breed apart from their predeces-
sors. In contrast to Kishi, Ikeda, and Satō—each of whom ascended to the 
pinnacle of the career civil service before embarking upon careers in elec-
tive politics—only Fukuda managed to gain promotion to a high-ranking 
bureaucratic post before running for election to the Diet. Kishi, Ikeda, and 
Satō held civil service positions for around two dozen years; the corre-
sponding figure for Fukuda, Ōhira, and Miyazawa was just sixteen years. 
As Ōhira came to realize, a bureaucratic career did not offer the sort of 
“extraordinary adventure in which a man might give full rein to his vitality 
as an individual” (Satō et al. 1990, 128, 131).
The trio of ex-bureaucrats emerged from the powerful Finance Min-
istry. Fukuda Takeo received the coveted “silver watch” (gin dokei) recog-
nizing the top graduate of Tokyo Imperial University’s Law Faculty and 
ascended to the post of director of the Budget Bureau, making him a 
likely candidate for the coveted administrative vice ministership (Calder 
1982, 3). However, his arrest on bribery charges (which were ultimately 
dropped) in the 1950 Shōwa Denkō scandal dictated an early depar-
ture from the civil service. Two years later, Fukuda was elected to a seat 
in the Diet’s lower house, and he went on to serve as finance minister in 
five cabinets. Ōhira Masayoshi graduated from Tokyo University of Com-
merce (present-day Hitotsubashi University) and was chief of the Public 
Works Section at the Economic Stabilization Headquarters when, in 1949, 
Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato handpicked him to serve as his secretary. It 
was then that Ōhira began contemplating an “extraordinary adventure” in 
elective politics, which he launched in the 1952 general election. By 1976, 
Ōhira had inherited the reins of the Ikeda faction and was a contender for 
the premiership, but he agreed to support Fukuda on the condition that 
his “senior” (senpai) from the Finance Ministry step aside after “one term 
of two years” (Satō et al. 1990, 375). Fukuda’s failure to do so resulted in 
a protracted feud between the rival faction bosses. Miyazawa Kiichi was 
born into a political family—his maternal grandfather held portfolios in 
two prewar cabinets and his father was a lower house MP—and graduated 
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from Tokyo Imperial University’s Law Faculty. In 1945, three years into 
his bureaucratic career, Miyazawa became one of Finance Minister Tsu-
shima Jūichi’s secretaries, the other being Ōhira. Miyazawa retired from 
the civil service in 1953 and was elected to an upper house seat, which he 
held until switching over to the lower house fourteen years later. Tanaka 
Kakuei famously referred to Miyazawa as an “English monger” (eigoya) in 
mockery of his impressive linguistic skills.
The seven remaining premiers were bona fide career politicians, hav-
ing been elected to an average of twelve parliamentary terms and having 
accumulated more than three decades of parliamentary service at the time 
they formed their first cabinets. With the exception of Tanaka (who never 
completed high school) and Suzuki (who received instruction at the Agri-
culture Ministry’s Fisheries Training Institute), all attended university. 
Nakasone graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, while Uno enrolled 
at the Kobe University of Commerce but failed to obtain a degree. Miki 
was a Meiji University alumnus who spent time studying at the University 
of Southern California, while Takeshita and Kaifu were Waseda Univer-
sity alumni who participated in the university’s Oratorical Society (Waseda 
daigaku yūbenkai), which has served as a sort of prep school for aspiring 
political figures.
Tanaka, Suzuki, and Nakasone were young MPs at the time of the 
LDP’s establishment, while Miki had earned the sobriquet of “Balkan 
Politician” (barukan seijika) for his frequent switches in party allegiance. 
Tanaka Kakuei employed the wealth he amassed in the construction 
business (augmented by wartime funds that remained in his posses-
sion for a never-to-be-completed project to relocate a piston ring factory 
to Korea) to launch a political career (Johnson 1986b, 5). After tasting 
defeat in 1946, he won a lower house seat the following year. Tanaka was 
arrested but not convicted in conjunction with the 1948 Coal National-
ization scandal and went on to become posts and telecommunications 
minister shortly after his thirty-ninth birthday. Miki Takeo was elected 
to the Diet in 1937 and was one of the relatively few successful candi-
dates who won seats in the 1942 general election without the endorse-
ment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. As communications 
minister in the JSP-led Katayama cabinet, Miki won kudos from the left 
for refusing to take part in the midnight snap vote called by the LDP to 
ratify the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 (Calder 1988, 196). Suzuki 
Zenkō was elected to the Diet in 1947 running as a Socialist, which was 
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logical given his background as a fisheries union leader. One year later 
he jumped to Yoshida Shigeru’s Democratic Liberal Party and, after the 
conservative merger, joined Ikeda Hayato’s faction. Nakasone Yasuhiro 
briefly held a post at the Home Ministry before becoming a junior officer 
in the Imperial Navy. He was elected to a lower house seat in 1947 and, 
later on, became a member of Kōno Ichirō’s faction. He earned fame for 
being one side of the “Ron-Yasu” relationship with U.S. president Ron-
ald Reagan, but evoked the ire of Japan’s East Asian neighbors for being 
the first prime minister to make an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, 
where Japan’s war dead, including fourteen “Class A” war criminals, are 
enshrined.
Takeshita, Uno, and Kaifu made their way to the Diet after first serv-
ing in local elective politics or as an MP’s staff assistant. A one-time 
middle school English teacher, Takeshita Noboru served two terms as a 
prefectural assemblyman before winning a lower house seat in 1958. He 
became a protégé of Satō Eisaku and later Tanaka Kakuei. He parted ways 
with the latter in 1985 to establish his own faction (Itasaka 1987, 75). 
Takeshita perceived the benefits of pork barrel politics—as witnessed in 
his quip that “politics is roads, roads is politics” (seiji izu dōro, dōro izu 
seiji)—and was forced to resign the premiership as a result of his implica-
tion in the Recruit scandal, which involved insider trading and influence 
peddling (discussed below). But Takeshita retained his Diet seat and con-
trol of a mighty faction, which enabled him to play the role of kingmaker. 
Uno Sōsuke, a lieutenant in the Nakasone faction rather than a faction 
boss in his own right, was an unexpected selection to replace Takeshita. 
After being repatriated in 1947 following two years’ detention in Siberia 
after the end of the Pacific War, Uno served as prefectural assemblyman 
and then as staff assistant to LDP faction leader Kōno Ichirō before gain-
ing election to the lower house in 1960. Uno resigned the premiership 
after only sixty-seven days in office when it came to light that he had had 
an extramarital affair with a geisha. She had gone public because of her 
dissatisfaction with the pittance Uno paid to ensure her silence. Kaifu 
Toshiki served an apprenticeship as an MP’s staff assistant in prepara-
tion for launching his own career in national elective politics. He was just 
twenty-nine years old at the time of his first election to the Diet in the 
1960 general elections. Kaifu’s appointment as prime minister was owed 
to the fact that he was one of the few rising leaders in the LDP not tainted 
by the Recruit scandal.
Table 4.1. The Confederate Cabinets, 1972 to 1993
Cabinet Prime Minister Established Dissolved PM’s Background
1st Tanaka (Kakuei) 
Cabinet Tanaka Kakuei 7/7/1972 12/22/1972 Career Politician
2nd Tanaka (Kakuei) 
Cabinet " 12/22/1972 11/25/1973 "
Reorg’ed 2nd Tanaka 
(Kakuei) (1) Cabinet " 11/25/1973 11/11/1974 "
Reorg’ed 2nd Tanaka 
(Kakuei) (2) Cabinet " 11/11/1974 12/9/1974 "
Miki Cabinet Miki Takeo 12/9/1974 9/15/1976 Career Politician
Reorg’ed Miki 
Cabinet " 9/15/1976 12/24/1976 "
Fukuda Cabinet Fukuda Takeo 12/24/1976 11/28/1977 Ex-Bureaucrat
Reorg’ed Fukuda 
Cabinet " 11/28/1977 12/7/1978 "
1st Ōhira Cabinet Ōhira Masayoshi 12/7/1978 11/9/1979 Ex-Bureaucrat
2nd Ōhira Cabinet " 11/9/1979 7/17/1980 "
Suzuki (Zenkō) 
Cabinet Suzuki Zenkō 7/17/1980 11/30/1981 Career Politician
Reorg’ed Suzuki 
(Zenkō) Cabinet " 11/30/1981 11/27/1982 "
1st Nakasone 
Cabinet Nakasone Yusuhiro 11/27/1982 12/27/1983 Career Politician
a
2nd Nakasone 
Cabinet " 12/27/1983 11/1/1984 "
Reorg’ed 2nd 
Nakasone (1) Cabinet " 11/1/1984 12/28/1985 "
Reorg’ed 2nd 
Nakasone (2) Cabinet " 12/28/1985 7/22/1986 "
3rd Nakasone 
Cabinet " 7/22/1986 11/6/1987 "
Takeshita Cabinet Takeshita Noboru 11/6/1987 12/27/1988 Career Politician
Reorg’ed Takeshita 
Cabinet " 12/27/1988 6/3/1989 "
Uno Cabinet Uno Sōsuke 6/3/1989 8/9/1989 Career Politician
1st Kaifu Cabinet Kaifu Toshiki 8/9/1989 2/29/1990 Career Politician
2nd Kaifu Cabinet " 2/29/1990 12/28/1990 "
Reorg’ed 2nd Kaifu 
Cabinet " 12/28/1990 11/5/1991 "
Miyazawa Cabinet Miyazawa Kiichi 11/5/1991 12/11/1992 Ex-Bureaucrat
Reorg’ed Miyazawa 
Cabinet " 12/11/1992 8/9/1993 "
a Nakasone briefly served as a Home Ministry bureaucrat before becoming a naval 
officer. 
Source: JCCM Database (Appendix A).
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Departmental Ministers
The modal minister in the confederate cabinets was a sixtyish male MP 
serving a seventh term in the lower house (or a third term in the upper 
house). He was almost certainly affiliated with the LDP, and probably rep-
resented an electoral district located outside the country’s most heavily 
urbanized areas. This modal minister was university educated, although, 
in contrast to earlier cohorts of ministers, it is much more likely that the 
diploma bore the name of an elite private university. There is better than 
a fifty-fifty chance our modal minister was a career politician, which, in 
most cases, meant that he gained experience as a local politician or as an 
MP’s staff assistant before assuming a seat in the Diet. Those ex-bureau-
crats given portfolios were more likely to have departed from the civil 
service at a junior rank than had been the case with previous ministerial 
cohorts. There is a better than one-in-three chance that our modal minister 
was a “hereditary politician,” meaning that he was the offspring, adopted 
child, grandchild, or sibling of an MP.
Ninety-nine percent of all ministers in the confederate cabinets were 
male MPs, and 86 percent held seats in the lower house. The average minis-
ter had been elected to 6.7 lower house terms and accumulated two decades 
of parliamentary service. This meant that he was nearly three years older 
and had almost five years more parliamentary experience than the aver-
age minister in the corporatist cabinets. Four out of five ministers repre-
sented districts located in regions outside the largest metropolitan areas. 
Only four out of the 655 ministerial portfolios went to MPs not affiliated 
with the LDP. And all four of those portfolios went to MPs from the New 
Liberal Club (Shin jiyū kurabu), which split from the LDP in 1976. These 
New Liberal Club MPs were given entrée to the ministerial elite because 
the LDP had won only 49 percent of the seats in the 1983 lower house elec-
tions and needed to forge a coalition to manage the Diet.
Because of the LDP’s unshakeable parliamentary majority, ministerial 
portfolios were reserved for party MPs. A novice MP could expect to be 
appointed to a supporting post in one of the party’s headquarters bureaus, 
while a second- or third-term MP could acquire policy expertise in leader-
ship positions in the Policy Affairs Research Council (Seimuchōsakai) or a 
Diet committee or subcommittee. A five-term MP was a ministerial candi-
date, while a seven- or eight-term MP was in line for a second portfolio or 
one of the top party leadership posts. An MP having even more parliamen-
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tary seniority would likely have become the boss or a senior lieutenant 
in one of the intraparty factions (Matsuzaki 1987, 22). Under the con-
federate cabinets, seniority violations became exceedingly rare. In fact, 
only 5 percent of ministers were selected for their posts before attaining 
the expected five-term norm (or two terms in the case of upper house 
MPs), as opposed to 20 percent of ministers in the corporatist cabinets. 
This suggests that a seniority system for recruiting cabinet ministers had 
become established.
Career politicians came to dominate the ministerial elite. Whereas ex-
bureaucrats accounted for nearly half of all ministers in the corporatist 
cabinets, they accounted for less than 30 percent of ministers in the con-
federate cabinets. Moreover, a smaller percentage of these ex-officials—56 
percent as opposed to 70 percent—had risen to a senior post before exit-
ing the career civil service. At the same time, there was a steep jump in 
the number of ministers who had served in local elective office or as staff 
assistants to an MP. Specifically, 54 percent of ministers had served in local 
office or as staffers, as opposed to only 26 percent of ministers in the corpo-
ratist cabinets. All together, more than half of all ministers fit the descrip-
tion of career politicians, as opposed to less than one-third of corporatist 
cabinet ministers.
Remodeling the Cabinet System
For the first time since Japan’s modern cabinet system was established 
in 1885, the number of ministerial portfolios decreased, from a high of 
twenty-eight portfolios under the corporatist cabinets to twenty-one. Also 
for the first time ever, the Westminster-style ministerial hierarchy emerged 
with the prime minister stationed at the top of the pecking order followed 
by the holders of the finance, foreign affairs, and international trade and 
industry portfolios (see Appendix C).
Tanaka’s plan to remodel the country with roads and bridges and rail-
way lines created the need for a government agency to oversee land use 
policy. The Headquarters for Comprehensive Land Development (Kokudo 
sōgō kaihatsu honbu) was organized under the cabinet in July 1973, and 
one year later the National Land Agency (Kokudochō) was established as 
a cabinet-level organ. The new agency absorbed various functions from 
the Economic Planning Agency as well as the Construction and Home 
Affairs Ministries and assumed the functions of the Capital, Kinki, and 
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Chūbu regional development headquarters. Its main purpose was to over-
see land use planning in the context of national and regional development 
and to coordinate the efforts of government agencies in developing water 
resources and guarding against natural disasters. The inaugural director 
was Nishimura Eiichi, a former Transport Ministry official, who, not sur-
prisingly, was a senior leader in the LDP’s Tanaka faction. Among the agen-
cy’s other directors were former Home Ministry bureaucrat Niwa Hyōsuke 
and Kanemaru Shin.
The Management and Coordination Agency (Sōmuchō, or MCA) was 
established on July 1, 1984, to implement the recommendations of the Sec-
ond Ad Hoc Commission on Administrative Reform (discussed below). 
The agency absorbed functions scraped together from other government 
organs, including the Prime Minister’s Office and the former Administra-
tive Management Agency (Gyōsei kanri chō, or AMA). The MCA portfo-
lio was given responsibility over the central government’s organizational 
structure, coordination of policies and programs falling within the juris-
dictions of multiple ministries or agencies, and the population census. 
Gotōda Masaharu, a former top official of the National Police Agency and 
a close confidant of former prime minister Tanaka Kakuei, was appointed 
as the MCA’s inaugural director.
In 1986, three policy offices were created within the Cabinet Secretar-
iat. The Office of Internal Affairs (Naisei shingi shitsu) was established under 
the directorship of a seconded official from the Finance Ministry, while a 
Foreign Ministry official supervised the Office of External Affairs (Gaisei 
shingi shitsu). Meanwhile, the Office of National Security Affairs (Anzen 
hoshō kaigi)—which, in 1998, changed its name to the Office of National 
Security Affairs and Crisis Management—was placed in the charge of a 
Defense Agency official (Shinoda 2005, 807; Hayao 1993, 168). Prime Min-
ister Nakasone was the driving force behind these reforms, described as 
“the most ambitious and enduring postwar effort to strengthen the role of 
the prime minister and cabinet in Japan’s national policy formulation and 
implementation processes” (Angel 1988–1989, 601).
Power Relations in the Executive Branch
Power relations in the executive branch became more complicated during 
the 1970s and 1980s. Strong-willed prime ministers, immovable govern-
ment bureaucrats, and influential policy tribalists (zoku giin) made claims 
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for executive primacy. Cabinets struggled to impart purposeful direction 
in executive decision-making in a fragmented policy-making landscape.
The Advent of Twisted Diets
In a “Twisted Diet” (nejire kokkai)—or “Reverse Diet” (gyakuten kokkai)—
the ruling party controls a majority of seats in the lower house but not in 
the upper house. This poses problems because, under Japan’s Constitution, 
legislation requires approval of both houses of the Diet, and a two-thirds 
vote in the lower house is required to override an upper house rejection of 
one of its bills. In the event that a two-thirds lower house majority cannot 
be mustered or the upper house fails to take action, a joint committee of 
both houses will be created to seek reconciliation. If the joint committee 
fails to reconcile and the upper house does not act within sixty days, the 
lower house bill will be rejected (Constitution of Japan, Article 59). This 
enables the upper house to undermine the efforts of government to exer-
cise policy leadership. In a Twisted Diet, the upper house can temporarily 
block passage of the government’s budget, although the lower house bill 
becomes the decision of the Diet after thirty days (Article 60). In addi-
tion, if the two houses cannot agree on the choice of a prime minister, the 
lower house designee automatically becomes the decision of the Diet after 
ten days (Article 67). When the Diet is twisted, therefore, the opposition-
controlled upper house is able to block the enactment of government bills 
and delay the passage of budgets and the appointment of prime ministers.
The 1989 upper house elections resulted in a somewhat Twisted Diet. 
Several factors accounted for the LDP’s poor showing, including the par-
ty’s sponsorship of an unpopular 3 percent consumption tax (enacted the 
previous December), opposition to the liberalization of agricultural mar-
kets, and fallout from the Recruit scandal. The knockout punch came in 
the form of Uno’s geisha scandal, and the elections that followed left the 
LDP in control of only 109 upper house seats, well shy of the 127 required 
to maintain a majority. Uno accepted responsibility for the election fiasco 
and resigned, and the LDP-dominated lower house selected Kaifu to be 
the next prime minister. The opposition-controlled upper house chose 
JSP chairperson Doi Takako as its candidate, and a joint committee failed 
to resolve the impasse. Ultimately, Kaifu became prime minister on the 
basis of the primacy of the lower house vote, but the opposition had taken 
advantage of the Twisted Diet to delay his installation.
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The opposition-controlled upper house in the Twisted Diet seldom 
missed a chance to torment the Kaifu cabinet. On March 26, 1990, the 
upper house rejected the government’s supplementary budget proposal, 
which had been approved by the lower house four days earlier. Once again 
a joint committee failed to reconcile the bicameral discord, and the lower 
house’s budget bill remained stalled for the requisite thirty days. Aside 
from the annoyance, the budget impasse resulted in delayed salary pay-
ments to more than 1 million national civil servants (Dolan and Worden, 
eds. 1994). Then, in December 1989, the upper house passed its own pro-
posal to repeal the unpopular consumption tax—which had gone into 
effect the previous April—and sent it on to the lower house. Although this 
effort predictably came to naught, it contributed to the hubbub that led to 
the “consumption tax dissolution” (shōhizei kaisan) on January 24, 1990. 
As a result of the February 11 lower house elections, the JSP realized a net 
gain of 51 seats (going from 85 to 136 seats), while the LDP suffered a net 
loss of 25 seats (from 300 seats to 275). This was merely a preview of things 
to come in the tightly Twisted Diets that afflicted the body politic after the 
2007 upper house election.
Prime Ministerial Government—Failure to Launch
Prime ministerial government is characterized by “a generalized ability [of 
the prime minister] to decide policy across all issue areas in which he or 
she takes an interest” and “by defining a governing ‘ethos,’ ‘atmosphere,’ 
or operating ideology which generates predictable and determinate solu-
tions to most policy problems” (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990, 5, 8). Of the 
ten premiers in the confederate cabinets, only two—Tanaka Kakuei and 
Nakasone Yasuhiro—displayed the sort of personal leadership that might 
be construed as prime ministerial government. In the early days of his 
administration, Tanaka enjoyed high levels of public support, and there 
was enthusiasm for his plan to remodel the Japanese archipelago. Tanaka’s 
ability to parlay his policy initiatives into reality was made possible by his 
mammoth intraparty faction, referred to as the “Tanaka General Hospital” 
(Tanaka sōgō byōin) because it included “specialists” in every policy area. 
Tanaka’s lavish gift-giving created numerous allies in the Diet and govern-
ment bureaucracy (Johnson 1986b, 11). His excellent memory for names 
and details, coupled with a forceful, straight-ahead leadership style, earned 
him the nickname “computerized bulldozer.”
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Nakasone entered office with a weak power base and had to rely on the 
support of the Tanaka faction to gain and retain the premiership. Yet Naka-
sone’s on-camera presence and close personal relationship with President 
Reagan helped make him appear “presidential.” His influence peaked with 
the LDP’s landslide victory in the 1986 “double elections,” which left the 
party in control of nearly 60 percent of lower house seats and 57 percent 
of upper house seats. This granted Nakasone the political capital needed to 
privatize several debt-ridden state-owned enterprises (discussed below). 
In this effort, Nakasone deftly used personal advisory bodies to neutralize 
resistance from the government bureaucracy, appointed pro-privatization 
presidents of the new companies, and pressed companies to hire the public 
employees made redundant by privatization (Sakoh 1986, 2).
Yet neither Tanaka nor Nakasone was able to institutionalize prime 
ministerial government. Tanaka was toppled by scandal just two years after 
taking office and spent the remainder of his political career ruling from 
the shadows, which meant that none of his many factional followers could 
become prime minister (Fukui 1984, 430). This led to the breakup, in 1985, 
of the mighty Tanaka faction. Nakasone’s influence derived, in large part, 
from his telegenic nature and the credit he could claim for the LDP’s tri-
umph in the 1986 elections. Yet despite his efforts to strengthen the pre-
miership through establishing the Administrative Management Agency 
and reorganizing the Cabinet Secretariat, his successors did not exude a 
similar prime ministerial aura. As with most Japanese prime ministers, 
Takeshita Noboru’s strong suit was that of a backroom deal-broker, while 
Uno Sōsuke was not in office long enough to do much of anything. Like-
wise, Kaifu Toshiki’s tenure in office was possible only as long as the Tanaka 
faction supported him, while Miyazawa Kiichi was plagued by political 
scandal.
Eclipse of the Leviathan
The almighty powers of the bureaucratic Leviathan showed signs of wither-
ing away under the confederate cabinets. This was reflected in a drop in the 
share of government-sponsored bills that became enacted laws, which fell 
from 91 percent to 84 percent. The bureaucracy’s enervated state was put 
on display in 1983 when Prime Minister Nakasone overruled the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau in negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding with 
the United States; that agreement allowed Japan to sidestep the ban on the 
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export of weapons by providing access to its dual-use military technology 
and other advanced research (Samuels 2004, 5). The bureaucracy’s influ-
ence also declined as fewer ex-officials chose to pursue second careers in 
elective politics. As noted earlier, only three of the ten prime ministers who 
headed confederate cabinets were ex-bureaucrats, and only one had risen 
to a high post in his ministry. This contrasts with the state of affairs under 
the corporatist cabinets, when a succession of three elite ex-bureaucrats 
occupied the prime minister’s chair. Most ex-bureaucrats who served as 
departmental ministers also separated from the career civil service at rela-
tively junior rank.2 In other words, the former government officials who 
held portfolios under the confederate cabinets were less steeped in the 
“way of the bureaucrat” than had been the case with their predecessors.
Nevertheless, the government bureaucracy continued to influence 
executive affairs. As Tanaka observed, “Eighty percent of a prime minis-
ter’s job is getting the civil service to do what he wants” (quoted in John-
son 1986b, 6). The civil service was a traditionally elite career pathway, 
whose upper leadership was drawn disproportionately from alumni of the 
country’s most prestigious universities. Bureaucrats continued to initiate 
and draft most policy proposals, and they did so under the oversight of, at 
most, three political appointees per ministry. They also performed the pol-
icy research function for understaffed MPs and drafted the answers read 
aloud by their ministers in Diet interpellations. Moreover, frequent cabinet 
reshufflings made it difficult for transitory ministers to effectively monitor 
the career officials in their ministries. In many cases, this ministerial turn-
over was done to reward LDP MPs rather than in response to an electoral 
mandate. Then there were the twice-weekly meetings of the administrative 
vice ministers of each ministry to set the agenda for cabinet meetings, and 
the institutional memory of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, the bureau-
cracy’s stronghold (gajō). In the fall of 1991, the CLB became the “mortal 
enemy” of LDP secretary general Ozawa Ichirō by declaring unconstitu-
tional the proposed dispatch of Self-Defense Forces personnel to support 
the U.S.-led effort in the first Gulf War (Samuels 2004, 8).
Party High, Bureaucracy Low
In the aftermath of the first oil shock, the balance of power in executive 
affairs began to shift in favor of elected politicians, especially the “policy 
specialists” (zoku giin) who played the part of chieftains in the various 
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“policy tribes” (zoku). “Thanks to prolonged immersion in their chosen 
field of specialization,” Koh explains, tribal politicians were able to “boast 
more expertise in their field of specialization than senior bureaucrats, who 
are subject to frequent rotation in assignments” (Koh 1989, 213). In other 
words, the expertise and influence acquired as a result of long years of ser-
vice in a specific policy area enabled the LDP’s policy tribalists to “match 
and even dominate” their peers in the government bureaucracy (Schoppa 
1991, 79). The term “tōkō kantei” (party high, bureaucracy low) was coined 
to denote this sea change (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987, 19–21; Koh 1989, 7, 
212–213).
Policy tribes emerged in every major policy arena (Satō and Matsuzaki 
1986, 216–229). The LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council (Seimuchōsakai, 
or PARC) became a training ground in which aspiring tribalists acquired 
policy expertise and forged links to allies in the bureaucracy (Inoguchi and 
Iwai 1987, 20, 27–28). Beginning in the early 1960s, the LDP required that 
all policy and budgetary proposals be reviewed within the relevant subunit 
of PARC before submission to the Diet, which ensured that the policy trib-
alists could exert their influence at the early stages of the policy-making 
process (McCubbins and Noble 1995, 15; George Mulgan 2003a, 78; 
Woodall 1996, 115). Each LDP MP was allowed to join a maximum of 
three PARC divisions (bukai) and an unlimited number of its investiga-
tion committees (chōsakai) and special committees (tokubetsu iinkai). Not 
surprisingly, the most popular PARC divisions were those with domin-
ion over palpable distributive policy benefits, such as public works, agri-
cultural subsidies, and tax breaks. The “three noble houses” (go-sanke) of 
commerce, agriculture, and construction—whose chairs were regarded 
as “cabinet ministers within the party”—attracted the largest numbers of 
members (Woodall 1996, 115, 117).
Tribalists brokered deals between the ruling party and the government 
ministries, mediated interministerial turf wars, and lobbied for policies 
and budget proposals desired by their ministries (ibid., 113). In return, the 
tribalists were rewarded with special policy briefings by ministry officials, 
early notification of actions that affected their constituents (which permit-
ted them to credibly claim credit for those decisions), and a certain degree 
of leverage in steering distributive benefits to their districts and key sup-
porters (ibid., 119–122; Iio 2004, 6).
The fact that the LDP was, in essence, a “federation of factions” rather 
than a unified political party imparted added drama to executive affairs 
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(Scalapino and Masumi 1962, 18). Particular factions wielded greater rel-
ative influence in certain policy domains (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987, 298, 
296). For example, nearly half of the coveted agriculture portfolios dis-
tributed from 1955 to 1972 went to members of the Kishi faction and 
its successor branches. Meanwhile, members of the Satō and Kōno fac-
tions and their successor branches dominated the porcine construction 
portfolio (Woodall 1996, 109–110). Tanaka’s attempt to build his mighty 
faction into a “general hospital” with specialists on staff to treat every 
conceivable policy malady posed a challenge to central party leaders 
(Samuels 2003, 239).
Low Growth and Political Reform
The confederate cabinets confronted a range of challenges. The “Nixon 
shocks” paved the way for the restoration of ties to Beijing, while the 1973 
and 1979 oil shocks dictated dramatic changes in the country’s energy poli-
cies. In addition, the historical interpretation given in Japanese school text-
books became a source of conflict with neighboring countries, while the 
outbreak of the first Gulf War led to demands for Japan to play a greater 
international security role. The ways in which a succession of governments 
responded to the problem of a mushrooming public debt and demands to 
reform a malfunctioning electoral system provide unique insights into the 
adaptability of the cabinet system.
Trimming Debt in a Slow-Growth Economy
As career politicians came to dominate the political scene, so did demands 
for increased government spending. From the late 1940s through the mid-
1960s, Japanese governments adhered to the policy of balanced budgets 
dictated by the Dodge Line (discussed in chapter 2), but the slow-growth 
economy and static government revenues that followed the 1973 oil shock 
led to demands for Keynesian economic policies. As a result, total central 
government debt as a percentage of GDP ballooned from 4.6 percent in 
1964 to 50 percent by 1980. These massive government outlays financed 
the bullet trains and island-linking bridges and a dramatic increase in 
social spending that elevated Japan from “welfare laggard” to “welfare 
superpower” (Nakagawa 1979). In this regard, Tanaka’s “remodeling plan” 
not only brought an end to balanced budgets, it also enhanced the relative 
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powers of MPs vis-à-vis civil servants in decisions concerning government 
spending (Vogel 1996, 54–55).
On October 17, 1973, six OPEC countries raised the producer price 
of oil by 21 percent and threatened an embargo against the United States 
and its allies as punishment for their support of Israel in the Yom Kippur 
War. As an American ally with a heavy addiction to petroleum, Japan was 
stunned by OPEC’s action. Additional price hikes and production cuts fol-
lowed, adding to the trepidation already felt in a country that depended 
on imports for 99 percent of its petroleum needs. The Tanaka cabinet 
responded with an Outline for Countermeasures for the Petroleum Crisis 
(Sekiyu kinkyū taisaku yōko), but bankruptcies surged and panic buying of 
toilet paper and other products ensued. One of the Miki cabinet’s first acts 
was to announce that Japan had experienced its first negative economic 
growth in the postwar period.
The Ōhira cabinet proposed a general consumption tax to cut the defi-
cit. Not surprisingly, the opposition denounced the plan, but some in the 
LDP camp were also opposed to it. Ōhira responded by dissolving the Diet 
and calling new elections, which left the LDP in control of only 49 percent 
of lower house seats. On May 17, 1980, after months of internecine warfare 
among the LDP’s various factions, a JSP-sponsored non-confidence motion 
against the Ōhira cabinet passed by a 273 to 187 margin. The motion’s pas-
sage was ensured by the strategic absence of sixty-nine members of the 
Fukuda and Miki factions. Ōhira and his cabinet resolved to remain in 
office, opting to dissolve the Diet and call new elections, which, for the first 
time ever, would simultaneously elect members of both Diet chambers. On 
May 31, while campaigning in an electoral contest that most pundits pre-
dicted would go badly for the LDP, Ōhira was hospitalized suffering from 
exhaustion. He succumbed to a heart attack less than two weeks later, but 
an unexpected “sympathy vote” gave the LDP absolute majorities in the 
lower and upper houses.
The takeaway lesson for Ōhira’s successors was that proposing a con-
sumption tax was risky business. Consequently, the Suzuki and Nakasone 
governments aimed to cut the deficit through administrative reform and 
spending cuts. Suzuki tasked the Second Ad Hoc Commission on Admin-
istrative Reform (Daini rinji gyōsei chōsakai or Rinchō) with setting the 
agenda for this delicate operation. Under the leadership of former Toshiba 
Corporation and Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) 
president Dokō Toshio, the Rinchō (also known as the Dokō Commis-
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sion) began operations on March 16, 1981 (Watanabe, ed. 1995, 321–
322). Two days after the commission’s launch, Suzuki pledged to “stake 
his political career”—hence, the fate of his cabinet—on the achievement 
of administrative reform (Elliott 1983, 773). As an extra-governmental 
advisory body, the Rinchō was in a position to make recommendations 
for reforms that shifted the blame away from the ruling LDP and its law-
makers, who were able to criticize the measures while at the same time 
voting them into law (Vogel 1996, 55–56). During the two years of its exis-
tence, the Rinchō issued five reports, the final two coming after Nakasone 
replaced Suzuki as prime minister. As Dokō and his colleagues eventually 
discovered, however, retired and incumbent bureaucrats who sat on the 
commission’s committees were able to water down reform proposals that 
threatened to diminish their ministries’ powers (ibid., 57; Watanabe, ed. 
1995, 330).
Acting on the Rinchō recommendations, the Nakasone government 
set about privatizing debt-ridden public corporations. The biggest target 
of the privatization drive was the Japan National Railways (JNR), which 
by 1983 had accumulated in excess of $120 billion in debt and was losing 
$25 million per day (Vogel 1996, 56). JNR had become “one of the most 
inefficient and overstaffed railroads in the world,” with 420,000 union-
ized workers on its payroll (Sakoh 1986). These workers understood that 
one aim of Nakasone’s plan was to break the backs of their unions, while 
government bureaucrats and LDP MPs opposed JNR privatization out of 
fear of losing an important source of distributive benefits and votes (ibid.). 
The Nakasone government encountered similar resistance in attempting 
to privatize the Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation (Nippon senbai 
kōsha), with its ninety thousand well-organized tobacco farmers—many of 
whom supported the LDP—and a Finance Ministry loath to lose $1.7 bil-
lion in annual tax revenues (ibid.). Privatization proceeded more smoothly 
in the case of Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (Nippon denshin denwa) 
and Japan Airlines. This is because NTT’s 320,000 employees were allowed 
to remain with the company, and the government already owned only 35 
percent of shares in the semipublic airline (ibid.; Vogel 1996, 56).
Reform Drama in Four Acts
The confederate cabinets had to respond to judicial rulings and popu-
lar demands to reform a malfunctioning electoral system. What was to 
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become a four-part drama began to unfold following the July 1974 elec-
tions, in which the LDP lost its upper house majority. In an exposé pub-
lished in the October 1974 issue of the Bungei shunjū magazine, journalist 
Tachibana Takashi trained a spotlight on Prime Minister Tanaka’s shady 
business practices. Vice Prime Minister Miki Takeo openly criticized 
Tanaka and joined Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo and Administrative 
Management Agency Director Hori Shigeru in resigning from their posts. 
Tanaka announced his resignation on November 26, and LDP vice presi-
dent Shiina Etsusaburō brokered a deal to make Miki the next prime minis-
ter (Masumi 1985, 251). “Clean Miki” appointed a cabinet whose members 
publicly disclosed their finances and vowed to reform the electoral system 
(ibid., 265, 266). These efforts bore fruit in the passage of a significantly 
enhanced campaign finance law and in the adoption of a primary election 
system in which the LDP’s MPs and general members voted to determine 
who would become party president (Woodall 1999, 37).
Act Two began in February 1976 with former Lockheed Corporation 
vice president A. Carl Kotchian’s admission to a U.S. Senate subcommittee 
that he had dispensed millions of dollars in bribes to sell the Tristar pas-
senger jet to airlines in Japan (Johnson 1986b, 13–14). This led Japanese 
prosecutors to follow Lockheed’s money trail, which led to businessmen, 
right-wing fixers, and politicians, and then all the way to Prime Minister 
Tanaka. On August 16, the former prime minister was arrested on charges 
of violating the Foreign Exchange Law, while fifteen others were indicted 
on bribery and other charges (Mitchell 1996, 121). Prime Minister Miki 
was denounced by elements within the LDP for not halting the investi-
gation of Tanaka (Watanabe, ed. 1995, 256; Johnson 1986b, 7). Miki was 
obliged to resign following the LDP’s poor showing in the 1976 lower 
house elections, and, in a backstage deal, Fukuda agreed that he would 
serve a two-year term and then turn the premiership over to Ōhira. Fuku-
da’s decision to renege on the deal by seeking a second term in 1978 led to 
warfare between the two faction leaders and their allies (Satō et al. 1990, 
375–376, 384). Consequently, Ōhira’s premiership was troubled from the 
outset, and it was left to Suzuki to restore public trust by promising politi-
cal reform. On August 19, 1982, the Diet passed a cabinet-sponsored bill 
modifying the 1947 Public Election Law to create a proportional repre-
sentation system to fill a portion of seats in the upper house. In October 
1983, Tanaka’s guilty verdict produced an uproar that led to new elections, 
in which the LDP failed to secure an absolute majority of seats, prompting 
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Prime Minister Nakasone to offer portfolios to an MP from the New Lib-
eral Club, a splinter party.
Act Three in the reform drama was ushered in by the Supreme Court’s 
ruling on July 17, 1985, that a five-to-one disparity between the most over- 
and underrepresented lower house districts was unconstitutional. The fol-
lowing June, the Nakasone cabinet secured passage of a bill to add one 
seat to the eight most underrepresented districts and take one seat away 
from the seven most overrepresented districts (Woodall 1999, 38). This 
brought the level of malapportionment just below the court-mandated dis-
parity of three-to-one in time for the July 1986 “double elections,” which 
gave Nakasone and the LDP a stunning victory. In late June 1988, though, 
it was revealed that Ezoe Hiromasa, chairman of the Recruit Company, had 
funneled gifts that included prelisted shares of stock in the real estate sub-
sidiary of his company to politicians, bureaucrats, and others. Prime Min-
ister Takeshita and former premier Nakasone Yasuhiro were among those 
implicated in the scandal, which led to the resignations of Foreign Minister 
Miyazawa Kiichi, Justice Minister Hasegawa Takashi, and Economic Plan-
ning Agency Director Harada Ken. In the end, no major politicians were 
arrested, but the scandal—coupled with the unpopular consumption tax—
resulted in plunging public approval for the Takeshita cabinet. With all of 
the logical successors to the premiership sullied in the Recruit scandal, 
LDP leaders tapped Uno Sōsuke, a lieutenant in the Nakasone faction, to 
assume the party presidency (Watanabe, ed. 1995, 394–395). Uno was soon 
engulfed in his own geisha scandal, and he resigned to take responsibility 
for the LDP’s defeat in the July 1989 upper house elections.
The selection of Kaifu Toshiki, who took office on August 25, 1989, 
was also owed to the fact that all of the other likely candidates carried the 
stench of the Recruit scandal. A lieutenant in the smallest of the LDP’s five 
main factions, Kaifu would not have become party president (and, there-
fore, prime minister) without the support of the mighty Takeshita faction. 
That is why his cabinet came to be dubbed the “Cloistered Takeshita Cabi-
net” (Takeshita insei naikaku) and “remote-controlled cabinet” (rimokon 
naikaku) (Watanabe, ed. 1995, 409). Kaifu stated that “political reform is 
the mission of my cabinet” because “public opinion demands plain and 
clean politics” (Woodall 1999, 38). In August 1991, the Kaifu cabinet sub-
mitted a bill based on the recommendations of the nonpartisan Election 
System Deliberation Council calling for the creation of three hundred sin-
gle-member districts and for 170 members to be elected from a national 
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proportional representation district. While the opposition denounced the 
proposal, the most serious resistance came from LDP backbenchers, who 
feared that “rains of blood will fall if districts are tampered with” (cited in 
McElwain 2006, 34). In September 1991, the cabinet-sponsored bill stalled, 
leading Kaifu to consider dissolving the Diet. Party leaders convinced 
him to drop the idea, and on October 4 Kaifu announced that he would 
not seek another term as party president (Watanabe, ed. 1995, 411). The 
Takeshita faction threw its support behind Miyazawa, who was considered 
sufficiently rehabilitated to assume the premiership.
The protagonist in Act Four of the scandal-reform cycle was LDP 
vice president Kanemaru Shin. In the early months of 1992, the “shadow 
shogun” was accused of having underworld ties and peddling his influ-
ence to secure bureaucratic approval for additional trucking routes for the 
Sagawa Kyūbin express delivery company. Eventually, it was revealed that 
130 MPs had received political contributions from Sagawa Kyūbin’s gen-
erous owner. Kanemaru admitted his guilt on August 27 and resigned his 
party post, but the light fine he received—roughly equivalent to a parking 
ticket—drew public outcry. On October 14, Kanemaru resigned from his 
lower house seat, but prosecutors continued probing; they finally arrested 
the aging kingmaker on March 6. Searches of Kanemaru’s residence and 
office uncovered $50 million in cash, gold bullion, and bonds (Mitchell 
1996, 127). Subsequent investigations exposed a web of corruption involv-
ing bribes received from major general contractors (zenekon) for preferen-
tial intervention by politicians in the allocation of public works projects. 
It was rumored that Kanemaru himself received a kickback of 5 percent 
of the contracted price of each public works project he steered to a par-
ticular contractor (Woodall 1996, 40). The zenekon scandal exposed a vast 
network of influence peddling and bribery in which contractors funneled 
money to politicians or their intermediaries in exchange for public works 
contracts (ibid., 13).
With two major scandals raging, the Miyazawa cabinet had every rea-
son to press for political reform to restore public approval. Its reform pro-
posal—which bore a close resemblance to the Kaifu cabinet’s proposal—was 
rejected by the LDP’s Executive Council on June 15, 1993 (Woodall 1996, 
39). Three days later, an opposition-sponsored no-confidence vote against 
the Miyazawa cabinet was approved, thanks to the support of Ozawa Ichirō, 
Hata Tsutomu, and a number of other disaffected former LDP legislators. 
The lower house elections of August 18 left the LDP in control of only 44 
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percent of the seats, paving the way for the establishment of the Hosokawa 
cabinet, founded on an eight-party coalition. This brought down the cur-
tain on nearly four decades of LDP rule.
On August 10, in his first press conference as premier, Hosokawa 
Morihiro committed his government to the cause of political reform. After 
much debate and some compromise, the Hosokawa cabinet’s reform bills 
were enacted into law on January 29, 1994. These laws created a lower 
house electoral system based on a mixture of single-member and propor-
tional representation districts, and significantly strengthened the regula-
tion of campaign finance. Ironically, the LDP, now in the unfamiliar role of 
opposition party, opted to support a lower house electoral system reform 
bill whose core provisions were almost identical to the proposal the party 
had rejected before it had self-destructed just eight months earlier.
Findings
Tanaka Kakuei and Miyazawa Kiichi represented radically dissimilar book-
ends in an era of confederate cabinets that witnessed the zenith of LDP 
dominance and its inglorious fall from grace. During these two decades, 
the party’s presidents continued to serve simultaneously as prime minis-
ters, and only a handful of cabinet portfolios were allocated to non-LDP 
MPs. Because the LDP virtually monopolized the allocation of portfolios, 
ministerial appointment became a regular part of the ruling party’s pro-
motion process. In this way, the ministerial elite was shaped by the LDP’s 
hegemonic mastery of the parliamentary realm; consequently, the charac-
teristics of the ministerial elite came to mirror the narrow set of specific 
characteristics of the party’s senior MPs.
At the end of the day, cabinet government did not become established 
under the corporate cabinets. Efforts to bolster the powers of the prime 
minister were not institutionalized, and, although the influence of the gov-
ernment bureaucracy declined, the advent of Twisted Diets made Diet 
management difficult for a succession of cabinets. Policy specialists came to 
rule over the fief-like subgovernments that dotted the policy-making land-
scape. Meanwhile, the oil shocks inflicted dramatically higher energy costs 
that brought an end to the high-speed growth era and its ever-expanding 
budgets. With a Diet dominated by career politicians with an insatiable 
appetite for pork barrel spending, the inevitable result was a mushroom-
ing government deficit. Prime Minister Ōhira’s disastrous experience with 
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a proposed consumption tax prompted his successors to pursue deregula-
tion and privatization. A series of corruption scandals and dangerously 
low public approval ratings forced a succession of LDP-led cabinets to try, 
but ultimately fail, to reform a malfunctioning electoral system. So it was 
that the LDP’s protracted lordship over the parliamentary realm came to a 
temporary end.
Now Japan drifted aimlessly into consecutive “lost decades” of eco-
nomic and political stagnation. With the end of LDP hegemony, coalition 
cabinets became the rule, and a once-toothless Diet became an irritation to 
a succession of governments. Disaffected former LDP MPs and the leaders 
of new parties played the role of change agents in the drama that unfolded. 
Surprisingly, an iconoclastic agent of change emerged from within a revi-
talized LDP and proceeded to declare war on a mighty policy lobby, whose 
chieftains were ruling party MPs.
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Disjoined Cabinets—Act I
Coalition Governments and the Lost Decades, 
1993–2006
At the broadest level it is possible to see that the demands of [the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition] have meant the restoration 
of Cabinet government, and an end to the more informal style 
of “government by sofa” that emerged under New Labour during 
1997–2010.
—Felicity Matthews, “Constitutional Stretching” (2011), 505–506
A cabinet should be a body that executes and realizes the policy of a 
political party that won the support of a majority of voters. In Japan, 
however, the policy of a cabinet often contradicts that of the ruling 
party. The postal privatization by the Junichiro Koizumi cabinet was a 
typical example.
—Hideki Kato, “Political Reform of the Japanese 
System of Government” (2008), 3
Lost Decades, Lost Leadership
After enduring a seemingly interminable period of economic malaise, Jap-
anese voters had all but lost hope that their democratically elected leaders 
could lead the country out of what came to be known as the “lost decade.” 
Then, after a succession of faction bosses from the perpetually ruling Lib-
eral Democratic Party (LDP) had taken turns as prime minister in cabi-
nets composed of ministers recruited almost exclusively from the ranks of 
party lawmakers—and through half-baked policies, scandals, and gaffes 
had managed to drive popular support for the government to near his-
toric lows—an unlikely leader emerged. In contrast to most of his pre-
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decessors, Koizumi Jun’ichirō did not command an internal faction, and 
he assembled his cabinet without consulting the faction bosses. He also 
pledged to refrain from engaging in the standard practice of frequent cab-
inet reshuffles that allowed LDP MPs to hold coveted cabinet posts but 
weakened political oversight of the government bureaucracy. He vowed 
to press through reforms to revitalize the economy. The Koizumi cabinet 
was welcomed with unprecedented public approval, and a majority of citi-
zens continued to support it even as it pressed ahead with its tough-love 
reform agenda. Then, in August 2005, cabinet-sponsored postal privatiza-
tion bills were defeated in the Diet’s upper house as a result of the defection 
of a number of LDP MPs. Koizumi dissolved the Diet and called new elec-
tions to obtain a popular mandate for his cabinet’s policies. Those elections 
revealed resounding public approval for the policies of the Koizumi cabi-
net, which quickly set about securing passage of the reform bills and pun-
ishing the “postal rebels.” Finally, it seemed that maybe, just maybe, cabinet 
government had arrived on the Japanese scene.
In this chapter I assess the extent to which cabinet government became 
institutionalized during the period between August 1993 and September 
2006. During these years, the already difficult task of providing tactical 
direction to government policy was magnified by the challenge of main-
taining unity and focus in cabinets composed of ministers from multiple 
parties. As Koizumi and his cabinet learned through painful experience, 
the challenge was further magnified by a fragmented policy-making land-
scape dominated by powerful, self-serving subgovernments. These factors 
all came to the fore in the pitched battle led by Koizumi and his ministers 
to privatize postal services.
Renegade Reformers
It was the secession of a large number of LDP MPs in the run-up to the 
1993 lower house election—not voter displeasure—that temporarily 
brought down the curtain on the LDP’s hegemonic rule. While the leaders 
of the jailbreak claimed to be reformers, their motives were mixed (Reed 
and Scheiner 2003, 473–474). This was especially true of Ozawa Ichirō, the 
prized “disciple” of legendary wheeler-dealers Tanaka Kakuei and Kane-
maru Shin (Samuels 2003, 326). An “opportunist” and a “child of the polit-
ical machine,” Ozawa began looking to abandon ship when Kanemaru 
became ensnared in a major corruption scandal (Gaunder 2007, 10). Oza-
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wa’s first move, in December 1992, was to gather forty-two loyal follow-
ers and split from the Takeshita faction to establish the Reform Forum 21, 
with Hata Tsutomu as its titular head. In June of the following year, Ozawa 
and his followers used the LDP’s rejection of a political reform bill as the 
pretext to establish the Japan Renewal Party (Shinseitō) (Woodall 1996, 
144). Henceforth, Ozawa would be the leader—or shadow shōgun—in a 
succession of parties. When the Japan Renewal Party merged into the New 
Frontier Party (Shinshintō) in 1994, Ozawa became its president. When 
that party disbanded four years later, he established the Liberal Party 
(Jiyūtō), which became a partner in an LDP-led coalition. Ozawa seized the 
opportunity to settle an old score by downgrading the formal status of the 
director general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, who had blocked his 
proposal to dispatch SDF forces to participate in the first Gulf War. Never-
theless, the CLB director general was allowed to continue answering ques-
tions on behalf of the government in Diet deliberations (Samuels 2004, 10).
Other change agents emerged from new parties created around the 
time of the LDP’s fall. Hosokawa Morihiro founded the Japan New Party 
(Nihon shintō) in May 1992 and became prime minister in the first non-
LDP cabinet in nearly four decades. Future prime minister Noda Yoshi-
hiko was one of the thirty-five candidates endorsed by the Japan New 
Party to win a Diet seat in the 1993 lower house elections. The New Party 
Sakigake (Shintō sakigake), founded by LDP defector Takemura Masayoshi 
in June 1993, produced a pair of future prime ministers—Hatoyama Yukio 
and Kan Naoto. Hata Tsutomu was cofounder of the Japan Renewal Party, 
which also nurtured Okada Katsuya, Nikai Toshihiro, and other future 
leaders. In addition, Koizumi Jun’ichirō should be numbered among the 
change agents. Although he never left the LDP, Koizumi was always an 
outsider in the long-ruling party. As mentioned, he was not the boss of his 
own faction—which set him apart from most LDP prime ministers—and, 
as we shall see, he refused to play by the party’s rules. Ever the maverick, 
Koizumi dared to declare war on LDP MPs and key party support groups 
that opposed his policies.
The eight parties that formed the coalition that made up the Hoso-
kawa cabinet vowed to “smash the union of legislators, bureaucrats, and 
industrialists” and to enact a political reform bill (Woodall 1996, 100). 
While the coalition made little headway in smashing the unholy union, 
it managed to enact a new system for electing lower house MPs. Even 
after the LDP reassumed the reins of power—albeit in coalition govern-
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ments—pressure for reform continued. This was evident in the October 
1996 lower house election campaign—which took place in the shadow of 
several highly publicized corruption scandals involving government offi-
cials (discussed below)—when all of the major parties called for adminis-
trative reform (Nakano 1998, 303; Mishima 1998, 969). In response, Prime 
Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō tasked his Administrative Reform Council 
(Gyōsei kaikaku iinkai, or ARC) with proposing measures to strengthen 
the cabinet’s functions, streamline government, and make administration 
more transparent. In June 1998, the Diet passed a bill to streamline govern-
ment that, when implemented in January 2001, cut the number of govern-
ment ministries almost in half, established a Cabinet Office, and bolstered 
political oversight of the government bureaucracy.1 Yet this institutional 
upheaval did not give birth to cabinet government. On the contrary, this 
period saw the rise of disjoined cabinets that failed to restore economic 
growth or to respond effectively to domestic and international challenges.
The Ministerial Elite
Between August 9, 1993, and September 26, 2006, seven prime min-
isters presided over twenty-one cabinets. The average life expectancy of 
these cabinets was just over seven months (228 days), making them three 
months shorter than the confederate cabinets that preceded them. How-
ever, the Reorganized first Koizumi cabinet, which held office for 722 days, 
stands as one of the longest-lived cabinets. As for prime ministerial tenure, 
the Koizumi government endured for nearly five and a half years (1,979 
days), while the Hata government lost vital signs after just over two months 
(63 days) in office.
Prime Ministers
The prime ministers were career politicians one and all. Each held a seat 
in the Diet’s lower house, and, on average, had been elected to an average 
of nine and a half lower house terms and had accumulated nearly twenty-
seven years of parliamentary experience. Two of them built local bases of 
support as grassroots politicians, four learned the trade as lawmakers’ staff 
assistants, two were journalists, and one was a labor union leader. Five of 
them emerged from political families.
The 1993 elections opened the door for three non-LDP prime min-
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isters. Hosokawa Morihiro was a descendent of a feudal lord and grand-
son of former premier Konoe Fumimaro, Hata Tsutomu was the son of 
a lower house MP, and Murayama Tomiichi was a fisherman’s son. All 
three graduated from private universities—Hosokawa from Sophia, Hata 
from Seijō, and Murayama from Meiji. Hosokawa worked as a newspaper 
reporter before winning an upper house seat, which he relinquished to run 
for prefectural governor. Hata worked at a bus company prior to serving 
as an MP’s staff assistant, while Murayama was a labor union leader before 
going into grassroots politics. In 1992 Hosokawa founded the Japan New 
Party (Nihon shintō), and the following year Hata cofounded the Japan 
Renewal Party. Hosokawa and Hata headed coalition governments com-
posed of all of the former opposition parties except the Japan Commu-
nist Party. Murayama’s cabinets made “oddly coupled coalition partners” 
of his Japan Socialist Party and the LDP, its longtime nemesis in the “1955 
system” (Samuels 2004, 5). Hosokawa resigned amid accusations that he 
failed to repay a loan from an express delivery company. The JSP’s decision 
to withdraw from the coalition left Hata at the helm of a minority govern-
ment that was replaced by a JSP-LDP alliance with Murayama in the prime 
minister’s chair. But, as a condition for its partnership in the coalition, the 
LDP insisted that the JSP renounce its opposition to the U.S.-Japan secu-
rity alliance, a central element in the JSP’s branding.
The next three prime ministers were LDP faction bosses. All three 
graduated from famous private universities—Hashimoto Ryūtarō was a 
Keiō man, while Obuchi Keizō and Mori Yoshirō were Waseda alumni. 
Hashimoto’s father was a minister in the Yoshida and Kishi cabinets, and 
Obuchi was also an MP’s son. Hashimoto briefly served as staff assistant 
to Health and Welfare Minister Nishimura Eiichi. Mori worked as a news-
paper reporter before becoming an MP’s staff assistant. Both Hashimoto 
and Obuchi were first elected to the Diet in 1963; Mori joined them in the 
lower house pews half a dozen years later. Hashimoto and Obuchi were 
members of the Tanaka faction, and Mori enlisted in the Fukuda faction. 
The first Hashimoto cabinet was founded on a coalition with the Japan 
Socialist and Sakigake parties, but the LDP’s strong showing in the 1996 
lower house elections temporarily eliminated the need for a coalition part-
ner. Obuchi assumed the premiership after Hashimoto resigned to take 
responsibility for the LDPs’ dismal showing in the 1998 upper house elec-
tions. When Obuchi suffered a stroke in April 2000, Mori took the helm, 
but his premiership was marred by microscopic approval ratings and a 
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series of gaffes, one of which occurred in an exchange with U.S. president 
Bill Clinton at the G8 summit in 2000. When introduced to the American 
president, Mori blurted out, “Who are you?”—instead of “How are you?”—
to which Clinton jokingly replied, “I’m Hillary’s husband.” An oblivious 
Mori responded, “Me too.”2
Koizumi Jun’ichirō was a third-generation cabinet minister who, at 
the time he became prime minister, had occupied a lower house seat for 
nearly three decades. In August 1969, a twenty-seven-year-old Koizumi 
was studying at London University when his lawmaker father passed away 
unexpectedly. He returned to Japan but failed in his bid to “inherit” his 
father’s seat in the December elections, so he went to work as staff assis-
tant to Finance Minister Fukuda Takeo, whose faction he joined upon win-
ning a Diet seat three years later. Koizumi served several stints as health 
and welfare minister, and held the posts and telecommunications portfo-
lio at the time of the LDP’s fall from grace in 1993. In 1995 and 1997 Koi-
zumi declared his candidacy for the LDP presidency, but he was defeated 
each time. When he finally managed to win the post in April 2001, pundits 
predicted that his tenure in office would be short-lived. Koizumi defied 
the naysayers and went on to occupy the presidency and premiership for 
nearly five and a half years.
Departmental Ministers
Of the 214 individuals who held portfolios in these cabinets, the modal 
minister was a sixty-two-year-old male university graduate who had spent 
nearly two decades as an MP. (While the ministerial elite remained a 
largely male affair, the fact that women now accounted for one in ten min-
isters marked a major change. In contrast, only 1 percent of ministers in 
the previous ministerial cohort were female.) Chances are that this modal 
minister held a lower house seat and was serving a sixth term in that Diet 
chamber, or a fourth term in the case of upper house MPs. There is a four-
in-five chance that our modal minister was an alumnus of one of only eight 
public or private universities: Tokyo, Kyoto, or Hitotsubashi universities 
(the publics) and Keiō, Waseda, Chūō, Meiji, or Nihon universities (the 
privates). Keiō alumni alone claimed 17 percent of all portfolios. There is a 
high probability that this modal minister was a career politician.
The changing composition of the ministerial elite is reflected in the 
continued influx of career politicians and further institutionalization of a 
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seniority system for recruiting ministers. Forty-three percent of ministers 
were first elected to the Diet before their fortieth birthdays, which suggests 
that ministerial aspirants understood that an early start was sine qua non 
for a successful career in national elective politics. The average ministe-
rial appointee had spent nineteen years treading upon the Diet’s fabled red 
carpet (aka jūtan), while the average novice minister arrived with nearly 
sixteen years of accumulated parliamentary service. Fifty-seven percent of 
ministers emerged from preparliamentary apprenticeships typically pur-
sued by aspiring political careerists, including MP’s staff assistant (which, 
by itself, accounted for 36 percent of ministerial appointees), grassroots 
politician, journalist, and attorney. While ex-bureaucrats accounted for 
one-quarter of ministers, three out of four of them had exited the civil ser-
vice before attaining senior rank. In other words, they too perceived that 
politics was no longer an amateur avocation to be taken up later in life. 
Forty percent of ministers seemingly inherited the “political gene” as sec-
ond-generation (or in some cases third- or fourth-generation) politicians.
With the advent of coalition governments came additional changes. 
For one thing, only 78 percent of ministers were affiliated with the prime 
minister’s party. This was a major change from the days of single-party 
rule, when 99 percent of ministers were LDP lawmakers. The most extreme 
case was that of the Hosokawa cabinet, in which the prime minister him-
self was the only MP with ties to the Japan New Party. Less extreme were 
the Murakawa cabinets—which were JSP-LDP joint ventures—in which 
only a quarter of ministers were numbered among Socialist Party MPs. 
In a related vein, the advent of coalition governments brought a surge in 
the presence of ministers from the urbanized areas surrounding Tokyo, 
Nagoya, and Osaka. These urban or suburban ministers claimed one in 
three portfolios, as opposed to the one in five figure for ministers appointed 
during the LDP’s hegemonic reign. Thus, ministers in coalition cabinets 
brought a broader range of policy perspectives and interests to executive 
decision-making than had been the case with LDP-dominated cabinets.
Reorganizing Government
All of the major parties called for administrative reform during the cam-
paign for the July 1996 general elections. The New Party Sakigake firmly 
embraced the issue and insisted that it be placed on the political agenda as 
a condition for its participation in an LDP-led coalition government. Upon 
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forming his cabinet, Prime Minister Hashimoto pledged to “consume him-
self to ashes” in pursuing the cause of reform (Nakano 1998, 291–292). By 
establishing and serving as chair of the Administrative Reform Council, 
Hashimoto signaled that his cabinet took the issue seriously. In its final 
report, issued on December 3, 1997, the ARC recommended that the num-
ber of major central government organs be reduced and that the powers of 
the prime minister and cabinet be bolstered. At an extraordinary cabinet 
meeting convened the following day, Hashimoto and his ministers pledged 
“firm resolve” to bring about the recommended reforms by 2001 (Admin-
istrative Reform Council 1997). The successor Obuchi and Mori cabinets 
continued to press for the enactment of the reforms, and on January 7, 
2001, a dramatically reconfigured central government organization was 
unveiled.
As a result of the restructuring, the Prime Minister’s Office, a dozen 
ministries, two commissions, and eight agencies were recast into a Cabi-
net Office, ten ministries, a commission, and an agency. In a single stroke, 
twenty-four major administrative organs were reduced to thirteen. Some 
changes were essentially cosmetic. For example, the Ministry of Finance’s 
name was changed from Ōkurashō to Zaimushō—meaning “Treasury 
Ministry”—presumably to signal its rebirth following a series of embar-
rassing scandals, while the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
became the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (Keizai sangyō shō, 
or METI). At the same time, a Westminster-style ministerial hierarchy 
became firmly established. Before and after the restructuring, the prime 
minister, finance, economy, and foreign affairs portfolios attracted high-
status MPs (see Appendix C).
Five ministries were created through the amalgamation of exist-
ing governmental organs. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science, and Technology (Monbukagakushō) arose from the merger 
of the Education Ministry and the Science and Technology Agency 
(Kagakugijutsuchō), while the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare 
(Kōseirōdōshō) was produced by the union of the Health and Labor 
Ministries. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
(Sōmushō—known as the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, 
Posts and Telecommunications until 2004) was brought forth from the 
amalgamation of the Home Affairs and Telecommunications Minis-
tries and the transfer of functions of the Management and Coordina-
tion Agency (Sōmuchō), while the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and 
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Transport (Kokudokōtsūshō) was created through the amalgamation of 
the Transport and Construction Ministries and the Hokkaidō Develop-
ment Agency. Meanwhile, the Environment Agency was upgraded to the 
Ministry of the Environment (Kankyōshō) and assumed the waste recy-
cling functions of the former Health Ministry.
The Cabinet Office (Naikakufu) combined the functions of the Prime 
Minister’s Office and the agencies for economic planning, Okinawa devel-
opment, management and coordination, science and technology, and 
national land. It was also given supervisory power over the National Public 
Safety Commission as well as the Defense and Financial Services agencies, 
and, at least in theory, was accorded a status superior to that of the ten reg-
ular government ministries. The Cabinet Office’s administrative staff were 
placed under the direct supervision of the prime minister and chief cabi-
net secretary, who were assisted by three senior vice ministers (naikakufu 
fukudaijin) and three parliamentary secretaries (naikakufu daijin seimuji-
kan). This meant that the Cabinet Office was supervised by eight political 
appointees, as opposed to the maximum of six in other government minis-
tries.3 As with other government ministries, however, the post of adminis-
trative vice minister—who was in charge of its day-to-day operations—was 
filled by a senior career civil servant.
Steps were taken to strengthen the leadership role of the cabinet and 
prime minister. Four “important policy councils” (jūyō seisaku kaigi) 
were established as “places of wisdom” (chie no ba) to assist in “the plan-
ning and drafting, and comprehensive coordination needed for the inte-
gration of the policies of administrative branches” (Headquarters for the 
Administrative Reform of the Central Government 2000). They included 
the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (Keizai zaisei shimon kaigi, 
or CEFP), the Council for Science and Technology Policy (Chūō kagaku 
gijutsu kaigi), the Central Disaster Prevention Council (Chūō bōsai kaigi), 
and the Council for Gender Equality (Danjo kyōdō sankaku kaigi). Coun-
cil members included ministers of state as well as individuals from the 
private sector, academia, NGOs, labor unions, quasi-governmental bod-
ies, and local government. In addition, the Cabinet Secretariat was given 
charge of the “comprehensive coordination” of the “important policies” 
relating to foreign affairs and national security, administrative and finan-
cial management, economic policy and budgetary planning, and gov-
ernmental affairs. To assist in this, three new positions were established 
within the Secretariat—assistant cabinet secretary, cabinet secretary for 
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public relations, and cabinet secretary for information research (ibid.). 
The prime minister was empowered to appoint as many as five special 
advisers (the previous maximum had been three) and to fill key posts in 
the Cabinet Secretariat with officials from the various ministries and spe-
cialists from outside government.
The post of “minister of state for special missions” (tokumei tantō dai-
jin) was created to boost the prime minister’s power to focus on high-
value policy priorities (Headquarters for the Administrative Reform of the 
Central Government 2000). Although there was no limit to the number 
of special minister portfolios, cabinets formed between January 2001 and 
September 2008 allocated between six and twenty-six of them. According 
to the revised Cabinet Law, prime ministers were obliged to appoint spe-
cial ministers for financial services, problems concerning Okinawa and the 
Northern Territories, and consumer and food safety. In practice, most cab-
inets included special ministers for disaster management, economic and 
fiscal policy, science and technology policy, regulatory reform, and gender 
equality and social affairs. In addition, special ministers were appointed 
to oversee a variety of other issues, including civil service reform, regional 
revitalization, global environmental problems, ocean policy, the abduction 
of Japanese citizens by North Korea, and the possible transfer of the func-
tions of the capital. Because the Cabinet Law limited the maximum num-
ber of ministers to eighteen, special missions ministers frequently held as 
many as five portfolios.
Executive Rivals
At least on paper, the government restructuring enhanced the powers of 
the prime minister and cabinet. Although the government bureaucracy 
had lost much of its luster, it remained a force in executive affairs. Koizu-
mi’s “presidential” leadership style led to speculation that prime ministerial 
government might become the rule, but his successors “failed miserably to 
come even close to Koizumi’s successes” (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010, 250). 
While maintaining solidarity among coalition partners caused a few head-
aches, the fractured policy-making environment—which was, as Samuels 
aptly put it, “characterized by excessively diffused power guarded tena-
ciously within narrow policy silos”—proved far more troublesome (2013, 
53). In this feudalistic arrangement, policy specialists (zoku giin), govern-
ment bureaucrats, and special interests defended their policy fiefs from all 
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challengers. This revealed the essential nature of the LDP as a confedera-
tion of policy tribes that put narrow vested interests above the broader 
interests of ruling party and country.
Bureaucratic Inertia
The establishment of the Cabinet Office gave ministers greater voice in 
shaping policy proposals, and the appointment of state secretaries and par-
liamentary vice ministers meant that additional “political eyes” were now 
dedicated to the task of monitoring bureaucrats in the ministries. Prior 
to the 2001 restructuring, the maximum number of political appointees 
supervising any given ministry was three, including the minister and one 
or two parliamentary vice ministers, while the cabinet-level agencies were 
supervised by a politically appointed director general and a parliamentary 
vice minister. This meant that fifty-five elected politicians were responsible 
for monitoring nearly eight hundred thousand government bureaucrats. 
As a result of the 2001 restructuring, sixty-three political appointees now 
supervised a government bureaucracy that was in the process of being 
“slimmed down” (surimuka) through privatization and staff reductions. 
As part of the restructuring, a measure was taken to reduce bureaucratic 
influence by allowing only four “special government assistants” to testify in 
Diet debates (Kyodo News, January 11, 1999). Prior to this, it was common 
for senior bureaucrats to take the podium for their ministers in legislative 
interpellations.
Yet the bureaucracy continued to influence executive affairs through 
the institutional memory embodied in the Cabinet Legislation Bureau and 
the position of deputy chief cabinet secretary for administrative affairs, 
who chaired the biweekly gatherings of administrative vice ministers to set 
the agenda for cabinet meetings. For instance, Deputy Secretary Ishihara 
Nobuo, a former administrative vice minister of home affairs known as the 
“Don of Kasumigaseki,” was able to block initiatives taken by the Hoso-
kawa and Murayama governments (Shimizu 2005, 33). As the CLB’s direc-
tor general explained to Murayama following the 1995 Kōbe earthquake, 
“it is problematic to amend the law to enable the prime minister to control 
and supervise the ministries and agencies—even during an emergency” 
(Samuels 2004, 5).
Corruption scandals and incompetence, however, combined to shat-
ter whatever remained of the myth of bureaucratic infallibility (Koh 1989, 
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205). The Ministry of Health and Welfare was vilified in 1996 when it came 
to light that more than one thousand hemophiliacs and others had con-
tracted HIV through the use of non-heat-treated blood products, even 
though safe products were available (Feldman and Bayer 1999). By the late 
1990s, the Finance Ministry’s once pristine image was in tatters as a result 
of officials receiving bribes and illegal benefits, and for the ministry’s role 
in a controversial $6.5 billion bailout for troubled credit unions (jūsen) 
(Laurence 2001, 174). Then, in 2001, the Foreign Ministry took a reputa-
tional hit when the media reported that one of its officials had used more 
than ¥50 million in embezzled funds to purchase racehorses and to finance 
an extravagant lifestyle (Berkofsky 2002).
As a result, government ministries found it increasingly difficult to 
recruit and retain the best and brightest university graduates. Until the 
early 1990s, nearly two hundred graduates each year from Tokyo Uni-
versity’s prestigious Faculty of Law elected to become career bureaucrats. 
In 2006, only sixty-eight Tōdai law graduates accepted civil service posts 
(Nariai 2007). While this was partly the result of an overall cut in the num-
ber of civil service positions (discussed below), growing numbers of young 
bureaucrats were moving on to greener pastures with private-sector com-
panies or in the legal profession. In fact, between 2001 and 2006, nearly 
three hundred career civil servants chose to take early retirement from 
government positions, a 3.5-fold increase over the corresponding figure 
from the 1980s (ibid.). It is likely that the bureaucracy’s tarnished image 
contributed to these recruiting and retention problems, and the allure of a 
civil service career was weakened as a result of the diminution of powers 
and prerogatives dictated by deregulation.
Threshold of Cabinet Government
The 2001 restructuring elevated the status of the Cabinet Office to that of 
“comprehensive coordinator” of interministerial affairs, which meant that 
the Cabinet Office was primus inter pares among government ministries. 
Other ministries responded by seconding their rising stars to the Cabi-
net Office and the Cabinet Secretariat (Yomiuri Shimbun, May 31, 2005). 
Moreover, while the ministries and agencies eliminated nearly two hun-
dred thousand staff positions between 2000 and 2007, there was an increase 
in the number of employees assigned to the Cabinet Office (2,202 to 2,337) 
and the Cabinet Secretariat (338 to 612).
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However, policy failures, gaffes, and scandal negated efforts to estab-
lish cabinet government. While every cabinet has its share of slips, the 
Mori cabinet set a new standard for dim-wittedness. In a speech delivered 
in May 2000, Mori referred to Japan as “the nation with the Emperor at its 
heart in the land of deities” (tennō o chūshin to suru kami no kuni), which 
conjured up images of the militaristic prewar regime under a divine-right 
ruler (“Statement,” May 16, 2000). This sent public support for the cabi-
net into a tailspin (dropping to a low of 7.2 percent in April 2001) and 
led to a no-confidence bill, to which Mori responded by dissolving the 
Diet and calling new elections. October found Mori with his foot in his 
mouth again, this time for suggesting to North Korean officials that the 
abductee problem could be resolved by having the kidnapped Japanese 
pop up in a third country (The Independent, October 25, 2000). Later that 
month, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nakagawa Hidenao was forced to resign 
after being implicated in a sex scandal and for reputed ties to the under-
world. All of these gaffes and scandals might have been overlooked had 
the cabinet’s economic policies produced results. In a general sense, the 
descriptions of Mori as having “the heart of a flea and the brain of a shark” 
and as “an embarrassment” corresponded with the popular perception of 
the prime ministers and cabinets at the country’s executive helm (BBC, 
November 20, 2000; Guardian, November 6, 2000).
A Maverick Stakes His Claim
Of the dozen individuals to sit in the prime minister’s seat between 1993 
and 2006, only Koizumi displayed the type of forceful leadership associ-
ated with prime ministerial government. While Koizumi’s “kantei style” 
approach was different from the traditional, understated leadership associ-
ated with Japanese prime ministers, some measure of his success in effect-
ing policy change was owed to the longevity of his government. In fact, 
Koizumi’s five-and-a-half-year premiership ranks as the third longest 
among postwar prime ministers (behind only Satō Eisaku and Yoshida 
Shigeru). This gave Koizumi considerable time to pursue his policy agenda, 
which included rectifying the bad debt crisis, trimming pork barrel spend-
ing, and privatizing postal services (Shimizu 2005). In addition, his gov-
ernment brought Japan into the U.S.-led War on Terror and dispatched 
Self-Defense Forces personnel to Iraq, the first such mission to an active 
war zone since the end of the Pacific War.
Disjoined Cabinets—Act I  181
Nicknamed the “Lone Wolf Prime Minister” (ippiki ōkami no shushō) 
because of his go-it-alone tendencies—and, more famously, “Lionheart” 
(raion haato) because of his tenacity and leonine hairstyle—Koizumi was 
unusually assertive for a Japanese prime minister (Maeda 2006, 623). His 
refusal to consult with faction leaders in making cabinet appointments and 
threats to eliminate pork barrel spending ruffled feathers within the ruling 
party (Takenaka 2008, 19–21; Scheiner 2006, 34). By keeping his first cabi-
net intact for 611 days, Koizumi went against the norm of frequent cabi-
net reshuffles to maintain factional balance. He claimed that his selection 
of ministers was based on merit rather than factional ties, and he took the 
unusual step of appointing Takenaka Heizō, an economics professor who 
did not hold a Diet seat, to take the lead in resolving the bad debt crisis and 
privatizing postal services. Koizumi also went outside the cabinet to make 
use of specially created organs, such as the Council on Economic and Fis-
cal Policy, to avoid the difficulties and delays that would have arisen by 
working through established channels (Takenaka 2008, 5).
A self-styled maverick, Koizumi was willing to attack party struc-
tures and vested interests that obstructed pursuit of his policy agenda. He 
eliminated some of the perks enjoyed by postmasters, organized farmers, 
and construction contractors, and endeavored to expand the LDP’s sup-
port base in urban areas. Koizumi appealed to female voters by giving a 
record number of portfolios to women. However, his support rating went 
into a free fall after he sacked popular foreign minister Tanaka Makiko, 
Tanaka Kakuei’s daughter, for causing a stir at the ministry (Uriu 2003, 81). 
By calling snap elections following the upper house rejection of his postal 
privatization package, Koizumi employed a style of leadership seldom seen 
on Japan’s political stage. In the words of one observer, “Koizumi really 
challenged the traditional machinations of domestic politics to achieve his 
reform agenda. . . . He decided that he was going to push ahead with his 
agenda and sweep tradition aside” (Nicholas Szechenyi quoted in Fogarty 
2006).
Still, Koizumi failed to firmly establish prime ministerial government. 
As time would tell, none of the half-dozen LDP and DPJ prime minis-
ters who followed him was similarly telegenic or suited to “kantei-style” 
leadership. Moreover, despite Koizumi’s vow to break the ties binding the 
political, bureaucratic, and business worlds, he failed to vanquish the sub-
governments that dominated the fragmented policy-making environment, 
including the dreaded postal family. In fact, Koizumi’s powers peaked fol-
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lowing the referendum on postal privatization, which left him barely more 
than one year in the prime minister’s seat. At the end of the day, Koizumi—
like Tanaka Kakuei and Nakasone Yasuhiro before him—was unable to 
establish a system of top-down prime ministerial leadership.
Coping with the Fragmented Policy-Making Environment
Cabinets were forced to deal with a variety of challenges. The Murayama 
cabinet had to respond to the deadly Kōbe earthquake and the sarin gas 
attack unleashed by Aum Shinrikyō cultists on the Tokyo subway system. 
The Hashimoto cabinet was forced to apologize for the government’s fail-
ure to recall blood products that carried the virus that causes AIDS, while 
the Obuchi cabinet had to deal with the “financial big bang” (kin’yū biggu 
ban) that resulted in major changes in banking and financial services. The 
Mori cabinet was forced to address public concerns about food safety when 
fifteen thousand citizens became ill after consuming Snow Brand milk, and 
the Koizumi cabinet took steps to repatriate citizens abducted by North 
Korean agents. Above all those, the Koizumi government’s efforts to priva-
tize postal services provide a unique lens through which to assess the chal-
lenges cabinets faced in providing executive leadership in a policy-making 
landscape dominated by powerful subgovernments.
Postal Privatization Armageddon
On April 26, 2001, Koizumi assumed the premiership, vowing to revitalize 
the economy through liberalization and deregulation. He and his ministers 
understood that they would have to do battle with powerful subgovern-
ments whose core members included influential LDP lawmakers, govern-
ment bureaucrats, and the leaders of well-organized special interests. As 
one cabinet minister observed, “after the collapse of the [asset] bubble there 
was a rush to implement a variety of reforms. . . . Nonetheless, because pol-
icy decisions were driven by the bureaucracy and zoku giin (Diet members 
who act in the interest of certain government ministries and the industries 
they regulate), the necessary reforms were all postponed to another day” 
(Takenaka 2008, 12–13). In many ways, the postal lobby epitomized the 
fragmented system of subgovernments that dominated the political land-
scape and subordinated the national interest to vested interests. Koizumi 
vowed to “smash” obstructionist elements in the LDP and boldly com-
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mitted his government to the cause of privatizing the debt-ridden postal 
service, repeatedly vowing to dissolve the Diet if his reform efforts were 
thwarted (ibid. 2008, 16; Maeda 2006, 623).
The Koizumi cabinet’s opponent was the “postal family” (yūsei ikka), 
a legendarily powerful subgovernment. Its chieftains included members 
of the LDP’s postal tribe (yūsei zoku), officials of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications (formerly the Ministry of Posts and Tele-
communications, or MPT), and the heads of two postmasters’ organi-
zations.4 It was said that postmasters could mobilize 1 million votes at 
election time, and MPT bureaucrats often directed postmasters to support 
specific candidates, some of whom were retired postal officials (MacLach-
lan 2004, 307–308). The family’s influence was enhanced by the fact 
that post offices were located in every locality and offered government-
insured, tax-free interest on deposits up to a certain amount. In other 
words, post offices performed some of the functions served by banks and 
financial institutions in other countries. By the time the Koizumi cabinet 
took office, the postal savings system boasted ¥224 trillion in household 
deposits, and postal life insurance services claimed holdings of ¥126 tril-
lion. This meant that Japan’s postal savings system was the world’s largest 
bank, while government borrowing through the issuance of bonds drawn 
from the Fiscal Investment and Loan Plan (FILP) accounted for a signifi-
cant slice of the national debt.
The Koizumi Cabinet’s Reform Bill
Calls for the reform of postal services began as early as the late 1960s, but 
the issue did not gain traction in policy circles until the 1990s (MacLach-
lan 2004, 282). In its September 2007 interim report, Hashimoto’s ARC 
called for a dramatic overhaul of mail delivery, postal savings, and insur-
ance. MPT officials counterpunched by mobilizing postmasters to lobby 
members of the postal tribe and other LDP politicians to oppose the 
ARC’s recommendations (Kawabata 2004, 28). Nevertheless, in Decem-
ber the council issued a final report recommending that postal delivery, 
savings, and insurance be managed by an independent public corpora-
tion. Hashimoto went further, proposing to allow private companies to 
enter the postal business and to sever the link between the postal savings 
system and the FILP (Porges and Leong 2006, 387). However, the Hashi-
moto government was forced to resign as a result of the LDP’s poor show-
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ing in the 1998 upper house elections, and the postal privatization debate 
fell into semihibernation.
Koizumi realized that the biggest obstacle to postal privatization would 
come from members of his own political party, which is why he assembled 
a cabinet that “transcended factional and tenure balance” (Takenaka 2008, 
21). Among his ministers were five women and three individuals from the 
private sector, including Takenaka Heizō, a Keiō University economist 
who was given the economic and fiscal policy portfolio. “We have a really 
tough fight ahead,” said Koizumi to Takenaka, “please join my cabinet as 
a minister and fight with me” (ibid., 2). At the cabinet’s inaugural meet-
ing, Koizumi declared that “without structural reforms there can be no 
economic recovery” (kōzō kaikaku nakushite keiki kaifuku nashi) (“State-
ment by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi” 2001). Boosted by an 81 per-
cent public approval rating, Koizumi threw down the gauntlet at a May 9 
plenary session of the lower house, declaring that “the nonsensical logic of 
the ex-Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications does not work for the 
Koizumi cabinet. . . . [The impediment of private-sector activities by postal 
businesses] will not be tolerated by the Koizumi cabinet” (Kawabata 2004, 
21; Takenaka 2008, 26).
Acting on cabinet orders, the Internal Affairs Ministry dutifully pro-
duced two draft bills in March 2002. The first bill proposed to open the 
letter delivery market to private firms. However, the fact that it required 
participating firms to install mailboxes in the ninety-nine thousand local-
ities nationwide extinguished whatever interest there might have been 
among private-sector firms (Kawabata 2004, 29). The second bill called for 
the establishment of the Japan Postal Services Corporation (Nihon yusei 
kōsha)—or “Japan Post”—to replace the Postal Services Agency (ibid.; 
“Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi” 2001). In April, the 
Koizumi cabinet unilaterally approved and sent the bills to the Diet with-
out having gone through the LDP’s preapproval system (Kawabata 2004, 
29). Naturally, this did not please senior LDP leaders, leading to anxious 
moments for Koizumi and his ministers, especially as the bills appeared 
to be stalled in a Diet session set to close at the end of June. Then Policy 
Affairs Research Council chairman Asō Tarō stepped in and persuaded 
the postal tribe to allow the establishment of Japan Post in exchange for 
an amended letter delivery service bill (ibid., 30). The Diet approved both 
bills in July.
In a September 2003 address to the Diet, Koizumi stated his gov-
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ernment’s goal of realizing the privatization of postal services within 
four years. “Soon we will arrive at the heart of hearts,” the prime minis-
ter observed. “Privatization of the postal service has now become a cabi-
net issue” (Takenaka 2008, 134; italics added). The CEFP was tasked with 
devising a plan to submit the privatization bills to the Diet the following 
year. In the meantime, Koizumi dissolved the lower house and called new 
elections, observing in his email magazine that he did so to gauge popular 
support for his reform agenda (Koizumi Cabinet E-mail Magazine 2003). 
The 2003 general elections left the LDP and its coalition partners, the New 
Kōmei and New Conservative parties, in control of 57 percent of lower 
house seats. In the aftermath, DPJ president Kan Naoto conceded that the 
“Koizumi administration won public trust through this election” (Nikkei 
Net, November 10, 2003).
In early 2004, the Koizumi cabinet shifted into overdrive. A Prepara-
tory Office for Privatization of Postal Services was established in April, and 
four months later the CEFP unveiled the outline of a basic plan for priva-
tizing the Japanese postal system (Takenaka 2008, 142, 144). The council’s 
plan called for the establishment of independent corporations to handle 
counter services, mail delivery, postal banking, and postal insurance. A 
holding corporation would be set up to control shares of the four corporate 
subsidiaries, but the national government would continue to own more 
than one-third of the issued corporate stock (Porges and Leong 2006, 388). 
The following month, the cabinet approved the plan, once again without 
securing preapproval from the LDP’s top leaders (Takenaka 2008, 154). In 
late September, Koizumi reshuffled his cabinet, giving Takenaka the postal 
privatization and economic/fiscal policy portfolios to guard against sab-
otage by Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications bureaucrats 
(ibid., 155).
Defeat in the Diet
In early January 2005, Takenaka began to feel that “there was a distinct 
possibility that the situation surrounding postal privatization could take 
a turn for the worse, and sound the death knell of the Koizumi Cabinet” 
(2008, 165). Later that month, at the opening session of the Diet, Koizumi 
reaffirmed his determination to privatize postal services along the lines 
outlined in a plan proposed by the CEFP (ibid., 166–167). In early April, 
Koizumi asked Takenaka to obtain a unified cabinet position on postal 
186  Growing Democracy in Japan
reform, which he endeavored to achieve by convening a marathon meet-
ing of ministers (ibid., 171). Reflecting on the meeting, Takenaka mused, “I 
doubt there has ever been another administration that experienced having 
its ministers stuck in a room to debate intensively for two full days” (ibid., 
173). The ordeal produced a unified cabinet proposal that was passed along 
for approval by the LDP’s five top leaders and the six concerned cabinet 
ministers. On April 25, the party leaders approved the reform bills over the 
objections of upper house secretary general Katayama Toranosuke (ibid., 
178). Two days later, at an extraordinary cabinet meeting, the Koizumi 
cabinet approved the package of bills and sent them to the LDP’s Executive 
Council for review (ibid.).
The lower house began deliberating the bills on May 26, with the DPJ 
refusing to participate on the grounds that “postal privatization is . . . irre-
sponsible and unwise, and the increasing pressure for private management 
is of concern” (Takenaka 2008, 180). Although the DPJ later joined the 
debate, the Koizumi cabinet faced a far greater challenge dealing with the 
chieftains of the postal tribe. One of them, Watanuki Tamisuke, was in 
the process of mobilizing about seventy LDP MPs to vote against the cab-
inet-sponsored bills (ibid., 191). Nevertheless, on July 4, after 109 hours of 
debate, the lower house approved the bills in a 233 to 228 vote. The narrow 
margin of victory was owed to the fact that fifty-one LDP MPs either voted 
against or refrained from voting on the cabinet-sponsored bills (ibid., 194).
The bills were then sent to the upper house, which commenced delib-
erations on July 13. About this time, Takenaka, who had been elected to 
the upper house in 2004, began noticing large groups of postmasters from 
rural areas descending upon the upper house members’ office building to 
lobby for rejection of the privatization bills (ibid., 198). On August 5, after 
eighty hours of question-and-answer debate in the Diet, the upper house 
rejected the Koizumi cabinet’s reform package in a 125 to 108 vote (ibid., 
199). This time, twenty-two LDP MPs voted “no,” while eight abstained 
(Maeda 2006, 622). Koizumi immediately convened an emergency cabinet 
meeting at which he proposed to dissolve the Diet and call new elections. 
Initially only three ministers supported the plan, but eventually all except 
Agriculture Minister Shimamura Yoshinobu came around to the prime 
minister’s point of view (Takenaka 2008, 200). When Shimamura refused 
to go with the flow, Koizumi fired him.5 Koizumi conveyed the cabinet’s 
decision to the emperor, who then formally dissolved the lower house and 
called new elections (Porges and Leong 2006, 891).
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The Koizumi Cabinet Prevails
At a press conference on August 8, Koizumi observed that: “the Diet has 
reached the conclusion that there is no need to privatize the postal ser-
vices. Still, I intend to once again ask the people whether it really is the 
case that only civil servants can handle the work of the post office and 
if we really cannot allow the private sector to take it on” (Koizumi Press 
Conference 2005). Ignoring the fact that eighty MPs from his own party 
had voted against or abstained from voting on the privatization bills, Koi-
zumi declared that “now that we have become the party of reform, the LDP 
will face the DPJ straight on and turn to the people to ask them to pass 
their judgment. That is why I choose to dissolve the Diet” (ibid.). Koizumi 
vowed to punish the “postal rebels” by denying them party backing and 
by dispatching “assassins” (shikaku)—including female candidates whom 
the foreign media dubbed “lipstick ninjas”—to run against them in the 
districts.6
The general elections of September 11 brought forth the highest voter 
turnout since 1990 (69.3 percent) and delivered an electoral mandate for 
the Koizumi cabinet’s policies. Candidates of the LDP and the Clean Gov-
ernment Party, its coalition partner, combined to win 68 percent of lower 
house seats. Meanwhile, the DPJ suffered a net loss of sixty-four seats. The 
new Diet convened on September 21 and took only three weeks to approve 
the postal reform bills. To prevent bureaucratic sabotage, Koizumi handed 
the internal affairs and communications and postal privatization portfo-
lios in his reshuffled cabinet to the trusted Takenaka (Takenaka 2008, 210). 
Koizumi continued to punish the postal rebels, expelling former agricul-
ture minister Norota Hōsei and pressuring ex-cabinet ministers Horiuchi 
Mitsuo, Hiranuma Takeo, Noda Seiko, and others to leave the party (Japan 
Times, October 29, 2005).
Findings
Coalition governments became the norm following the tumultuous 1993 
lower house elections. With the exception of the period from July 1998 
through January 1999, when the LDP ruled alone, coalition governments 
defined the period. The eight-party coalition that established the Hoso-
kawa cabinet survived less than nine months, while the Hata cabinet col-
lapsed after only sixty-three days. In June 1994, the LDP returned to power 
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as senior partner in a series of coalitions with the JSP and other parties. A 
central objective of the 2001 government restructuring was to enhance the 
leadership role of the cabinet and prime minister. The newly established 
Cabinet Office enhanced the cabinet’s oversight and coordination func-
tions, while the appointment of special missions ministers granted greater 
discretion to the prime minister in pursuing high-priority policies. The 
establishment of state secretary and parliamentary secretary posts aug-
mented the cabinet’s ability to oversee and coordinate the policy activities 
of the government ministries and agencies.
Even though on the surface Japan’s cabinet system was more “West-
minsterian” than ever, cabinet government failed to take root. Although the 
relative influence of the government bureaucracy continued to decline—a 
consequence of rising public distrust, reduced bureaucratic powers, and 
fewer ex-officials among the ministerial elite—cabinets did not fill the void. 
Although the Koizumi cabinet’s victory in the battle to privatize postal ser-
vices led some pundits to believe that Japan was on the threshold of an 
era of prime ministerial government, this, too, did not materialize. While 
the Koizumi cabinet prevailed in the postal privatization battle, the postal 
family would live to fight another day. The challenge of providing effective 
executive leadership would become even more vexing in an era of Twisted 
Diets.
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Disjoined Cabinets—Act II
Twisted Diets and Lost Leadership Opportunity, 
2006–2013
[Under the Westminster model,] the executive is in a powerful 
position to lead government and pass the legislation it wishes. British 
government is usually strong government.
—Stuart McAnulla, British Politics (2006), 14
Governments facing Twisted Diets propose fewer laws, they suffer more 
changes to and failures of the legislative proposals they do submit, and 
they must adapt the scope and . . . content of their programs to the 
exigencies of extra-governmental legislative coalition building.
—Michael F. Thies and Yuki Yanai, 
“Divided Parliaments and Lawmaking” (2012), 28
The Return of the Prince
On December 26, 2012, Abe Shinzō became the first former premier to 
return to form a government since Yoshida Shigeru had done so sixty-
four years earlier. Known as the “prince of the political realm” (seikai no 
purinsu) because both his father and grandfather had been royalty in par-
liamentary circles, Abe had formed his first cabinet on September 26, 2006. 
Despite strong public approval, Abe’s predecessor, Koizumi Jun’ichirō, had 
been obliged to step aside to comply with the rule that limited the tenure 
of the LDP’s president to two three-year terms. Abe’s first stint as prime 
minister, which began with high hopes, endured just one troubled year, 
and similar fates befell the governments of Fukuda Yasuo and Asō Tarō, 
the LDP leaders who followed him. In the general elections held on August 
30, 2009, voters demonstrated their displeasure with the ineptitude and 
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corruption associated with LDP-led cabinets by installing a new ruling 
party that promised meaningful reform. Yet, despite great expectations, 
the average length of tenure for the three DPJ-led governments—under 
Hatoyama Yukio, Kan Naoto, and Noda Yoshihiko—was barely more than 
one trouble-filled year. As a consequence, scarcely any of the promised 
changes were actually accomplished. So it was that Prince Abe reassumed 
the throne amid popular optimism that his “Abenomics” policies—which 
assumed that aggressive monetary easing and public works spending 
would revive the economy—might finally bring an end to the lost decades 
(Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2013).
In this chapter, I focus on the seven governments that occupied the 
executive helm from September 2006 through late 2013. During this period 
of controversy and crisis, the difficulties of dealing with “Twisted Diets”—
in which the ruling coalition did not control an upper house majority—
created countless headaches for prime ministers and their cabinets. Once 
portrayed as the essentially functionless “appendix of the Diet” (kokkai no 
mōchō), the upper house became hostile and obstructed the appointment 
of prime ministers and passage of the national budget, and determined 
what policy objectives governments could and could not pursue. In the 
same way that acute appendicitis causes intense physical discomfort, the 
angst caused by dealing with Twisted Diets was palpable, and it led to a 
succession of ephemeral cabinets. Finally, I assess the extent to which a 
Westminster-style cabinet system had become established by exploring the 
controversy over the proposed relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Sta-
tion at Futenma.
Restorationists and Reformists
Koizumi’s aggressive reform efforts brought forth two types of detrac-
tors: restorationists and reformists. The trio of post-Koizumi LDP premiers 
attempted to restore intraparty factionalism and shore up the fragmented 
policy-making system dominated by powerful subgovernments. Although 
Abe was seen as Koizumi’s protégé, his decision to readmit the postal reb-
els to the LDP seemed to signal a return to old-school politics (Kabashima 
and Steel 2010, 119). This, along with the disappearance of millions of pen-
sion payment records (discussed below) and several corruption scandals, 
sent the Abe cabinet’s public approval rating plummeting. Thus, it came 
as no surprise that the LDP lost its upper house majority in the July 2007 
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elections. Citing health concerns, Abe resigned about a month later, leav-
ing it to Fukuda and Asō to tussle with a DPJ-dominated upper house. 
Fukuda attempted to end the policy gridlock caused by a Twisted Diet by 
proposing a grand coalition to DPJ leader Ozawa Ichirō, but other DPJ 
leaders objected. When his turn came, Asō installed a cabinet of cronies 
and unleashed a torrent of old-fashioned LDP pork barrel spending in a 
fruitless effort to jump-start the economy (ibid., 125).
The August 2009 lower house elections propelled reformist DPJ-led 
cabinets into power, but the Hatoyama cabinet did not control a majority 
of seats in the upper house, a situation that obliged him to include MPs 
from two minor coalition partners in his cabinet. One of them, the Social 
Democratic Party (Shakai minshutō, or SDP)—formerly known as the Japan 
Socialist Party—had long advocated the removal of U.S. military bases from 
Japanese soil. Although the DPJ’s “Manifesto” and Hatoyama’s campaign 
pledges clearly indicated that the party wished to see the American bases 
moved elsewhere, the reality of being at the executive helm, as opposed to 
sitting in the opposition pews, led to equivocation. When Hatoyama finally 
agreed to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Base to another loca-
tion on Okinawa, the Social Democratic Party minister publicly announced 
her refusal to abide by the cabinet’s decision. With sagging approval rat-
ings and upper house elections on the horizon, the Hatoyama cabinet was 
obliged to resign. The July 2010 upper house elections produced an even 
more tightly Twisted Diet, which became a perpetual thorn in the sides of 
the subsequent DPJ-led Kan and Noda cabinets.
So it was that, despite alternation in ruling party and promises to 
reform the executive branch, cabinet government did not materialize. The 
three LDP-led governments that followed Koizumi’s required resignation 
attempted to restore features of the ancien regime, while the three DPJ-
led governments put forward reform agendas. Whenever the Diet became 
twisted, a hostile upper house could be counted on to block government-
proposed bills and to delay the passage of the national budget and the 
selection of a prime minister. Dealing with Twisted Diets made governing 
difficult and led to rapid turnover of prime ministers and cabinets.
The Ministerial Elite
Between September 2007 and December 2013, seven prime ministers pre-
sided over fourteen cabinets. A total of 135 individuals held ministerial 
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portfolios. The average life span of these cabinets was less than six months 
(178 days), making them the shortest-lived of those of any era in the evolu-
tion of Japan’s parliamentary cabinet system. With a life of just thirty days, 
the Reorganized Abe cabinet was Japan’s second shortest.
Prime Ministers
The trio of LDP prime ministers who came after Koizumi were portrayed as 
“spoiled sons” (obotchan) of famous political families. Abe Shinzō was the 
son of a veteran foreign minister and LDP faction boss (Abe Shintarō), and 
his maternal grandfather was Kishi Nobusuke. Fukuda Yasuo was the son 
of Fukuda Takeo, while Asō Tarō was an MP’s son and the grandson of leg-
endary premier Yoshida Shigeru. Fukuda was a Waseda University alum-
nus, while Abe graduated from Seikei University and Asō from Gakushūin 
University. Both Abe and Fukuda worked in the private sector—for Kobe 
Steel and Maruzen Petroleum, respectively—and apprenticed as staff 
assistants to their MP fathers before “inheriting” their Diet seats. Prior to 
becoming prime minister, Abe had held only one ministerial appointment, 
as chief cabinet secretary in the Koizumi government, although he gained 
fame for his role in negotiating the release of Japanese citizens abducted by 
North Korean agents. Fukuda had the misfortune of having to deal with a 
Twisted Diet that blocked his cabinet’s efforts to renew a bill to continue 
Japan’s role in refueling American warships engaged in the War on Terror. 
Asō’s tenure in office was plagued by a sluggish economy and, ultimately, 
met its demise in the LDP’s defeat in the 2009 lower house elections.
The DPJ prime ministers presented a mixed bag. Like the three LDP 
premiers who preceded him, Hatoyama Yukio was seen as an obotchan. 
The son of a foreign minister, grandson of a prime minister, and great 
grandson of a Meiji-era lower house speaker, Hatoyama was a rare fourth- 
generation MP. Kan Naoto was the son of a “salary man,” and Noda Yoshi-
hiko’s grandparents were farmers. Hatoyama’s mother was heiress to the 
Bridgestone Tire Company fortune, while Noda’s parents were so poor that 
they could not afford to pay for him to have a wedding reception (Bloom-
berg.net, August 30, 2011). Hatoyama was educated at the prestigious Peers 
School, while Kan and Noda attended public schools. Hatoyama matricu-
lated to Tokyo University and received his doctorate from Stanford Uni-
versity, while Kan studied at the Tokyo Institute of Technology and Noda 
at Waseda University. Hatoyama was an assistant professor before entering 
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the family business, which he did by winning a lower house seat in 1986. 
Kan worked as a patent attorney (benrishi) and as a campaign strategist 
before winning election to the lower house in 1980 on his fourth attempt. 
Noda entered politics at the grassroots level as a member of the Chiba 
Prefectural Assembly and was elected to the Diet in 1993 as a member of 
Hosokawa Morihiro’s Japan New Party. Hatoyama’s extraterrestrial looks 
earned him the nickname of “ET” or “The Alien” (uchūjin), while Noda 
compared himself to a dojō loach, a plain-looking bottom-feeding fish 
whose tireless efforts keep the pond livable for all its inhabitants. As health 
minister, Kan famously ordered ministry officials to open up internal files 
on decisions that allowed tainted blood products to infect more than one 
thousand Japanese citizens with HIV.
Departmental Ministers
The modal minister was a sixty-year-old male university graduate in his 
fifth lower house term (or third upper house term in the case of the one-
quarter of ministers who held seats in that chamber). He had spent nearly 
nineteen years in national elective politics, which he approached as a life-
long career. There is a better than two-in-three chance that this modal 
minister studied at one of three elite public universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, or 
Hitotsubashi) or five elite private universities (Waseda, Keiō, Chūō, Nihon, 
or Meiji). Yet while these eight universities continued to groom the great-
est number of ministers, it is worth noting that they produced 87 percent 
of ministers in the previous cohort.
The composite background of ministers demonstrates that career poli-
ticians continued to climb the parliamentary ladder. In fact, nearly two-
thirds of ministers emerged from pre-parliamentary occupations that 
facilitate the pursuit of a political career, such as parliamentary staffer (29 
percent), local elective politics (22 percent), law (13 percent), and the mass 
media (8 percent). At the same time, fewer ex-bureaucrats were awarded 
portfolios, and most of those who received portfolios had exited the civil 
service from low-level posts. Ex-bureaucrats accounted for one minis-
ter in every five (as opposed to one in every four in the previous cohort), 
and only 10 percent of them retired from high-level civil servant posts (as 
opposed to 22 percent in the previous group). In addition, ministers were 
a bit younger (by 1.8 years) and assumed their seats in the Diet at a more 
youthful age (by 1.2 years) than the previous ministerial cohort.
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Even though Hatoyama was a fourth-generation MP, the DPJ’s 2009 
election manifesto promised to put an end to hereditary Diet seats. Per-
haps as a result, there was a marked drop in the presence of hereditary 
politicians among ministerial appointees (from 42 percent to 30 percent). 
Because of the DPJ’s relatively stronger base of support in urban areas, 
there was an increase in the number of ministers representing districts 
located in the Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya metropolitan areas (from 33 per-
cent to 38 percent).
Reconstructing the Cabinet System
The cabinet system was modified in several ways. In January 2007, the 
Abe cabinet supervised the transformation of the Defense Agency into 
the Defense Ministry (Bōeishō). Not surprisingly, the move to convert a 
dependent agency under the Prime Minister’s Office into a free-standing 
Ministry of Defense with its own budget was portrayed by opponents as 
a step toward Japanese remilitarization. Veteran LDP lawmaker Kyūma 
Fumio was given the inaugural defense minister’s portfolio, but he had 
to resign in July after opining that the atomic bombings of Japanese cit-
ies had been necessary to end the Pacific War (Washington Times, July 
1, 2007). His successor, Koike Yuriko, was forced to stand down after 
only fifty-four days amid controversy sparked by her attempt to replace 
the ministry’s administrative vice minister without having first consulted 
with the chief cabinet secretary (Japan Times, July 14, 2007). Despite 
the alternation in ruling party, high-status ministers continued to hold 
the finance, prime minister, foreign affairs, and economy portfolios (see 
Appendix C).
The DPJ assumed power vowing to end “government delegated to the 
bureaucracy” by founding a “unitary system of Cabinet-centered policy-
making” (Democratic Party of Japan 2009). On September 18, 2009, the 
newly formed Hatoyama cabinet created a National Policy Unit (Kokka 
senryaku shitsu, or NPU), subsequently renamed the National Policy 
Bureau, to facilitate interministerial coordination and strengthen political 
oversight of the bureaucracy. The NPU aimed to “strengthen the functions 
of the Prime Ministership” by bringing together “talented people from 
both the public and the private sector to shape a national vision for the 
new era, and formulate the budget framework with politicians taking the 
lead” (ibid.). One of Kan Naoto’s first tasks as inaugural state minister for 
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national policy (Kokka senryaku tantō) was to supervise the compilation of 
a supplementary budget for fiscal year 2009 and a general budget for fiscal 
year 2010. One month later, in October, the Hatoyama cabinet established 
the Government Revitalization Unit (Gyōsei sasshin kaigi) to propose ways 
to eliminate budgetary waste and improve government administration. 
Hatoyama himself chaired the body, whose inaugural members included 
state minister Sengoku Yoshito, Inamori Kazuo (former CEO of Kyocera 
Corporation), and others.
The DPJ resolved to establish a fully functional Westminster-style cab-
inet system. During the summer of 2009, party leaders Kan Naoto and 
Ozawa Ichirō took study trips to Britain to observe a Westminster system 
in action (Noble 2011, 257). Upon taking power, the DPJ declared that the 
policy-making influence of government bureaucrats would be dramati-
cally curtailed, and the resulting void would be filled by expanding the role 
of ministers, senior vice ministers, and parliamentary secretaries in intra-
ministry affairs. In addition, Ozawa seized the opportunity to pursue his 
vendetta with the Cabinet Legislation Bureau for vetoing his effort to send 
SDF personnel to participate in the first Gulf War (Samuels 2004, 8). At 
the urging of the DPJ strongman, the CLB’s director general was excluded 
from testifying on behalf of the government in Diet interpellations (Kyodo 
News, January 14, 2010). The Noda cabinet subsequently lifted the exclu-
sion (MSN Sankei News, January 20, 2012).
The DPJ aimed to establish a “unified system of Cabinet-centred policy-
making” by abolishing its Policy Affairs Research Council (Seimuchōsakai) 
to enable the cabinet to assume its rightful role as policy initiator (Noble 
2011, 257). “Policy decisions will be made by the Cabinet,” explained Sec-
retary General Ozawa, “with the opinion of lawmakers being heard in pol-
icy committees within each ministry” (Japan Times, October 21, 2009). To 
this end, the DPJ established “policy conferences” (seisaku kaigi) to cor-
respond with the Cabinet Office and the government ministries, and all 
DPJ MPs were allowed to attend. The relevant state secretaries and par-
liamentary secretaries were tapped to chair the policy conferences tasked 
with coming up with proposals for ministers to use in drawing up bills for 
cabinet approval.
The DPJ’s promise to bring the bureaucracy to heel was immediately 
put to the test. An ex-bureaucrat was second in command at the new Con-
sumer Affairs Agency (Shōhisha chō), which had begun operations just two 
weeks before the Hatoyama cabinet took office. The cabinet-level agency 
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was created to allay public concerns over faulty product labeling and food 
safety. These issues had become front-page news as a result of scandals 
involving the importation of American-grown beef products that held the 
potential of causing mad cow disease, water heaters that emitted lethal lev-
els of carbon monoxide, and the sale of Chinese-made “gyōza” dumplings 
that contained pesticides. Although the Hatoyama cabinet fulminated, it 
did not remove the ex-bureaucrat from his post (Japan Times, September 
11, 2009).
The March 2011 disasters led to the establishment of the Reconstruc-
tion Agency (Fukkōchō) as a cabinet-level “control tower” (Samuels 2013, 
142). On June 27, DPJ lawmaker Matsumoto Ryū became minister of state 
in charge of recovery from the disasters. Matsumoto’s tenure was brief, as 
eight days later he was forced to resign as a result of gaffes made during a 
visit to the badly damaged region. He offended residents by confessing his 
ignorance of local geography and publicly dressing down the Miyagi Pre-
fecture governor for keeping him waiting in a reception room. Matsumoto 
sealed his fate by explaining to the Iwate Prefecture governor that the Kan 
government “will try to help those places that come up with ideas to help 
themselves, but not those that don’t” (New York Times, July 5, 2011). Mat-
sumoto was replaced by Hirano Tatsuo, an upper house MP from Iwate 
Prefecture who became minister of reconstruction following the agen-
cy’s formal establishment on February 10, 2012. After the December 2012 
elections returned the LDP to power, the portfolio was given to Nemoto 
Takumi, a lower house MP from Fukushima Prefecture.
Finally, in May 2013, the second Abe cabinet began laying the ground-
work to establish a National Security Council (Kokka anzen hosho kaigi, or 
NSC) patterned after the American model. The advent of a Twisted Diet 
frustrated the first Abe cabinet’s initial quest to establish an NSC by reor-
ganizing the Security Council of Japan. Soon after reassuming the premier-
ship, however, Abe focused his administration on establishing an NSC with 
the prime minister, chief cabinet secretary, foreign minister, and defense 
minister as core members to decide national security and diplomatic strat-
egies. In emergency situations such as the March 2011 disasters, the group 
would expand to nine members, including four ministers (land, infra-
structure, and transport; finance; economy, trade, and industry; and inter-
nal affairs and communications) and the commissioner of national public 
safety (Yomiuri Shimbun, May 23, 2013). In late November 2013, soon after 
the Diet passed the bill establishing the NSC, the new body was called into 
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action to respond to China’s unilateral imposition of an air defense iden-
tification zone over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Japan Times, 
November 27, 2013).
Executive Rivals
Despite efforts to reinforce structural supports for a Westminster system, 
cabinets competed with government bureaucrats and Twisted Diets for 
executive primacy. While subgovernments continued to lord over fief-like 
policy domains, no government attempted to throw down the gauntlet as 
Koizumi had done in the battle with the “postal family.” Prime ministers 
and cabinets failed to take decisive action even after the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear disaster exposed the dangerous realities of the so-called nuclear 
village (genshi mura), which imperiled public safety in serving the nar-
row interests of a tightly knit policy community of government regulators, 
lawmakers, and the regulated firms (Kushida 2012, 39–40; Samuels 2013, 
111). While the coalitional nature of cabinets created difficulties in getting 
everyone on the same policy page, a succession of scandal-ridden cabinets 
and oblivious prime ministers ensured that cabinet government would not 
take hold.
Clueless Prime Ministers
Japanese young people use the colloquialism “cannot read the air” (kūki 
yomenai, or simply KY) to describe someone who is “out of touch” or “clue-
less.” To be dubbed “KY” is especially bad in Japan’s political realm, where 
the ability to pick up on unspoken social signals is highly valued. Unfortu-
nately for those who hoped that Koizumi’s top-down kantei-style leader-
ship would take root, each of the next six men to serve as prime minister 
demonstrated varying degrees of obtuseness when it came to “reading the 
air” of public opinion and political reality.
Abe set the stage by promoting patriotic education, enhanced military 
status, and constitutional reform when what the public really wanted was 
economic recovery and a solution to a fiasco involving lost pension records 
(New York Times, August 28, 2007). An oblivious Fukuda followed by fail-
ing to display sufficient concern for the missing pension records (discussed 
below) and by proposing a substantial hike in health insurance premiums 
paid by senior citizens (BBC, June 11, 2008). Asō earned the moniker “Tri-
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ple KY” for his inability to revive the economy, his indecisiveness when it 
came to dissolving the Diet, and his problems in pronouncing certain Chi-
nese characters used in written Japanese (Shiota 2011, 316; Reuters, Janu-
ary 21, 2009). Not to be outdone, Hatoyama displayed “KY” in pledging 
that Japan would cut greenhouse gas emissions on the order of 25 percent 
by the year 2020 even though he had not first discussed the matter with 
the government bureaucrats who would have to implement what many 
believed was an unfeasible policy (Duffield and Woodall 2011, 3743). Kan 
earned his “KY” stripes by repeatedly flip-flopping on the future of nuclear 
power, prompting cabinet ministers to complain about his habit of mak-
ing off-the-cuff policy proclamations (Woodall 2013). Noda jumped on 
the “KY” bandwagon by ordering the restart of two idled nuclear reactors 
despite strong public opposition, flip-flopping on a pledge to eliminate reli-
ance on nuclear power by the 2030s, and pressing on with a bill to raise 
taxes (New York Times, December 17, 2012).
For almost a year after returning to the premiership, Prince Abe did 
not experience a major “KY” relapse. However, his popularity nose-dived 
in December 2013 following the forced enactment of a controversial bill 
imposing stiff penalties for leaking “state secrets” (Mainichi Shinbun, 
December 17, 2013). Coming amid the hubbub over Edward Snowden’s 
revelation of the U.S. National Security Agency’s secret data gathering, 
Abe’s forced passage of the state secrets bill, with little Diet deliberation, 
rekindled images of Kishi Nobusuke—his grandfather—steamrolling rati-
fication of the revised U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in 1960. While 
there may be a fine line between forceful and clueless leadership, the fact 
that the economy remained healthy may have earned Abe a free pass from 
a citizenry with fresh memories of the lost decades.
Resilient Leviathan
Any lingering belief in bureaucratic infallibility was extinguished once and 
for all with the revelation that sloppy record keeping at the Social Insurance 
Agency (SIA) made it impossible to verify as many as 50 million pension 
records. Prime Minister Abe appeared to not take the “pension records 
problem” (nenkin kiroku mondai) seriously when early disclosures began 
to appear. When the full extent of the bureaucratic bungling was revealed 
in May 2007, droves of distraught senior citizens descended on govern-
ment offices and demanded assurances about their retirement nest eggs. 
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The resulting hubbub contributed to the defeat of the LDP in the July 2007 
upper house elections and ensured the collapse of the Abe cabinet. As one 
observer explained, “Government officials in Japan used to be regarded 
as the best and brightest, and thus too much reliance on bureaucracy was 
observed. . . . The general public was under the illusion that government 
officials were able to do and did everything correctly without committing 
any errors” (Takayama 2009).
In the DPJ’s 2009 election manifesto, the party vowed to move away 
“from government delegated to the bureaucracy, to politician-led gov-
ernment in which the ruling party holds full responsibility” (Demo-
cratic Party of Japan 2009). To this end, the party proposed to abolish the 
administrative vice ministers meetings, believed to be the “real decision- 
making organ in the executive branch” and the venue at which the top 
career bureaucrats set the agenda for cabinet meetings (Koh 1989, 202). 
These meetings, which were chaired by the deputy chief cabinet secretary 
for administrative affairs, had been held each Monday and Thursday to 
coordinate issues prior to the regular Tuesday and Friday cabinet meetings 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, September 15, 2009). What was supposed to have been 
the last vice ministers meeting was held on September 14, 2009, just two 
days before the Hatoyama cabinet took office (Kyōdō Tsūshin, September 
14, 2009). However, the vice ministers meeting did not stay abolished for 
long, as just two years later the Noda cabinet repackaged the institution 
under the new guise of “ministerial liaison meetings” (kaku fu-shō renraku 
kaigi) (Asahi Shimbun Globe, September 10, 2011).
Still, the government bureaucracy was able to influence executive 
affairs. Ex-bureaucrats continued to rotate through the post of deputy 
chief cabinet secretary for administrative affairs, and the Cabinet Secre-
tariat continued to be “largely dominated by bureaucrats” (Shinoda 2005, 
821). Despite the efforts of Prime Minister Kan, the Cabinet Legislation 
Bureau continued to ensure that the country’s time-honored “bureaucratic 
cabinet system” (kanryō naikakusei) did not devolve into a “parliamentary 
cabinet system” (kokkai naikakusei) (Asahi Shimbun Globe, June 14, 2010). 
Bureaucrats in the ministries continued to do their jobs with relatively few 
“political” eyes trained on them. In 2008, for example, a total of sixty-eight 
MPs monitored Japan’s historically activist government bureaucracy, as 
opposed to the nearly one thousand political appointees supervising the 
executive branch of the U.S. government.1 This meant that only five politi-
cal appointees monitored the Ministry of Agriculture, while 184 political 
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appointees supervised the U.S. Department of Agriculture (U.S. Govern-
ment 2008). The fact that Japanese MPs were afforded few legislative staff-
ers also meant that they had to rely on bureaucrats for policy expertise 
(Takenaka 2008, 51). In addition, Japan’s government bureaucrats contin-
ued to wield significant regulatory and approval powers and exerted influ-
ence through the issuance of cabinet orders (which do not require Diet 
approval) and exercising discretion in implementing policies. As Takenaka 
observed, “government administration really is the accumulation of many 
minute legal actions. It is precisely because bureaucrats control each of 
those that they wield such great power” (ibid., 81).
Painfully Twisted Diets
The 2007 upper house elections produced the first truly Twisted Diet 
(nejire kokkai) in Japan’s political history. In contrast to the mildly Twisted 
Diets that prevailed from 1989 to 1993 and 1998 to 1999, when the gov-
erning party remained the largest group in the upper house, the 2007 elec-
tions produced a state of affairs more prone to policy paralysis. In fact, for 
all but one year between 2007 and 2012, the governing party confronted 
an upper house controlled by the opposition. “In this scenario,” Thies and 
Yanai explain, “opposition coalition building is the easier task and it is the 
government that would have to assemble a broad, incoherent menagerie 
in order to deny the opposition control over the chamber” (2012, 8). As 
a consequence, post-2007 governments proposed markedly fewer laws, 
suffered more changes to and failures of the legislative bills they did sub-
mit, and had to adapt their programs to enlist legislative coalition partners 
(ibid., 28). The resulting gridlock and frustration led to a succession of 
short-lived governments.
In Hobbesian terms, Twisted Diets dictated a “solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish and short” existence for LDP- and DPJ-led governments alike. In 
2007, the DPJ flexed its upper house muscles to deny passage of proposals 
from the Abe and Fukuda cabinets to extend a law that allowed the Mari-
time Self-Defense Force to refuel U.S. and allied warships in the Indian 
Ocean. The original law had been passed as a show of support in the after-
math of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but the DPJ objected to renewal of the 
law on the grounds that the refueling mission had no United Nations man-
date. Having failed to get the DPJ to back down, Abe abruptly announced 
his resignation on September 12.2 Still, the DPJ refused to concede, and the 
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anti-terrorism law was allowed to expire on November 1, forcing a cessa-
tion of MSDF refueling activities. This embarrassed the Fukuda cabinet, 
as it seemed to signal Japan’s unwillingness to participate in the U.S.-led 
War on Terror. In early January, the Fukuda government employed its two-
thirds majority to force through a one-year extension of the bill. The only 
prior instance of the use of a supermajority in this manner was in 1951, 
when the Diet awarded a monopoly over motorboat racing and gambling 
to an untried “Class A” war criminal (Samuels 2003, 244). Later on, in June 
2008, the upper house approved the first-ever censure motion against a 
postwar prime minister for Fukuda’s role in the vanishing pensions records 
fiasco. When Fukuda resigned three months later, the upper house nomi-
nated DPJ leader Ozawa Ichirō in a nose-thumbing gesture aimed at Asō 
Tarō, the lower house’s nominee to be prime minister.
When the DPJ-led Hatoyama cabinet stepped down in June 2010, 
party strategists hoped that the July upper house elections would un-twist 
the Diet. But this was not to be, and the de facto minority government of 
Kan Naoto was forced to seek support from other parties on a policy-by-
policy basis. By February of the following year, the Kan government was 
under siege as a result of the LDP-led upper house’s approval of censure 
motions against two ministers for their mishandling of the fallout from the 
collisions between a Chinese trawler and Japan Coast Guard vessels off the 
disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Yomiuri Shimbun, November 28, 2010). 
The triple disasters of March 2011 granted Kan a temporary reprieve, but 
he was able to cling to power only by promising the Twisted Diet that he 
would step down if it approved his energy reform bills (Woodall 2013, 24). 
Noda Yoshihiko staked the survival of his cabinet on gaining passage of a 
bill that aimed to curb Japan’s sovereign debt crisis by doubling the national 
income tax. The LDP-led opposition agreed to allow the bill to pass only 
on Noda’s assurance that the lower house would be dissolved and new elec-
tions called at an early date (Thies and Yanai 2012, 9).
Cabinet Government Postponed
Those who hoped for the emergence of cabinet government were dis-
appointed. While ministers’ gaffes and scandals had been familiar fare 
throughout the evolution of Japan’s parliamentary cabinet system, the 2006 
to 2013 period was especially rife with folly and tragedy. Health Minister 
Yanagisawa Hakuo unwisely referred to women as “birthing machines” in 
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a January 2007 speech, while Defense Minister Kyūma Fumio was obliged 
to resign later that year for remarks that seemed to justify the U.S. atomic 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Long the subject of corruption accu-
sations, Agriculture Minister Matsuoka Toshikatsu committed suicide in 
May 2007, just hours before having to explain his padded office expenses 
before a Diet committee (George Mulgan 2006; Kabashima and Steel 2010, 
121). Less than two months later, Matsuoka’s successor, Akagi Norihiko, 
was forced to resign on charges of expense padding; he added fuel to the 
fire by refusing to explain why he appeared at a cabinet meeting with two 
large bandages plastered to his face (New York Times, July 28, 2007). Yet 
another agriculture minister, Ōta Seiichi, resigned in September 2008 to 
take responsibility for his ministry’s failure to prevent imported rice meant 
for industrial purposes from being sold for human consumption. In Feb-
ruary 2009, Finance Minister Nakagawa Shōichi, reputed to be a heavy 
drinker, was forced to step down after delivering a slur-laden speech fol-
lowing a meeting with counterparts from the G7 countries.
Five and a half decades of LDP dominance created a vacuum that the 
DPJ was unequipped to fill. Because almost all ministerial portfolios allo-
cated between 1955 and 2009 had gone to LDP MPs, the DPJ-led cabinets 
had relatively few ministerial veterans from whom to choose. Indeed, only 
five of the nineteen ministers in the Hatoyama cabinet arrived with any 
prior experience. Further, the DPJ’s distrust of government bureaucrats 
created difficulties when it came to getting on the same page with the Cap-
tains of Kasumigaseki. This was plainly evident in Kan’s refusal to believe 
what bureaucrats were telling him about the situation at the crippled Fuku-
shima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (Kushida 2012, 60). This lent credence 
to accusations that the DPJ was “a group of ‘amateurs’ who were insuffi-
ciently aggressive in implementing the changes they had promised in their 
2009 party manifesto and too slow to respond” to the March 2011 disasters 
(Samuels 2013, 33).
Coping with Controversy
Cabinets were forced to respond to a variety of challenges, including the 
disappearing pension records scandal, food safety concerns, renewal of the 
bill to extend the SDF’s refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, the col-
lapse of the Lehman Brothers global financial services firm, and territorial 
conflicts with China, South Korea, and Russia. The proposed relocation 
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of an American military air base in Okinawa provoked a controversy that 
spanned the entire period and provides a lens through which to view the 
domestic and foreign policy challenges that cabinets confronted.
The Futenma Fiasco
Although opposition to the American military presence on Okinawa had 
been simmering for years, concrete steps to reduce the burden of host-
ing the bulk of U.S. forces in Japan did not crystallize until 1995. The piv-
otal event was the kidnap and rape of a twelve-year-old Japanese girl by 
three U.S. servicemen. The barbarity of the incident—the perpetrators 
duct-taped the girl’s eyes and mouth shut, bound her hands, and took 
turns raping her on a deserted beach—shocked and disgusted Okinawans 
(Time Magazine, October 2, 1995). In preparation for the February 1996 
summit meeting with President Bill Clinton, Prime Minister Hashimoto 
met with Okinawa governor Ōta Masahide, who explained that “the emo-
tions of the Okinawan people would be soothed if the Futenma base is 
returned to Okinawans and the Marine presence reduced” (Eda 2010). 
When he sat down with Clinton, however, Hashimoto could not get him-
self to broach the matter. At the end of the meeting Clinton turned to 
the prime minister and said, “If there are any problems with Okinawa, 
please tell me.” “I know this is difficult,” a suddenly emboldened Hashi-
moto replied, “but we would be grateful if you could return Futenma” 
(ibid.). Three days later, Clinton instructed Secretary of Defense William 
Perry to explore the possibility of returning the air base. Soon thereafter, 
Washington secretly conveyed to Tokyo that the return of Futenma was 
possible as long as a suitable replacement site could be found. As an aide 
to Hashimoto observed, “for us Japanese, it was a success we couldn’t have 
dreamed of hoping for” (ibid.).
On April 12, Hashimoto and U.S. ambassador Walter Mondale 
announced that the two sides had reached an understanding concerning 
relocation of the air base. Three days later, the interim report of the Spe-
cial Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) proposed to explore ways to 
“reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Oki-
nawa, while fully maintaining the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces 
in Japan” (SACO 1996a). The two governments agreed that the United 
States would return a substantial portion of land from its military facili-
ties on Okinawa and called for the “return of Futenma Air Station within 
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the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are com-
pleted.” Four days later, the Hashimoto cabinet agreed to promote solutions 
to problems involving U.S. military bases in Okinawa. This whirlwind of 
diplomatic and governmental activity was carefully timed to set the stage 
for Clinton’s visit to Japan, which produced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declara-
tion on Security. SACO’s final report, issued on December 2, proposed that 
twelve thousand acres at eleven U.S. military facilities be returned and that 
Futenma Air Station be relocated to a sea-based facility to be constructed 
“off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa” (SACO 1996b).
Although Tokyo and Washington were on the same page concerning 
the Futenma issue, politicians and citizens’ groups in Okinawa were send-
ing mixed signals. On January 15, 1996, the Okinawa Prefectural Assem-
bly passed a motion calling for a reduction of bases on the island (Eldridge 
1997, 889). In a nonbinding plebiscite taken a year later, a majority of Nago 
City voters expressed their opposition to the construction of an offshore 
heliport for the relocated Futenma Air Station. Three days later, Higa Tet-
suya, Nago’s mayor, traveled to Tokyo, where he told Hashimoto that he 
was committing political “seppuku” by agreeing to accept the heliport 
(Eda 2010). Higa’s prophecy was fulfilled on February 8, 1998, when a pro-
base candidate was elected to succeed him. In early April, after the central 
and prefectural governments proposed a ¥100 billion economic stimulus 
package for Okinawa, residents of the Henoko district in Nago City sent a 
request to the prefectural assembly inviting the construction of an offshore 
heliport. Then, on November 15, Okinawan voters replaced Governor Ōta 
with Inamine Keiichi, who announced that the prefecture would accept the 
proposed heliport.
Attention now turned to deciding what type of facility to build. On 
November 22, 1999, Governor Inamine proposed the construction of 
a large-scale offshore airport in Nago City to be used for dual military- 
civilian purposes for fifteen years, at which time the airport would revert to 
civilian use. The Obuchi cabinet endorsed Inamine’s plan without inform-
ing Washington, which, unsurprisingly, was not keen on the idea of restric-
tions on military use of the airport. In 2002, the national, prefectural, and 
municipal governments settled on a plan to build a dual-use airport with 
a two thousand-meter runway to be constructed on reclaimed land some 
two kilometers off Henoko’s coast. This infuriated environmentalists, who, 
beginning in 2004, launched a prolonged sit-in campaign to obstruct 
efforts to conduct an environmental impact assessment. The protestors 
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opposed relocation of the airport, which threatened to damage a coral reef 
and the habitat of the dugong, an endangered relative of the manatee. Ten-
sions soared in August 2004 after the crash of a Marine helicopter on the 
grounds of a university campus adjacent to Futenma Air Station. Fortu-
nately no one was killed or injured in the accident. These environmental 
and safety concerns prompted Tokyo and Washington to abandon the idea 
of an offshore dual-use airport in favor of an L-shaped runway jutting out 
from the Henoko Peninsula at Camp Schwab.
Finally, on May 1, 2006, the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realign-
ment Implementation (Saihen jisshi no tame no nichibei rōdo mappu) was 
signed by the two countries’ foreign and defense ministers. The Roadmap 
called for the construction of a V-shaped runway to be located partially 
on-shore and partially off-shore on reclaimed land. Assurances were made 
that the new facility would permit the U.S. military to maintain opera-
tional capabilities “while at the same time addressing issues of safety, noise, 
and environmental impact.” A target date of 2014 was set for its comple-
tion. In addition, the American side agreed to relocate approximately eight 
thousand Marines and their nine thousand dependents from Okinawa to 
Guam. The Koizumi cabinet approved the plan on May 30.
The Cabinet Implodes
From the opposition pews, the DPJ demanded that the Futenma Air Sta-
tion be moved out of Okinawa. In July 1999, the party released its “DPJ 
Okinawa Policy.” DPJ MPs submitted two Okinawa-related bills to the 
Diet the following year. One bill called for the return of land used by the 
U.S. military, while the other proposed revisions to the Status of Forces 
Agreement. In May 2002, the party established its Okinawa Vision Coun-
cil, which called for a reduced U.S. military presence in Okinawa. During 
the summer of 2008, the DPJ began forging a platform for lower house 
elections that, by law, had to be held no later than September 11, 2009. 
In its “Okinawa Vision 2008,” the party proposed an action program to 
“achieve closure of the Futenma base” and other U.S. military facilities 
(Minshūtō 2008). In May 2010, DPJ president Hatoyama Yukio stated that 
he expected that “at the very least [the Futenma airstrip] would be relo-
cated outside [Okinawa] prefecture” (Yomiuri Shimbun, May 28, 2010). The 
DPJ’s 2009 election manifesto pledged to establish an “autonomous foreign 
policy strategy for Japan” and to “move in the direction of re-examining 
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the realignment of the U.S. military forces in Japan and the role of U.S. mil-
itary bases in Japan” (Democratic Party of Japan 2009, 28).
As a result of the August 30 general elections, the DPJ-led Hatoyama 
cabinet assumed the executive helm, with the Social Democratic Party and 
the People’s New Party as coalition partners. The three parties pledged to 
“move in the direction of reexamining the realignment of the U.S. mili-
tary forces in Japan and the role of U.S. military bases in Japan so as to 
reduce the burden on Okinawa residents” (Kyodo News, September 10, 
2009). While the agreement echoed pledges enumerated in the DPJ elec-
tion manifesto, the SDP maintained its hard-line opposition to the pres-
ence of U.S. military forces in Japan. At a September 25 press conference, 
Hatoyama stated that the inability to resolve the Futenma relocation issue 
“is a big failure on the part of previous [LDP-led] governments.” He con-
tinued, “We need to address this matter within the overall review of the 
question [of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan], without drawing out 
the matter for very long. . . . We need to draw a conclusion bearing fully in 
mind the feelings of the Okinawan people, not just those of the Japanese 
and U.S. governments” (“Hatoyama Statement” 2009).
With the arrival of fall, Hatoyama began to equivocate. At a press 
conference on October 7, he admitted that reevaluation of the situation 
concerning U.S. bases on Okinawa might necessitate changes in the gov-
ernment’s position (Yomiuri Shimbun, May 28, 2010). Two weeks later, U.S. 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates reminded Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya 
that the bilateral plan for relocating the Futenma base had been reached 
“after consideration of various options over a long period of time” by both 
parties and was, therefore, “the only viable option.” Okada begged Gates to 
understand “the difficult political situation in Japan” (“Meeting Between” 
2009). On November 14, Hatoyama and President Barack Obama estab-
lished a working group to consider the Futenma issue, and in early Decem-
ber Okada traveled to Okinawa to plead with residents to understand the 
“crisis of the alliance” and the “difficulty” of the negotiations (McCormack 
2010). At a news conference on December 15, Hatoyama explained that 
he was “groping to find a site other than Henoko” for the airstrip. Ten days 
later he vowed to “devote his maximum effort” to resolve the controversy 
by a self-imposed deadline of May 31, 2010 (Yomiuri Shimbun, May 28, 
2010). On several occasions Hatoyama reaffirmed his determination to 
adhere to the deadline.
With the arrival of spring, Hatoyama flipped over to Washington’s 
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point of view (Yomiuri Shimbun, April 30, 2010). On May 1, the cabinet 
decided to propose that a runway be built in almost the same location as 
the site agreed upon by the Japanese and U.S. governments in 2006, lead-
ing to predictions that it would “trigger a barrage of criticism of Hatoyama 
and his administration from the [SDP], a junior coalition partner . . . and 
people and local governments of Okinawa Prefecture” (Yomiuri Shim-
bun, May 1, 2010). Three days later, during his first visit to Okinawa since 
taking office, Hatoyama explained to Governor Nakaima Hirokazu that 
it would be difficult to move Futenma out of Okinawa without straining 
bilateral relations. In early May, the Hatoyama cabinet’s public approval 
rating plunged to 24 percent, the “danger zone,” and intracabinet schisms 
soon became public (Yomiuri Shimbun, May 11, 2010). Consumer Affairs 
Minister—and Social Democratic Party chairperson—Fukushima Mizuho 
stated that “[Hatoyama] does not have to stick to the deadline. It will be 
better [for Hatoyama] to seek a true solution [to the problem] rather than 
reach a terrible conclusion at the end of May.” Meanwhile, Defense Min-
ister Kitazawa Toshimi called on coalition partners to reach an accord as 
soon as possible (Yomiuri Shimbun, May 12, 2010).
On May 24, the Hatoyama cabinet decided to relocate the Futenma 
Air Station to the agreed-upon site in Nago City. Hatoyama knew that this 
would alienate the SDP and negatively impact the DPJ’s prospects in antic-
ipated lower house elections. Two days later, Fukushima announced her 
refusal to sign a cabinet order approving the cabinet’s decision (Yomiuri 
Shimbun, May 27, 2010). In so doing, she violated the norm of collective 
solidarity, by which ministers are expected to publicly support cabinet pol-
icy—or else resign—so as to avoid the confusion that inevitably would arise 
“if ministers contradict each other in public and abide by some decisions 
and not others” (James 2002, 6; Rose 1971, 412). Hatoyama made a final 
effort to resolve the impasse by calling an extraordinary cabinet meeting, 
to be followed by talks with the coalition party leaders. He ordered Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Hirano Hirofumi to ensure that all concerned cabinet 
members, including Fukushima, would be on standby until midnight in 
the vicinity of the Prime Minister’s Official Residence. After meeting with 
DPJ power broker Ozawa Ichirō, however, Hatoyama cancelled the order 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, May 28, 2010). Sometime around 8:00 the following 
morning, Hatoyama spoke on the telephone with Obama, who addressed 
the Japanese prime minister by his given name and thanked him for agree-
ing to the Futenma plan. Hatoyama then fired Fukushima and telephoned 
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Governor Nakaima to offer a “heartfelt apology” for causing confusion and 
for failing to keep his promise to move the Futenma base out of the prefec-
ture (Japan Times, May 24, 2010).
Tokyo and Washington issued a joint statement on May 29 confirming 
their intention to relocate Futenma Air Station to “the Camp Schwab Heno-
kosaki area and adjacent waters.” Four days later, Hatoyama announced his 
resignation, saying, “I sincerely hope people will understand the agonizing 
choice I had to make. I knew we had to maintain a trusting relationship 
with the U.S. at any cost” (Guardian, June 2, 2010). Later that day, Ozawa 
resigned as DPJ secretary general, although his decision may have had less 
to do with the Futenma fiasco than with unrelated allegations of campaign 
finance irregularities (Woodall 2014). Reflecting on this, Eda Kenji, an 
aide to Prime Minister Hashimoto during the 1996 negotiations, observed 
that Hatoyama and his ministers were “too thoughtless, saying whatever 
popped into their heads about the country’s foundation—national secu-
rity—and the agreement [concerning Futenma] that is as delicate as a lay-
ered glass sculpture. They’ve fallen into a grave they’ve dug for themselves” 
(Eda 2010).
Unresolved Controversy
Yet the base relocation controversy continued to smolder. In Septem-
ber 2012, protests followed the announcement that MV-22B Osprey air-
craft—with a reputation of being accident-prone—were to be deployed to 
Futenma (New York Times, September 14, 2012). The following February, 
a newly recrowned Abe initiated negotiations with Governor Nakaima to 
win approval for the base relocation plan. Shortly thereafter, Abe asked 
President Obama to arrange for the early return of the U.S. Marine Corps’ 
Camp Kinser, which had been agreed to in bilateral talks, as a tangible sign 
that efforts were being made to ease Okinawa’s burden of hosting U.S. mili-
tary forces (Yomiuri Shimbun, March 24, 2013). Behind the scenes, negoti-
ations continued between the Abe government and Okinawan officials. On 
December 25, Abe and Nakaima met for talks in Tokyo amid media spec-
ulation that a deal was imminent. The following day, Abe’s unannounced 
visit to Yasukuni Shrine elicited outrage from the governments of China 
and South Korea, and disappointment from the Obama administration. 
On December 27, Governor Nakaima announced his decision to approve 
land reclamation in Henoko in exchange for large outlays of development 
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funds from the national budget and Abe’s promise to revise the Status of 
Forces Agreement to allow Japanese authorities to enter U.S. bases to con-
duct environmental surveys (Mainichi Shimbun, December 27, 2013). 
Although Abe produced a breakthrough in a controversy that spanned 
eighteen years, the deal he brokered did little to reduce Okinawa’s burden, 
ensuring that the issue would remain a Damoclean sword for future prime 
ministers and their cabinets.
Findings
The cabinets formed between 2007 and 2012 dealt with Twisted Diets that 
produced policy gridlock. Under constant harassment by a hostile upper 
house, these cabinets proposed fewer laws and endured frequent compro-
mise and defeat of their legislative proposals (Thies and Yanai 2012, 28). As 
a result, the average life span of these governments was barely more than 
one year. While the rigors of doing battle with Twisted Diets extracted a 
toll, it did not help that each of the men who sat in the prime minister’s 
chair displayed varying degrees of “KY” dyslexia when it came to “read-
ing the air” of public opinion and political common sense. The manner in 
which the Futenma fiasco brought down the Hatoyama cabinet revealed 
the absence of a well-established norm of collective solidarity.
Despite temporarily unseating the LDP as governing party, the DPJ 
failed to bring forth a fully functional Westminster system. Even though 
the government bureaucracy was a shell of its once supposedly infallible 
self, the Captains of Kasumigaseki continued to shape executive affairs. 
It mattered not whether the DPJ or LDP controlled the upper house; the 
result was the same—policy gridlock. If nothing else, the era of Twisted 
Diets demonstrated that the upper house was hardly the innocuous “appen-
dix” of the legislative branch that pundits portrayed it to be. As one of the 
LDP’s first actions, Prime Minister Abe restored the party’s system of pre-
approving policy proposals. Henceforth, before any bill could be submit-
ted to the Diet, it would have to be precleared by the LDP’s Policy Affairs 
Research Council, Executive Council, and Government/Ruling Party Liai-
son Conference, at which point the coalition partner Clean Government 
Party would get a chance to weigh in (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December 
28, 2012). In the final analysis, therefore, it is clear that cabinet government 
failed to take root.
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Conclusion
The Cabinet is the core of the British constitutional system. It is the 
supreme directing authority. It integrates what would otherwise be 
a heterogeneous collection of authorities exercising a vast variety of 
functions. It provides unity to the British system of government.
—Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government (1936), 1
With the Kan Cabinet running about like a chicken with its head cut 
off—in stark contrast to the calm, stoical demeanor that . . . earned the 
. . . victims [of the March 2011 disasters] worldwide admiration—the 
public can scarcely feel reassured about the future.
—Hiroshi Izumi, Post-Earthquake Politics (2011), 1
Failure of the Second Attempt?
Why has cabinet government failed to develop in Japan? The failure is puz-
zling because the 1947 Constitution established Westminster-style parlia-
mentary institutions, and more surprising given the fact that the seedlings of 
parliamentary democracy began to sprout under the anti-Westminsterian 
prewar order. Most would agree that postwar Japan has established a stable 
system of democratic governance; but it has yet to produce the effective 
executive leadership—in the form of cabinet government, strong prime 
ministerial leadership, or other structures—that is needed to respond to 
the panoply of challenges faced by advanced industrialized democracies. 
After all these years, why has Japan produced parliamentary democracy in 
form but failed to do so in practice? The shorthand solution to this puzzle 
is that cabinet government has not become institutionalized in the Japa-
nese context. To get a sense for the degree to which institutionalization has 
progressed, it is useful to compare the Japanese system with an idealized 
Westminster model.
Focusing first on the internal orientation of institutionalization—in 
other words, the cohesiveness of the cabinet as an executive actor—it is 
clear that Japan’s cabinet system has approached, but never achieved, the 
Westminster ideal. Since the mid-1950s, over 95 percent of ministers have 
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been recruited from the ranks of elected MPs, just as expected in a West-
minster system. Moreover, on average, ministers in the post-1955 cabinets 
embarked on political careers before reaching their mid-forties and had 
spent more than eighteen years as MPs upon assuming their portfolios. 
Seniority violations—the awarding of portfolios to MPs who had not been 
elected to a minimum of five lower house (or two upper house) terms—
decreased as the cabinets formed between 1946 and 1955 (in which nearly 
two-thirds of ministers violated the seniority norm) gave way to those 
formed between 1955 and 1972 (13 percent) and the cabinets of 1972 to 
1993 (3 percent). The instability associated with coalition governments and 
Twisted Diets is reflected in the fact that 11 percent of ministers in the cab-
inets formed between 1993 and 2013 did not meet the seniority standard. 
From the early 1970s on, a majority of ministers were career politicians who 
had emerged from preparliamentary occupations, such as local elective 
politics, parliamentary staffer, law, media, and academia. Ex-bureaucrats 
represented a significant presence among ministers in the cabinets formed 
between 1946 and 1955 (37 percent) and those formed between 1955 and 
1972 (46 percent), and the majority of them left senior posts in the career 
civil service.
Meanwhile, cabinets became increasingly complex. On the one hand, 
a Westminster-style ministerial hierarchy appeared in the early 1970s and 
remains in place. As in other advanced parliamentary democracies, the 
prime ministership and the portfolios of finance, foreign affairs, and econ-
omy are almost exclusively reserved for ministers with elite parliamentary 
and social background attributes. Yet, to the extent that cabinets formed 
between 1972 and 1993 performed suboptimally, the blame might lie in 
appointing too many ministers, resulting in “overinstitutionalization” 
(Klimek et al. 2008; Kesselman 1970, 26). Indeed, the expansion of portfo-
lios, especially under the cabinets formed between 1993 and 2011 (which 
averaged over twenty-seven portfolios distributed among nineteen minis-
ters) raises questions as to whether or not a minister can effectively carry 
out the duties of multiple portfolios.
Japanese cabinets clearly came up short in exercising strategic choice in 
executive decision-making, the external dimension of institutionalization. 
Pre-1947 cabinets were never able to exercise strategic choice, as they were, 
in essence, tools in the hands of the Sat-Chō oligarchs, technocrats, and 
unfettered generals and admirals. Although postwar prime ministers were 
empowered to appoint and dismiss ministers, they and their cabinets were 
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constrained when it came to setting the policy agenda, overseeing govern-
ment ministries, and authorizing policy initiatives. Until the government 
restructuring in 2001, no more than three transitory political appointees 
were responsible for monitoring the activities of each ministry’s legions of 
immovable career civil servants. Even a doubling in the number of politi-
cal “eyes” monitoring bureaucrats in streamlined ministries did not bring 
the bureaucrats to heel. From 1886 until 2009, the government’s agenda 
was set at gatherings of the top career civil servants who met on the day 
prior to regular cabinet meetings. In addition, from the early 1960s until 
it was ousted from power in 2009, the LDP approved all major policy and 
budgetary proposals before they were decided upon in cabinet meetings. 
While, in theory, cabinets were collectively responsible to the Diet, in real-
ity their collective solidarity could not be ensured. This was demonstrated 
by the inability of the Koizumi cabinet to obtain party discipline in the 
postal privatization brouhaha and in the fact that a lone dissenting min-
ister from a small coalition partner was able to bring down the Hatoyama 
cabinet in the Futenma Air Station relocation fiasco.
As for their durability and adaptability, which also relate to institu-
tionalization’s external dimension, once again the performance of Japanese 
cabinets fell short of the Westminster ideal. On the one hand, by continu-
ing through 141 cabinet formations from July 1871 through April 2013, the 
cabinet system proved to be a durable and accepted presence in the cen-
tral state executive. Despite the assassination of three prewar prime minis-
ters and the passage of non-confidence votes against four postwar cabinets, 
there was no lapse in prime ministerial leadership succession. However, 
cabinets displayed an uneven record when it came to adapting to major 
challenges. Although they were sometimes able to exploit GHQ’s bipolar 
tendencies, the early postwar cabinets did nothing to prevent the pernicious 
growth of “structural corruption.” Even as the Satō cabinet deftly reversed 
course to embrace environmental protection and managed to secure the 
return of Okinawa, it was unable to prevent a bilateral textile imbroglio. 
The Kishi cabinet’s strong-arm tactics in pressing forward with ratification 
of a revised security treaty poisoned relations with the opposition and gen-
erated widespread public protest. The cabinets formed between 1972 and 
1993 responded effectively to the challenge of government deregulation in 
a slow-growth economy, yet failed miserably in addressing demands for 
electoral reform. Finally, to privatize postal services, the Koizumi cabi-
net had to fight a civil war against a powerful subgovernment that had 
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been numbered among the party’s key support groups, while the DPJ-
led Hatoyama cabinet imploded over its flip-flop on the Futenma issue. 
It is worth pointing out that prime ministers found it necessary to work 
through back-channel diplomacy or extracabinet committees to achieve 
favorable resolution of the Okinawa reversion, government deregulation, 
and postal privatization issues.
In sum, more than six decades after erecting the institutional frame-
work for a parliamentary cabinet system—and more than twelve decades 
since the birth of its modern cabinet system—Japan has failed to institu-
tionalize cabinet government. The greatest deficiency lies in factors that 
inhibit the cabinet’s ability to exercise strategic choice. The cabinet has 
never become the foremost executive organ, as expected in a Westminster 
system, and this has contributed to its mixed record in responding to criti-
cal challenges. The autonomy of post-1947 cabinets was never ensured, as 
the American military dictatorship, an activist economic bureaucracy, self-
governing “policy tribes,” and the uncertainties of coalition governments 
and Twisted Diets kept the cabinet from assuming its prescribed role. 
Although on the surface Japan’s cabinet system resembles the Westminster 
model, in practice it does not. While Japan deserves praise for establishing 
a stable and broadly accepted democratic order, thus far efforts to estab-
lish cabinet government have not succeeded. At least in a limited sense, 
the postwar experience can be viewed as a failed second attempt at parlia-
mentary democracy, the prewar flirtation with democratic governance that 
came to a bloody end on May 15, 1932, being the first.1
Institutionalization and Institutions
To understand why Japan has established a parliamentary system in form 
but not in practice, one must appreciate the role of institutions and institu-
tional change. This prompts a second puzzle. Since institutionalization is a 
ubiquitous process, why has Japan’s cabinet system assumed its character-
istic form and function? This draws attention to the shaping influence of 
institutions, which requires that we account for the significant roles played 
by context and history in determining institutional change. It also high-
lights the distributional consequences of institutions and the role of critical 
junctures and tipping points as strategic openings for institutional change.
By viewing institutions as humanly devised constraints that structure 
behavior and carry power-distributional consequences, we can perceive 
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their shaping effect and the role they play in bringing forth bold as well 
as incremental change. Seen in this light, it is evident that the distinctive 
organizational structures, roles, and relationships that give form to Japan’s 
cabinet system were forged in a matrix composed of laws, ordinances, 
political structures, norms, and unwritten codes of conduct.
The pre-1947 cabinet system was forged in a matrix cobbled together 
out of an assortment of institutions. When it came to designing the insti-
tutions of a central state executive, the Sat-Chō oligarchs went to great 
lengths to create an anti-Westminsterian system. Shortly after the cabinet 
system was created in 1885, the top career civil servants in the various min-
istries began holding weekly meetings to set the agenda for cabinet ses-
sions; those bureaucratic meetings would continue for the next 123 years. 
Measures were taken to prevent partisan meddling in bureaucratic person-
nel matters, although the people’s parties would challenge this. The pur-
pose of cabinet meetings, whose decisions were based on the principle of 
unanimity, was to adopt state policies and engage in discussion “to ensure 
that such policies were consistent with those of the state” (“Naikaku seido 
to rekidai naikaku,” accessed May 23, 2013). The Meiji Constitution of 1890 
made “ministers of state” individually responsible for advising a divine-
right emperor, but it did not make cabinets collectively responsible to the 
Imperial Diet. The prime minister was not empowered to appoint and dis-
miss ministers, as this was the prerogative of the divine-right emperor. 
Naturally, there was no expectation that the prime minister would be the 
leader of the largest party in the lower house or that ministers would be 
recruited from the ranks of elected MPs. In addition, the Meiji Constitu-
tion established a Privy Council with veto power over all policy and bud-
getary proposals, and created a dual system of government by allowing the 
military branches to select their own ministers (thus empowering them to 
topple cabinets with whose policies they disagreed) and authorizing them 
to bypass the cabinet in reporting directly to the emperor. Like a “fatal 
thread” running through the history of the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
maintaining the prerogatives and prestige of the armed forces became “the 
standard by which decisions affecting the whole course of the nation’s pol-
icy were taken” (Maxon 1957, 29).
The post-1947 cabinet system was shaped in a matrix fashioned out of 
imposed and indigenous institutions. When the first two postwar Japanese 
cabinets proved unwilling to democratize the Meiji Constitution, American 
officials produced a document that became the basis for the Constitution of 
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Japan. The 1947 Constitution made the cabinet collectively responsible to 
the House of Representatives, whose continuing confidence was required 
to remain in office. It mandated that the prime minister and the majority 
of ministers be elected MPs and that all must be civilians. The prime min-
ister was empowered to appoint and dismiss ministers, whose maximum 
number was specified in the Cabinet Law. That law dictated that the cabi-
net “shall perform its functions through cabinet meetings,” which was, in 
keeping with long-standing tradition, informally interpreted to mean that 
collective decisions must be unanimous. The decision of occupation plan-
ners to occupy a defeated Japan indirectly enhanced the influence of an 
already powerful government bureaucracy, and for a quarter-century Japa-
nese governments embraced the balanced budget principle proposed in 
the Dodge Line.
Other institutions shaped the development of the cabinet system. Insti-
tutions such as the deputy chief cabinet secretary for administration and 
the Cabinet Legislation Bureau ensured that bureaucratic interests were 
reflected in executive actions. Referred to as the “bureaucrat of the bureau-
crats” (kanryō naka no kanryō), the deputy chief cabinet secretary pre-
sided over the biweekly meetings of administrative vice ministers that set 
the agenda for cabinet meetings, while the CLB proved to be an especially 
significant source of institutional inertia. Between May 1946 and Decem-
ber 2012, for example, a total of seventeen men held the powerful post of 
CLB director general—dubbed the country’s foremost “policy technician” 
(hōritsu gijutsuya) and the prime minister’s “in-house lawyer”—while 
thirty-two governments and ninety-three cabinets came and went (Nai-
kaku Hōsei Kyoku 1985, 141; Samuels 2004, 2). This meant that the average 
length of tenure for a CLB director general was double that of the average 
prime minister.2 In addition, under the LDP’s protracted dominance the 
system for electing lower house MPs through a single nontransferable vote 
(SNTV) in multimember constituencies produced intraparty factionalism, 
which led to frequent cabinet reshufflings and the appointment of minis-
ters with sometimes dubious qualifications (Grofman et al. 1999, 14–15). 
The fact that voters favored candidates who could bring home the bacon 
in the form of delivered policy benefits reduced the significance of policy-
based issues and provided fertile ground for money politics.
Thus, while the post-1947 cabinet system was similar to the Westmin-
ster model in form, the institutional matrix in which it was forged ensured 
that in practice it bore little resemblance. The perpetuation of an activ-
Conclusion  217
ist government bureaucracy that operated under minimal political super-
vision meant that the relative autonomy of cabinets in carrying out their 
executive responsibilities could not be ensured and that ministers would 
struggle to be more than mere figureheads. The byproducts of a lower 
house election system founded upon SNTV in multimember districts dic-
tated that the central leaders of the perpetually ruling LDP (whose presi-
dents doubled as prime ministers and whose MPs virtually monopolized 
ministerial portfolios) could not effectively discipline the intraparty fac-
tions, veteran MPs (especially members of the policy tribes), or even the 
party’s backbenchers. In addition, the perpetuation of certain informal 
institutions, such as the twice-weekly meetings of top bureaucrats and the 
unanimity principle, worked at cross-purposes with the strong executive 
role and collective solidarity required for effective cabinet government.
Critical Junctures and Institutional Change
But where do institutions come from and when do they change? The answer 
is found in the spurts of institutional innovation that cluster around criti-
cal junctures in history, when “institutional configurations are upended 
and replaced by fundamentally new ones,” as well as in the gradual evolu-
tion of established institutions (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 2). The Kan 
cabinet and its support staff, whose responsibility it was to provide execu-
tive leadership in the wake of the triple disasters of March 2011, was itself 
the product of evolutionary institutional change. While the foundations of 
Japan’s parliamentary cabinet system were set in place under an American-
led occupation, that system inherited genetic material from a central state 
executive that took shape in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In 
other words, the parliamentary democratic system established under the 
1947 Constitution inherited institutions, structures, personnel, and norms 
from an authoritarian prewar order. Viewed in this light, Japan’s present 
parliamentary cabinet system evolved through eight distinct stages.
The pre-1947 cabinet system was forged in three historical stages. An 
exogenous shock in the form of an uninvited port call by a small squadron 
of American warships in 1853 led to the collapse of the Tokugawa shōgunate 
and the putative restoration of power to the Emperor Meiji. In 1868, an 
alliance of feudal lords and lower-ranking samurai toppled a shōgunate 
whose once mighty control structures had atrophied to the point that it 
could not fend off the insurgency. As a result of the Meiji Restoration, a 
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cabal of leaders from Satsuma and Chōshū—the feudal domains that led 
the charge against the shōgunate—came to dominate the organs of the 
central state executive. The “cabal cabinets” that congealed under a central 
state executive inspired by an eighth-century Chinese model dominated 
the scene for three decades. In response to demands for a representative 
assembly and expanded popular rights, the Sat-Chō oligarchs established a 
modern cabinet system and granted a constitution designed to prevent the 
emergence of parliamentary democracy. Nevertheless, beginning in 1898, 
an era of “quasi-party cabinets” was born as a result of endogenous pres-
sure exerted by renegade former government insiders. On three occasions, 
the leader of the largest party in the lower house sat in the prime minister’s 
chair, and by the late 1920s elected MPs routinely held half of all portfolios. 
This brief flirtation with democracy abruptly ended on May 15, 1932, with 
the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai. The young naval officers who 
fired the fatal shots simultaneously killed Inukai and the era of party cabi-
nets and opened the door to a decade and a half of rule under a union of 
“reform bureaucrats,” “control officers,” and the leaders of fascist-inspired 
groups. Under the techno-fascist cabinets, anti-government voices were 
suppressed and priority was given to rational planning that employed all 
of the economic, political, and spiritual resources of the Empire of Japan.
While the 1947 Constitution established a Westminster-style cabinet 
system, much of the material used in its construction was left over from 
the prewar system. Even after the new Constitution went into effect and 
the Home Ministry and military ministries had been dissolved, much of 
the government structure remained intact; in fact, twelve ministerial port-
folios traced their roots to the prewar order. Moreover, twenty-six indi-
viduals who held portfolios in postwar cabinets—including five prime 
ministers—brought with them skills acquired as prewar cabinet ministers. 
Many of these carry-overs and other postwar ministers had been deemed 
unfit to hold public office under the occupation-inspired purge of mili-
tarists and rightists. Meanwhile, the Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Legisla-
tion Bureau, and other support organs for the cabinet system continued 
to perform their functions. In addition, the unanimity principle in cabi-
net decision-making lived on, enabling lone-wolf dissenters to continue 
to undermine the prime minister’s leadership role. The resurrection of 
the SNTV system, under which an average of four MPs were elected in 
each lower house district, created conditions for intraparty factionalism 
and “money power politics” (kinken seiji) that would shape the evolution 
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of the cabinet system. Finally, the tradition of cabinet subordination lived 
on, especially when it came to the career civil servants who continued to 
initiate and draft the vast majority of government proposals. These elite 
bureaucrats—many of whom would choose to descend into second careers 
in elective politics—continued to be monitored by no more than three sets 
of political eyes per ministry.
The evolution of the post-1947 parliamentary cabinet system can be 
subdivided into five stages. In the initial postwar stage, the blunt trauma 
of total defeat and unconditional surrender paved the way for sweeping 
reforms under General MacArthur and the American military dictator-
ship. Yet continuities from the prewar order shaped the evolution of Japan’s 
parliamentary cabinet system. The leadership vacuum created by the purge 
of militarists and right-wingers enhanced the relative influence of the civil 
bureaucrats, who represented the best pool of experienced administrative 
talent. Prime Minister Yoshida actively recruited elite ex-bureaucrats and 
fast-tracked them into ministerial posts. Meanwhile, as MacArthur ruled 
from his headquarters in the Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Building, a 
succession of figurehead cabinets under leaders who functioned as go-
betweens with the American occupiers reigned. Although these compra-
dor cabinets were sometimes able to get their way by playing factions at 
GHQ against one another, at the end of the day they danced to an Ameri-
can tune. This was displayed in the “essentially American” origins of the 
1947 Constitution, for which the Japanese side dutifully claimed author-
ship. It was also seen in the government’s willingness to adhere to the 
balanced budget policy dictated by the Dodge Line and the tax reforms 
pressed by the Shoup mission.
In November of 1955, the leaders of the major conservative parties put 
aside their differences to establish the Liberal Democratic Party. These lead-
ers found common cause in the specter of a unified Socialist Party and in 
the perception that many occupation-inspired reforms had gone too far and 
needed to be rolled back. Many key leaders in the corporatist cabinets that 
emerged under the “1955 system,” including three of the five prime minis-
ters, were ex-government officials who took politics as a second career and 
who approached their ministerial responsibilities with a bureaucratic men-
tality and style. Yet, thanks to a national consensus supporting the high-
speed growth policies they sponsored (which were, incidentally, initiated 
by bureaucrats), the corporatist cabinets were able to play a symbolic role 
in imparting strategic direction to government policy. This enabled them 
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to claim credit for a constantly expanding economic pie while for the most 
part maintaining balanced budgets. Nevertheless, because of its ongoing 
mastery of the parliamentary realm, the LDP was in a position to demand 
that it be allowed to preapprove all policy and budgetary proposals before 
they were taken up by the cabinet or Diet.
The exogenous “shocks” of the early 1970s were a tipping point in the 
cabinet system’s evolution. In particular, OPEC’s threatened embargo of 
petroleum exports in October 1973 brought dramatically higher energy 
costs that dictated an end to the high-speed growth era. But modest eco-
nomic growth was not accompanied by reduced demand for government 
spending. On the contrary, the “policy specialists” who now played a pro-
tagonist’s role in policy-making subverted the balanced budget policy 
through increased spending on pork barrel projects and social welfare 
programs. These veteran MPs vigorously defended the interests of their 
subgovernments in what devolved into a fragmented policy-making envi-
ronment. Consequently, the confederate cabinets at the executive helm 
were challenged to provide tactical direction to government policy, even 
though the career politicians who dominated their ministerial rosters 
exuded a more “Westminsterian” persona than their ex-bureaucrat prede-
cessors. In its role as permanent ruling party, the LDP was able to ensure 
that its lawmakers virtually monopolized appointments to cabinet posts; as 
a consequence, the background characteristics of cabinet ministers became 
identical to those of senior LDP MPs.
Finally, the LDP’s fall from grace in August 1993 raised the curtain on 
an era of coalition governments and Twisted Diets. The principal agents 
of change in the ensuing drama were renegade former LDP lawmakers 
who now led new political parties and a self-proclaimed “maverick” who 
managed to become LDP president and prime minister during the party’s 
temporary resurgence. They succeeded in reforming the lower house elec-
toral system, restructuring government administrative organs, creating a 
Cabinet Office, and privatizing postal services. In August 2009, the Dem-
ocratic Party of Japan came to power promising to bolster the powers of 
the cabinet and to bring bureaucrats under the control of politicians. As 
one of its first acts, the DPJ abolished the twice-weekly gatherings of the 
top career bureaucrats from each ministry on the day before regular cab-
inet meetings. On the surface, Japan’s parliamentary cabinet system was 
now more Westminsterian than ever; in reality, cabinet government still 
failed to materialize. In fact, a combination of factors—among them coali-
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tion governments, Twisted Diets, inexperienced ministerial leadership, 
and an enervated government bureaucracy—produced disjoined cabinets. 
These cabinets occupied the executive helm as the nation drifted aimlessly 
through two decades of economic malaise and failed to provide effective 
leadership in response to the cascading disasters of March 2011.
Implications
Important theoretical and policy implications emerge from the analysis 
presented in the pages of this book. As Marx observed in The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, “Men make their own history, but they do 
not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circum-
stances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted 
from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a night-
mare on the brains of the living.” Indeed, the tradition of earlier Japanese 
cabinets and the institutional changes that shaped them weigh down on 
today’s prime ministers and their cabinets. Although institutionalization is 
a universal process, the manner in which a particular organization institu-
tionalizes—or fails to do so—is shaped by the institutional matrix in which 
it operates. The specific institutions from which that matrix is fabricated 
are given under “circumstances already existing.” This draws attention to 
the role of path dependency, the determination of solutions as a conse-
quence of small events that, once those solutions prevail, lead down a par-
ticular path from whence it is difficult to exit (North 1990, 94). Thus, to 
understand the capabilities and limitations of today’s Japanese parliamen-
tary cabinet system, it is essential to trace the long-lasting process through 
which it evolved, which leads back to institutional solutions rendered by 
renegade reformers in the 1990s, American occupation planners, techno-
crats in the superagencies of the late 1930s, and, ultimately, the cabal that 
ruled in the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration. In other words, it is essen-
tial “to distinguish between long-lasting movements and short bursts, the 
latter detected from the moment they originate, the former over the course 
of a distant time” (Braudel 1982, 34).
The domestic implications are plain to see. Indeed, six and a half 
decades after establishing a parliamentary system in form, Japan has yet to 
establish parliamentary government in practice. At the very least, it is clear 
that the system of cabinet government associated with the Westminster 
model has not been firmly planted. While cabinet government is an elusive 
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ideal and not necessarily the only possible solution to Japan’s problems, 
the perpetual lack of direction from the country’s political executive is tak-
ing a toll on the citizenry’s confidence. In fact, the ineffective executive 
leadership displayed throughout the “lost decades” and the policy gridlock 
produced by Twisted Diets led to increased popular disillusionment and 
cynicism. Prime Minister Kan’s much-criticized performance in respond-
ing to the disasters of March 2011 deepened these doubts, although blame 
should have been ascribed to a malfunctioning cabinet system. In fact, the 
cabinet system did not provide the essential infrastructural support and 
corporate solidarity required to impart coherent direction to government 
policy. The Japanese people deserve better than this, and if the country is 
going to prosper and avoid the possibility of constitutional crisis they must 
demand and expect systemic reform of the executive branch.
The most meaningful lesson taught by the evolution of Japan’s parlia-
mentary system is that growing democracy is not easy. Establishing the 
requisite institutional framework is difficult enough, but it is orders of 
magnitude more difficult to create a system of democracy that functions 
properly in practice. Would-be reformers must consider the broader insti-
tutional and historical context in which they seek to implant democratic 
institutions. For example, American planners never understood the power 
of Japan’s career civil service; consequently, the bureaucracy emerged from 
the occupation stronger than ever. For this reason, the first cohort of post-
war prime ministers and their cabinets not only labored under the institu-
tional inertia built up as a result of decades of authoritarian rule, they had 
to learn how to perform their expected role in the shadow of not one, but 
two, mandarinates: the domestic government bureaucracy and the Ameri-
can military dictatorship. As the DPJ-led cabinets learned the hard way, it is 
exceedingly difficult to break bonds that congealed over the course of nearly 
fifty-five years of single-party rule. Indeed, set patterns do not break down 
easily and, however illogical, are a “long time in dying” (Braudel 1982, 32).
By tracing the evolution of Japan’s parliamentary cabinet system, it is 
clear that a properly functioning system of democratic governance is not 
likely to appear swiftly or spontaneously, nor can it be imposed by the sword 
or simply snapped together on the ground using parts from an imported 
model.3 If democracy is to take root in a political setting—be it in Japan or 
elsewhere—it has to grow from within, shaped by carefully crafted institu-
tions and institutionalizing by degrees until the essential processes and values 
become well established and broadly embraced by an empowered citizenry.
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Appendix A
Japanese Cabinets and 
Cabinet Ministers Database
The Japanese Cabinets and Cabinet Ministers (JCCM) Database contains a 
wide range of data pertaining to the 141 cabinets formations, 1,350 individ-
uals appointed to ministerial posts, and 3,612 portfolios allocated between 
July 1871 and May 2013. In delineating cabinet formations and dissolu-
tions, I followed the system employed by the Government of Japan, which 
provides a complete listing of cabinets, portfolios allocated, and the names 
and the dates of appointment and dismissal of all ministers from Decem-
ber 22, 1885, to the present (http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/rekidai/index 
.html). My JCCM Database deviates from that system in that it begins with 
the de facto cabinets that emerged within the Grand Council (Dajōkan) 
beginning in July 1871.
By tracing ministers’ changing parliamentary and social frame attri-
butes, the JCCM Database illuminates the “cohesiveness” aspect of cabi-
net institutionalization (explained in chapter 1). The “parliamentary” data 
distinguish MPs from non-MPs, and in the case of the former specify 
the Diet chamber in which the minister held a seat, number of elective 
terms, length of parliamentary service (since first election to the Diet), age 
(at time of appointment, first election to the Diet, and initial ministerial 
posting), partisan and factional affiliation, factors related to the electoral 
district (for example, urban or rural character, etc.), and prior ministe-
rial service. The “social frame” attributes include ministers’ gender, family 
background (in other words, whether or not she or he is a “hereditary poli-
tician”), geographic origin (by region and prefecture), educational attain-
ment (for example, university attended, type of university, whether or not it 
was among the eight elite institutions, etc.), and occupational background 
(subdivided into upper-level or junior grade ex-government bureaucrat, 
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local politician, legislative staffer, attorney, journalist, labor union leader, 
local government official, and entertainer/celebrity).
The JCCM Database was forged of data mined from various sources. 
I dug especially deeply into Seikan yōran (various years), Miyagawa, ed. 
(1990), Shiratori (1979), and “Naikaku seido to rekidai naikaku” (http://
www.kantei.go.jp/jp/rekidai/index.html; last accessed May 26, 2013). In 
addition, I found valuable data in Kensei shiryō hensankai (1978), Nai-
kaku seido hyakunenshi henshū iinkai (1980), Jinjikōshinroku (various 
years), Kodama et al. (1983), Satō and Matsuzaki (1986), Naka (1980), 
Nihonkoku kokkai zengiin meikan hensan iinkai (1986), Naikaku seido 
hyakujūchōnen kinenshi henshū iinkai (1995), Naikaku seido hyakunen-
shi henshū iinkai (1980), Naikaku shisei chōsakai (1980), and the National 
Diet Library’s “Portraits of Modern Japanese Historical Figures” website 
(http://www.ndl.go.jp/portrait/e/contents/#nameNavi; last accessed May 
26, 2013). In addition, Steven R. Reed’s “Japan MMD Data Set” (http://
www.fps.chuo-u.ac.jp/~sreed/DataPage.html; last accessed May 26, 2013) 
provides data for candidates in every Diet election held from 1947 to 1993. 
Constructing the JCCM Database was made immeasurably easier thanks 
to the efforts of these researchers, who sifted through mountains of raw 
data to extract valuable ore.
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Appendix C
Ministerial Hierarchy
Table A.3. Ministerial Hierarchy
Ministerial Portfolio
Ministers’ Parliamentary and Social Frame Attributes Scorea
1955-1972 1972-1993 1993-2001 2001-2006 2006-2013
Finance 5.4545 7.6552 8.3542 8.75 10
Prime Minister 5.4091 8.0150 8.4176 9.8571 7.7857
Foreign Affairs 6.0823 7.7368 7.8462 6.8 7.2667
Justice 5.3465 6.0552 5.2923 4.5 6.7692
Agriculture, Forestry, & 
Fisheries 5.7950 6.4214 5.9026 7.0571 6.5625
Economy, Trade, & 
Industry 5.8182 7.5385 7.3923 7.0536 6.5310
Chief Cabinet Secretary 5.6491 6.9872 5.9881 6.5556 6.1099
Internal Affairs & 
Communications – – – 6.125 6.0643
Environment – 4.9286 3.5513 5.1270 6.0615
Land, Infrastructure, & 
Transport – – – 6.125 5.9810
National Public Safety 5.5833 5.9933 5.7568 5.2381 5.9018
Defense 5.7308 6.3036 6.4359 6.1429 5.7884
Education 5.5505 6.0038 4.8951 4.6310 5.1758
Health, Welfare, & 
Labor – – – 7.25 4.7857
Administrative 
Management 6.1255 6.4615 – – –
Regional Development 5.9091 5.6667 – – –
Prime Minister’s Office 5.6316 5.0000 – – –
Special Missions – – – – –
Construction 5.8217 6.0292 6.7778 – –
Management & 
Coordination – 5.9679 6.4256 – –
Health & Welfare 4.9583 5.8796 6.2867 – –
Financial Revitalization – – 6.1250 – –
Science & Technology 4.7554 5.2475 5.9077 – –
Transport 5.3460 6.2600 5.8042 – –
Labor 6.1739 5.2873 5.6667 – –
Home Affairs 5.2092 5.9548 5.6224 – –
Table A.3. Ministerial Hierarchy
Ministerial Portfolio
Ministers’ Parliamentary and Social Frame Attributes Scorea
1955-1972 1972-1993 1993-2001 2001-2006 2006-2013
Posts & 
Telecommunications 4.3750 5.6806 5.5192 – –
Okinawa Development – 5.4056 5.5167 – –
Hokkaidō Development 5.1667 5.7436 5.1571 – –
Economic Planning 5.9249 6.4087 4.3965 – –
a The Parliamentary and Social Frame Attributes (PSFA) Score is the sum of ten 
dummy variables (1 or 0) for ministers who held each respective portfolio: (1) MP; 
(2) <40 years old at first election; (3) >5 terms; (4) >7 terms; (5) >20 years of MP 
service; (6) prior ministerial service; (7) male (alas, few women become ministers); 
(8) attended university; (9) pursued pre-MP “preparatory” occupation (attorney, 
journalist, local government official, union leader, MP’s staffer, or local politician); 
and (10) close relative of an elected MP. In this table, the PSFA scores for ministers 
were summed and averaged for the time periods indicated. The assumption here is 
that the most prestigious portfolios will go to high-status MPs. 
Source: JCCM Database.
(continued)
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Notes
Introduction
1. As a result of the 1995 Kōbe earthquake, the posts of Minister of State for 
Disaster Management and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management 
were created to coordinate disaster response policies.
2. The “lost decades” refers to the prolonged economic stagnation and absence 
of effective political leadership that followed the bursting of the “bubble economy” 
in the early 1990s. It left Japanese financial institutions buried under a mountain 
of nonperforming loans and produced a succession of governments that proved 
unable to enact fruitful policy solutions.
3. The symbolic powers of Japan’s head of state are constitutionally defined, 
while in Britain those powers developed through historical convention. Australia’s 
constitution grants extensive powers to its head of state, although those powers are 
not actually used. Aurelia George Mulgan kindly pointed this out to me.
4. Members of the press corps were allowed to observe cabinet meetings in 
December 1985, September 1993, and April 2002 (Naikaku seido hyakunen shi 
henshū iinkai 1980, 22 and 24).
5. Tent villages became a fixture on the scene around the time of the forma-
tion of the Okada cabinet in July 1934 (Naikaku seido hyakujūchōnen 1995, 130).
6. For purposes of this study, the Imperial Household Office, Fair Trade Com-
mission, Financial Services Agency, and the National Personnel Authority are not 
considered part of the cabinet system.
7. Of the forty-nine non-confidence motions submitted between May 1947 
and May 2013, only four were approved—December 23, 1948 (second Yoshida 
cabinet), March 14, 1953 (fourth Yoshida cabinet), May 16, 1980 (second Ōhira 
cabinet), and June 18, 1993 (Miyazawa cabinet).
8. Australia, Austria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Korea, New Zealand, Poland, 
Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom also permit ministers to retain their par-
liamentary seats.
9. By traditional convention, British ministers are expected to be MPs (Rose 
1971, 401, 411). Many of the isolated instances in which non-MPs have been 
awarded portfolios occurred during wartime, and came with the expectation that 
these individuals would win a seat in the House of Commons in a subsequent 
by-election. Peacetime examples are rare. In October 1964, Prime Minister Har-
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old Wilson gave the foreign secretary portfolio to Patrick Gordon Walker and 
the technology portfolio to Frank Cousins even though neither held seats in the 
Commons. Walker and Cousins agreed to accept peerages, and were expected to 
win seats as “carpetbaggers” in by-elections held several months later. Cousins 
emerged victorious, but Walker was defeated and had to surrender his portfolio 
(Brazier 1997, 64–65). More recently, in October 2008, Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown gave the business secretary portfolio to Peter Mandelson, a veteran of Tony 
Blair’s cabinet who did not currently hold a seat in Commons, but Mandelson was 
immediately elevated to the House of Lords (Telegraph, October 3, 2008). I am 
grateful to Arthur Stockwin for pressing me to clarify this point.
10. Britain’s “government” consists of about one hundred members who are 
nominated by the prime minister and appointed by the monarch; the “cabinet” 
itself consists of only about fourteen of these individuals (Curtis 1997a, 68). In 
contrast, Japan’s government in late December 2012 consisted of seventy-four 
individuals—nineteen cabinet ministers, three deputy chief cabinet secretaries, 
twenty-five state secretaries, and twenty-seven parliamentary secretaries.
11. A study of Canadian provincial governments found that larger cabinets 
complicate decision-making and erode teamwork (White 1994, 262).
12. The types of cabinet decisions are explained at “Naikaku seido to rekidai 
naikaku,” www.kantei.go.jp/jp/rekidai/1-2-5.html; accessed May 23, 2013.
13. Since May 7, 2002, cabinet meetings have been held in a room on the fourth 
floor of the Prime Minister’s Official Residence (Kantei), except during parlia-
mentary sessions, when they are held in a special chamber in the National Diet 
Building. Prior to this, the cabinet met in a room on the second floor of the old 
Kantei, a Frank Lloyd Wright-inspired structure that opened in March 1929. In 
the closing days of the Pacific War, cabinet meetings were held behind two-meter-
thick reinforced walls in the National Defense Telephone Bureau (Naikaku seido 
hyakujūchōnen 1995, 99).
14. The term “government” denotes the continuous period from the appoint-
ment of a prime minister until his or her dismissal.
15. As Heasman observed, “the relative importance of any office . . . [depends] 
in large measure on the influence and character of the incumbent as well as on 
conditions of the time” (1962a, 309).
16. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) associate symbionts with institutional drift.
1. The Anti-Westminsterian Roots of Japan’s Parliamentary 
Cabinet System, 1868–1946
1. Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) emperor Hongwu initially modeled his gov-
ernment on the centralized T’ang model, but by 1380 he was relying on a small 
group of loyal mid-level officials for advice and assistance. Eventually this inner 
court came to be known as the “Nèigé,” or cabinet.
2. Shidehara Kijūrō, Yoshida Shigeru (the former diplomat, not the prewar 
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“reform” bureaucrat of the same name), Ashida Hitoshi, Hatoyama Ichirō, and 
Kishi Nobusuke were prewar ministers who went on to become postwar prime 
ministers. The other members of this human bridge are Saitō Takao, Kanamori 
Tokujirō, Obara Naoshi, Uchida Nobuya, Funada Naka, Kaya Okinori, Yoshino 
Shinji, Karasawa Toshiki, Ino Hiroya, Ōasa Tadao, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Miura 
Kunio, Ogata Taketora, Ōdachi Shigeo, Tsushima Juichi, Sakomizu Hisatsune, 
Matsumura Kenzō, Yamazaki Iwao, Murakami Giichi, Ogasawara Sankurō, and 
Narahashi Wataru.
3. Seven of these men—whose average life span was just forty-five years—met 
violent ends through assassination (Ōkubo Toshimichi, Ōmura Masajirō, Hiro-
sawa Saneomi, and Yokoi Shonan), execution (Etō Shinpei and Maehara Issei), or 
suicide (Saigō Takamori). Only three died of natural causes (Kido Kōin, Komatsu 
Tatewaki, and Iwakura Tomomi).
4. The “Three Departments and Six Ministries System” was a centralized 
model of government administration established during the Sui Dynasty (561–
618). Under that system, the senior official (zaixiang) in each department per-
formed the functions of a prime minister, while a senior secretary supervised each 
of the six ministries (Civil Affairs, Revenue, Rites, War, Justice, and Public Works). 
Together with the emperor and a few dignitaries, the zaixiang and the senior sec-
retaries composed the Grand Council of State (Gernet 1996, 242; Asakawa 1903, 
223–225). This system was modified during the T’ang Dynasty (618–907).
5. The Taika Reform (646) established a system of government that allowed 
the Imperial Court to exercise centralized control of the entire country. The Taihō 
Code (702) introduced suitably adapted Chinese political institutions to the Japa-
nese context (Varley 1974a, 34). Nara was selected as the site for a capital pat-
terned after the T’ang capital at Chang’an (present-day Sian), and the imperial 
court moved there in 710.
6. The Imperial Household Ministry (Kunaishō) had no equivalent in the 
original T’ang model.
7. A central state executive based upon “three posts and seven departments” 
(sanshoku, nanaka) was established on January 11, 1868. The three posts—min-
ister president (sōsai), legislators (gitei), and councilors (san’yo)—were occupied 
by imperial princes and court nobles, who had the right of direct access to the 
emperor on matters of state. Beneath them were seven functional “departments” 
(ka, later recast as administrative bureaus) for religious rites, finance, justice, 
administration, and domestic, foreign, military affairs, and, later on, a minister 
president’s bureau (sōsai kyoku).
8. The only non-hanbatsu councilor was Katsu Kaishū, a former Tokugawa 
naval officer.
9. In this and subsequent reorganizations of government organs, the Impe-
rial Household Ministry existed apart from other governmental ministries and 
agencies.
10. The number of cabinet-related officials—including those attached to the 
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Board of Audit—varied from 434 (1895) to 1,006 (1886) (Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications 2012a).
11. The cabinet’s powers and functions were clarified in “Cabinet Decisions” 
(Naikaku giketsusho) and “Cabinet Rules” (Naikaku kisoku), documents inspired 
by Itō Hirobumi and drafted by Itō Miyoji.
12. Note: the analysis presented throughout this book does not take account of 
caretaker premierships (for example, Sanjō Sanetomi, who served as acting prime 
minister from October 25, 1889, to December 24, 1889). In addition to Sanjō, 
the other caretaker and acting premiers were Kuroda Kiyotaka, Saionji Kinmochi, 
Uchida Yasuya (twice), Wakatsuki Reijirō, Shidehara Kijūrō, Takahashi Korekiyo, 
Gotō Fumio, Kishi Nobusuke, and Itō Masayoshi.
13. Iwakura was assisted by Ōkubo Toshimichi, Kido Kōin, Yamaguchi Nao-
yoshi, and Itō Hirobumi. Kido and Ōkubo were senior leaders of the respective 
Chōshū and Satsuma cliques. The mission was composed of 108 people, including 
forty-three students being sent abroad to study (“Iwakura shisetsudan” 2004/2005).
14. Ravina argues that Saigō did not necessarily want his assassination to pro-
voke war with Korea, but, rather, to “determine the Koreans’ true intentions and 
to ascertain whether they intended to impugn the Japanese imperial house” (2004, 
185).
15. Although Ōki also hailed from Hizen, his opposition to constitutional gov-
ernment was in line with the views of the Sat-Chō councilors.
16. The key posts in the Grand Council were prime minister (dajōdaijin), 
minister of the left (sadaijin), minister of the right (udaijin), cabinet adviser (nai-
kaku kōmon), imperial councilor (sangi), director general of colonization (kaitaku 
chōkan), and the home (naimukyō), foreign affairs (gaimukyō), finance (ōkurakyō), 
army (rikugunkyō), navy (kaigunkyō), justice (shihōkyō), education (kyōbukyō and 
monbukyō), industry (kōbukyō), and agriculture and commerce (nōshōmukyō) 
ministerships.
17. Suematsu Kenchō (a former journalist) and Shimazu Hisamitsu (the last 
daimyō of Satsuma domain) were the only ministers who did not emerge from the 
government bureaucracy or the armed forces.
18. They were Iwakura Tomomi, Itō Hirobumi, Kaneko Kentarō, Ōkubo Toshi-
michi, Kido Kōin, Tanaka Fujimarō, Yamada Akiyoshi, Sasaki Takayuki, Tanaka 
Mitsuaki, and Nomura Yasushi.
19. Until 1893, graduates of Tokyo Imperial University were exempted from 
taking the Higher Civil Service Examination (Tanaka 1976, 43).
20. Between 1891 and 1898, the bureaucracy issued 2,264 imperial ordinances 
and treaties, while the Diet passed only 266 laws (calculated from data in Naikaku 
seido 1995, 170).
21. Once again, Ōki Takatō was the lone outsider.
22. The council was empowered to approve Imperial ordinances during the 
nine months out of the year when the Diet was not in session (Japan Times Year-
book 1933, 30). In contrast to cabinet ministers, who advised the emperor and 
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headed a ministry, Privy Councilors had “no other function than to debate in an 
irresponsible consultative body” (Colegrove 1931a, 596).
23. This requirement was modified on several occasions. It was revised in 1900 
to allow only active-duty officers to hold the military portfolios, but modified 
three years later to allow reserve-duty officers to supervise the military branches. 
The active-duty requirement was reinstated in 1936.
24. In fact, only Katsu Kaishū and Enomoto Takeaki were not hanbatsu figures.
25. South Sakhalin was under the administrative purview of the Karafuto 
Office (Karafuto chō).
26. The characters in Yamamoto’s given name are sometimes given as 
“Gonnohyōe.”
27. The regional- and prefectural-level population data are taken as an average 
of the eighteen censuses conducted between 1898 and 1932.
28. Some ministers, such as Home Minister Hara Kei, were able to promote 
cooperative bureaucrats and demote the uncompliant (Sims 2001, 95; Ramseyer 
and Rosenbluth 1995, 10, 62, 73).
29. The undersecretaries’ titles were later changed to administrative vice min-
ister (seimujikan) and parliamentary councilor (san’yokan) (Colegrove 1936a, 
906).
30. The Taishō emperor, who reigned from 1912 to 1926, suffered from the 
effects of meningitis contracted during childhood. In 1921 his health deteriorated, 
and Crown Prince Hirohito (the future Shōwa emperor) was appointed regent.
31. The consequences of SNTV in multi-member districts—devised by 
Yamagata to weaken the people’s parties—would become apparent after the sys-
tem was revived in 1947 (Woodall 1999, 26).
32. In firing the shots that killed Inukai, the young naval officers effectively 
“killed the ‘party cabinet system’ ” (Tanaka 1976, 640).
33. On average, 327 days elapsed between the dissolution or establishment of 
cabinets and the next lower house election.
34. Mimura uses the term “techno-fascism” to denote a “radical, authoritarian 
form of technocracy” whose advocates “sought to realize a productive, hierarchi-
cal, organic, national community based on the cultural and geographical notions 
of Japanese ethnic superiority and the managerial principles of ‘fusing private and 
public’ and ‘separating capital and management’ ” (2011, 3–4). While I agree with 
Mimura about the origins and orientations of the technocrats, I believe that the 
mystical, backward-looking ideologies of conservative rightists, such as Hiranuma 
and Konoe, emerged from a separate conduit. In my opinion, it is essential to 
understand that the rational strategies of the technocrats were justified by mys-
tical, emperor-centric “national essence” ideologies. That said, it is important to 
note that use of the term “fascist” as a label for Japan’s prewar political order is 
hotly contested (e.g., Tansman 2009, 3; Lederer 1934; Maruyama 1969; Moore 
1966; Forman 1974; Duus and Okimoto 1979; and Kasza 1984).
35. The term “Versailles-Washington System” denotes an amalgamation of ele-
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ments from the Versailles Treaty, Washington Conference on Naval Limitations, 
and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Hata 1989, 282; Schlichtmann 2009, 7).
36. The Resources Bureau’s organizational predecessor was the Equipment 
Bureau, established in 1925 (Mimura 2011, 20).
37. Even veteran cabinet ministers with ties to political parties—for exam-
ple, Yamazaki Tatsunosuke, Maeda Yonezō, Ogawa Gotarō, Shimada Toshio, and 
Machida Chūji—accepted portfolios as IRAPA affiliates.
38. The February 26 Incident was inspired by the Aizawa Incident, which was 
precipitated by the dismissal of Imperial Way leader Mazaki Jinzaborō from the 
post of Inspector General of Military Education. This action was seen as a cal-
culated move by the rival Control faction to dominate the army’s supreme high 
command. On August 12, 1935, Imperial Way officer Lieutenant Colonel Aizawa 
Saburō avenged the trespass by assassinating General Nagata Tetsuzan, the sup-
posed “evil genius” behind Mazaki’s removal (Crowley 1962, 322, 325).
2. Comprador Cabinets and Democracy by the Sword, 
1946–1955
1. The compradors, also known as “cohong” or “hong” merchants, were “autho-
rized merchants” who acted as authorized brokers for foreign trade (Mazumdar 
1998, 302).
2. After consenting to serve as foreign minister in the Higashikuni cabinet, 
Yoshida Shigeru consulted former prime minister Suzuki Kantarō, who told him 
to be a “good loser.” “It was good advice,” Yoshida recalled, “and I decided then and 
there to follow it throughout my dealings with GHQ” (Nara, ed. 2007, 49).
3. Many of the same U.S. officials worked together at the Inter-Divisional 
Area Committee on the Far East (est. October 1943), the Post War Program Com-
mittee (est. July 1944), the SWNCC and its Subcommittee on the Far East, and, 
finally, the Far Eastern Commission (est. 1945) (Borton 1966, 205).
4. Draft constitutions were proposed by private groups and individuals, 
among them former prime minister Konoe Fumimaro. Konoe committed suicide 
the day before he was to be taken into custody as an accused war criminal.
5. For example, GHQ’s translation of Article 2 of the Matsumoto draft reads, 
“The Emperor is the monarch and exercises the rights of sovereignty according to 
the present constitution” (NDL “Birth” 3-7).
6. The Constitution Investigation Association’s (Kenpō kenkyūkai) “Outline 
of Constitution Draft” (Kenpō sōan yōkō)—submitted to the Shidehara cabinet on 
December 26, 1945, and translated in full by GHQ—made the cabinet collectively 
responsible to the Diet and tasked the speakers of the Diet’s two chambers with 
recommending the prime minister (NDL “Birth” 2-16).
7. Because Esman’s refusal to concur with the Constitution Steering Com-
mittee’s perspective threatened to delay completion of the GHQ draft, Kades sent 
him to Nikkō to get some “rest and rehabilitation.” For this reason, Esman’s sig-
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nature does not appear on the letter that accompanied the GHQ draft (McNelly 
2000, 72).
8. The remaining cut-and-paste articles are: Article 3 of the final draft (com-
pare with Article 3 of the GHQ draft), Article 63 (Article 56), Article 70 (Article 
63), Article 72 (Article 64), Article 74 (Article 66), Article 75 (Article 67), Article 
79 (Article 71), Article 80 (Article 72), Article 86 (Article 79), Article 87 (Article 
81), Article 90 (Article 84), and Article 91 (Article 85).
9. Article 57 of the GHQ draft became two separate articles in the Constitu-
tion, but the upshot remains the same. That is, the cabinet must resign en masse 
or dissolve the Diet within ten days of passage of a non-confidence resolution or 
rejection of a confidence resolution (Article 69) and a general election must be 
held within forty days in the event of Diet dissolution (Article 54).
10. For the record, the Philippines did not become an independent state until 
July 4, 1946. Because the FEC was home-based in Washington, D.C., it was deemed 
prudent to set up an “outpost in Tokyo”—the Allied Council for Japan—to moni-
tor occupation policy.
11. Yoshida claimed that Whitney and Kades conveyed to him that GHQ had 
no objection to this interpretation as long as the principle of civilian control was 
firmly established (Lu 1997, 471).
12. The Soviet, British, Canadian, Australian, Dutch, and New Zealand repre-
sentatives also insisted that the “civilian” clause be included in an amended Con-
stitution (NDL “Birth” 4-11).
13. Hatoyama recalled that Yoshida had a fourth condition, which was that 
Hatoyama would retain control over party personnel decisions (Itoh 2003, 105). 
In 1952, a group of Japanese nationals—at least some of whom may have worked 
for G2’s intelligence-gathering operation—plotted to assassinate Yoshida to pave 
the way for his replacement by the more hawkish Hatoyama. The plot collapsed 
because of intelligence leaks, insufficient personnel, and internal rivalries (“CIA 
Papers Reveal Japan Coup Plot,” Associated Press, March 1, 2007).
14. MacArthur also noted the significance of the emergence of Christian heads 
of government in China (Ch’iang Kai-shek) and the Philippines (Manuel Roxas).
15. In December 1948, Izumiyama created a hubbub by hugging and planting 
an unwanted kiss on the cheek of Yamashita Harue, a female MP. When Yamashita 
resisted his advance, the finance minister allegedly bit her on the cheek (Togawa 
1983, 280). Although Izumiyama was forced to surrender his portfolio and resign 
from the Diet, he earned the moniker “Tiger Minister” (Tora daijin) and easily 
won election to the upper house in 1953.
16. Home Ministry officials accounted for thirteen hundred of the eighteen hun-
dred civil bureaucrats who were purged (Johnson 1982, 41–2; Calder 1988, 151).
17. As evidence of the “reverse course,” in July 1950, shortly after the outbreak 
of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, MacArthur sent a letter to Prime Minister 
Yoshida authorizing him to establish a seventy-five thousand-man national police 
reserve.
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18. This meant that the justice minister was seated on the premier’s immedi-
ate right, while the foreign minister was seated to the immediate left of the chief 
cabinet secretary, with the remaining ministers seated sequentially in the follow-
ing order: finance, education, health and welfare, agriculture, international trade 
and industry, transport, posts and telecommunications, labor, construction, and 
home affairs.
19. When asked how many students passed through his “School,” Yoshida jok-
ingly replied, “I don’t know how many, since I do not receive tuition” (Masumi 
1985, 279).
20. Japanese servility is also evident in the Yoshida government’s agreement to 
diplomatically recognize the Republic of China, rather than the Peoples’ Republic 
of China, in acceding to the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
21. For example, Nishio Suehiro, vice prime minister in the Ashida cabinet, 
was forced to resign amid allegations that he accepted bribes from a construc-
tion company. The Coal Nationalization scandal (which resulted in the conviction, 
subsequently reversed, of Tanaka Kakuei), the MCI Textile scandal, and the Tōyō 
Milling scandal were among the other high-profile corruption incidents of the 
early postwar period (Satō et al. 1990, 119; Mitchell 1996, 92–108).
3. Corporatist Cabinets and the Emergence of 
the “1955 System,” 1955–1972
1. In addition, a schism emerged between the “mainstream” (shuryū) factions 
that supported the party president and the “non-mainstream” (hi-shuryū) factions.
2. While Jackie Robinson’s story is well-known, few are aware that Japanese 
American Wataru (Wat) Misaka broke the National Basketball Association’s color 
barrier when he suited up for the New York Knicks in 1947.
3. For purposes of this study, the “urban” prefectures include Tokyo, Saitama, 
Chiba, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, Hyōgo, and Kyoto.
4. The “Regional Development” portfolio is taken as an average of the amalgam-
ated characteristics of the directors-general portfolios for the Capital Region (created 
in 1957), Kinki Region (1964), and Chūbu Region (1966) development commissions.
5. For instance, Construction Minister Kōno Ichirō’s heavy-handed appoint-
ment of handpicked officials to serve in key ministry posts temporarily disturbed 
the delicate balance among the ministry’s “generalist” (jimukan) and “technical 
specialist” (gikan) bureaucrats (Woodall 1996, 61–63).
4. Confederate Cabinets and the Demise of 
the “1955 System,” 1972–1993
1. In the mid-1980s, for example, Tanaka faction MPs accounted for 69 per-
cent and 56 percent of the respective memberships of the construction and postal 
tribes (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987, 295–304).
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2. As Park explains, it is not surprising that ambitious bureaucrats would exit 
the civil service at midcareer “to enter the ‘all-powerful’ . . . LDP Diet contingent . . . 
rather than try to reach the pinnacle of the bureaucratic hierarchy . . . only to toil 
under . . . often much younger LDP ministers” (1986, 180).
5. Disjoined Cabinets—Act I
1. The Law for Basic Reform of Central Government (Chūō shōchō to kaikaku 
kihon hō) was enacted on June 9, 1998, while the Law to Establish the Cabinet 
Office (Naikakufu setchi hō) received Diet approval the following week.
2. The Japanese government denies that this exchange took place, although 
it was reported in the media (for example, Shūkan bunshun, August 5, 2000). A 
different version of the story has it that Mori was instructed to greet Clinton with 
“How are you?” to which the U.S. president would reply, “Fine, thanks,” and then 
Mori would respond, “Me too.” In fact, however, Clinton replied, “I’ve come with 
Hillary,” and then Mori replied, “Me too.” Arthur Stockwin alerted me to this alter-
native version of Mori’s famous gaffe.
3. Beginning in February 2012, the number of political appointees attached to 
the Cabinet Office increased with the inclusion of three senior vice ministers and 
parliamentary secretaries with concurrent appointments in other agencies (for 
example, the Reconstruction Agency). The number of political appointees does 
not include the Assistants to the Prime Minister (Naikaku sōridaijin hosakan), of 
whom the prime minister may appoint a maximum of five.
4. The National Association of Private Postmasters (Zenkoku tokutei 
yūbinkyokuchō kai) is the principal lobby for nearly three hundred thousand 
postal service employees, while the Liaison Association for the Promotion of the 
Commissioned Postmasters’ Duties (Tokutei Yūbinkyokuchō Gyōmu Suishin Ren-
rakukai) provides a bridge to the government bureaucracy (MacLachlan 2004, 
300–301).
5. Prime Minister Nakasone sacked Education Minister Fujio Masayuki in 
1986 for refusing to apologize for remarks he made justifying Japan’s actions dur-
ing the Pacific War. In 1953, Prime Minister Yoshida fired Agriculture Minister 
Hirozawa Kōzen for participating in a Diet boycott protesting the prime minister’s 
reference to a JSP MP as a “fool” during parliamentary interpellations (discussed 
in chapter 3).
6. Of the thirty-seven postal rebels, three chose to not seek reelection, seven 
joined other parties, while all the rest ran as independents (Maeda 2006, 623).
6. Disjoined Cabinets—Act II
1. The DPJ’s 2009 election manifesto proclaimed that “real responsibility for 
drafting and deciding the policies of the central government and agencies” should 
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be given to the one hundred or so MPs who hold the posts of minister, senior vice 
minister, and parliamentary secretary (Democratic Party of Japan 2009).
2. Although Abe was admitted to a hospital with a stomach issue, many 
believed that he resigned to secure the DPJ’s agreement to extend the anti- 
terrorism law (BBC News On-line, September 12, 2007).
Conclusion
1. “The failure of the first attempt” is the subtitle of Scalapino’s Democracy and 
the Party Movement in Prewar Japan (1953).
2. From June 1947 through December 2012, the average length of tenure for 
CLB directors general was 1,413 days, as opposed to the 760-day life span of the 
average government.
3. Some of these same points are emphasized in “Current Challenges to 
Democracy,” a statement issued in 2008 by the World Movement for Democracy 
(http://www.wmd.org/about/current-challenges/current-challenges-democracy; 
accessed May 28, 2013).
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